United States of America v. Michael J. Madigan

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-2249
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
M ICHAEL J. M ADIGAN ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:22-cr-00115-1 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 9, 2026 — DECIDED A PRIL 27, 2026
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, S CUDDER , and M ALDONADO, Circuit
Judges.
S CUDDER , Circuit Judge. Michael J. Madigan served as the
Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives for over three
decades. The government prosecuted him in federal court for
expansive corruption rooted in bribery. A four-month trial
ended with a jury convicting him on several counts. Madigan
now appeals. But sufficient evidence supports each

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2 No. 25-2249
conviction, and we see no prejudicial error in the district
court’s jury instructions. We therefore affirm.
I. Background
In 2022, a grand jury indicted Madigan on twenty-three
counts. Almost half of the charges in the operative (supersed-
ing) indictment concerned two broad schemes relevant on ap-
peal. The government aimed to prove the following at trial.
The first scheme involved Madigan’s dealings with the
Chicago-based utility company named Commonwealth Edi-
son. The company faced financial trouble from 1998 until
2011. During those years, ComEd confronted a statutory rate
freeze and regulatory unpredictability, which limited its rev-
enue and put pressure on profitability. By 2011, the state
agency in charge of energy rates had been disallowing or un-
dercounting ComEd’s costs to the tune of $100 million per
year. ComEd enlisted Madigan’s help to resolve the down-
ward financial spiral.
From 2011 to 2019, ComEd lined the pockets of Madigan’s
close political allies. The company did so in part by using in-
termediaries to funnel over $1.3 million to five of Madigan’s
friends for little or no work. ComEd would increase the dollar
amount of contracts with certain businesses with the under-
standing that those businesses would then pay Madigan’s po-
litical associates as so-called “subcontractors.” In much the
same vein, ComEd awarded contracts worth over $1.8 million
to a law firm founded by a Madigan fundraiser.
These payments were in exchange for Madigan’s support
advancing ComEd’s legislative agenda. In 2011, he voted to
override the governor’s veto on a law to stabilize energy rates.
This was a boon to ComEd, and Madigan supported similar

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No. 25-2249 3
legislation in the years that followed. These actions restored
rate predictability and relieved ComEd’s financial distress.
Madigan took steps to avoid being caught red handed. He
orchestrated the scheme indirectly through his longtime
friend, Michael F. McClain, a former Illinois legislator who
had been a contract lobbyist for ComEd since the 1980s. What
Madigan did not know was that the government had wire
tapped McClain’s phone. And the government featured the
recorded calls at trial.
The second scheme concerned Madigan’s interactions
with Chicago City Council Alderman Daniel Solis. The gov-
ernment had investigated Solis for years, and when con-
fronted, he agreed to cooperate and to record his conversa-
tions with Madigan. The government directed Solis to tell
Madigan that he was thinking of retiring as an alderman and
wanted Illinois’s incoming governor to appoint him to a state
board. Madigan agreed to recommend Solis to Governor-elect
JB Pritzker in exchange for business referrals.
The government tried Madigan and McClain together.
The trial lasted four months, with the government introduc-
ing over 1,000 exhibits into evidence and calling more than 50
witnesses to testify, including some of Madigan’s alleged co-
conspirators in the ComEd scheme and Solis himself. The trial
transcript spans more than 11,000 pages.
The jury returned a partial and mixed verdict. The counts
related to ComEd and the state board seat charged Madigan
alone (Counts 2–7 and 8–14, respectively). The jury convicted
him on most of them (Counts 2, 4–6, 8–10, 12–14) but acquitted
him on two alleging that he tried to get a political ally ap-
pointed to ComEd’s board of directors (Counts 3 and 7) and

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4 No. 25-2249
one framing his state board dealings as federal-program brib-
ery (Count 11). Other counts charged both Madigan and
McClain, including one alleging a vast conspiracy in violation
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.
The jury could not reach a verdict on this second set of counts.
At the close of trial, Madigan renewed an earlier motion
for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 29 and also moved for a new trial under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. The district court denied both
motions in a thorough opinion canvassing broad swaths of
the record. It later sentenced Madigan to 90 months’ impris-
onment and fined him $2.5 million.
Madigan now appeals.
II. ComEd Counts
We begin with the jury’s verdict. It first convicted Madi-
gan on several counts related to the ComEd scheme. Count 2
alleged a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, claiming that Madigan
conspired both to receive a stream of benefits in exchange for
taking official acts beneficial to ComEd, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), and to falsify records to hide a bribe, in
violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(5) and 78ff(a). Counts 4 and 6
charged Madigan with violating 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) by
accepting individual bribes.
A. Jury Instructions
Madigan contends that the jury received erroneous in-
structions on § 666(a)(1)(B). “The district court enjoys sub-
stantial discretion in formulating its instructions.” United
States v. Siepman, 107 F.4th 762, 765 (7th Cir. 2024) (cleaned
up). “To secure a new trial based on improper jury instruc-
tions, an appellant must show both that the instructions did

