Alma Sanchez , on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. EL MILAGRO, INC ., doing business as EL MILAGRO

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-3250
A LMA S ANCHEZ , on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
EL M ILAGRO, I NC ., doing business as EL M ILAGRO ,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:22-cv-01852 — LaShonda A. Hunt, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 5, 2025 — DECIDED M AY 27, 2026
____________________
Before R IPPLE, K IRSCH , and LEE, Circuit Judges.
R IPPLE, Circuit Judge. Alma Sanchez, invoking Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Illinois Human Rights Act
(IHRA), 1 claimed that she was sexually harassed by a
coworker at an El Milagro tortilla factory. She further alleged
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-101 et seq.

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2 No. 24-3250
that El Milagro had failed to investigate promptly her allega-
tions. The district court granted summary judgment for El
Milagro, and Ms. Sanchez brought this timely appeal. For the
reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of
the district court.
I
BACKGROUND 2
El Milagro manufactures and distributes tortilla products.
It operates eight locations in Illinois and employs approxi-
mately 500 individuals. At the Chicago manufacturing facility
involved in this case, the production department has multiple
lines. Employees on the “back line” use machinery to make
tortillas; employees on the “front line” pack the tortillas.
Since Ms. Sanchez joined El Milagro in July 2019, she has
worked continuously in the production department on the
second shift. Initially, Ms. Sanchez was a “passer.” In that
role, she verified the quality of newly produced tortillas and
passed satisfactory items down a conveyor for packaging and
organization. Ms. Sanchez’s role later changed because a dis-
ability prevented her from moving the fingers on her left
hand, and she could not work a full eight-hour shift as a
passer. Her supervisors, therefore, permitted her to work as a
“free person.” 3 In this capacity, Ms. Sanchez substituted on
2 Because this appeal arises from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for El Milagro, we must take all facts and draw all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to Ms. Sanchez. Whitaker v. Dempsey,
144 F.4th 908, 916 (7th Cir. 2025).
3 R.154 at 3.

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No. 24-3250 3
the production line and spent the remainder of her shift per-
forming sweeping and cleaning duties.
Because her supervisors did not require that she work on
the production line for a full eight hours, at least eight of her
coworkers began to express discontent about her accommo-
dation. At one point (the timing is not clear from the record),
they collected signatures with the intent of petitioning El Mil-
agro to terminate Ms. Sanchez’s employment. The record is
unclear as to whether this petition reached El Milagro’s man-
agement, but Ms. Sanchez reported her coworkers’ comments
to Arturo Brito, the second shift supervisor in the production
department. Brito took two actions in response. On October 1,
2019, he wrote a report to El Milagro’s Human Resources
(HR) department. He also raised the issue during a regularly
scheduled pre-shift team meeting for the production depart-
ment employees. After Brito wrote his report to HR, El Mil-
agro provided a formal designation to Ms. Sanchez as a “free
person.” 4 Ms. Sanchez relates that although her co-workers’
adverse comments decreased for a while, they eventually be-
came more frequent. Brito raised the issue again at another
meeting.
Francisco Gutierrez is, according to Ms. Sanchez, one of
the workers who petitioned for her discharge. Ms. Sanchez
claims that Gutierrez sexually harassed her by inappropri-
ately touching her three times over the following year. There
is significant ambiguity in Ms. Sanchez’s allegations about
these encounters. Several record documents frame the ambi-
guity. One document is a written statement that Ms. Sanchez
prepared for El Milagro’s HR department when she reported
4 R.135-3 at 44:17–20, 45:06–17.

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4 No. 24-3250
the third incident on August 30, 2020 (“the HR statement”).
The other documents are the operative complaint and her
deposition in this lawsuit. The HR statement at times contra-
dicts her complaint and some of her later deposition testi-
mony.
The first inconsistency involves the timing of the alleged
incidents of harassment. According to the HR statement,
Gutierrez inappropriately touched Ms. Sanchez first in Octo-
ber or November 2019, then in March 2020, and finally in Au-
gust 2020. But Ms. Sanchez alleges in her operative complaint
that Gutierrez touched her first in May or June 2020, then in
July 2020, and finally in August 2020. Both her HR statement
and her representations in the lawsuit, however, assert that
the third and final incident happened on August 29, 2020.
There is also ambiguity with respect to Ms. Sanchez’s ac-
counts of how Gutierrez inappropriately touched her. With
respect to the first incident, Ms. Sanchez alleges in her com-
plaint that Gutierrez intentionally “rubbed his genitals”
against her buttocks as he passed by her on the production
line and then continued to walk away. 5 She recounts in her
deposition that she believes Gutierrez purposefully touched
her because “there were many ways for him to pass through
without touching me.” 6 He did not touch her for long because
“he made it look like he was passing by.” 7 When she felt the
contact and turned around, “[h]e had already passed.” 8 In her
5 R.79 at ¶ 22.
6 R.145-4 at 77:21–22.
7 Id. at 78:23–24.
8 Id. at 79:19.

