Thomas T.d. Polk, individually v. PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY and SECURA S U- PREME INSURANCE COMPANY

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1553
THOMAS T.D. POLK, individually and as Special Administrator
of the Estate of K ATARZYNA K UREK-P OLK, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN I NSURANCE C OMPANY and S ECURA S U-
PREME I NSURANCE C OMPANY ,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
24 C 00935 — Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 4, 2025 — DECIDED A PRIL 2, 2026
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, K IRSCH , and K OLAR , Circuit Judges.
K IRSCH , Circuit Judge. This insurance-coverage dispute
arises from a tragic car accident. While assisting another mo-
torist on the side of the road, Thomas T.D. Polk and his wife,
Katarzyna Kurek-Polk, were struck by an oncoming vehicle.
Thomas was injured and Katarzyna was killed. Thomas and

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2 No. 25-1553
Katarzyna’s estate received $100,000 from the responsible
tortfeasor.
Thomas submitted claims under three underinsured mo-
torist (UIM) policies that he and his wife carried at the time of
the accident: a $1,000,000 policy with AMCO Insurance Com-
pany; a $500,000 policy with Progressive Northern Insurance
Company; and a $500,000 policy with Secura Supreme Insur-
ance Company. All three policies contain a proportionate lia-
bility provision that says the insurer’s liability is the pro rata
share of all UIM coverage. The parties agree that the pro rata
shares are as follows: 50% AMCO; 25% Secura; and 25% Pro-
gressive. Each policy also has an “Other Insurance” anti-
stacking provision which limits liability to the highest limit of
liability under any one policy. Here, that amount is $1,000,000
under the AMCO policy. In addition to the $100,000 from the
tortfeasor, Thomas and Katarzyna’s estate received $800,000
from a settlement with AMCO and were offered $220,000 in
UIM benefits from Secura, which they rejected. Progressive
did not make or offer any payments under its policy.
Subsequently, Thomas—both in his individual capacity
and on behalf of Katarzyna’s estate (collectively, Polk)—sued
Progressive and Secura, alleging breach of contract. Secura,
Progressive, and Polk all moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the in-
surance companies and denied Polk’s cross-motion. The dis-
trict court concluded that the Progressive and Secura policies
provide per accident, as opposed to per person, coverage and
that the anti-stacking language in the policies limited Polk’s
recovery to the highest UIM coverage available under any one
policy—in this case, $1,000,000 under the AMCO policy. It
was undisputed that Polk had already received $100,000 from

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No. 25-1553 3
the at-fault driver and $800,000 from the AMCO settlement.
Because Secura had offered to settle Polk’s claims, the district
court ordered it to pay Polk $100,000 (to bring the total recov-
ery to $1,000,000) and reasoned that Progressive was not obli-
gated to provide any coverage under its policy. Polk ap-
pealed.
We apply de novo review to a district court’s ruling on
cross-motions for summary judgment. Cent. States, Se. and Sw.
Areas Pension Fund v. Univar Sols. USA Inc., 148 F.4th 426, 429
(7th Cir. 2025). Because we need only consider defendants’
motions against Polk, we construe the facts in the light most
favorable to Polk and take all reasonable inferences in Polk’s
favor. Gills v. Hamilton, 164 F.4th 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2026). Sum-
mary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dis-
pute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The interpretation of an insurance policy is a matter of
state law. Rahimzadeh v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 142 F.4th 972, 976 (7th
Cir. 2025). The parties agree that Illinois law governs their dis-
pute. Because “[a]n insurance policy is a contract,” Illinois
courts apply “the rules applicable to contract interpretation
to” insurance policies. Thounsavath v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 104 N.E.3d 1239, 1244 (Ill. 2018). Doing so, Illinois
courts “construe an insurance policy in its entirety and give
effect to each provision where possible.” Kuhn v. Owners Ins.
Co., 241 N.E.3d 397, 407 (Ill. 2024). Illinois courts enforce clear
and unambiguous insurance policies as written, unless en-
forcement violates public policy. Thounsavath, 104 N.E.3d at
1244. Insurance policies are ambiguous when they are “sus-
ceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Kuhn,
241 N.E.3d at 403 (citation modified).

