United States of America v. William Fillyaw

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1836
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM F ILLYAW,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:23-cr-00650-1 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.
____________________
S UBMITTED M AY 18, 2026 — DECIDED M AY 26, 2026
____________________
Before S CUDDER , K IRSCH , and TAIBLESON , Circuit Judges.
S CUDDER , Circuit Judge. In 2022 law enforcement officers
executed a warrant and arrested William Fillyaw in Gurnee,
Illinois. The arrest occurred in an apartment parking lot after
Fillyaw stepped out of his car and started walking toward the
entrance carrying a backpack. While handcuffing Fillyaw, the
officers removed the backpack and searched it a few minutes
later, finding a loaded handgun and various drugs. Federal
charges followed.

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Fillyaw moved to suppress the gun and drugs. The district
court denied the motion, concluding that the inventory search
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
authorized the search of Fillyaw’s backpack. Fillyaw pleaded
guilty to the federal charges and reserved his right to appeal.
We see no error in the district court’s denial of the motion
to suppress. In no way does Fillyaw challenge his arrest. For
good reason: the officers had a warrant (alleging that Fillyaw
committed arson). He instead challenges the officers’ seizure
of his backpack and the ensuing search of its contents. But the
law has long been clear that when an arrestee is not in a pri-
vate space, it is “reasonable for the officers to take custody of
the personal property in the arrestee’s possession at the time
of his arrest.” United States v. Griffith, 537 F.2d 900, 905 (7th
Cir. 1976); see also Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 5.5(b) (6th ed. 2025) (ex-
plaining that police taking custody of property “presents no
problem when a person is arrested in some public place while
carrying a suitcase or like object, for it would be clearly im-
proper for the police to simply leave the container unattended
at the scene of the arrest”). And once the authorities take law-
ful custody of personal property, they may conduct an inven-
tory search “in accordance with established inventory proce-
dures.” Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983).
These principles find straightforward application in and
resolve Fillyaw’s appeal. He begs to differ by suggesting that
the officers should have simply left the backpack in the park-
ing lot. The Fourth Amendment did not compel that course.
Even more, for all the officers knew, the backpack may have
contained personal valuables that anyone could have then
come and stolen—a result certain to prompt a complaint from

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No. 25-1836 3
the property owner. Nor, of course, does law enforcement
have to run the safety risk of leaving what might be weapons
or contraband in an open location following an arrest. It takes
no imagination to foresee terrible consequences from follow-
ing that course. The inventory search doctrine does not force
the police into the predicaments Fillyaw presses on appeal.
Fillyaw also suggests that the officers could have put his
backpack in his car, given it to his girlfriend who was appar-
ently in the area, or taken it to the apartment complex’s gen-
eral manager. He is right that the Fourth Amendment would
not have prohibited any of these options. But Fillyaw presents
no evidence that he or anyone else asked the officers to take
these steps. On these facts, the district court was right to con-
clude that the inventory search doctrine amply authorized the
officers’ actions.
Reaching further, Fillyaw insists that the officers con-
ducted and documented the inventory search in ways that did
not align with the letter of their written policies. But any de-
viations were minimal, such as the fact that only one officer
conducted the search and used the wrong form to log what he
found. None of this is material. See United States v. Cartwright,
630 F.3d 610, 616 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[M]inor deviations from de-
partment policy do not render an inventory search unreason-
able.”). Nor do we see anything to Fillyaw’s suggestion that
the officers somehow acted in bad faith. Quite to the contrary,
what transpired has all the earmarks of sound, responsible
police work.
Finally, Fillyaw also invites us to consider an issue he ad-
mits he forfeited. He alleges that law enforcement’s use of a
commercial license plate reader database to identify his loca-
tion violated the Fourth Amendment. We decline to do so, as

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he had every opportunity to include this issue in his motion
before the district court.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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