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No. 24-3250 5
HR statement, Ms. Sanchez wrote that Gutierrez “only said
sorry.” 9 But in her deposition, she said that Gutierrez walked
away laughing. 10 He “turned around and stare at me like
watching and saying ‘oops’ [sic].” 11 Ms. Sanchez recounted
that she responded not with words but by making a facial ex-
pression indicating she found his conduct inappropriate. She
“looked at him making him aware that he was making [her]
feel uncomfortable.” 12
Ms. Sanchez relates that she verbally reported this first in-
cident two hours later to her supervisor, Brito. 13 El Milagro
disputes that Ms. Sanchez reported this incident directly to
Brito. Again, the record reveals inconsistent allegations. In her
HR statement, Ms. Sanchez stated that although she men-
tioned this incident to Brito, she did not tell him Gutierrez’s
name. 14 She claimed at one point in her deposition, however,
that she “specifically told [Brito] that Mr. Gutierrez had
rubbed his genitals on my buttocks.” 15 But when asked out-
right, she agreed that she did not share Gutierrez’s name with
Brito when she reported the first incident. 16 Brito stated in his
deposition that she did not complain to him about sexual
9 R.135-16 at *3.
10 R.145-4 at 65:18.
11 Id. at 79:22–23.
12 Id. at 65:08–09.
13 R.135-3 at 84:14–20.
14 R.135-16 at *3.
15 R.145-4 at 84:22–24.
16 R.135-15 at 12:18.

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6 No. 24-3250
harassment at all prior to August 2020. 17 No report was made
to HR about this individual incident.
Ms. Sanchez alleges that Gutierrez sexually harassed her
for the second time in July 2020. She claims that he groped her
buttock with his hand. Ms. Sanchez again contradicts herself
about when she reported this incident. She wrote in her HR
statement that she could not have reported the incident be-
cause the factory had shut down because of the pandemic. 18
But her Rule 56.1 statement recited that she did report the har-
assment to Brito the day after it happened. 19 Brito did not for-
ward a complaint about this incident to HR.
The third and final incident occurred on August 29, 2020.
Ms. Sanchez contends that Gutierrez touched her buttocks for
“a short time,” or “a few seconds” while she was stooping
down to put down boxes that she was holding. 20 He apolo-
gized afterwards. 21 There is ambiguity about the precise man-
ner of touching. In her earlier written statement to HR, she
claimed that Gutierrez touched her buttocks with one hand. 22
Ms. Sanchez’s Rule 56.1 statement asserted, however, that
Gutierrez groped her with both hands when she bent over to
put down a box she was carrying. 23
17 R.152-3 at 116:11.
18 R.135-16 at *3.
19 R.145 at ¶ 9.
20 R.135-3 at 95:17, 96:14–16.
21 Id. at 96:18.
22 R.135-16 at *3.
23 R.145 at ¶ 11.

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No. 24-3250 7
The record is also unclear about some of the details of the
events after this last incident. In her deposition, Ms. Sanchez
related that Brito’s assistant, Rafael Ortega, noticed that she
was upset and that she told him what had happened. Ortega
then told her that he would inform Brito and that she should
either complain in writing or go directly to HR. 24 Brito stated
in his deposition, however, that Ms. Sanchez spoke to him di-
rectly. 25 He also stated that he told Ms. Sanchez a “report
would have to be done because it was something serious.” 26
The reporting requirement at El Milagro mandated that Brito
have the complaining employee write out her account and
that Brito speak to the other involved parties and direct those
individuals to write out their own versions. Brito then would
write his own report and send it to HR, along with the state-
ments of those involved in the incident. HR would then fol-
low up on the case. 27
Ms. Sanchez submitted her written statement to HR de-
scribing the three incidents. In his statement, Gutierrez re-
lated that on August 29, 2020, he touched Ms. Sanchez “by
mistake” while he was packing tortillas and “asked her for
forgiveness.” 28 He claimed also that an hour later, he stepped
back into a different coworker and apologized to her. He said
that the space was limited and the touching was an accident.
24 Id.
25 R.152-3 at 115:10–13.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 115:15–24.
28 R.135-16 at *11.

