United States of America v. David Patrick Sheffield

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 21, 2026
Decided April 22, 2026
Before
KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1814
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DAVID PATRICK SHEFFIELD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division
No. 1:22-CR-00303(1)
Andrea R. Wood,
Judge.
O R D E R
David Sheffield pleaded guilty to transmitting threatening communications in
interstate commerce and was sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment. He filed a notice
of appeal, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to
withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We notified Sheffield of
counsel’s motion, and he did not respond. See C IR . R. 51(b). Counsel explains the nature
of the case and addresses the potential issues that an appeal like this could involve.
Because the analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1814 Page 2
discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We grant the motion
and dismiss the appeal.
In March 2022, Sheffield asked a sixteen-year-old girl, who was in the Northern
District of Illinois, to send him explicit photos and videos on Snapchat. When she
refused, he threatened to kill her. The girl responded that her father was a federal law
enforcement officer, and Sheffield said, in vulgar language, that he did not care and
would harm her father too. To show that his threat was serious, Sheffield then sent her a
list of his prior convictions. He told her he knew the name of the street where she lived,
that he would hire someone in Chicago to kill her and her family, and that he had saved
photos of her so the person he hired would “know who to grab.” He told her: “I’ll be on
ft [FaceTime] with you so I can see you bleeding.”
Sheffield pleaded guilty to one count of transmitting threatening
communications in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). In the plea agreement, he
preserved his right to appeal the outcome of his sentencing and the validity of his plea
but waived his right to appeal any pretrial issues.
Ahead of sentencing, a probation officer prepared a presentence investigation
report that calculated a guidelines range of 24 to 30 months’ imprisonment based on a
total offense level of 10 and a criminal history category of VI. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2A6.1(a)(1),
3E1.1(a). Regarding Sheffield’s criminal history, the PSR assessed 15 points for his prior
convictions and arrests.
In his sentencing memorandum, Sheffield argued for a sentence of 33
months—approximately his time served. He objected to the PSR’s criminal history
calculation, arguing that it should be category V instead of VI because one of his prior
arrests had been double counted. He also objected to some supervised release
conditions, such as the potential use of penile plethysmograph (PPG) and polygraphs in
sex-offender treatment and what he regarded as overbroad language governing his
interaction with minors. In mitigation, Sheffield noted a longtime, traumatic personal
history of abuse and ongoing mental health diagnoses.
The government requested a sentence of 60 months—the statutory
maximum—owing to Sheffield’s prior criminal history and other troubling interactions
with minors on Snapchat that surfaced during its investigation. Previous sentences, the
government argued, had not deterred Sheffield, so a 60-month sentence was warranted,
especially considering the severity of his conduct.

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No. 25-1814 Page 3
The district judge agreed with Sheffield that his criminal history category should
be V, yielding a guidelines range of 21 to 27 months, but sentenced him above that
range to 48 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release. Addressing the
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the judge highlighted the serious nature of Sheffield’s
threats and their traumatic impact on his victim, his past pattern of harmful interactions
with women, his extensive criminal history, and the need for greater deterrence given
his persisting criminality. These aggravating factors, the judge determined, weighed in
favor of a sentence above the guidelines range but below the statutory maximum.
In his Anders brief, counsel informs us that he consulted with Sheffield about the
risks and benefits of challenging his guilty plea and confirmed that Sheffield does not
wish to do so. See United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024). Counsel
therefore properly omits discussion of whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. Id.
Counsel does consider, and properly rejects, any challenge to district judge’s
guidelines calculation. Sheffield waived the right on appeal to challenge the guidelines
calculation when he affirmatively agreed with it at sentencing. See United States v.
Robinson, 964 F.3d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 2020).
Counsel also correctly concludes that any challenge to the substantive
reasonableness of Sheffield’s sentence would be frivolous. The judge considered the
§ 3553(a) factors, discussing the seriousness of the offense and Sheffield’s background
(noting his extensive criminal history while also acknowledging the abuse he suffered
as a child). A judge must reasonably justify imposing an above-guidelines sentence,
United States v. Hendrix, 74 F.4th 859, 871–72 (7th Cir. 2023), and the judge here did so
with reference to the seriousness of Sheffield’s threats, the impact of the threats on his
victim and her family, his criminal history, and the need for deterrence.
Counsel next evaluates whether Sheffield could argue that the district judge—by
considering prior charges and arrests that did not lead to convictions, as well as arrests
based on conduct more aggravated than the ultimate offense of conviction—considered
unreliable information at sentencing in violation of his rights under the Fifth
Amendment. But counsel rightly rejects this argument. The judge was entitled to
consider Sheffield’s arrest record in her evaluation of the § 3553(a) factors because the
nature of those charges (solicitation of sexually explicit images, pandering a juvenile,
sexual assault, and extortionate rape) resembled the offense of conviction and was thus
a reliable indicator of a pattern of criminality. See United States v. Mansfield, 21 F.4th 946,
957–58 (7th Cir. 2021).

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No. 25-1814 Page 4
Finally, counsel considers and rightly rejects challenging any conditions of
Sheffield’s supervised release. Sheffield could not plausibly challenge the potential use
of PPG and polygraph testing during his future sex-offender treatment because it is
speculative and thus premature. See United States v. Rhodes, 552 F.3d 624, 628–29
(7th Cir. 2009) (challenge to specific tests in sex-offender treatment not ripe for review
given uncertainty about whether test would ever be used). The judge also acted within
her discretion to reject Sheffield’s request to clarify the types of incidental contact with
minors he could have. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519, 529 (7th Cir. 2016).
Relatedly, to the extent the prohibition on contact with minor girls and boys was
overbroad (by including boys), Sheffield’s remedy would be to request modification of
the condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). Miller, 829 F.3d at 530.
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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