Ali Bakhtiari v. Jeffrey Kahn

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 5, 2026*
Decided May 6, 2026
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2782
ALI BAKHTIARI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JEFFREY KAHN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 24-cv-191
Martha M. Pacold,
Judge.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Nos. 24-2782 & 24-2787 Page 2
No. 24-2787
ALI BAKHTIARI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JEFFREY D. MAYS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 24-cv-7344
Martha M. Pacold,
Judge.
O R D E R
In these consolidated appeals, Ali Bakhtiari argues that the district court abused
its discretion by sua sponte dismissing his suits with prejudice as a sanction for his
conduct toward opposing counsel. We affirm both dismissals.
In 2024, Bakhtiari sued his former employer, alleging wrongful termination. That
same year, he brought a separate federal suit challenging the denial of his
unemployment benefits, alleging that the decision violated his due process rights. In the
second suit, Bakhtiari named as a defendant Brian Schwartz, the opposing counsel in
the wrongful termination case, alleging that Schwartz had conspired with state officials
to deny him benefits.
In August 2024, Bakhtiari attempted to serve the complaint on Schwartz. In an
email to Schwartz, Bakhtiari stated that he had retained a process server to serve
Schwartz and, claiming that Illinois law requires abode service, provided the server
with a photograph of Schwartz and all other residents of the home. He asserted that a
resident refused to accept service, and he wrote that “the law does not look upon
process evaders kindly.” He concluded by writing, “Please do not make us trace
various addresses affiliated with your family. Accept service of process on your own
behalf only.” He attached to the email a photo of Schwartz, his wife, and his two minor
daughters.
The next month, Bakhtiari filed motions to disqualify Schwartz as counsel in his
wrongful termination case, to seal the disqualification motion, and for an emergency
hearing. In his motion to disqualify, Bakhtiari attached the same photo of Schwartz and
his family but with the daughters’ faces redacted, and accused Schwartz of various
improprieties, including that he had referred to Bakhtiari as “an Iranian spy.” He also

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Nos. 24-2782 & 24-2787 Page 3
asserted that he had received a call from someone who was purportedly Schwartz’s
wife, who he described as inebriated, and claimed she asked whether “the Iraqians”
were coming after their family.
On September 11, 2024, counsel for all parties in both cases appeared before the
district court for a hearing regarding the motion to disqualify counsel. Schwartz denied
making the comments Bakhtiari attributed to him and rejected the contention that
Schwartz’s wife had called him. Schwartz relayed to the court the incident involving the
process server and the email with the photo of his family. At one point, Schwartz said to
the court, “I need you to rein this man in because he’s threatening the life of my kids
and … he’s been getting progressively more aggressive, and I don’t know what his next
step is, but I can’t wait to find out. … [H]e has lost his right to be a litigant in this court
system.”
Bakhtiari responded, defending his use of the process server and maintaining
that Illinois law required him to attempt service at Schwartz’s residence. He insisted
that the process server required photos of the home’s residents and that it was the
server’s private investigator, not Bakhtiari, who had obtained the photo of Schwartz’s
family. He did not explain why it was necessary to attach the photo to his email to
Schwartz or to his motion to disqualify. Schwartz disputed Bakhtiari’s account about
the photo, stating that he had spoken with the process server who said Bakhtiari had
provided the photo. Bakhtiari countered that he never claimed the process server
supplied the image but instead attributed it to a private investigator affiliated with the
service company he had retained.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court reviewed Bakhtiari’s history of
litigation misconduct, citing two cases as examples. It first discussed United States v.
Bakhtiari, 714 F.3d 1057 (8th Cir. 2013), in which Bakhtiari pleaded guilty to obstruction
of justice in connection with a prior lawsuit. In that criminal case, Bakhtiari sent an
email to opposing counsel containing threatening language and photos of the attorney’s
family with crosshairs superimposed on their faces. He later showed a rifle to the
attorney’s law partner, reinforcing the perceived threat.
The U.S. Attorney’s Office initiated an investigation, and a grand jury indicted
Bakhtiari for sending a threatening communication in interstate commerce. Bakhtiari
filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in which he alleged that the federal agents who
arrested him had subjected him to torture and sexual abuse. After government counsel
notified Bakhtiari that he could be subject to additional charges for making false
allegations against the agents, Bakhtiari pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice in

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Nos. 24-2782 & 24-2787 Page 4
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). In so doing, he admitted to sending the threatening
email and to fabricating the sexual abuse allegations against the federal agents. The
district court sentenced Bakhtiari to 51 months’ imprisonment.
After reading the relevant portions of the opinion, the court concluded that this
history reflected highly concerning conduct involving threats accompanied by images
of an attorney’s family.
The court then recounted the relevant facts from Bakhtiari v. Towey,
No. 4:18-cv-256-DDN, 2018 WL 4007869, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 22, 2018), in which
another district court dismissed Bakhtiari’s complaint for being malicious, citing his use
of disrespectful, mocking language and his admission that he had previously filed
multiple malicious lawsuits.
Following the discussion of the two prior cases, the court concluded that
Bakhtiari’s conduct in the present matter constituted continued abusive litigation. It
found the conduct especially troubling in light of his history involving threats against
opposing counsel and determined that the motion to disqualify amounted to
harassment. Emphasizing that his behavior was “very distressing” given the prior
record, the court concluded that Bakhtiari had forfeited his ability to proceed as a
litigant and dismissed both cases with prejudice as a sanction.
Bakhtiari appeals the district court’s dismissal of his cases. We review the district
court’s imposition of that sanction for abuse of discretion and its underlying factual
findings for clear error. Martin v. Redden, 34 F.4th 564, 568 (7th Cir. 2022). Bakhtiari first
argues that the court failed to identify its authority to dismiss his suits with prejudice as
a sanction. But district courts possess inherent authority to do so where a party “act[s]
in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Fuery v. City of Chicago,
900 F.3d 450, 463 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation omitted). “[O]utright dismissal of a
lawsuit … is a particularly severe sanction, yet is within the court’s discretion.”
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991). Bakhtiari identifies no mandate
requiring the district court to specify the source of its sanction authority and, given its
inherent authority, any misstep in not doing so would be at most harmless error.
Bakhtiari next asserts that the district court should have applied Rule 11 rather
than rely on its inherent authority. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 11. The Supreme Court has
explained that “when there is bad-faith conduct in the course of litigation that could be
adequately sanctioned under the Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the Rules
rather than the inherent power.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50. If the district court had

