United States of America v. Haris Matchalovas

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 21, 2026
Decided April 22, 2026
Before
KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1503
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
HARIS MATCHALOVAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:22-CR-00531(1)
Thomas M. Durkin,
Judge.
O R D E R
Haris Matchalovas was found guilty by a jury of bank robbery in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and sentenced to 170 months in prison. Matchalovas appeals, but his
appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1503 Page 2
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).1 We notified Matchalovas of counsel’s
motion to withdraw, and he did not respond. See 7TH C IR . R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief
adequately explains the nature of the case and discusses potential issues that an appeal
of this kind might be expected to involve. United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir.
2014). Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects
that counsel discusses. See id. We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
A federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Matchalovas
with seven counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The charges arose
from seven bank robberies carried out by Matchalovas in Chicago and its northern
suburbs between November 2021 and August 2022.
Well into the pretrial proceedings, Matchalovas filed a motion in limine to
preclude the government from eliciting allegedly prejudicial testimony from his
ex-fiancée over the bank robber’s identity from surveillance footage. The judge denied
the motion, finding that the testimony was admissible as lay witness opinion testimony
under Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Matchalovas then moved to sever the counts in the indictment, see F ED. R. C RIM .
P. 14(a), on grounds that a single trial on all counts might allow a jury to infer—
inappropriately—that he had a propensity to commit robberies, see FED. R. EVID. 403.
But the judge, citing Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, denied the motion
because the similarities between the seven robberies overwhelmed the differences. If the
counts were severed and Matchalovas were on trial for just one robbery, the judge
noted, evidence related to the other counts would be admissible under Rule 404(b) to
prove identity and modus operandi common to all seven robberies.
The case proceeded to trial, at which the government presented evidence tying
Matchalovas to the seven robberies. In each robbery Matchalovas—donning dark
clothes, a surgical face mask, and dark work gloves with white lettering—presented
bank tellers with a black backpack and demanded that they fill it with money. In five of
1 Counsel, a private practitioner, later filed a second motion to withdraw because
she closed her practice after having accepted employment as an assistant federal public
defender. We granted that motion by separate order and appointed as new counsel the
Chief Federal Defender, who in turn assigned this case to the same attorney who
previously represented Matchalovas. Counsel then filed a third motion to withdraw,
standing on her original Anders brief.

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No. 25-1503 Page 3
the robberies, Matchalovas also brandished a knife. Further, according to testimony
from an FBI agent, the three getaway vehicles used in multiple robberies were
registered to Matchalovas’s parents. Another FBI agent testified that he had searched
Matchalovas’s home and found outside his bedroom an unopened pair of work gloves
matching the gloves worn during the robberies. Moreover, cell-site data reflected that
on the day of each robbery, Matchalovas left either his home or his ex-fiancée’s home,
went to the vicinity of the robbery, and returned after each robbery to his or his
ex-fiancée’s home. Matchalovas’s ex-fiancée also testified, identifying from surveillance
footage the three cars used in the robberies as well as various items of clothing and a
backpack; further, she pointedly recognized Matchalovas as the robber in four of the
seven robberies. The jury found Matchalovas guilty.
Matchalovas moved for judgment of acquittal, see F ED. R. C RIM P. 29, or in the
alternative, a new trial, see id. R. 33. He first asked the judge to set aside the guilty
verdict and enter a judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence: He
argued that no bank-teller witnesses identified him, no physical items connected to the
robberies were recovered, and no biological evidence linked him to the crime. He then
asked for a new trial on grounds that (1) the cumulative evidence of multiple bank
robberies was highly prejudicial and encouraged the jury to infer his guilt across all
counts; (2) his ex-fiancée’s identification testimony should have been excluded because
it relied on physical descriptions of him that the jury could see for itself; and (3) the
government withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of his rights under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), specifically, body-camera footage from one robbery.
At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the judge denied the motions. On the
motion for judgment of acquittal, the judge determined that the record contained
“ample” evidence—including the “great similarity” of disguises and clothing worn by
Matchalovas at each of the robberies—from which a jury could find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. On the motion for a new trial, the judge referred to a limiting
instruction he gave the jurors advising them to consider each charge separately. Even if
the counts had been severed, added the judge, the evidence of each robbery (being as
similar as it was) would have been allowed under Rule 404(b). Second, the judge
concluded, the testimony from Matchalovas’s ex-fiancée was proper because of her
intimate relationship with Matchalovas, and the jury was free to weigh her credibility.
Third, as to Matchalovas’s claim about the body-camera footage, there was no evidence
that the government suppressed it, and Matchalovas did not demonstrate that he was in
any way prejudiced.