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8 No. 24-3250
Ms. Sanchez has not seen anyone else experience sexually
harassing conduct at any time during her employment at El
Milagro. However, after the three incidents with Gutierrez,
Jose Guzman, an employee, told her that other employees
could “grab [Ms. Sanchez’s] butt” because Gutierrez was not
fired. 29 Guzman and three other employees made additional
sexual remarks that she overheard and that may have con-
cerned her. Ms. Sanchez reported the comments to Brito but
did not tell him or HR the names of the employees who made
them because she believed that reporting would not help. 30
II
DISCUSSION
A
We review de novo the grant of summary judgment to El
Milagro. Whitaker v. Dempsey, 144 F.4th 908, 916 (7th Cir.
2025). The basic substantive principles that govern our deci-
sion are well-settled and familiar. Title VII and the IHRA pro-
hibit sexual harassment in the workplace. Although
Ms. Sanchez contends that the standards for determining sex-
ual harassment under the two provisions differ, she does not
identify any difference between the two laws that are relevant
to her claims. While she correctly points out that the text of
the IHRA is not identical to that of Title VII, both this court
and Illinois state courts consistently state that the analytical
standards are the same. See Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs.,
Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Illinois courts apply the
federal Title VII framework to IHRA claims.” (citing Rabé v.
29 R.145 at ¶ 72.
30 Id. at ¶¶ 72–73, 76–77.

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No. 24-3250 9
United Air Lines, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 807, 821 (N.D. Ill. 2013)));
see also Wong v. Midwest Gaming & Ent. LLC, 228 N.E.3d 792,
797 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023) (“To determine the existence of a hos-
tile work environment sufficient to sustain a sexual harass-
ment claim [under the IHRA], a plaintiff must establish that
[…] the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to create a
hostile work environment.”); Trayling v. Bd. of Fire & Police
Comm’rs of Bensenville, 652 N.E.2d 386, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(“The Supreme Court’s decision in Harris,” which required
that conduct be “severe or pervasive enough to create an ob-
jectively hostile or abusive work environment,” “should be
applied to sexual harassment claims brought pursuant to the
IHRA.” (citation modified)).
Present case law also establishes firmly that Title VII and
the IHRA do not prohibit all workplace conduct that good
managers and good employees would consider unacceptable.
To constitute actionable sexual harassment, the activity “must
be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
[the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working en-
vironment.” Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
“[W]hether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be de-
termined only by looking at all the circumstances.” Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). “These may include
the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee’s work performance.” Id. But “no single
factor is required.” Id.
It is also well-established that hostile work environment
claims require that the facts be assessed through both a subjec-
tive and an objective lens. First, the victim must “subjectively

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10 No. 24-3250
perceive the environment to be abusive.” Id. at 21. Here, the
district court decided that Ms. Sanchez subjectively perceived
the El Milagro environment to be abusive and that the parties
agreed on this point. Secondly, the facts must be assessed
from an objective lens. The conduct must be of such a charac-
ter that a reasonable person would find it offensive in the
workplace. See Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798,
807 (7th Cir. 2000). Determining what conduct satisfies the ob-
jective requirement and what falls short is a sensitive line-
drawing problem. And “[d]rawing the line is not always
easy.” Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir.
1995). Moreover, on this point, we must be careful not to sub-
stitute judicial predilections for jury determinations. Here,
precedent from the Supreme Court, our court, and our sister
circuits supply significant guidance on the sort of conduct
that a trier of fact might conclude to constitute sexual harass-
ment. To begin, it is well-established that verbal utterances
that are fairly characterized as “occasional vulgar banter,
tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers,”
are not, by themselves, actionable. Id. at 430. More severe, as-
saultive speech, especially of a repetitive nature, can yield a
different result. See, e.g., Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489
F.3d 781, 788–89 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that a jury reasonably
could find a hostile work environment created by at least
eighteen sexist or sexual comments over ten months).
Notably, as a general principle, situations involving phys-
ical acts are considered “more severe than harassing com-
ments alone.” Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321,
334 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation modified). See also Rene v. MGM
Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting
that prohibiting “[p]hysical sexual assault” under Title VII is
“routine[]” in the courts of appeals).

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No. 24-3250 11
Nevertheless, “[p]hysical harassment lies along a contin-
uum just as verbal harassment does.” Hostetler, 218 F.3d at
808. The Second Circuit put it well in Redd v. N.Y. Div. of Pa-
role, 678 F.3d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 2012), when it pointed out that
courts “must take care […] not to view individual incidents in
isolation” because the individual alleging harassment experi-
ences the entire context of her working environment, not a se-
ries of piecemeal events. We therefore have acknowledged
that some physical contact, especially among friends, might
be considered neither severe nor pervasive absent “aggravat-
ing circumstances such as continued contact after an objec-
tion.” Patton v. Keystone RV Co., 455 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir.
2006). Even cruder acts, if they occur in isolation, might be
considered not actionable, depending on the circumstances.
“But when the physical contact surpasses what ‘(if it were
consensual) might be expected between friendly coworkers
… it becomes increasingly difficult to write the conduct off as
a pedestrian annoyance.’” Id. (quoting Hostetler, 218 F.3d at
808). “When entering a workplace, reasonable people expect
to have their autonomy circumscribed in a number of ways;
but giving up control over who can touch their body is usu-
ally not one of them.” Id.
Our cases have made clear, however, that the inappropri-
ate touching of an intimate body part presents a particularly
egregious situation. Turner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679,
685–86 (7th Cir. 2010). Put bluntly, “direct contact with an in-
timate body part constitutes one of the most severe forms of
sexual harassment.” Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 268 (7th Cir.
2001). This is a principle well-established not only in this cir-
cuit but in the other circuits that have had to address the ques-
tion. The Second Circuit set forth the rule succinctly in Redd:
“The repeated touching of intimate parts of an unconsenting