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No. 25-2249 5
not adequately state the law and that the error was prejudicial
to [him] because the jury was likely to be confused or misled.”
United States v. Clark, 140 F.4th 395, 413 (7th Cir. 2025) (cleaned
up).
Section 666 is known as the federal-program bribery stat-
ute. It provides that “[w]hoever, … being an agent of … a
State … government, … corruptly solicits or demands for the
benefit of any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything
of value from any person, intending to be influenced or re-
warded in connection with any business, transaction, or series
of transactions of such … government … involving any thing
of value of $5,000 or more” shall be punished. 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(1)(B).
The district court correctly identified the elements of the
offense, instructing the jury that the government had to prove
that Madigan “solicited, demanded, accepted, or agreed to ac-
cept a thing of value from another person”; that Madigan “did
so corruptly”; and that he “acted with the intent to be influ-
enced or rewarded.” This tracked our Pattern Jury Instruc-
tions. See The William J. Bauer Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions
of the Seventh Circuit 300 (2023 ed.).
1. Official Action
Madigan first asks us to vacate the Count 2 conspiracy
conviction because Instruction 56 informed the jury that
§ 666’s “term ‘thing of value’ may involve a stream of benefits
in a ‘this for that’ exchange for one or more official actions.”
He contends that the district court should have instructed the
jury to convict on this so-called “stream of benefits” theory
only if it found that Madigan agreed—upon joining the con-
spiracy—to take official action on a specific question or

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6 No. 25-2249
matter. In his view, the Supreme Court said as much in
McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016).
Madigan’s reading of McDonnell is plenty reasonable.
McDonnell involved an honest-services wire fraud conviction
where the parties agreed to define the crime according to 18
U.S.C. § 201, the general federal bribery statute. See id. at 562.
The government had to show that the defendant “committed
or agreed to commit an ‘official act’ in exchange for” certain
“loans and gifts.” Id. at 563. Congress defined “official act” to
mean “any decision or action on any question, matter, cause,
suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be
pending, or which may by law be brought before any public
official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s
place of trust or profit.” Id. at 562 (quoting § 201(a)(3)). And
the Supreme Court vacated the convictions in part because
the district court’s instructions allowed a jury to believe that
“merely arranging a meeting or hosting an event to discuss”
“something as nebulous as ‘Virginia business and economic
development’” counted as an “official act.” Id. at 578–79.
McDonnell identified “two requirements” for what consti-
tutes an “official act” under § 201(a)(3). Id. at 567. First, the
government must identify a “question” or “matter” that is
sufficiently formal and “focused and concrete.” Id. at 567–68,
570. Second, the government must prove that the defendant
either took an action or agreed to take an action on “that ques-
tion [or] matter.” Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
The government stipulated at Madigan’s trial that
§ 666(a)(1)(B) requires proving that he agreed to take an “of-
ficial act” as Congress defined that term in § 201(a)(3). McDon-
nell therefore suggests that convicting Madigan on this object
of the Count 2 conspiracy charge required finding that he

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No. 25-2249 7
promised “at the time the bribe was accepted” “to take official
action on a specific and focused question or matter.” United
States v. Silver, 948 F.3d 538, 569 (2d Cir. 2020) (emphasis omit-
ted). But see United States v. Burnette, 65 F.4th 591, 614 (11th
Cir. 2023) (Jordan, Rosenbaum, & Newsom, JJ., concurring)
(reading McDonnell to allow conviction where the defendant
promises to help every time an opportunity arises).
This understanding aligns with what the district court told
the jury. Instruction 56 required the government to prove that
“[w]hen the defendant conspired to solicit, demand, accept, or
agree to accept, a ‘thing of value’ … in connection with his
official duties,” he “understood the conspiracy involved a
‘this for that’ exchange of a ‘thing of value’ for an ‘official ac-
tion’” (emphasis added). Instruction 47, in turn, defined “offi-
cial action” as “a specific decision or action on, or an agree-
ment to make a decision or take action on, a specific question or
matter,” even clarifying that the “‘question’ or ‘matter’ must
… be something specific and focused, rather than a broad pol-
icy objective” (emphasis added). Just to be safe, Instruction 56
clarified that “[v]ague expectations of some future benefit are
not sufficient, by themselves, to make a payment a bribe.” All
told, the district court instructed the jury to convict only if it
found that Madigan agreed—at the moment he joined the
scheme—to take an official act on a specific question or mat-
ter. We see no error.
2. Corruptly
Madigan next urges us to vacate the convictions on Counts
2, 4, and 6 because the district court erroneously defined
§ 666(a)(1)(B)’s “corruptly” element. Instructions 56 and 63
stated that a “defendant acts ‘corruptly’ if he acted with the
understanding that a ‘thing of value’ is to be exchanged for an

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8 No. 25-2249
‘official act’ with the intent to influence or reward a State
agent in connection with his official duties.” Both instructions
clarified that “[t]he government need not prove … that the de-
fendant knew that the law prohibited his conduct.” Madigan
contends that these instructions focused too much on the
bribe-giver’s intent and not enough on the bribe-receiver’s in-
tent. In his view, a defendant acts “corruptly” only when he
knows his actions are unlawful or wrong.
Our precedent forecloses Madigan’s challenge. We held in
United States v. Hawkins that someone acts “corruptly” under
§ 666(a)(1)(B) when he understands that the bribe-giver in-
tends to influence or reward him in connection with his offi-
cial duties. See 777 F.3d 880, 882 (7th Cir. 2015); see also United
States v. Mullins, 800 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2015) (“An agent
acts corruptly when he understands that the payment given
is a bribe, reward, or gratuity.” (citing Hawkins, 777 F.3d at
882)); United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 736 (7th Cir.
2015) (“‘Corruptly’ refers to the recipient’s state of mind and
indicates that he understands the payment as a bribe or gra-
tuity.” (citing Hawkins, 777 F.3d at 882)). That is what the dis-
trict court told the jury.
Madigan insists that the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in
Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1, abrogated Hawkins. But that
is true only with respect to the portion of Hawkins concluding
that § 666 applies to gratuities. Compare Snyder, 603 U.S. at 5,
with Hawkins, 777 F.3d at 881. Hawkins never relied on that
proposition to define “corruptly.” See 777 F.3d at 882. Were
there any doubt, we recently relied on Hawkins in part to re-
affirm the proposition that “a person acts ‘corruptly’ when he
understands the payment is a bribe.” United States v. Cui, 163
F.4th 1072, 1087 (7th Cir. 2026). While Cui technically

