United States of America v. Glenn D. Wooden

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2702
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GLENN D. WOODEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 3:19-cr-30004-CRL-KLM-1 — Colleen R. Lawless, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED O CTOBER 28, 2025 — DECIDED A PRIL 30, 2026
____________________
Before BRENNAN , Chief Judge, and JACKSON -A KIWUMI and
LEE, Circuit Judges.
BRENNAN , Chief Judge. Across three transactions, Glenn
Wooden sold nearly 100 grams of methamphetamine to con-
fidential informants. When police searched his apartment,
they found another 222 grams prepared for distribution. After
his arrest, Wooden admitted on video to selling methamphet-
amine.

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2 No. 24-2702
After a jury trial, Wooden was convicted of possessing and
distributing methamphetamine. In the district court and on
appeal, he contends his convictions should be reversed, and
his sentence vacated, because the government failed to prove
he sold “illegal” methamphetamine. In his view, the Con-
trolled Substances Act covers only the “optical isomers” of
methamphetamine, not the generic drug. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 812,
841(b)(1). So, it was not enough for the government to put on
expert testimony from a Drug Enforcement Administration
chemist, confirming the “methamphetamine” Wooden sold
was 98% pure d-methamphetamine hydrochloride—in lay-
man’s terms, crystal meth. Rather, prosecutors had to prove
the drugs contained specific kinds of molecules.
Wooden submits the district court erred during trial by
not properly instructing the jury and not taking precautions
as to witness testimony. He also contends insufficient evi-
dence supported the drug quantity for which he was con-
victed. Underlying these challenges is Wooden’s primary as-
sertion that “[n]ot all methamphetamine is illegal as a matter
of federal law.” Because this is not correct, we affirm the dis-
trict court.
I
In 2018, the West Central Illinois Task Force learned about
Wooden’s drug dealing from an informant, so it organized a
series of controlled buys to catch him in the act. Each transac-
tion involved more meth, and Wooden made over $2,600 in
profits. Based on audio and video recordings of the buys, of-
ficers secured a warrant to search Wooden’s apartment.
There, they recovered many of the marked bills from the drug
sales and a Crown Royal whisky box full of plastic baggies,
each containing a different amount of methamphetamine.

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No. 24-2702 3
Law enforcement arrested Wooden after the third con-
trolled buy. In a videotaped interview, he admitted that he
and an associate had picked up two “bricks” (kilograms) of
ice methamphetamine from Iowa the day before, broken them
down into smaller amounts, and packaged them for distribu-
tion. He also admitted to distributing two “zips” (ounces) of
meth during the controlled buy earlier that morning. Wooden
made clear he knew the drugs were “hot”—slang for “illegal.”
Based on this evidence, Wooden was indicted on three counts
of distributing, and one count of possessing, “methampheta-
mine (actual).”
Wooden chose to represent himself at trial. The govern-
ment called six witnesses who testified about the controlled
buys and offered evidence that the drugs Wooden sold were
methamphetamine. One witness, DEA Chemist Louis
Chavez, confirmed the weights of “pure methamphetamine”
Wooden sold based on several rounds of standard lab testing.
Wooden did not challenge the government’s characteriza-
tion of the controlled buys or his confession. Rather, his main
defense was that the government had not proved the exact
molecular composition of the “methamphetamine” he distrib-
uted. Wooden repeatedly made this argument:
• In his opening statement, he declared, “[t]he
methamphetamine that the Government al-
leged I sold and possessed, they must prove
it’s criminalized.”
• He proffered his own jury instructions,
which would require the government to
prove he distributed “a controlled substance

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4 No. 24-2702
being methamphetamine, its salts, isomers,
or salts of isomers.”
• He asked every witness if they knew “what
chemical formula makes methamphetamine
illegal.”
• And his post-trial motion for a judgment of
acquittal laid out “case law” supporting his
theory.
To combat Wooden’s frequent suggestions that “some
methamphetamine is legal,” the government asked the dis-
trict court to take judicial notice of the fact that “the distribu-
tion of controlled substances, including methamphetamine,
[is] illegal under federal law.” The government noted that
methamphetamine “is listed in the statute by name”—unlike
some other controlled substances, which are defined by chem-
ical formula. Wooden vehemently opposed the government’s
request, insisting “that methamphetamine has a chemical for-
mula that is illegal inside of it, inside of methamphetamine.”
Wooden did not always clearly explain his theory at trial.
But in his motion for a judgment of acquittal, he identified the
basis for his argument. Relying on language in this court’s cat-
egorical approach cases, Wooden believed the Controlled
Substances Act criminalizes only some methamphetamine
isomers, not the stimulant more generally. See United States v.
De La Torre, 940 F.3d 938, 951 (7th Cir. 2019); Aguirre-Zuniga v.
Garland, 37 F.4th 446, 451–53 (7th Cir. 2022). As Wooden in-
sisted, “isomers and salts are the chemical formulas of meth-
amphetamine.”
The district court disagreed with Wooden. It provided a
statement to the jury clarifying that all methamphetamine is