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No. 25-1503 Page 4
The judge sentenced Matchalovas to 170 months in prison, within the Guidelines
range of 151 to 188 months (based on a total offense level of 30 and criminal history
category of V). Significant for the calculation of Matchalovas’s offense level was a two-
level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(1) for each count because he took property from
a financial institution, as well as a three-level increase under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) on five of
the counts because he brandished a dangerous weapon. As for the sentencing factors
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the judge highlighted the seriousness of the offense;
Matchalovas’s criminal history, lack of employment, and drug addiction; and the need
for specific and general deterrence.
In her Anders brief, counsel first considers whether Matchalovas could argue that
the judge erred by denying his motion to sever his seven counts of bank robbery.
Counsel correctly rejects this argument as frivolous. No prejudice exists when, as here,
the evidence on the potentially severed counts would be admissible at trial on the
remaining counts. See United States v. Coley, 137 F.4th 874, 883 (7th Cir. 2025). As the
judge pointed out, evidence from each robbery would be admissible at trials on the
other robberies to prove identity and modus operandi. F ED. R. EVID. 404(b); United States
v. Edwards, 26 F.4th 449, 454 (7th Cir. 2022). And any potential prejudice was cured
when the judge instructed the jury to consider all counts separately. Coley, 137 F.4th at
884.
Counsel also considers but rightly declines to challenge the denial of
Matchalovas’s motion in limine to prevent his ex-fiancée from testifying. Under Rule of
Evidence 701, an admissible lay opinion must be (1) rationally based on the witness’s
perception; (2) helpful to determining a fact in issue; and (3) not based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. United States v.
Bard, 73 F.4th 464, 478 (7th Cir. 2023). The judge properly allowed the ex-fiancée’s
testimony because her identification was based on her perception of Matchalovas,
helped the jury determine the robber’s identity, and did not rely on expert knowledge.
Counsel next considers and properly rejects an argument that the evidence was
insufficient to convict Matchalovas. Evidence is insufficient when no rational trier of
fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v.
Scott, 150 F.4th 929, 934 (7th Cir. 2025). But here the government presented ample
evidence connecting the robberies to Matchalovas—his clothing, his car, the video
surveillance footage, cell-site data, and witness identifications.

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Counsel also rightly rejects any argument that the district judge abused his
discretion by denying Matchalovas’s motion for a new trial. A new trial should be
granted only if the evidence against the verdict is so strong that it would be a
miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand. United States v. Friedman, 971 F.3d 700, 713
(7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Matchalovas’s arguments would be frivolous for the
reasons already mentioned: the judge did not need to sever the counts; the testimony
from his ex-fiancée was proper; and ample evidence supported Matchalovas’s guilt.
Counsel lastly evaluates whether Matchalovas could plausibly challenge his
sentence but concludes, correctly, that doing so would be frivolous. Matchalovas’s
within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable, and we will uphold a sentence
if the judge adequately explains his reasoning. United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 384
(7th Cir. 2022). Here, the judge explained the sentence with reference to the § 3553(a)
factors, emphasizing the seriousness of the offense (“The consequences of going in and
flashing a knife to a bank teller are not felt in the moment and then forgotten … . They
fear for themselves and their coworkers and they keep reliving it.”); Matchalovas’s
criminal history (“You kept doing [crime] over and over and over. And unfortunately,
the conduct escalated.”); and the need for deterrence (“People need to know if you
commit a bank robbery, you’ll go to jail.”).
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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