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No. 25-2249 9
interpreted and addressed § 666(a)(2), our reasoning covered
§ 666(a)(1)(B) as well. See, e.g., id. at 1087–88 (“To be guilty of
soliciting or accepting a bribe in violation of section
666(a)(1)(B) requires knowing that the money or other thing
of value received was indeed a bribe, which is to say an in-
ducement to do a corrupt act.” (quoting United States v.
Curescu, 674 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir. 2012))).
3. Intent to Be Influenced or Rewarded
Madigan finally asks us to vacate the convictions on
Counts 2, 4, and 6 because he claims the district court effec-
tively told the jury that the government did not need to show
that he “intend[ed] to be influenced or rewarded,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(1)(B), thereby relieving the government of its burden
to prove this element of the crime. He points to Instruction 58,
which informed the jury that it was not “necessary that the
public official in fact intended to perform the specific official
act” and that it was “sufficient if the public official knew that
the thing of value was offered with the intent to exchange the
thing of value for the performance of the official act.” Accord-
ing to Madigan, this instruction contradicted § 666(a)(1)(B),
which requires proving that the defendant received a thing of
value “intending to be influenced or rewarded.”
But we cannot read Instruction 58 in isolation. The district
court twice listed the elements of § 666(a)(1)(B), stating in In-
structions 55 and 63 that the government had to prove that
Madigan acted “with the intent to be influenced or re-
warded.” Instruction 58 never erased that element or even de-
fined it. It instead clarified the meaning of “Intent to Influ-
ence,” which mattered for two different reasons. First, Count
2 alleged that Madigan conspired to violate not only
§ 666(a)(1)(B), but also § 666(a)(2). And § 666(a)(2) requires

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10 No. 25-2249
showing that the bribe-giver acted with “intent to influence or
reward.” Instruction 58 therefore helped the jury decide
whether Madigan conspired to violate § 666(a)(2). Second, re-
turning to § 666(a)(1)(B), Instructions 55, 56, and 63 explained
that the government must separately prove that he acted “cor-
ruptly”—“with the understanding that a ‘thing of value’ is to
be exchanged for an ‘official act’ with the intent to influence
or reward a State agent in connection with his official duties.”
Instruction 58 therefore clarified § 666(a)(1)(B)’s “corruptly”
element, not its distinct requirement that a bribe-receiver “in-
tend[ed] to be influenced or rewarded.” We see no error.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Madigan also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for
his ComEd convictions. Our role as a court of review is lim-
ited. We must view “the evidence in the light most favorable
to the” jury’s verdict and ask whether “any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime be-
yond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979). We have described this burden as “nearly insurmount-
able.” United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 535 (7th Cir. 2009)
(cleaned up).
1. Conspiracy to Commit Federal-Program Bribery
Count 2 first charged Madigan with conspiring to violate
18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) by accepting a stream of benefits in
exchange for advancing ComEd’s legislative agenda. The jury
could have rationally convicted him on this ground. Under-
standing why requires digging into the expansive trial record.
Stay with us. The particulars of the evidence reveal that
ComEd faced regulatory uncertainty surrounding its rates,
that it sought a legislative solution to its financial turmoil

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No. 25-2249 11
while funneling large sums of money to Madigan’s close po-
litical allies, and that Madigan, in exchange, delivered in
Springfield. Indeed, the evidence was overwhelming.
We begin with ComEd itself. The jury learned that the
company was in serious financial distress for many years
leading up to 2011. One of its financial executives, Scott Vogt,
testified that from 1998 to 2006, ComEd could not change its
energy rates due to a statutory rate freeze. This held ComEd’s
revenue constant, forcing the company “to be very, very cost
effective and diligent on the decisions [it] could make about
how much [it] could invest in the business.” Vogt testified that
ComEd worried that the General Assembly would extend the
rate freeze, which would have caused the company to be un-
able to pay its already agreed-upon supply contracts. Vogt
helped prepare bankruptcy affidavits just in case.
ComEd’s financial difficulties shifted in 2007. The statu-
tory rate freeze ended, leaving the Illinois Commerce Com-
mission in charge of rates. At the time, Illinois used a tradi-
tional rate system. Vogt explained that this meant that a pub-
lic utility company would identify a test year and provide the
ICC with that year’s costs and expenses, with the Commission
then evaluating the information and determining the rates the
company could charge.
ComEd sought relief before the ICC. According to Vogt,
the company asked the Commission to increase its rates
enough to generate an additional $318 million in annual rev-
enue. The ICC rejected ComEd’s request, ultimately allowing
only $74 million per year. Vogt testified that the ICC reached
its decision by second-guessing ComEd’s claimed costs. He
stated that this decision had a “dramatic impact,” decreasing
ComEd’s income by around $450 million in 2007 alone.