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No. 24-2702 5
illegal. And the court instructed the jury using the Seventh
Circuit’s pattern instruction, which employs “methampheta-
mine” as a generic term. THE WILLIAM J. BAUER PATTERN
C RIMINAL JURY I NSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH C IRCUIT 846–47
(2023 ed.).
The jury found Wooden guilty on all counts. Due to the
large quantities of methamphetamine he trafficked, he faced
higher mandatory minimums. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). Ulti-
mately, the district court sentenced him to twenty-five years
in prison—a below-Guidelines sentence reflecting his prior
history of state drug crimes and his responsibility for over 300
grams of “ICE methamphetamine,” or “d-methamphetamine
hydrochloride” of at least 80% purity. U.S. SENT’ G GUIDELINES
M ANUAL § 2D1.1.
II
Nearly every argument in this appeal hinges on one issue:
the meaning of the word “methamphetamine” in the Con-
trolled Substances Act. Pub. L. 91-513 (1970). The government,
relying on this circuit’s pattern jury instructions, uses it as a
broad term covering a range of different drugs. By contrast,
Wooden thinks the statute defines “methamphetamine” at a
molecular level, requiring the government to prove the sub-
stance he sold was made of prohibited isomers.
He raises two challenges that depend on the answer to this
question: whether the district court erred by offering the pat-
tern jury instruction for methamphetamine convictions, and
whether the government supplied sufficient evidence of the
accurate drug weight to trigger mandatory minimums. We re-
view de novo whether jury instructions accurately state the
law. United States v. Bonin, 932 F.3d 523, 537–38 (7th Cir. 2019).

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6 No. 24-2702
The same is true of a sufficiency of the evidence challenge
properly raised in a motion for a judgment of acquittal. United
States v. Godinez, 7 F.4th 628, 638 (7th Cir. 2021).1
A. Background
To see why Wooden’s arguments fail as a matter of law, it
is important to understand the structure of the Controlled
Substances Act and some basic chemistry.
1. The Act
In 1970, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act
as part of a broad effort to consolidate and modernize federal
drug controls. Responding to rampant drug abuse through-
out the 1950s and 1960s, Congress repealed almost all prior
1 The government believes Wooden waived, or at least forfeited, both
his jury instruction and his sufficiency of the evidence challenges. He pre-
served the latter in his motion for a judgment of acquittal. But he explicitly
told the district court he had no objection to the main jury instruction he
challenges on appeal. This court, however, has “hesitate[d]” to find waiver
“where counsel merely engaged in a rote call-and-response colloquy with
the district judge” during a jury instructions conference. United States v.
Thomas, 970 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation modified). More to the
point, Wooden repeatedly raised his “isomer” theory at every critical
point of the trial, and he objected to another one of the government’s jury
instructions touching on the same issue.
The touchstone of waiver is the “intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right.” Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th
887, 895 (7th Cir. 2023). And forfeiture only occurs when a party does not
“inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for the objec-
tion before the jury retires to deliberate.” United States v. Johnson, 47 F.4th
535, 542 n.2 (7th Cir. 2022). Given that Wooden represented himself and
reiterated the same theory throughout his trial, we cannot say he inten-
tionally relinquished this argument, nor did he fail to inform the court of
his concerns. Accordingly, de novo review is appropriate.

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No. 24-2702 7
drug legislation and replaced it with the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. See Pub. L.
No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970). Title II of that Act, known as
the Controlled Substances Act, became the centerpiece of the
reform. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904.
Congress structured the Act to strike a balance between
two goals. It recognized that many controlled substances
“have a useful and legitimate medical purpose and are neces-
sary to maintain the health and general welfare of the Ameri-
can people.” 21 U.S.C. § 801(1). Yet it emphasized that the “im-
proper use of controlled substances,” as well as their “illegal
importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession,”
have “a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and
general welfare of the American people.” Id. § 801(2).
Accordingly, the Act designates a broad range of sub-
stances as “controlled,” but it varies the level of regulation
based on the likelihood of abuse and genuine medical benefits
of each substance. Id. § 812(b). Congress also created path-
ways to obtain exemptions, allowing controlled substances to
go on the market in limited circumstances. See, e.g., id.
§ 811(g). Of course, it is always illegal to “manufacture, dis-
tribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance” outside of the
legitimate channels approved by the Act. Id. § 841(a)(1).
Before 1970, no federal legislation identified methamphet-
amine by name. That changed with the Controlled Substances
Act. Now, “[a]ny substance … which contains any quantity of
methamphetamine, including its salts, isomers, and salts of
isomers,” falls under the Act’s regulations. 21 U.S.C. § 812

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8 No. 24-2702
Schedule III(a)(3); see also id. Schedule II(c).2 In 1988, Congress
added a second provision mentioning methamphetamine:
mandatory minimums for offenses involving certain amounts
of “methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers”
or mixtures containing “a detectable amount” of the same. 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1); see Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6470(g), 102 Stat. 4378.
The Act does not define “methamphetamine.” But it does
define another key term: “‘isomer’ means the optical isomer.”
21 U.S.C. § 802(14). Congress, then, made two related choices
when it regulated methamphetamine. It limited the kinds of
isomers covered by the statute to “optical isomers,” but it did
not elaborate on the meaning of “methamphetamine.” Both
choices are at issue in this case.
2. The Science
Wooden’s statutory argument also requires some basic
chemistry knowledge. His reasoning implicates the phrase
“optical isomer[s],” which are not further defined by statute.
21 U.S.C. § 802(14). And it touches on ambiguities in the way
scientists use the word “methamphetamine.”
Isomers are molecules with the same chemical formula but
different arrangements of atoms in space—differences that of-
ten change the substance’s properties. M ARTIN S. SILBERBERG,
PRINCIPLES OF GENERAL C HEMISTRY 84 (3d ed. 2012). Roughly
speaking, there are three kinds of isomers: optical, geometric,
2 By regulation, all substances containing methamphetamine have
been reclassified as Schedule II controlled substances. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 1308.12(d) (2026). This has been the case since 1973. See Schedule of Con-
trolled Substances, 38 Fed. Reg. 8254, 8256 (Mar. 30, 1973) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. § 308.12).

