Flavia Coatl -Chiquito v. TODD W. BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General of the United States

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1233
F LAVIA C OATL -C HIQUITO,
Petitioner,
v.
TODD W. BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General of the United
States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
No. A096-210-400
____________________
S UBMITTED DECEMBER 10, 2025 — DECIDED A PRIL 30, 2026
____________________
Before BRENNAN , Chief Judge, and LEE and K OLAR , Circuit
Judges.
K OLAR , Circuit Judge. Petitioner Flavia Coatl-Chiquito
came to the United States in 2004, without documentation.
After failing to appear for her removal proceeding in Decem-
ber 2004, she was declared removable in absentia. In 2021,
Coatl-Chiquito sought to reopen her case, claiming that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Niz-Chavez v. Garland tolled the

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2 No. 25-1233
statutory deadline to reopen and provided a new ground for
cancellation of removal based on defects in her initial notice-
to-appear. She subsequently filed a second motion to reopen,
asserting for the first time that she never received proper no-
tice of the December 2004 hearing.
The Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (the “Board”) declined to reopen the case, holding that
Niz-Chavez did not equitably toll the 90-day deadline for
moving to reopen a final order of removal,1 and holding that
her second motion was numerically barred. They further de-
clined to reopen the case sua sponte.
Coatl-Chiquito petitions us to reverse the Board’s conclu-
sion, claiming error in the Board’s refusal to (1) apply equi-
table tolling under Niz-Chavez, (2) excuse the numerical bar,
and (3) reopen her proceedings sua sponte. Because the
Board’s holdings as to equitable tolling and the numerical
bar on motions to reopen are consistent with our precedents,
we deny the petition as to those claims. And because Coatl-
Chiquito cites no legal error in the Board’s refusal to reopen
sua sponte that is within our jurisdiction to review, we dis-
miss that claim for lack of jurisdiction.
1 The immigration judge observed that in absentia orders are actually
subject to a 180-day deadline to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C),
rather than the 90-day deadline that applies generally for motions to re-
open (not in absentia) under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). But Coatl-
Chiquito argued before the immigration judge and the Board that the 90-
day deadline under § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) applied, and those adjudicatory
bodies reasonably adopted her framework. For the purposes of this opin-
ion, we apply the correct, 180-day deadline to reopen in absentia orders
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C) to Coatl-Chiquito’s claims. The precise
deadline, however, does not alter the outcome of this appeal.

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No. 25-1233 3
I. Background
Coatl-Chiquito entered the country, without inspection,
on September 26, 2004. A few days later, a vehicle transport-
ing her and fifteen other migrants was struck by a semi-truck
while stopped at a highway intersection. Two of the passen-
gers were killed in the accident, and the survivors, including
Coatl-Chiquito, were taken to a local jail. After brief ques-
tioning from local law enforcement about the accident, she
was then transferred to a larger detention facility and ques-
tioned by officers from the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity. The officers took her information, including an Indiana
mailing address, and confirmed that she had neither been
processed upon entry to the country nor claimed a lawful ba-
sis to remain. On October 4—presumably while she was still
in detention—DHS personally served Coatl-Chiquito with a
notice-to-appear in Chicago Immigration Court, at a date
and time “to be set” later.
The Immigration Court mailed a formal notice-of-hearing
dated November 3, 2004 to the Indiana mailing address, set-
ting her initial hearing for December 29. Coatl-Chiquito,
however, claims to never have resided at the Indiana address
collected by DHS, having taken residence in Columbus, Ohio
immediately after the traumatic car crash. As a result, she did
not appear at the hearing, and the Immigration Judge de-
clared her removable in absentia.
For sixteen years, Coatl-Chiquito’s case laid dormant; no
efforts were taken to enforce the removal order, nor did she
attempt to reopen her case. But a duo of Supreme Court de-
cisions—Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198 (2018), and Niz-
Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021)—prompted Coatl-
Chiquito to seek cancellation of removal on new grounds.