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12 No. 25-2249
ComEd continued to file with the ICC. But Vogt testified
that “every time we would get a rate case order, the rules or
the reasons for an allowance or disallowance would change.”
As a result, Vogt and others at ComEd “didn’t feel like [they]
had a fair shot at really getting a reasonable outcome, which
made it very difficult then to predict what the revenue and the
financial condition of the company was going to be.” Vogt re-
called that the ICC disallowed about $100 million in annual
costs in the years leading to 2011.
This is where Madigan enters the picture. By 2011, ComEd
needed a financial game changer to survive, so it turned to the
Illinois General Assembly. Vogt testified that ComEd’s then-
Chief Operating Officer, Anne Pramaggiore, led the com-
pany’s efforts to enact the Energy Infrastructure Moderniza-
tion Act, or EIMA. This measure promised to replace tradi-
tional ratemaking with a formula rate, which would control
the inputs used by the ICC to set energy rates. Vogt explained
that ComEd wanted this change because it would stop the
ICC from allowing certain costs one year and disallowing
them the next, increasing financial predictability and cer-
tainty. EIMA also provided for a $2.6 billion investment in en-
ergy infrastructure benefiting ComEd. The General Assembly
passed the legislation, but then the governor vetoed it.
ComEd’s only hope for getting EIMA across the finish line
was a veto override.
ComEd began providing financial benefits to Madigan’s
political allies. Sometime around August 2011, the company
started funneling monthly payments to a man named Frank
Olivo. He was the former alderman for Chicago’s 13th Ward,
the same ward where Madigan held leadership roles for over
40 years. Fidel Marquez, a former ComEd vice president,

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No. 25-2249 13
testified for the government at trial that Olivo was known to
be Madigan’s “political ally.” And one of ComEd’s contract
lobbyists, Jay Doherty, took good care of him. Doherty owned
a lobbying firm, Jay D. Doherty & Associates, and one of his
administrative assistants testified that the firm increased its
contract amount with ComEd so that it could send monthly
payments to Olivo as a “subcontractor.” An FBI agent clari-
fied that JDDA paid Olivo $4,000 each month. But this was not
your average, above-board subcontract. There was no written
arrangement, and according to Marquez, Olivo did no work
in return for the money.
ComEd did not stop there. On October 25, 2011, just one
day before the EIMA veto-override vote and after receiving
pressure from McClain, the company awarded a contract to
the Reyes Kurson law firm. Victor Reyes was a named partner
at the firm and a fundraiser for Madigan. And the contract
guaranteed his firm at least 850 hours of annual billable work
for three years. ComEd’s former general counsel Tom O’Neill
testified that John Hooker, the company’s then-head of gov-
ernment affairs, told him that time was of the essence with the
Reyes Kurson contract—“we needed to get it done and we
needed to get it done now.”
It appears ComEd’s efforts paid off. The very next day, on
October 26, 2011, Madigan and a supermajority of the General
Assembly voted to override the governor’s veto, allowing
EIMA to become law. Vogt testified that ComEd credited
Pramaggiore for the legislative victory, making her CEO
shortly thereafter.
But ComEd was not completely off the hook. Vogt ex-
plained that EIMA included a sunset provision that required
the company to return to the state house before 2017. He

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14 No. 25-2249
stated that Madigan’s office proposed this provision and that
ComEd agreed to it only after learning that the bill would not
move forward without it. ComEd also learned that EIMA
needed to be clarified. According to Vogt, the ICC in 2012
started disputing the meaning of the statutory language, de-
creasing ComEd’s expected annual revenue by around $40–
$50 million.
ComEd provided more benefits to those in Madigan’s or-
bit. In April 2012, the company started funneling payments to
Edward Moody. He was a former 13th Ward precinct captain
who had performed election work for Madigan for about 20
years. He testified for the government at trial, explaining that
he asked Madigan for a consulting position that would pay
him $45,000 per year as he neared retirement. Madigan even-
tually told him he would “be working for McClain” and that
this was how he “reward[ed] [his] good soldiers.” ComEd ex-
ecutive Marquez testified that Moody’s payments came indi-
rectly from ComEd and that he was not aware of any work
performed by Moody. According to Moody, McClain called it
“one hell of a plum” job.
ComEd did something similar a couple months later. In
June 2012, it began channeling monthly payments to Ray-
mond Nice. He, too, was one of Madigan’s close political al-
lies. Marquez testified that he was “one of the top three pre-
cinct captains for the 13th Ward.” And once again, Jay
Doherty’s administrative assistant testified that his firm in-
creased its contract amount with ComEd so that it could send
monthly payments to Nice. An FBI agent explained that Jay
D. Doherty & Associates paid Nice $5,000 per month.
Marquez stated this was for no work.

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No. 25-2249 15
ComEd’s continued loyalty to Madigan reaped dividends.
In 2013, the company pushed for Senate Bill 9, which clarified
the EIMA provisions disputed by the ICC. Madigan voted for
the bill, the governor vetoed it, and Madigan voted for the
veto override. A supermajority of state legislators followed
suit, and Senate Bill 9 became law. Vogt testified that its en-
actment finally led to certainty before the ICC. And according
to his projections at the time, extending the formula rate from
2018 through 2022 promised to increase shareholder value by
around $400 million. The first step of that extension occurred
in 2014, when ComEd successfully pushed the sunset to 2019.
Madigan was absent for the floor vote, but then-CEO Pramag-
giore wrote him a thank you note afterward acknowledging
his “ongoing support.”
The next wave of activity came in 2015. ComEd’s Scott
Vogt testified that the company pushed for the Future Energy
Jobs Act, or FEJA, which proposed extending the formula rate
to 2022 and providing price support to two underperforming
nuclear power plants owned by ComEd’s parent company.
Tom O’Neill, ComEd’s former general counsel, testified that
around this same time, the company seriously considered de-
creasing its guaranteed hours for the Reyes Kurson law firm,
with one in-house lawyer even contemplating not renewing
the contract at all. O’Neill explained that there was just not
enough work to give to the firm.
Madigan’s longtime friend, Michael McClain, caught
wind of ComEd’s reservations. In January 2016, he emailed
Pramaggiore this note:
Last night I got a call from Victor [Reyes] who
informed me that the company cut his law firm
down to administrative hearing hours only. No