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No. 24-2702 9
and positional. Id. at 467–70.3 Optical isomers come in pairs:
the two molecules not only have the same chemical formula,
but all the atoms are in the exact same order. Id. at 468–69. The
only difference between them is that they are mirror images
of one another, like a right and left hand. Id.
This matters because “methamphetamine” has optical
isomers. Sometimes, scientists use the word “methampheta-
mine” to describe specific molecules sharing the chemical for-
mula C 10 H15 N. That molecule can exist as two optical isomers:
dextromethamphetamine (or d-methamphetamine) and levo-
methamphetamine (or l-methamphetamine). These molecules
have vastly different effects on the human body, so they are
valued differently in the drug market.4 As this court once
noted, “[p]roducers, suppliers, and users of methampheta-
mine want to obtain d-methamphetamine, not l-methamphet-
amine, because the latter form has little or no physiological
effect and is worthless.” United States v. McEntire, 153 F.3d
424, 431 (7th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, d-methamphetamine
products have been tightly regulated for years, but the less-
potent l-methamphetamine has been an active ingredient in
over-the-counter inhalers for nearly a century.5
3 Wooden treats these three kinds of isomers as if they are chemically
equivalent. But positional isomers (“constitutional” or “structural”
isomers) “have different arrangements of atoms,” while “stereoisomers”
(optical and geometric isomers) “have the same atom arrangement but dif-
ferent spatial orientations.” S ILBERBERG, supra, at 459.
4 See John Mendelson et al., Human Pharmacology of the Methampheta-
mine Stereoisomers, 80 C LIN . PHARMACOL. T HER . 403, 404–05 (2006).
5 Donald R. Wesson, David E. Smith & John P. Morgan, The Interna-
tional Scheduling of OTC Inhaler Ingredients: An Abuse Perspective, 18 J.
PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 151, 151–52 (1986).

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10 No. 24-2702
The C 10 H15 N molecule also has positional isomers. One
commonly cited example is a food additive known as N,N-
Dimethylphenethylamine, which has a “sweet fishy aroma”
and is used to flavor processed foods. Scientists do not com-
monly refer to these positional isomers as “methampheta-
mine,” instead reserving that term for the optical isomers.6
Beyond these molecular definitions, scientists use the
word “methamphetamine” in another way. Properly speak-
ing, it refers to “an equal mixture of dextromethamphetamine
and levomethamphetamine” known as dl-methampheta-
mine.7 This mixture flooded American streets in the late 1960s
because it was the main product created by illicit amateur
labs. Pharmaceutical companies and industrial scale opera-
tions have the capacity to refine dl-methamphetamine into
pure d-methamphetamine; home brewers usually do not have
the means or the motive to do so.8
6 Rodney A. Higgs & Richard A. Glennon, Stimulus Properties of Ring-
Methyl Amphetamine Analogs, 37 P HARMACOL . BIOCHEM. & B EHAVIOR 835,
835 (1990) (“the term[] methamphetamine” is “commonly employed to re-
fer only to the N-methyl analog of amphetamine,” not positional isomers);
see GEORGE A. B URDOCK , FENAROLI ’S HANDBOOK OF FLAVOR INGREDIENTS
499 (6th ed. 2010).
7 Rama Yasaei & Abdolreza Saadabadi, Methamphetamine, Nat’l Libr.
Med. (May 1, 2023), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK535356/.
8 See M. Douglas Anglin et al., History of the Methamphetamine Problem,
32 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 137, 138 (2000); Crime in America—Why 8 Billion
Amphetamines?: Hearings on H. Res. 17 Before the H.R. Select Comm. On
Crime, 91st Cong. 754–56 (1969) [hereinafter Hearings] (Abbott Laborato-
ries representative doubted that most street “methamphetamine” was “d-
methamphetamine” because “that form of the drug is considerably more
difficult to manufacture because … the levo (l) isomer must be removed.”).

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No. 24-2702 11
B. Definition of Methamphetamine
What sense of the word “methamphetamine” did Con-
gress enact in 21 U.S.C. §§ 812 and 841? Because these statutes
have not been amended since enactment, this question must
be answered by looking to “the text’s ‘ordinary, contempo-
rary, common meaning.’” Hulce v. Zipongo, Inc., 132 F.4th 493,
497–98 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Delaware v. Pennsylvania, 598
U.S. 115, 128 (2023)). In other words, “we should consider the
meaning ‘at the time Congress enacted the statute,’” not our
understanding of the words today. Id. at 498 n.3 (quoting Wis.
Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S. 274, 277 (2018)). To ascer-
tain the ordinary meaning of words not defined in older stat-
utes, courts can look to dictionaries and encyclopedias from
the time of enactment, the statutory context, relevant caselaw,
the regulatory backdrop, and other sources that might shed
light on the semantic meaning of the relevant terms. Wis.
Cent., 585 U.S. at 277–80.
We proceed in two steps. First, we examine the text of the
relevant statutes. Second, we consider evidence of the ordi-
nary meaning of the word “methamphetamine” at the time
Congress passed these statutes. This analysis leads us to hold
that the word “methamphetamine,” as used in the Controlled
Substances Act, refers to the forms of the substance C 10 H15N
commonly used for their stimulating effects. “Methampheta-
mine,” WEBSTER ’ S THIRD NEW I NT’ L DICTIONARY 1422 (1971).
1. Statutory Text
The full text of 21 U.S.C. § 812 makes “[a]ny substance …
which contains any quantity of methamphetamine, including
its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers” a controlled substance.
21 U.S.C. § 812 Schedule III (a)(3). On its face, this provision

