United States of America v. Roscoe Chambers

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 19, 2026
Decided May 20, 2026
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2150
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ROSCOE CHAMBERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:25-CR-00268(1)
Edmond E. Chang,
Judge.
O R D E R
Roscoe Chambers appeals the revocation of his supervised release. His
appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Although a defendant does not have an
unqualified constitutional right to counsel in a revocation proceeding, Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973), it is still our practice to apply the safeguards of Anders
in this context. See United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). Because
counsel’s analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel
discusses and the response that Chambers has filed under Circuit Rule 51(b). See United
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

-- 1 of 5 --

No. 25-2150 Page 2
States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We grant counsel’s motion and dismiss
the appeal.
In 2013, a jury in the Southern District of Iowa convicted Chambers of two counts
of distribution of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and one count of
possession with intent to distribute at least 28 grams of crack cocaine. 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B). Applying the 2012 Sentencing Guidelines, the district court
calculated an initial total offense level of 28 and criminal history score of IV. Because
Chambers was classified as a career offender, however, the court increased his total
offense level to 37 and his criminal history score to VI, yielding a guidelines range of
360 months to life. The court imposed concurrent 360-month sentences on each count,
followed by eight years’ supervised release. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. See United
States v. Chambers, 554 F. App’x 539 (8th Cir. 2014).
In 2021, Chambers moved for compassionate release, and the district court
granted the motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The court concluded that changes to
the Sentencing Guidelines meant Chambers no longer qualified as a career offender.
Recalculating his range based on an offense level of 28 and criminal history category IV,
the court determined that the applicable range was 110 to 137 months. By then,
Chambers had served 118 months (109 months and 9 months of good time credit), and
he suffered from health conditions that placed him at risk during the COVID-19
pandemic. But because the court noted “serious concerns” over Chambers’s lack of
rehabilitative progress, the court ordered his release on the condition that he reside in a
residential reentry program and abide by its rules. He was released in September 2021.
Since then, the district court has revoked Chambers’s supervised release three
times for violating the reentry program’s rules. Each time, the court sentenced
Chambers to a short term of imprisonment followed by eight years of supervised
release. In May 2025, after the third revocation, the district court again imposed a
condition requiring Chambers to reside in, and comply with the rules of, a residential
reentry program. Chambers was placed at a Salvation Army facility in Chicago, Illinois,
and the court transferred jurisdiction to the Northern District of Illinois.
One month later, the program discharged Chambers and the Probation Office
again petitioned to revoke his supervised release, alleging that Chambers refused to
comply with drug-testing requirements and the facility’s rules. The district court
appointed counsel and held a hearing. The probation officer testified that Chambers
repeatedly claimed that the residential reentry condition was unlawful and that she
repeatedly informed him that he must follow the Salvation Army’s rules. She also

-- 2 of 5 --

No. 25-2150 Page 3
testified that Chambers refused to participate in random drug testing by the Probation
Office, which required him to call daily to determine whether he had to report for
testing. The Salvation Army staff member likewise testified that Chambers refused drug
and breathalyzer tests, claimed his probation officer told him testing was unnecessary,
and left the facility without permission.
Chambers testified that staff permitted him to skip testing and to leave the
facility. After his discharge, Chambers lived in a shelter, which did not satisfy his
residential reentry condition of supervised release.
The district court found the government’s witnesses more credible, and thus
concluded that Chambers violated the condition of requiring him to reside in and
comply with a residential reentry program. It calculated an advisory range of 6 to
12 months based on a Grade C violation and a criminal history category of IV. At the
hearing, Chambers asked the court for leniency, emphasizing that the violation was
noncriminal and that he was reportedly looking for a job when he left the facility.
Chambers also argued that further incarceration would be impermissibly retributive
under Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025). But the court disagreed and imposed
three concurrent 12-month sentences (one for each original conviction), citing
Chambers’s repeated noncompliance and the needs for deterrence and public
protection. It declined to impose further supervision because Chambers was “simply
not supervisable.”
Counsel, in her Anders brief, begins with Chambers’s preferred challenge that the
district court was without power to impose a condition requiring him to reside in a
residential reentry center, so he did not have to abide by its rules. We agree with
counsel that this argument is frivolous: residence in a reentry program is expressly
enumerated as a condition that the district court may consider imposing under both
statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(11), and the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 5F1.1.
Counsel next considers whether—as Chambers insists in his response—he could
successfully challenge the revocation of his supervised release. A violation must be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. United States v. Perez, 99 F.4th 972, 976 (7th Cir.
2024). We review the decision for abuse of discretion and the factual findings
supporting revocation for clear error. Id.
Here, the court credited testimony from multiple witnesses that Chambers
refused to comply with the Salvation Army’s drug-testing requirements and left the
facility without permission. Chambers testified to the contrary, but the court did not

-- 3 of 5 --

No. 25-2150 Page 4
find him credible. Its finding that he violated the program’s rules was not clearly
erroneous, so the court did not abuse its discretion in revoking his supervised release.
See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (clear error where
“reviewing court … is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed”) (citation omitted).
Counsel also correctly concludes that Chambers lacks a viable procedural
challenge. The court correctly calculated a policy-statement range of 6 to 12 months
based on a Grade C violation and Chambers’s criminal history category of IV.
See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). And the court provided Chambers with written notice of the
alleged violations; disclosure of the evidence against him; the opportunity to appear,
present evidence, and question adverse witnesses; the right to counsel; and the right to
allocution. See FED. R. C RIM. P. 32.1(b)(2)(A)–(E).
A substantive challenge to Chambers’s sentence would also be frivolous. The
court imposed a within-guidelines sentence, which is presumptively reasonable.
See United States v. Yankey, 56 F.4th 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2023). And nothing in the record
rebuts that presumption here: the court considered the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)—expressly excluding improper considerations under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and
Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 194–95 (2025)—and reasonably concluded that a
term of imprisonment without further supervision was necessary given Chambers’s
repeated noncompliance.
Finally, although counsel notes that the district court erred by imposing three
terms of imprisonment, that error is harmless. After each prior revocation, the district
court in Iowa imposed only a single term of supervised release, so Chambers violated
just one term here and the court could impose only one sentence. See, e.g., United States
v. Snyder, 635 F.3d 956, 960 n.4 (7th Cir. 2011). But that mistake does not affect the
outcome because the sentences run concurrently and include no further supervised
release, eliminating any risk of future revocations on multiple counts. See Ryan v. United
States, 688 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[O]n direct appeal, courts are free to pretermit
decision about convictions producing concurrent sentences, when the extra convictions
do not have cumulative effects.”).
In his response, Chambers again challenges the district court’s factfinding at the
revocation hearing, but for the reasons already given, that challenge is frivolous. He
also asserts (without any substantiation) that the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa is embezzling funds from the Bureau of Prisons, but such a complaint is
not within the scope of a direct appeal.

-- 4 of 5 --

No. 25-2150 Page 5
We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

-- 5 of 5 --