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16 No. 25-2249
other hours …. I know the drill and so do you.
If you do not get involve[d] and resolve this is-
sue of 850 hours for his law firm per year then
he will go to our Friend. Our Friend will call me
and then I will call you …. Is this a drill we must
go through? … I just do not understand why we
have to spend valuable minutes on items like
this when we know it will provoke a reaction
from our Friend.
Pramaggiore apologized and said, “I am on this.” At trial, a
former Illinois legislator testified that McClain used the nick-
names “our friend” or “my friend” to refer to Madigan.
O’Neill testified that ComEd renewed its Reyes Kurson con-
tract in July 2016.
In December 2016, Madigan helped FEJA become law.
This was not a foregone conclusion. One of Madigan’s former
staffers, William Cousineau, testified that in the days leading
up to the vote, his roll call indicated that the bill would fail.
He also testified that Madigan told him to “go out and work
the bill and try to get that bill passed.” After the vote, McClain
stated on a recorded phone call that Madigan convinced 47
representatives to vote for the bill. This allowed FEJA to pass
despite Madigan’s abstention (also known as a “no-vote”).
O’Neill testified that this was a big win for ComEd and that
he saw Pramaggiore and McClain meet with Madigan in the
Speaker’s suite afterward.
A few months later, ComEd started funneling payments
to a new “subcontractor,” Edward Acevedo. He served as an
assistant majority leader in the General Assembly until Janu-
ary 2017. Marquez testified that this made Acevedo part of
Madigan’s leadership team. And according to an FBI agent, in

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No. 25-2249 17
March 2017, ComEd increased its monthly payments to Shaw
Decremer Consulting LLC by $5,000, which in turn started
paying Acevedo $5,000 per month. The principal of the con-
sulting firm, Shaw Decremer, used to work for Madigan. And
the FBI agent testified that she searched Decremer’s residence,
including his emails, and found no evidence of work per-
formed by Acevedo.
Another wave of mutual benefits occurred in 2018. Early
that year, the General Assembly began considering a bill that,
according to ComEd’s Marquez, “proposed that utilities set
up a special rate, a lower rate, for low-income customers.”
Marquez testified that the company opposed the bill because
the only way to offset costs would be to increase rates for
higher-income customers.
The jury heard that Madigan helped stop this unfavorable
legislation. When Marquez described the bill, he did so in the
context of a May 2018 email from McClain to Pramaggiore. In
that email, McClain wrote that “a friend of ours alerted me
and thereby us to this initiative,” which “we all know … was
code for we can go ahead and kill it.” Marquez testified that
he understood the “friend” to be Madigan. It appears from
the record that the bill never passed that session. So the jury
could have inferred that Madigan succeeded in blocking the
legislation.
In no way was Madigan’s assistance lost on ComEd. To
the contrary, in August 2018, ComEd started paying another
Madigan ally, Michael Zalewski, through an intermediary.
He was a former alderman for the 23rd Ward, which fell in
Madigan’s district. ComEd once again used Jay D. Doherty
Associates to deliver the money. Doherty’s administrative as-
sistant testified that the firm increased its contract amount

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18 No. 25-2249
with ComEd to cover its monthly payments to Zalewski. And
an FBI agent clarified that JDDA paid Zalewski $5,000 per
month. Marquez testified that Zalewski performed no work.
The final flurry of activity took place in 2019. That spring,
ComEd pushed for legislation known as the “Skinny Bill.”
Marquez testified that this bill would have extended the fa-
vorable formula rate permanently. He also testified that
ComEd aimed for the General Assembly to pass it by May
2019. The company was on the clock.
ComEd almost risked upsetting Madigan. The prior year,
Anne Pramaggiore accepted a promotion to ComEd’s parent
company, and ComEd replaced her with a new CEO named
Joe Dominguez, a former Assistant U.S. Attorney. This caused
members of the scheme to panic. In February 2019, several of
them worried that the new CEO would not approve the pend-
ing contract with Jay Doherty’s lobbying firm due to concerns
about the subcontractor arrangement.
Fidel Marquez met with Doherty that month and asked for
advice on how to explain the lobbying contract to
Dominguez. In the recorded conversation, Doherty suggested
reminding him that “ComEd money” “comes from Spring-
field” and telling him, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” Pramag-
giore recommended something similar in a separate recorded
phone call. She told Marquez to say it was a little too early to
end the subcontractor arrangement. She advised telling
Dominquez to wait “until after the session’s over” to avoid
getting “caught up in a … disruptive battle where … some-
body gets their nose out of joint” as “we’re in the middle of
needing to get something done in Springfield.” The jury could
have inferred she was speaking about the Skinny Bill.