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12 No. 24-2702
does not define the word “methamphetamine.” It instead re-
veals the sweeping manner in which Congress sought to con-
trol the distribution of methamphetamine.
The Act does not label “methamphetamine,” standing
alone, a controlled substance. Rather, it covers “any substance
… which contains any quantity of methamphetamine.” Id.
§ 812 Schedule III (a)(3) (emphasis added). For a jury to find
someone guilty of distributing methamphetamine, then, the
prosecution only needs to show the substance contains any
quantity of methamphetamine, however that word is defined.
Wooden reads the statute differently. In his view, the
phrase “its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers” defines the
word “methamphetamine.” So, for the prosecution to secure
a conviction under this statute, Wooden thinks it must prove
the existence of a “salt,” “isomer,” or “salt of isomers” in the
substance. And because 21 U.S.C. § 802(14) defines “isomer”
as “the optical isomer,” he concludes that the word “metham-
phetamine” means “optical isomers (of methamphetamine).”
There are several errors with Wooden’s reading. For one,
it ignores the fact that the statute does not purport to define
the word “methamphetamine”—a reason for pause, given
Congress’s willingness to define specific terms elsewhere in
the Act. See id. § 802. For another, Wooden’s interpretation
creates downstream problems. It effectively reads two key
words out of the statute: “including” and “methampheta-
mine” itself. His interpretation “runs squarely into one of the
most basic canons of [statutory] interpretation: that ‘every
clause and word of a statute should, if possible, be given ef-
fect.’” United States v. Hyatt, 28 F.4th 776, 783 (7th Cir. 2022)
(collecting cases and citing A NTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.

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No. 24-2702 13
GARNER , R EADING LAW : THE I NTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
174 (2012)).
Consider Wooden’s reading of the word “including.”
Again, the provision governs “any substance … which con-
tains any quantity of methamphetamine, including its salts,
isomers, and salts of isomers.” 21 U.S.C. § 812 Schedule III
(a)(3) (emphasis added). Wooden makes a crucial assump-
tion: to him the word “including” limits the scope of sub-
stances covered by the statute. That move stretches the text
too far.
An example illustrates this point. Imagine a person tells
his friend, “I will pay for dinner, including appetizers and
desserts.” The word “dinner” is an expansive word which
could encompass a variety of foods—appetizers, drinks,
soups, salads, desserts, and main courses. But an ordinary
person would likely assume that an entrée is part of a “din-
ner.” So it would be strange if that person stuck the friend
with the bill for the entrées, pleading, “By ‘dinner,’ I never
meant the whole meal—I just meant appetizers and desserts.
That’s why I specified those two.” This interpretation would
contravene the meaning of both “dinner” (which usually in-
cludes a main course) and “including” (which, in this context,
identifies some specific examples as part of the general term).
So too here: “including” illustrates the reach of the statute,
showing that many substances containing forms of metham-
phetamine fall within its ambit. The word “including” does
not limit or redefine the word “methamphetamine.” See also
SCALIA & GARNER , supra, at 132–33 (“the word include does not
ordinarily introduce an exhaustive list”).
Further, Wooden’s reading creates an incongruity be-
tween the schedule of controlled substances and the

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14 No. 24-2702
mandatory minimum provisions. Unlike § 812, § 841 does not
include the words “any substance” or “including” when it
discusses methamphetamine. It instead sets punishments
based on certain weights of “methamphetamine” and “its iso-
mers” separately. Id. The statute offers two tracks for increas-
ing the mandatory minimum sentence applied to a metham-
phetamine crime. First, it covers those who traffic certain
amounts of pure “methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and
salts of isomers.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), (b)(1)(B)(viii).
Second, it covers those who commit crimes involving “a mix-
ture or substance containing a detectable amount of metham-
phetamine, its salts, isomers, or salts of its isomers.” Id.
Wooden invites us to import the “definition” of metham-
phetamine—“optical isomers”—from the schedule of
controlled substances in § 812 to the mandatory minimum
provisions in § 841. Taken literally, this argument reads the
word “methamphetamine” out of § 841. If we replaced “meth-
amphetamine” with “isomers,” § 841 would effectively pun-
ish the illegal distribution of “methamphetamine isomers”
twice. Embracing this redundancy would invalidate Con-
gress’s choice to identify isomers apart from the generic term
“methamphetamine,” both here and in § 812.
2. Ordinary Meaning Analysis
We turn now to the ordinary meaning of the word “meth-
amphetamine,” as it was understood when Congress enacted
the Controlled Substances Act. This review of the regulatory
history and popular understanding of the word leads us to
reject Wooden’s cramped construction of this statute. In 1970,
scientists, journalists, and regulators all recognized the dis-
tinctions between different methamphetamine compounds.
Yet the Act uses a generic term, rather than listing specific