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Nos. 24-2782 & 24-2787 Page 5
applied Rule 11, Bakhtiari would have been entitled to notice and 21 days to correct or
withdraw the motion to disqualify before the opposing party was permitted to file a
motion for sanctions. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 11(c)(2).
But the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on its inherent
authority. The procedure provided in Rule 11(c)(2) is limited to violations of Rule 11(b),
which concerns written representations made to the court. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 11(b)
(limited to “a pleading, written motion, or other paper”). Here, the district court based
its sanction order on Bakhtiari’s motion to disqualify—which falls within the scope of
Rule 11(b)—but also on the testimony elicited at the hearing and the emails Bakhtiari
had sent to Schwartz—which do not. Where some sanctionable conduct is within the
reach of the rules but is “intertwined within conduct that only the inherent power could
address,” there is no abuse of discretion in resorting directly to the inherent power.
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50–51. As the Supreme Court explained, “requiring a court first to
apply Rules and statutes containing sanctioning provisions to discrete occurrences
before invoking inherent power to address remaining instances of sanctionable conduct
would serve only to foster extensive and needless satellite litigation, which is contrary
to the aim of the Rules themselves.” Id. at 51.
Bakhtiari next contends that the district court abused its discretion because its
finding of bad faith was unsupported and not made explicit. While a finding of bad
faith is required before imposing dismissal with prejudice, it may be based on the
court’s assessment of the egregiousness of the conduct and the record as a whole. Fuery,
900 F.3d at 463–64. The court may also rely on a litigant’s misconduct in prior litigation
in making its finding. Martin, 34 F.4th at 568.
Here, the record provides ample support for the district court’s conclusion that
Bakhtiari acted in bad faith. To support its finding, the court relied on Bakhtiari’s
motion to disqualify counsel attaching a photograph of opposing counsel’s minor
children. The court also reviewed Bakhtiari’s prior email to Schwartz containing similar
material and implied threats and heard Schwartz describe his fear for his family’s
safety. The court further contextualized this conduct by reviewing Bakhtiari’s prior
litigation history, including cases involving similar threatening communications and
abusive filings. The district court was not required to credit Bakhtiari’s claim that he
attached a photo of Schwartz’s family in an email for purposes of service of process or
that he included it in a public filing for “full disclosure.” See Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l
Comm., 594 U.S. 647, 687 (2021). Given this record, the district court did not clearly err in
finding bad faith.

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Nos. 24-2782 & 24-2787 Page 6
While Bakhtiari is correct that the court was required to make an explicit finding,
it was not, as he suggests, required to use the specific phrase “bad faith” so long as it is
clear the court “found that a litigant intentionally abused the judicial process in an
unreasonable and vexatious manner.” See In re Rimsat, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039, 1047 (7th Cir.
2000). That is precisely what the district court did here, finding that Bakhtiari’s conduct
constituted “continued abusive litigation” that “use[d] the system to basically harass
and abuse opposing counsel” in a manner involving “personal threats.” No more
needed to be said.
Bakhtiari next argues that the district court was required to consider lesser
sanctions prior to dismissing the case with prejudice. But where the circumstances
justify dismissal, a court need not explore lesser alternatives. See Dotson v. Bravo,
321 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2003). The circumstances here warranted such a penalty: the
district court reviewed Bakhtiari’s history of abusive litigation conduct, noted the
similarities between his previous threat to opposing counsel and the harassment of
Schwartz, and heard Schwartz express fear that Bakhtiari was threatening his children.
Indeed, we have affirmed dismissal with prejudice as a sanction for a pro se litigant’s
inappropriate behavior involving implicit threats communicated via email.
See Mohammed v. Anderson, 833 F. App’x 651, 653–54 (7th Cir. 2020). The court was well
within its discretion to impose such a sanction here.
Finally, Bakhtiari argues that the district court was required to provide notice
and a hearing prior to imposing the sanction. Its failure to do so, he asserts, violated his
right to due process. But “a hearing is not invariably required before sanctions may be
imposed.” In re Rimsat, 212 F.3d at 1046. And in circumstances where a litigant’s case is
dismissed as a sanction for misconduct, we have held that a district court is not
required to conduct a hearing if doing so will not aid its decision. Martin, 34 F.4th
at 569. Here, it is apparent that the district court heard everything it needed to hear to
make its decision to sanction Bakhtiari. And Bakhtiari was given ample opportunity to
respond to Schwartz’s assertion during the emergency hearing that Bakhtiari had lost
his right to litigate before the district court. In any event, he identifies no additional
evidence he would have presented that could have altered the outcome. Accordingly,
any procedural deficiency was harmless. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 61.
AFFIRMED

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