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No. 25-2249 19
A few days later, McClain spoke on the phone with
Pramaggiore and John Hooker, now a contract lobbyist for
ComEd. In the recording, McClain stated that he did not trust
Dominguez and predicted that he would “think that … this is
a quid pro quo and that he’s wired.” Put another way, McClain
worried that his requests on behalf of Madigan so resembled
bribery that the former prosecutor would think McClain was
setting him up. McClain then spoke to Marquez and Hooker.
In the recorded conversation, Marquez asked how their
“friend” would react to Dominguez ending the subcontractor
arrangement. Hooker responded with a prediction of Madi-
gan’s reaction that the jury was free to credit: “You’re not
gonna do it? You’re not going to do something for me, I don’t
have to do anything for you,” adding that “[h]e won’t say it.”
ComEd ultimately kept Madigan happy and vice versa. In
March 2019, the company renewed its contract with Jay
Doherty’s lobbying firm, who was paying Olivo, Nice, and
Zalewski. And in April 2019, McClain communicated to
Marquez that “Madigan was onboard” with the Skinny Bill.
Marquez’s cooperation in the Madigan investigation became
public before the bill could pass.
The jury could reasonably infer from this mountain of ev-
idence that Madigan conspired to receive bribes in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B). This was not politics as usual or
ordinary lobbying. The trial evidence exposed a sustained
and concealed arrangement to exchange enormous political
influence within the Illinois General Assembly for over $3 mil-
lion of benefits for political allies. There was no agreement
signed at a sit-down meeting. But there did not have to be. See
Blagojevich, 794 F.3d at 738 (“Few politicians say, on or off the
record, ‘I will exchange official act X for payment Y.’”). The

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20 No. 25-2249
jury received overwhelming circumstantial evidence that
Madigan agreed to help ComEd at a price in 2011 and then
stayed the course through early 2019.
Further, loads of evidence showed that Madigan both had
“knowledge” that ComEd “expect[ed] to achieve a forbidden
influence,” Hawkins, 777 F.3d at 882 (defining § 666(a)(1)(B)’s
“corruptly” element), and that he “intend[ed] to be influenced
or rewarded,” § 666(a)(1)(B), by the sizeable and concealed
payments over many years to his close political associates and
allies. Two examples underscore this point. When ComEd
dragged its feet renewing the Reyes Kurson contract, McClain
warned that failure to deliver would “provoke a reaction from
our Friend.” And when Marquez asked how Madigan would
respond to ComEd ending the subcontractor arrangement,
Hooker predicted that Madigan would feel that he would no
longer “have to do anything” for ComEd. These were not the
views of strangers. And the jury was allowed to rely on them
(and other like evidence) to draw conclusions about Madi-
gan’s knowledge and intent. See United States v. Loscalzo, 18
F.3d 374, 383 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[E]vidence of [a] defendant’s
acts or statements may be provided by the statements of co-
conspirators.”).
Madigan insists that the government had to prove some-
thing more. He points to McDonnell and asks us to adopt the
Second Circuit’s requirement that “a public official must do
more than promise to take some or any official action benefi-
cial to the payor as the opportunity to do so arises; she must
promise to take official action on a particular question or matter
as the opportunity to influence that same question or matter
arises.” Silver, 948 F.3d at 552–53.

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No. 25-2249 21
But the government presented plenty of evidence for the
jury to find that Madigan promised to take official action to
help ComEd with a specific question or matter, namely, its
struggle to control its energy rates, which drove its financial
distress. The evidence showed that ComEd turned to the Gen-
eral Assembly in 2011 to escape the ICC’s unpredictable rate
treatment. That same year, Madigan helped the EIMA legis-
lation cross the finish line, introducing a formula rate meant
to stop the ICC from undervaluing ComEd’s costs. He deliv-
ered again in 2013 and 2014 by supporting legislation clarify-
ing EIMA and extending the formula rate. In 2016, he
whipped votes for FEJA, which extended the formula rate fur-
ther. And in 2018, when a bill posed a threat to ComEd’s pre-
ferred rates, Madigan gave the code to kill it. The final touch
came in 2019, when McClain suggested that Madigan sup-
ported the Skinny Bill, which would have permanently ex-
tended the formula rate. The jury could have connected these
dots and concluded that Madigan agreed to help ComEd gain
control over its rates. See McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 572–73 (“It is
up to the jury, under the facts of the case, to determine
whether the public official agreed to perform an ‘official act’
at the time of the alleged quid pro quo. The jury may consider
a broad range of pertinent evidence … to answer that ques-
tion.”).
2. Conspiracy to Falsify Records
We affirm the Count 2 conspiracy conviction (under 18
U.S.C. § 371) for an independent reason. The government al-
leged that Madigan conspired to violate not only 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(1)(B), but also the recordkeeping provisions of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Sufficient evidence supported
this second ground. And that is all that is required for us to

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22 No. 25-2249
affirm on Count 2. See United States v. Beverly, 913 F.2d 337,
363 (7th Cir. 1990) (explaining that a § 371 conspiracy convic-
tion “will be sustained so long as the evidence is sufficient to
show that the defendants agreed to accomplish at least one of
the alleged objects” (cleaned up)).
The FCPA provides that “[n]o person shall … knowingly
falsify any book, record, or account,” 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5),
which would otherwise “accurately and fairly reflect the
transactions and dispositions of the assets of” a securities is-
suer, § 78m(b)(2)(A), and that knowing and willful violators
shall be punished, § 78ff(a).
The government presented evidence that ComEd’s finan-
cial records contained a falsehood. Recall that in 2018 ComEd
began funneling $5,000 per month to Madigan’s political ally
Michael Zalewski through an intermediary, Jay D. Doherty &
Associates. ComEd’s Fidel Marquez testified that Zalewski
did no work in return for these payments.
Zalewski’s money did not start flowing automatically. Jay
Doherty first submitted an amended contract to ComEd, re-
questing an additional $5,000 per month. He represented that
the increase was for his “expanded role with [the] Cook
County Board President’s office and [the] Cook County Com-
missioners and Department Heads.” At trial, the government
asked Marquez if this explanation was “truthful,” and he re-
sponded, “No.” He elaborated that “it [didn’t] reflect the ac-
tual situation of adding Mike Zalewski.”
Doherty then submitted an invoice to ComEd similarly
representing that the increased bill was “due to additional
scope of services.” A ComEd employee testified that ComEd
recorded that invoice as an expense, with the transaction then