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4 No. 25-1553
On appeal, Polk first argues that he can stack the UIM cov-
erage limits, despite clear anti-stacking provisions in the pol-
icies. Polk suggests (incorrectly) that the maximum available
UIM coverage is $2,000,000 across all three policies. Then—
based on the proportionate liability provisions and the tort-
feasor’s $100,000 payment—Polk concludes that he is entitled
to $475,000 under the Progressive policy and $470,000 under
the Secura policy (presumably offset by a $5,000 medical pay-
ment that Secura made to Katarzyna’s estate). However, the
Secura and Progressive policies contain clear anti-stacking
provisions that limit the insurers’ obligations to the highest
UIM coverage available under any one policy. Indeed, the
Progressive policy provides: “If this policy and any other pol-
icy providing similar insurance apply to the same accident,
the maximum limit of liability under all the policies shall be
the highest limit of liability under any one policy.” Similarly,
the Secura policy provides: “Any recovery for damages under
this policy or any other policy issued by us may equal but not
exceed the highest applicable limits for any one vehicle under
this or any other insurance providing coverage on either a pri-
mary or excess basis.” The highest limit of liability here is
$1,000,000 under the AMCO policy. Combining the anti-
stacking language with the proportionate liability provisions
in both policies, the maximum Polk could receive is $250,000
from Progressive and $250,000 from Secura for the single ac-
cident, notwithstanding the fact that both Thomas and
Katarzyna were involved.
Polk asserts that the anti-stacking language in the Progres-
sive and Secura policies is ambiguous since it fails to distin-
guish between per accident and per insured limits. But the
clauses in the Secura and Progressive policies are unambigu-
ous—they broadly bar stacking—and Illinois courts have

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No. 25-1553 5
found similar provisions to be unambiguous. See, e.g., Menke
v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 401 N.E.2d 539, 541–42 (Ill. 1980);
Bruder v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.E.2d 355, 359 (Ill. 1993);
Willison v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 690 N.E.2d 1073, 1074–77 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1998). The Illinois Insurance Code expressly author-
izing anti-stacking provisions provides:
Nothing herein shall prohibit an insurer from
setting forth policy terms and conditions which
provide that if the insured has coverage availa-
ble under this Section under more than one pol-
icy or provision of coverage, any recovery or
benefits may be equal to, but may not exceed,
the higher of the applicable limits of the respec-
tive coverage, and the limits of liability under
this Section shall not be increased because of the
multiple motor vehicles covered under the same
policy of insurance.
215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/143a-2(5). Polk understands the statute’s
use of a singular “insured” to mean that insurers are permit-
ted to limit a singular insured’s ability to stack per accident
UIM benefits but must allow the stacking of per accident UIM
benefits when more than one insured is injured in a single ac-
cident. We disagree. That the statute referred to a singular “in-
sured” person does not mean that Illinois authorizes stacking
when more than one insured person is involved in an acci-
dent. And Polk has failed to identify any case that interprets
the statute in the manner he proposes.
Second, Polk argues the district court erred in concluding
that Progressive’s and Secura’s obligations could be offset by
AMCO’s $800,000 settlement. But as we’ve already shown,
both policies explicitly authorize set-off by limiting liability to

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6 No. 25-1553
the maximum amount recoverable under any one policy is-
sued by any insurer: here, $1,000,000 under the AMCO policy.
Requiring Progressive and Secura to pay their proportionate
share (each 25% of the $1,000,000 limit, or $250,000) would al-
low Polk to recoup more than the maximum limit of liability.
See Grzeszczak v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 659 N.E.2d 952, 959 (Ill.
1995) (“[T]he purpose of underinsured-motorist coverage is
to fill the gap between the amount of the tortfeasor’s insur-
ance and the amount of underinsured-motorist coverage the
insured opted to buy.”). Polk contends that because Secura’s
anti-stacking provision limits recovery only under policies is-
sued by Secura, it doesn’t require offsetting Secura’s UIM cov-
erage with that provided by other insurance companies. That
the policy only limits recovery under Secura’s policies doesn’t
help Polk, however, because the policy limits recovery to the
highest limits “under this or any other insurance.” That
means Secura is entitled to offset its coverage based on pay-
ments from other insurers.
Polk complains that the policies conflict with the premium
rule of construction, which “prevents insurance companies
from collecting premiums for a given amount of coverage and
then applying limiting clauses to reduce its liability.” Id. at
958. But “the payment of multiple premiums is of no conse-
quence where the intent of the parties to the insurance con-
tract was manifested in the clear and unambiguous language
of an antistacking provision,” id., and as we’ve discussed,
both the Progressive and Secura policies contain clear anti-
stacking language preventing insureds from combining mul-
tiple UIM policies to increase coverage.
One additional matter warrants our attention. As men-
tioned above, the district court ordered Secura to pay the

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No. 25-1553 7
entire $100,000 owed to Polk because it offered to settle for
$220,000, despite Polk rejecting the settlement offer. Secura
now complains about that apportionment. But Secura did not
file a cross-appeal, so this issue has not been properly pre-
sented for our review. See Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro,
Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 969–70 (7th Cir. 2016).
A FFIRMED

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