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4 No. 25-1233
First, in Pereira, the Court held that an initial notice-to-appear
missing the date and time of the removal hearing does not
trigger the “stop-time rule” for determining an alien’s con-
tinuous presence in the United States. 585 U.S. at 201–02. This
decision rendered Coatl-Chiquito’s notice-to-appear—which
did not include the date or time of her initial hearing—defec-
tive. Then, in Niz-Chavez, the Supreme Court clarified that a
later notice providing the time and date of a removal hearing
does not cure a defective notice-to-appear for the purpose of
the stop-time rule. 593 U.S. at 160–61. For Coatl-Chiquito,
this meant that her notice-of-hearing, providing the date and
time of her initial hearing, did not cure the defect in her ini-
tial notice-to-appear.
Shortly after the Supreme Court handed down Niz-
Chavez, Coatl-Chiquito filed a motion in the Chicago Immi-
gration Court requesting that her removal proceedings be re-
opened. She acknowledged that the deadline for reopening a
final order of removal had long passed but requested that the
court consider the deadline equitably tolled by Niz-Chavez or,
alternatively, reopen the case sua sponte. If the deadline were
tolled, Coatl-Chiquito explained, she was now eligible for
cancellation of removal given her continuous presence in the
United States exceeding ten years, uninterrupted by the de-
fective notice-to-appear.
The immigration judge denied her motion, holding that
Niz-Chavez did not toll the statutory deadline to reopen and
refusing to reopen sua sponte. Coatl-Chiquito appealed the
denial to the Board of Immigration Appeals and, while the
appeal was pending, filed a second motion to reopen directly
with the Board. She argued in her second motion, for the first
time, that she was never provided adequate notice of her

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No. 25-1233 5
hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)—a challenge that
would excuse the statutory deadline to reopen. See 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). She based her lack-of-notice
claim on the fact that the DHS officers that interviewed her
and served her with the notice-to-appear did not speak Span-
ish, that she did not understand the papers she was signing,
and that she never resided at the Indiana address collected
by DHS.
The Board affirmed the Immigration Judge’s order. It
concluded that Niz-Chavez did not toll the deadline to reopen
her case because the asserted defect—the absence of infor-
mation in the notice-to-appear—was ascertainable when
Coatl-Chiquito was personally served with the notice in
2004, even if the Supreme Court had yet to recognize that ab-
sence as a defect. Nor had Coatl-Chiquito explained how she
had diligently pursued her claim in the intervening years. It
further held that Coatl-Chiquito’s second motion to reopen
based on lack of notice was “numerically barred”—that is,
barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)’s allowance for only “one
motion to reopen proceedings.” And alternatively, on the
merits, the Board held that Coatl-Chiquito had not estab-
lished lack of adequate notice. It observed there was no re-
quirement that her notice-to-appear be written or explained
to her in Spanish, and reasoned that “having failed to pro-
vide a valid address to the Immigration Court for purposes
of receiving notice, [Coatl-Chiquito] was not entitled to ac-
tual notice of her removal hearing.” Finally, the Board con-
cluded that “[Coatl-Chiquito’s] claims, cumulatively consid-
ered, also do not persuade this Board that sua sponte reopen-
ing is warranted.” Coatl-Chiquito now appeals the Board’s
holdings.

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6 No. 25-1233
II. Discussion
On appeal, Coatl-Chiquito argues that: (1) the Immigra-
tion Judge and the Board abused their discretion by refusing
to equitably toll her deadline to reopen based on Niz-Chavez;
(2) the Board abused its discretion in determining that her
second motion to reopen was numerically barred; and (3) the
Board erred by refusing to reopen her case sua sponte.
Putting aside the sua sponte denial—which we turn to in
due course—we review the Board’s decision to deny a mo-
tion to reopen removal proceedings for abuse of discretion.
Cruz-Velasco v. Garland, 58 F.4th 900, 903 (7th Cir. 2023).
A. Equitable Tolling
It is undisputed that Coatl-Chiquito’s first motion to reo-
pen was untimely. But we have held that the time and nu-
merical limits under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a are “non-jurisdictional
claim-processing rules, subject to the doctrine of equitable
tolling.” Ramos-Braga v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 871, 876 (7th Cir.
2018). Equitable tolling requires Coatl-Chiquito “to show
that [she] has been diligent in the pursuit of [her] rights but
that an extraordinary circumstance blocked [her] path.”
Mejia-Padilla v. Garland, 2 F.4th 1026, 1034 (7th Cir. 2021).
Coatl-Chiquito argues that because the Supreme Court’s
decision in Niz-Chavez was an “extraordinary circumstance,”
and she diligently moved to reopen shortly after it was de-
cided, equitable tolling applies. We have yet to consider
whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Niz-Chavez tolled
the statutory deadline to reopen for individuals who, like
Coatl-Chiquito, are found removable in absentia after a defec-
tive notice-to-appear. But our post-Pereira case law, rejecting