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No. 25-2249 23
feeding into the company’s general ledger—a foundational
corporate financial record. That meant ComEd’s general
ledger contained a falsehood: that ComEd paid Doherty’s
firm an extra $5,000 for increased lobbying services. As
Marquez testified, the money instead went to Zalewski for no
work at all.
The jury could have found that Madigan agreed to this ob-
ject of the conspiracy. In February 2019, McClain said on a
phone call with the ComEd contract lobbyist John Hooker
that he and a small group had come up with the Zalewski
plan and that their “friend” had “thought it was great.” It
would have been reasonable for the jury to infer that any dis-
cussion of the plan would have recognized that Doherty
would submit a false invoice leading to falsified ComEd fi-
nancial records. We see no reason to disturb the conviction.
3. Federal-Program Bribery
That brings us to Counts 4 and 6, which charged Madigan
with accepting bribes, in violation of § 666(a)(1)(B). Much of
the evidence from Count 2 applies here as well. So we only
need to highlight a few points.
Count 4 alleged that in 2018 Madigan arranged for ComEd
to funnel payments to his longtime political ally Michael
Zalewski in exchange for legislative action benefiting the
company. We have already canvassed evidence that ComEd
started making roundabout payments to Zalewski that year.
That came shortly after McClain emailed Pramaggiore that
their “friend” had given the code to “kill” a bill unfavorable
to ComEd. The jury heard plenty to find that Madigan had an
intent to be influenced or rewarded.

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24 No. 25-2249
Count 6 alleged that in 2019 Madigan accepted a renewed
contract between ComEd and Jay D. Doherty & Associates to
continue paying Olivo, Nice, and Zalewski in exchange for his
legislative help. The jury heard a recording of a February 2019
meeting where John Hooker predicted that Madigan would
halt his legislative support if ComEd terminated the subcon-
tracts. The next month, in March 2019, the company signed a
new contract with the lobbying firm. And finally, in April
2019, McClain communicated to Marquez that “Madigan was
onboard” with the Skinny Bill. The jury was welcome to agree
with Hooker’s understanding of Madigan’s intent to make
legislative aid contingent on no-work subcontracts for
friends.
III. State Board Counts
The jury also convicted Madigan of three counts related to
the state board seat. Counts 8–10 charged him with honest-
services wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346.
The indictment alleged that Madigan agreed to recommend
Alderman Daniel Solis to then-Governor-elect JB Pritzker for
a state board seat in exchange for financial benefits. It claimed
that Madigan, who practiced law while serving as Speaker,
wanted Solis to facilitate introductions to potential law firm
clients. Madigan also allegedly asked Solis to steer insurance
business to his son’s employer.
A. Honest-Services Fraud
A defendant commits honest-services wire fraud when he
devises a “scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intan-
gible right of honest services,” 18 U.S.C. § 1346, and he “trans-
mits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire … in inter-
state or foreign commerce, any writings … for the purpose of

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No. 25-2249 25
executing such scheme or artifice,” § 1343. The government
must prove that the defendant engaged in a kickback or bribe.
See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–09 (2010). This
“requires proof of a quid pro quo.” United States v. Johnson, 874
F.3d 990, 999 (7th Cir. 2017).
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Sufficient evidence supported finding that Madigan
agreed to a quid pro quo. The two men first met in the late
1980s, when Solis traveled to Springfield to advocate for leg-
islation. And in more recent years, Madigan would occasion-
ally call Solis to ask for an introduction to a potential law firm
client. Solis always obliged. Then in 2016, after being investi-
gated for years, Solis agreed to cooperate with the govern-
ment and to record his conversations with Madigan.
In June 2018, Solis approached Madigan and mentioned
he was interested in sitting on a state board. Madigan said he
would “take a note down” and that he had a “file.” Solis as-
sured Madigan that he would “continue to get [him] legal
business.” Madigan then shared that he had been trying to
connect with a local developer named Harry Skydell. Solis
promised to make the introduction. After the meeting, accord-
ing to Solis’s trial testimony, Madigan delivered documents
to Solis’s office describing the different board seats and their
compensation amounts.
In August 2018, Solis asked what would happen if Madi-
gan recommended him for a state board seat. Madigan clari-
fied, “See, I would go to Pritzker. That’s what I would do ….
So, you’d come in as Pritzker’s recommendation.” Solis once
again assured Madigan that he would continue to send him