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No. 24-2702 15
isomers. So, we conclude that the label “methamphetamine”
covers a range of substances known by various scientific
terms, street names, and pharmaceutical trademarks.
Scientists have long known about the differences between
the isomers of the C 10H15N molecule, recognizing how the
physiological effects of a substance vary based on the isomer
at issue.9 No new scientific developments after the enactment
of the statute have confused the meaning of the text. Congress
chose “methamphetamine,” not d- or l-methamphetamine,
even though the more specific, technical terms were available.
The regulatory backdrop reflects this understanding. In
1965, Congress intervened to address the global crisis of am-
phetamine abuse, which arose in the wake of World War II.10
So it passed the Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965—
a direct predecessor of the Controlled Substances Act. This
statute mentioned only “amphetamine,” not “methampheta-
mine.” Pub. L. No. 89-74, § 3(a), 79 Stat. 226, 227 (1965). But
the law gave the FDA authority to designate any drug that is
9 See, e.g., Gordon A. Alles, The Comparative Physiological Actions of dl-
β-Phenylisopropylamines, 47 J. PHARMACOL . EXP. T HER . 339, 339–40, 351–52
(1933); Mendelson et al., supra note 4, at 405 & n.8–10 (collecting articles
from 1939 and 1940); F.L. Golla, J.M. Blackburn, & S. Graham, A Compari-
son Between Some of the Effects of Isomyn (Benzedrine) and of Methylisomyn, 48
J. M ENT. SCI . 48, 49–50 (1940) (noting that d-methamphetamine, or d-me-
thylisomyn, may be more dangerous than benzedrine); A LFRED B URGER ,
M EDICINAL C HEMISTRY : CHEMISTRY, B IOCHEMISTRY , T HERAPEUTIC AND
PHARMACOLOGICAL A CTION OF N ATURAL AND S YNTHETIC DRUGS 312 (1st
ed. 1951) (seminal pharmacology textbook notes the difference between
Pervitin, a German brand-name for methamphetamine, and “the dextro
isomer of Pervitin, called Methedrine.”).
10 See Anglin et al., supra note 8, at 138.

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16 No. 24-2702
“habit forming because of its stimulant effect on the central
nervous system” as a controlled substance. Id.
Following an extensive public comment period, the FDA
chose to subject methamphetamine to additional controls.
Listing of Additional Drugs Subject to Control, 31 Fed. Reg.
4679, 4679–80 (Mar. 19, 1966) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 166);
see also Regulations Implementing Drug Abuse Control
Amendments of 1965, 31 Fed. Reg. 1071, 1071–74 (Jan. 27,
1966). Meth had exploded in popularity a few years earlier,
thanks to the ease with which amateurs could set up their
own labs and cheaply produce crude dl-methamphetamine.
Roger C. Smith, Traffic in Amphetamines: Patterns of Illegal Man-
ufacture and Distribution, 2 J. PSYCHADELIC D RUGS 20, 20–22
(1969). So the FDA promulgated a regulation targeting the
most dangerous substances: “all drugs … containing any
amount of … d-, dl- Methamphetamine and their salts.” 21
C.F.R. § 166.3 (1967 ed.); see also 21 C.F.R. § 320.3 (1969 ed.).
This regulation shows that rule makers knew how to sin-
gle out different forms of “methamphetamine.” They distin-
guished between an optical isomer (d-methamphetamine)
and a mixture (dl-methamphetamine), all while excluding the
less potent l-methamphetamine isomer. They targeted the
most deadly and prevalent forms of the drug available on the
market at this time. Unlike Congress, the FDA chose not to
control all kinds of “methamphetamine.”
By the late 1960s, the public also became aware of the
deadly effects of methamphetamine abuse. Methampheta-
mine, often known as “speed,” was seen as an unusually dan-
gerous variant of the general class of amphetamines. And
Congress grew concerned with the “horror stories about the
‘speed-freak’”—young people so addicted to

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No. 24-2702 17
methamphetamine that they entered states of panic, paranoia,
malnutrition, and unpredictable behavior. Hearings, supra
note 8, at 601.
Because this crisis arose in the mid-1960s, dictionaries in
1970 had not yet defined the word “methamphetamine,” as
distinct from the general term “amphetamines.” But a 1969
New York Times “Medicine” column explained the different
substances in the amphetamine “drug family.” It identified
both the generic names of the substances and common brand
names. William K. Stevens, Trouble for the ‘Speedsters,’ N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 1969, at E11. These included “amphetamine it-
self (Benzedrine), dextro amphetamine (Dexedrine), metham-
phetamine (Methedrine and De[s]oxyn), and phenmetrazine
(Preludin).” Id. Yet the column singled out the “most common
amphetamine used by the ‘drug-using subculture’” as “meth-
amphetamine – Methedrine and De[s]oxyn to the pharmacist,
‘speed’ to the East Village mainliner.” Id. The public, then,
would recognize the generic term “methamphetamine” as a
catch-all term for different brand names (Methedrine and
Desoxyn) and slang terms (speed), without worrying about
the differences between different isomers.
Against this backdrop, Congress chose to regulate meth-
amphetamine by name, not chemical formula, in the
Controlled Substances Act. Congress could have specified dif-
ferent isomers if it wanted. And the rest of the Act shows it
singled out substances by their chemical formulas when ap-
propriate. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 812 Schedule I (c)(18)–(28)
(chemical formulas), with id. at Schedule II (a) and Schedule III
(e) (using umbrella terms like “Opium” and “Anabolic ster-
oids”). Here, Congress chose the generic term.