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No. 25-1233 7
near-identical equitable tolling arguments, forecloses Coatl-
Chiquito’s argument.
After Pereira, we fielded many appeals from individuals
who, understandably, sought to equitably toll the deadline
to reopen and challenge their newly defective notices-to-ap-
pear. See, e.g., Mejia-Padilla, 2 F.4th at 1027–28; Chen v. Barr,
960 F.3d 448, 449 (7th Cir. 2020); Herrera-Garcia v. Barr, 918
F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2019). But we held, across the board,
that Pereira did not toll the petitioners’ obligation to chal-
lenge an asserted defect that was identifiable at the time of
the initial hearing. Mejia-Padilla, 2 F.4th at 1031–34 (“[P]rior
adverse circuit precedent does not amount to an extraordi-
nary circumstance that prevented [the petitioner] from mak-
ing a timely challenge to the deficient notice to appear.”);
Chen, 960 F.3d at 450–51 (“A problem in the charging docu-
ment could and should have been pointed out promptly, so
that any error could be fixed.”); Herrera-Garcia, 918 F.3d at
563 (“Herrera-Garcia ignores the fact that he could have
raised the issue under consideration in Pereira with the IJ or
the Board earlier or at least requested a stay until the case
was decided.”).
Under similar reasoning, we have also held that petition-
ers forfeited any argument that their notice-to-appear was de-
fective under Pereira where they did not raise such objections
at their initial hearings. See Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d
956, 964 (7th Cir. 2019) (recognizing that Pereira “represented
a genuine change in circumstances” but declining to excuse
forfeiture where “there were signs that a meritorious argu-
ment could be raised” pre-Pereira); Vyloha v. Barr, 929 F.3d
812, 817 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Vyloha could have argued that his

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8 No. 25-1233
Notice was statutorily deficient well before the Pereira deci-
sion. As such, Vyloha’s present challenge is untimely.”).
We see no reason to treat Niz-Chavez any differently. Far
from the significant evolution of Pereira, Niz-Chavez was “the
next chapter in the same story.” Niz-Chavez, 593 U.S. at 159.
Where Pereira recognized that a missing time or date is a de-
fect in a notice-to-appear, Niz-Chavez merely confirmed that
those missing terms may not be supplemented in a subse-
quent notice for the stop-time rule. See id. at 164. Niz-Chavez
did not change the fact that Coatl-Chiquito could have raised
her challenge to her notice-to-appear at the time of her initial
hearing, notwithstanding contrary circuit precedent at the
time. See Mejia-Padilla, 2 F.4th at 1034. By failing to raise such
an objection and waiting for other litigants to cause a favor-
able change in law, Coatl-Chiquito did not “diligent[ly]”
pursue her claims. Id.
B. Numerical Bar
The Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996, provides that “[a]n alien may file one motion to
reopen proceedings under this section” if she can identify
new facts supported by evidence. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(B). This is a numerical “bar” or “limita-
tion”: an individual may file only one motion seeking to reo-
pen her case once she has been declared removable. See Ra-
mos-Braga, 900 F.3d at 876. Coatl-Chiquito, the Board rea-
soned, reached this bar with her first motion to reopen filed
before the Immigration Judge, precluding her subsequent
motion arguing lack of notice.

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No. 25-1233 9
Coatl-Chiquito claims this was an abuse of discretion, ar-
guing that under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2), her claim
that she lacked notice of her initial hearing excused both the
time and numerical limitations on the motion to reopen. But
Coatl-Chiquito misreads the regulations and cannot escape
the numerical bar.
Understanding Coatl-Chiquito’s argument, and why it
does not work, requires untangling the web of regulations
governing motions to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7). As
noted above, motions to reopen removal proceedings are
generally subject to both a 90-day time limitation and a nu-
merical limitation (one motion), which are given effect in the
regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is true, however,
that the regulations grant certain exceptions to the time and
numerical limitations:
In removal proceedings pursuant to [8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a], the time limitation set forth in para-
graph (c)(2) of this section shall not apply to a
motion to reopen filed pursuant to the provi-
sions of § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). The time and numer-
ical limitations set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of
this section shall not apply to a motion to reopen
proceedings … [f]iled pursuant to the provi-
sions of § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)[.]
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).
Tracking down these cross-references, 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) refers to “Order[s] entered in absentia or in
removal proceedings,” while 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)
refers to “order[s] entered in absentia in deportation pro-
ceedings.”