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26 No. 25-2249
legal business. Madigan initially seemed wary of this trade,
responding, “Don’t. Don’t worry about it.”
But Madigan changed his tune later in that same conver-
sation. After confirming which two seats Solis wanted, he told
Solis, “Just leave it in my hands.” Solis then said he would
introduce Madigan to Skydell in a couple weeks and told
Madigan to let him know if “anything else” “interested” him.
Madigan responded, “There’s one thing you can do,” and
asked Solis to help his son Andrew secure the insurance busi-
ness of a local nonprofit.
Madigan told Solis to tell the nonprofit’s CEO to “[g]ive
Andrew something.” The hope was for Andrew to “get his
foot in the door.” Solis agreed, and Madigan reminded him to
“[j]ust leave this in my hands.” From 2019 to 2021, Andrew
Madigan received about $43,000 in commissions from the
nonprofit. The jury could have found that Madigan agreed to
help Solis to benefit his son.
Madigan tells us the government failed to identify a mate-
rial misrepresentation. Cf. United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d
124, 146 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (requiring a material misrep-
resentation for an honest-services fraud conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 1346). But a rational jury could have found that Madi-
gan planned to “conceal[] a material fact” by recommending
Solis without mentioning the bribery. United States v. Weimert,
819 F.3d 351, 355 (7th Cir. 2016). It also could have viewed the
missing information as material because a former adviser on
the Pritzker campaign testified that the administration
“would never” appoint someone who bribed Madigan.
Madigan insists that he never actually attempted to rec-
ommend Solis. But it is the “plan to take [a thing of value] in

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No. 25-2249 27
exchange for an official act” that “constitutes a scheme to de-
fraud.” Hawkins, 777 F.3d at 883–84 (emphasis in original).
And the jury heard evidence that Madigan did indeed plan to
make the recommendation. He asked for Solis’s resume to
prepare for an upcoming meeting with Governor-elect Pritz-
ker, affirmatively sent Solis materials outlining the different
board positions and their compensation, and took notes on
Solis’s preferred seats. The jury could have rationally con-
cluded that Madigan intended to recommend Solis.
Finally, Madigan contends that his recommendation
would not have counted as an official act. But “if a public of-
ficial uses his official position to provide advice to another of-
ficial, knowing or intending that such advice will form the ba-
sis for an ‘official act’ by another official, that too can qualify
as [an official act.]” McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 572. One of Madi-
gan’s former employees testified that Governor Pritzker ac-
cepted nearly half of his recommendations. And the govern-
ment presented evidence that Madigan understood the
weight of his recommendation. He confidently told Solis to
“[j]ust leave it in my hands” and said that Solis would “come
in as Pritzker’s recommendation.” We will not disturb these
convictions.
IV. Travel Act Counts
One final issue requires our attention. The jury convicted
Madigan on several counts under the Travel Act, which pro-
vides that “whoever … uses … any facility in interstate or for-
eign commerce, with intent to … promote, manage, establish,
carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establish-
ment, or carrying on, of an unlawful activity” and “thereafter
performs or attempts to perform” that unlawful activity shall
be punished. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). “[U]nlawful activity”

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28 No. 25-2249
means “extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of
the State in which [they are] committed or of the United
States.” § 1952(b).
Madigan asks us to vacate his Travel Act convictions due
to instructional error. The district court identified various
“unlawful activities” for the jury, including bribery (720 ILCS
§ 5/33-1) and legislative misconduct (720 ILCS § 5/33-8).
Madigan tells us the Illinois bribery statute includes no quid
pro quo element. And he claims that makes it overbroad rela-
tive to the Travel Act. See United States v. Shen Zhen New World
I, LLC, 115 F.4th 1167, 1182–84 (9th Cir. 2024) (applying the
categorical approach to the Travel Act and concluding that the
generic definition of “bribery” included a quid pro quo ele-
ment).
But the “omission of an element from the jury instruc-
tions” is “subject to harmless-error analysis.” United States v.
Wade, 962 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 2020). That means we
should affirm the convictions if it is “clear beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant
guilty absent the error.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18
(1999). We are confident that any error was harmless.
Count 5 alleged that in 2018 Madigan caused the use of an
email account to facilitate the Zalewski bribe charged in
Count 4. We have already decided that sufficient evidence
supported the jury’s conviction on Count 4. The same evi-
dence leaves us with no reasonable doubt that a rational jury
would have found that Madigan engaged in a quid pro quo
to get Zalewski hired. We ground our conclusion in the total-
ity of the evidence, including the timing of the hiring, the sur-
reptitious nature of the payments, Zalewski’s lack of actual
work, and John Hooker’s prediction that Madigan would

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No. 25-2249 29
have felt off the hook if ComEd ended its subcontract with
Zalewski. We will not disturb this conviction.
Counts 12–14 alleged that in 2018 Madigan caused the use
of a cell phone to facilitate the honest-services wire fraud
scheme charged in Counts 8–10. Once again, we have already
determined that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s con-
victions on Counts 8–10. The same evidence gives us no rea-
sonable doubt that a rational jury would have found that
Madigan engaged in a quid pro quo when he offered to rec-
ommend Solis for the state board seat. Madigan took affirma-
tive steps to help Solis choose his preferred seat and said he
would recommend him to Governor-elect Pritzker. And when
Solis responded by asking if Madigan was interested in any-
thing other than an introduction to Harry Skydell, Madigan
said, “There’s one thing you can do,” and asked Solis to steer
insurance business to his son’s employer. We see no addi-
tional arguments from Madigan on this point, so we are con-
fident that any error was harmless.
***
Michael Madigan spent nearly a decade leveraging his
power as one of the highest-ranking public officials in Illinois
in exchange for over $3 million of financial benefits for his
close political allies. The linkage was clear and far from fleet-
ing. He repeatedly facilitated changes to state law impacting
countless energy consumers in northern Illinois, all because
ComEd funneled money to the right people. Madigan insists
that this was run-of-the-mill politics. But a jury of twelve Illi-
nois residents saw the evidence differently. So do we.
AFFIRMED

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