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18 No. 24-2702
Ultimately, Congress used a word broad enough to ensure
substances containing d-, l-, and dl-methamphetamine fell
within the statute’s ambit. In line with the interpreters of the
1960s, we read the word “methamphetamine” as covering
more than just d- or l-methamphetamine isomers in isolation.
C. Subsequent Caselaw
Wooden’s reading of the Act departs from a near-
universal understanding of its broad scope. He thinks our
categorical approach cases require this change, but he is not
correct. To show why, we first review the post-enactment
implementation of these statutes. Then, we explain how our
holding does not contradict this court’s precedent.
1. Post-Enactment Developments
Courts do not require prosecutors to prove “methamphet-
amine” contains optical isomers—and they have not since the
1970s. In most early appellate cases reviewing convictions un-
der 21 U.S.C. § 841, courts assumed that “methamphetamine”
was a generic term covering different products. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cannon, 472 F.2d 144, 144 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Olson, 504 F.2d 1222, 1223 (9th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Santillo, 507 F.2d 629, 630–32 (3d Cir. 1975);
United States v. Thor, 512 F.2d 811, 812–13 (5th Cir. 1975); Dunn
v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 103 (1979). Of course, judges
knew about different kinds of meth, including d-metham-
phetamine hydrochloride. United States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d
217, 219 (2d Cir. 1973) (“methamphetamine hydrochloride—
popularly known as ‘speed’”); United States v. Eastwood, 489
F.2d 818, 819 (5th Cir. 1973) (“approximately 100,000 tablets
of d-methamphetamine hydrochloride”). They identified dl-
methamphetamine by name. United States v. Schmaltz, 562

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No. 24-2702 19
F.2d 558, 559 (8th Cir. 1977). And they noted the importance
of chemical testing to distinguish “pure methamphetamine”
from mixed substances. See, e.g., United States v. Welebir, 498
F.2d 346, 348–50 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Martin, 509
F.2d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Johnson, 513
F.2d 819, 822 n.1 (2d Cir. 1975) (discussing procedures used
for testing). Still, methamphetamine was treated generically,
even if there was clear evidence of an isomer or salt form. See,
e.g., United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385, 390 (9th Cir. 1974)
(noting the statute implicates “[m]ethamphetamine, in all its
forms,” including “desoxyn, a tablet form of methampheta-
mine”); cf. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 424–27 (1973)
(generic methamphetamine offense under predecessor stat-
ute, but the facts indicate dl-methamphetamine).
The regulatory history also shows this statute covered
more than just d-methamphetamine isomers. Six years after
Congress passed the Act, for example, the DEA created ex-
emptions for specific products containing methamphetamine
through 21 U.S.C. § 811(g). Though the “Vicks Inhaler” only
included “L-Desoxyephedrine” (l-methamphetamine), and
Rynal Spray contained dl-methamphetamine hydrochloride,
both products needed exemptions from the Act. See Excluded
Non-Narcotic Substances, 41 Fed. Reg. 16552, 16552–53 (Apr.
20, 1976) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1308.22). There would
be no need for pharmaceutical companies to pursue exemp-
tions if the statute’s text did not cover these substances.
Moreover, dictionaries published in the 1970s confirmed
the ordinary meaning of methamphetamine. Early definitions
of the word do not distinguish between the different metham-
phetamine isomers per se. Instead, they define it as “an amine
C 10H15 N used in the form of its crystalline hydrochloride as a

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20 No. 24-2702
stimulant for the central nervous system and in the treatment
of obesity.” “Methamphetamine,” W EBSTER ’ S N EW
C OLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 723 (1973 & 1975); Cf. “Methamphet-
amine,” W EBSTER ’ S THIRD NEW I NT’ L DICTIONARY 1422 (1971)
(“an amine C 6H 5CH2 CH(CH3)NHCH3 used in the form of its
crystalline hydrochloride as a stimulant for the central nerv-
ous system and in the treatment of obesity”), and W EBSTER ’ S
NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 894 (1979) (“a white crystalline de-
rivative of amphetamine, C10H15N, used in the form of its hy-
drochloride as a drug with a stronger stimulating action than
amphetamine”). If there was any lingering doubt, the ordi-
nary meaning of “methamphetamine” covered crystal meth-
amphetamine when Congress added mandatory minimums
in 1988. See 21 U.S.C. § 841; “Methamphetamine,” W EBSTER ’ S
NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF A MERICAN ENGLISH 854 (1988); see
also id. (defining “Methedrine” as the “trademark for metham-
phetamine hydrochloride” when that “compound [is] used as
a drug”); id. at 853 (defining “meth” as slang for “Methed-
rine”); id. at 1288 (“speed” can be slang for “Methedrine”).
Courts did not express doubts about using “methamphet-
amine” as a generic term until the 1990s—and that was be-
cause of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, not the text
of the statute. In the first version of the Guidelines, the penal-
ties for crimes involving “Methamphetamine” and “L-Meth-
amphetamine” differed in the drug equivalency tables.
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (1987 ed.) By 1995, though, the Guidelines
dropped the reference to l-methamphetamine, replacing it
with a threefold distinction between “methamphetamine,”
“methamphetamine (actual),” and “ice,” which persists to
this day. Compare id. (1994 ed.), with id. (1995 ed.) and (2025
ed.). The Guidelines define “ice” as “a mixture or substance
containing d-methamphetamine hydrochloride of at least