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10 No. 25-1233
For motions brought under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii), the
90-day time limitation is excused for in absentia removal or-
ders if the movant demonstrates, within 180 days, that her
“failure to appear was because of exceptional circumstances”
or, at any time, if she demonstrates “lack of notice” or that
she was in “Federal or State custody and the failure to appear
was through no fault of” her own. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii).
For motions brought under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A), the 90-day deadline and numerical
limit on motions to reopen in absentia deportation orders are
excused if the movant shows “within 180 days after the date
of the order … that the failure to appear was because of ex-
ceptional circumstances beyond [her] control” or “[a]t any
time” if she demonstrates that she “did not receive notice” or
that she “was in federal or state custody and the failure to
appear was through no fault” of her own. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(1)–(2).
To be sure, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) and (iii)(A) are
closely related: both provide for reopening an in absentia or-
der based on exceptional circumstances, lack of notice, or
failure to appear due to custody. But their impact on time
and numerical limitations are different. A motion to reopen
an in absentia removal order under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii)
is excused from only the 90-day time limitation, while a mo-
tion to reopen an in absentia deportation order is excused
from both the 90-day time limitation and the numerical limi-
tation. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).
Coatl-Chiquito invokes 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A) to
evade the numerical bar, but that regulation does not apply
to her because she was not placed in deportation proceed-
ings. Rather, her in absentia order arose from her removal

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No. 25-1233 11
proceedings, and her motion to reopen was governed by 8
C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii); this excused the 90-day time limita-
tion, but not the numerical limit. Coatl-Chiquito could have
brought her lack-of-notice claim “[a]t any time,” but only in
her first motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). The
Board did not abuse its discretion in dismissing her second
motion to reopen on this basis.
C. Refusal to Reopen Sua Sponte
Finally, Coatl-Chiquito claims that the Board abused its
discretion by refusing to ignore the time and numerical lim-
itations to her motions and reopen her removal proceedings
sua sponte. Our jurisdiction to review the Board’s refusal to
reopen a proceeding sua sponte is narrow: “the merits of the
Board’s decision to deny a motion to reopen sua sponte are
unreviewable,” but we have jurisdiction “to recognize and
address constitutional transgressions and other legal errors
that the Board may have committed in disposing of such a
motion.” Fuller v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 514, 519 (7th Cir. 2019).
Here, Coatl-Chiquito has not identified any error of law that
would grant us jurisdiction to review the Board’s sua sponte
denial.
The Board’s explanation for refusing to reopen Coatl-
Chiquito’s case sua sponte is, admittedly, brief: “[Coatl-
Chiquito’s] claims, cumulatively considered, also do not per-
suade this Board that sua sponte reopening is warranted.” But
we must read this “cumulative” remark in conjunction with
the rest of the Board’s decision, where it discusses several
factors bearing directly on its sua sponte authority: (1) that
Coatl-Chiquito did not diligently pursue her claims in the in-
tervening years, (2) that she did not give DHS an opportunity
to cure the error in the notice-to-appear, and (3) that she

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12 No. 25-1233
changed addresses without notifying DHS. See In re J-J-, 21 I.
& N. Dec. 976, 976 (BIA 1997) (“The Board’s power to reopen
or reconsider cases sua sponte is limited to exceptional cir-
cumstances[.]”).
While Coatl-Chiquito urges that “exceptional circum-
stances” were present in her case given “fundamental
changes in law” since she was ordered removable in absentia,
these arguments target the merits of the Board’s decision—
over which we have no jurisdiction. Fuller, 914 F.3d at 519.
Coatl-Chiquito identifies no “constitutional transgression[]”
or “legal error[]” that would grant us jurisdiction to review
the Board’s refusal to exercise its sua sponte authority. Id.
III. Conclusion
We DENY, and otherwise DISMISS for lack of jurisdic-
tion, the petition for review.

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