United States of America v. Monta Y. Anderson

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 21, 2026*
Decided April 29, 2026
Before
KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2165
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MONTA Y. ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 13-cr-10064
Michael M. Mihm,
Judge.
O R D E R
Monta Anderson appeals the denial of his motion for compassionate release
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). We dismiss the appeal in part and affirm in part.
Anderson pleaded guilty in 2015 to conspiracy to distribute heroin. 21 U.S.C.
§§ 846, 841(a)(l), (b)(l)(A). The district judge accepted Anderson’s guilty plea and
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. FED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-2165 Page 2
sentenced him to 223 months’ imprisonment followed by a 10-year term of supervised
release.
In early 2025, Anderson, through counsel, moved for compassionate release after
his brother experienced neurological deficits arising out of a recent open-heart surgery.
Anderson raised the following grounds as extraordinary and compelling reasons for a
sentence reduction: his caregiving role for his brother; his demonstrated rehabilitation;
the lack of danger he posed to the community; the necessity of avoiding unwarranted
sentencing disparities; and the totality of his circumstances.
The judge denied compassionate release. The judge concluded that Anderson’s
family circumstances did not warrant relief because he failed to show that his brother
was “incapacitated” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(D) (listing as an
extraordinary and compelling reason the incapacitation of a sibling when the defendant
would be the only available caregiver). Even if Anderson’s brother was deemed
incapacitated, the judge continued, Anderson had not established that he was the “only
available caregiver,” given the many other family members who might be able to
provide support. And while Anderson’s rehabilitative efforts in prison were
commendable, the judge acknowledged, the totality of the circumstances did not add
up to an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction. See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(5). Based on this conclusion, the judge did not need to consider the
sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), but even these—especially the seriousness of
his trafficking large amounts of heroin that caused several overdoses and one man’s
death—counseled against relief.
Anderson then filed two pro se motions, the first seeking leave to amend his
motion for compassionate release and the second for reconsideration. The judge struck
both submissions because Anderson was represented at the time by counsel.
On appeal, Anderson does not engage with the judge’s determination that he
failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction.
Although we are mindful of Anderson’s pro se status, he still must comply with Rule
28(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and explain why the judge's decision
was incorrect. See Atkins v. Gilbert, 52 F.4th 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2022). Regardless, the judge
needed only “one good reason” to deny compassionate release, United States v. Rucker,
27 F.4th 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2022), and here the judge acted within his discretion by
finding that the factors in § 3553(a)—particularly the need for Anderson’s sentence to
reflect the seriousness of the offense—weighed against release.

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No. 25-2165 Page 3
Anderson does challenge the judge’s order striking his pro se motions to
reconsider and amend. In Anderson’s view, the judge did not realize that Anderson’s
communications with his attorney had broken down, effectively severing the attorney-
client relationship. But we lack jurisdiction over that order, which postdated
Anderson’s notice of appeal by more than two months. See United States v. Taylor,
628 F.3d 420, 424 (7th Cir. 2010); Moran Foods, Inc. Mid-Atlantic Development Co. LLC,
476 F.3d 436, 440–41 (7th Cir. 2007). A notice of appeal must designate the order being
appealed. See F ED. R. APP . P. 3(a)(1), (c)(1)(B); United States v. Bonk, 967 F.3d 643, 649
(7th Cir. 2020). We would have jurisdiction over the order striking the pro se
submissions only if Anderson had amended his notice of appeal or filed a second notice
of appeal. See Bonk, 967 F.3d at 649.
Anderson also contends, for the first time, that his right to due process was
violated because the judge did not serve him with a copy of the order denying his
motion for compassionate release. But Anderson waived this argument by not raising it
first in the district court. See Crothersville Lighthouse Tabernacle Church, Inc. v. Church
Mutual Ins. Co., 168 F.4th 483, 490–91 (7th Cir. 2026); Hess v. Bresney, 784 F.3d 1154, 1161
(7th Cir. 2015) (applying rule to pro se litigants).
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the denial of Anderson’s motion for compassionate
release and DISMISS his appeal with respect to the judge’s order striking his motions to
reconsider and amend.

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