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No. 24-2702 21
80% purity.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. As in this case, many prosecu-
tors charge meth cases according to the Guidelines, not the
statute.
Both the Third and Eleventh Circuits have recognized that
the former Guidelines required more specificity than the stat-
ute. Each court vacated a sentence because the government
failed to distinguish whether the “methamphetamine” in-
volved was d-methamphetamine or l-methamphetamine.
United States v. Bogusz, 43 F.3d 82, 86–92 (3d Cir. 1994); United
States v. Patrick, 983 F.2d 206, 208–11 (11th Cir. 1993). But in
both cases, the court did not question the underlying convic-
tion, which only required the government to prove the exist-
ence of generic “methamphetamine.” See also United States v.
Carroll, 6 F.3d 735, 742–43 (11th Cir. 1993) (same).
The Third Circuit also declined to import this distinction
into the text of the statute. In United States v. DeJulius, 121 F.3d
891 (3d Cir. 1997), a defendant pleaded guilty to being a mem-
ber of a conspiracy to distribute nineteen pounds of metham-
phetamine. Id. at 892. When the government tried to apply the
ten-year mandatory minimum statute, though, the defendant
objected. Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 841. He argued the statute required
the government to prove “the methamphetamine in question
was actually D-methamphetamine as opposed to L-metham-
phetamine.” DeJulius, 121 F.3d at 892. As here, the govern-
ment did not prove the precise isomeric content of the meth-
amphetamine in question. The district court instead found the
defendant accountable for “111.6 grams” of “DL-
methamphetamine hydrochloride” based on an expert chem-
ist’s testimony. Id. It then assumed half of the substance was
d-methamphetamine and half was l-methamphetamine,

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22 No. 24-2702
declining to apply the ten-year mandatory minimum as a re-
sult. Id. at 893.
In the Third Circuit’s view, the case presented the question
of “whether ‘methamphetamine’ under 21 U.S.C. [§ 841]
means D-methamphetamine.” DeJulius, 121 F.3d at 893. Look-
ing to the “plain language of the statute,” the court concluded
it “makes no distinction between the different isomeric types
of methamphetamine” by “its explicit terms.” Id. at 893–94.
Rather, both isomeric forms—as well as the mixture dl-meth-
amphetamine and salts like dl-methamphetamine hydrochlo-
ride—all qualified as “methamphetamine.” See id. at 894 (“[I]t
makes no difference for purposes of the mandatory minimum
statute whether the substance in question is D-methampheta-
mine, L-methamphetamine, or DL-methamphetamine.”). So,
the Third Circuit reversed because “the district court erred by
not applying the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence.” Id.
at 895. The government had proved that “111.6 grams of dl-
methamphetamine were attributable to” the defendant, satis-
fying the requirement of proving actual “methamphetamine”
under the statute. Id.11
We agree with the Third Circuit’s analysis. Prosecutors do
not need to differentiate between the d- and l-methampheta-
mine isomers to secure a conviction or ask courts to apply
mandatory minimums under 21 U.S.C. § 841.
11 DeJulius also noted the Sentencing Commission removed its refer-
ence to l-methamphetamine after the Third Circuit decided Bogusz, ren-
dering that case “virtually obsolete.” 121 F.3d at 894. The distinction be-
tween the different isomers, it concluded, was only relevant “for those few
defendants whose conduct occurred” before the amendment and “for
whom the mandatory statutory minimum is not applicable.” Id. at 894–95.

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No. 24-2702 23
2. Categorical Approach Cases
Before the district court, Wooden insisted he had “case
law” supporting his theory, which otherwise contradicts the
text and history of the statute. But the precedent he invokes—
United States v. De La Torre, 940 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2019), and
Aguirre-Zuniga v. Garland, 37 F.4th 446 (7th Cir. 2022)—con-
cerns a different area of law: categorical approach cases,
where this court considered whether prior state-level meth-
amphetamine crimes qualified as predicate offenses for
heightened penalties. Both cases examined Indiana statutes,
asking whether they were categorically broader than their
federal counterpart.
De La Torre acknowledged that the text of 21 U.S.C. § 812
and the Indiana code were identical, making them a “seeming
match.” 940 F.3d at 951. But “a closer look reveal[ed] other-
wise,” because the federal statute “defines the term ‘isomer’
to mean ‘the optical isomer,’” while the state statute did not
define “isomer” at all. Id. The court concluded that all isomers,
including geometric and positional isomers, fell within the
state statute’s ambit. Summarizing this finding, this court
loosely said, “[F]or purposes of federal drug offenses, meth-
amphetamine includes only its optical isomers.” Id.
Assuming this conclusion, Aguirre-Zuniga considered an-
other Indiana statute, ruling that it was also “overbroad” be-
cause “the Indiana definition includes something more than
just optical isomers of methamphetamine.” 37 F.4th at 451
(quoting De La Torre, 940 F.3d at 951). Again, the relevant In-
diana statute did not define the term “isomer.” This time, the
government tried to argue the statute covered no isomers at
all, meaning it was not categorically broader than its federal
analog. This court rejected that argument. Relying on a brief

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24 No. 24-2702
discussion of the science of methamphetamine isomers, we
said, “If the Indiana Statute does not cover any isomers, it ar-
guably would not reach methamphetamine itself,” rendering
that statute “impotent—a criminal statute that criminalizes
nothing.” Id. at 453. So this court declined to read “isomer”
out of the state statute, finding it categorically broader than
21 U.S.C. § 841.
In Wooden’s view, these cases stand for the proposition
that the “federal definition of methamphetamine includes
only its optical isomers.” De La Torre, 940 F.3d at 951; see also
United States v. Turner, 47 F.4th 509, 520 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Fed-
eral law … criminalized only optical isomers of methamphet-
amine.”). But this reading does not match the text of the fed-
eral statute, which treats “methamphetamine” and “its iso-
mers” as separate categories. See supra, II.B.1. Moreover, De La
Torre and Aguirre-Zuniga do not purport to interpret the word
“methamphetamine.” Both cases instead focus on the mean-
ing of the word “isomers” in the federal statute, contrasting it
with Indiana law’s treatment of the same term. Because those
cases address a completely different legal question, they do
not apply here.
D. Application to Wooden’s Challenges
Based on the foregoing, we decline to follow Wooden into
an interpretation of the word “methamphetamine” that re-
writes the statute and upends decades of precedent. For over
fifty years, this court has upheld convictions based on a ge-
neric definition of methamphetamine. Compare United States
v. Owens, 162 F.4th 844, 847 (7th Cir. 2025), with United States
v. Cortwright, 528 F.2d 168, 172–74 (7th Cir. 1975) (using
“speed” and “methamphetamine” interchangeably), and
United States v. Ellery, 678 F.2d 674, 676 (7th Cir. 1982)

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No. 24-2702 25
(discussing “an ingredient used in manufacturing a con-
trolled substance called methamphetamine.”). That view
properly understands the text of the underlying statute.
By declining to depart from this consistent understanding
of the statute, we also avoid unsettling standard practices for
identifying and proving the existence of methamphetamine in
federal court. Per the DEA’s standard operating procedures,12
chemists must engage in two different tests to determine
whether a substance contains methamphetamine. These tests
also reveal the purity of the methamphetamine, as well as the
salt form present in the substance. But chemists conduct a
third test—one that specifically identifies the isomers present
in the substance—only upon request. Wooden’s view of the
statute would require the government to ask for this test every
time it wants to secure a conviction under the statute. The
Controlled Substances Act does not require such a granular
level of detail.
Accordingly, the district court did not err by following this
circuit’s pattern jury instructions and defining “methamphet-
amine” generically. As noted above, the word “methamphet-
amine” encompasses only the forms of C 10H15N used for their
stimulating effects. So, the government does not need to spe-
cifically identify the methamphetamine as an “optical iso-
mer” before the jury to secure a conviction under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841. Of course, the government must abide by the standard
practices for proving a substance is methamphetamine. In this
12 See “Standard Operating Procedure for the Analysis of Suspected
Methamphetamine,” DEA. GOV (Aug. 30, 2024), https://www.dea.gov/doc-
uments/2024/2024-08/2024-08-30/standard-operating-procedure-analysis-
suspected-methamphetamine (discussing the Marquis color test and mass
spectrometry tests required to identify methamphetamine).

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26 No. 24-2702
case, it cleared the bar by conducting thorough chemical test-
ing, in line with the DEA’s standard procedures, and present-
ing those results to the jury.
Wooden’s position faces two additional hurdles, even on
his reading of the law. First, Wooden admits the jury heard
testimony that “there were some optical isomers” present,
which is all the government would need for a conviction un-
der his view of the statute. Second, methamphetamine hydro-
chloride—the substance Wooden sold and possessed—is a
salt of methamphetamine, not an isomer. So, Wooden could
still be convicted and sentenced based on the evidence of the
salt form presented at his trial. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 Schedule III
(a)(3) (controlling “[a]ny substance … which contains any
quantity of methamphetamine, including its salts”).
Because Wooden’s primary theory fails, his sufficiency of
the evidence challenge also cannot stand. He contends the
jury needed to be told the meth was pure d-methampheta-
mine isomers—which is incorrect, because the mandatory
minimum portions of § 841 use “methamphetamine” as a ge-
neric term. Again, the government offered ample evidence
that the entire pure substance was crystal meth (that is, d-
methamphetamine hydrochloride), which contains d-meth-
amphetamine isomers. In his brief, Wooden raises the specter
of impropriety by noting that Chavez’s lab report identified
the presence of small amounts of l-methamphetamine. As
noted above, though, l-methamphetamine is also an optical
isomer of methamphetamine, so it is still a controlled sub-
stance. And the government chose not to charge Wooden for
any impurities, instead focusing on the overwhelming evi-
dence of lab-grade, pure crystal meth he sold and possessed.
There is no reversible error here.

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No. 24-2702 27
III
Finally, the district court did not err by permitting DEA
chemist Louis Chavez to testify without procedural safe-
guards. Wooden contends Chavez testified as a “dual-role
witness,” or a witness who offered both expert and lay testi-
mony at trial. United States v. Bard, 73 F.4th 464, 477 (7th Cir.
2023). If true, the district court should have followed the pro-
tocol outlined in United States v. Jett, 908 F.3d 252, 269–70 (7th
Cir. 2018). Wooden did not object to this alleged dual-role wit-
ness problem at trial, so plain error review is appropriate.
Thomas, 970 F.3d at 813.
A chemist discussing drug weights and testing results,
however, testifies only as an expert witness—even when the
chemist conducts the relevant tests and shares the results of
that research at trial. Cf. United States v. Gan, 54 F.4th 467, 477
(7th Cir. 2022) (citing Jett as a case about “managing dual-role
testimony from law enforcement”). The government properly
certified Chavez as an expert and confined its questions to the
tests he conducted on the drugs in this case. So, there was no
risk of confusing or misleading the jury by suggesting Chavez
was “privy to facts about the defendant not presented at
trial.” Jett, 908 F.3d at 267 (citation omitted). When expert
chemists testify to their own examination of the relevant ma-
terials in drug cases, they are not fact witnesses. We decline to
mandate Jett procedures in this context.13
13 Wooden also argues that his right to a fair trial was violated because
of cumulative error at his trial. But he did not establish any errors—much
less the two errors needed to succeed with this challenge. United States v.
Edwards, 34 F.4th 570, 588 (7th Cir. 2022).

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28 No. 24-2702
IV
All methamphetamine is illegal under federal law. The
plain text of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812 and 841 criminalizes the posses-
sion and distribution of methamphetamine, using the generic
term instead of a specific chemical formula. Because Wooden
offers no evidence that can disturb his conviction or sentence,
the judgment of the district court is A FFIRMED.

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