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12 No. 24-3250
employee’s body is by its nature severely intrusive and can-
not properly be characterized as abuse that is ‘minor.’” 678
F.3d at 179. In enforcing our Country’s sex discrimination
law, the federal courts have, with one voice, regarded the
touching of intimate body parts as an especially intrusive in-
vasion of an employee’s autonomy and human dignity. See
Rene, 305 F.3d at 1065 (collecting cases). 31
B
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the case be-
fore us. We are confronted with two fact-based disputes. 32
The first is Ms. Sanchez’s allegation that Gutierrez sexually
harassed her through three separate acts. The second is her
allegation that El Milagro was negligent in addressing her
complaints with respect to these episodes.
31 Notably, but predictably, none of the cases differentiate on whether the
touching intrusion was through the victim’s clothes. Indeed, it appears
that, in all the published cases, the victim remained clothed. Assessing the
severity of the touching of intimate body parts on such a basis would be
the worst sort of casuistry. Assessing the severity of such an intrusion by
holding a stopwatch on it is worthy of the same characterization.
32 Ms. Sanchez’s opposition to El Milagro’s summary judgment motion is
dependent on her own account of the events that she says occurred at El
Milagro. Ms. Sanchez may rely on her own testimony. See Berry v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 618 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Payne v. Pauley, 337
F.3d 767, 770–73 (7th Cir. 2003)). “It is not for courts at summary judgment
to weigh evidence or determine the credibility of such testimony; we leave
those tasks to factfinders.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). However, where “[t]he only evidence supporting” a
claim against a defendant is the plaintiff’s “own testimony,” a court must
“assess that testimony to determine whether a reasonable jury could credit
[her] version of the disputed facts that could support a verdict in [her]
favor.” Whitaker, 144 F.4th at 918.

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No. 24-3250 13
1
All three incidents here involved Gutierrez’s touching
Ms. Sanchez’s buttocks. The first incident is particularly trou-
bling because it involved Gutierrez rubbing his genitals
against Ms. Sanchez’s buttocks. While “even one act of har-
assment will suffice if it is egregious[,]” we need not decide
here whether this act should be so characterized. Hostetler, 218
F.3d at 808. Rather, we must assess this act as one of three un-
wanted intimate bodily intrusions and in light of the manifest
hostility of Gutierrez toward Ms. Sanchez. We must consider
whether, given the circumstances here, a fact-finder could
reasonably conclude that these intrusions changed the condi-
tions of her employment. 33
The district court here remarked that “courts frequently
hold that circumstances far more egregious than those present
in this case fail to qualify as objectively severe or pervasive
harassment.” 34 Indeed, some of our cases do, at least on the
surface, describe significant misbehavior. 35 As we explain in
33 We do not know whether Ms. Sanchez’s account would be accepted by
a trier of fact. She would face significant hurdles in that regard. Her own
deposition testimony admitted to a certain tentativeness about Gutierrez’s
intent at the time of the first incident. Specifically, Ms. Sanchez described
this moment as one she initially wanted to see as accidental. The finder of
fact would have to assess this testimony; that assessment is not ours to
make.
34 R.154 at 12.
35 In Koelsch, for instance, the plaintiff’s claim failed when she alleged that
her company’s president “removed his shoe and rubbed his foot against
[her] leg,” continuing “despite her demands that he stop”; told her that he
found her attractive; and later “grabbed [her] buttocks.” Koelsch v. Beltone
Elecs. Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 706–07 (7th Cir. 1995). In Anderson, a terminated
restaurant waitress alleged that “[p]atrons touched her inappropriately ‘a

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14 No. 24-3250
the next section, while we affirm the grant of summary judg-
ment, we think that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude
that these particular facts of alleged harassment constitute be-
havior forbidden by the statute. Here, the jury would be enti-
tled to conclude that Gutierrez’s misbehavior was motivated
by an intent to force Ms. Sanchez out of El Milagro because of
his upset at her accommodation. The jury would be entitled
to conclude that these events, each egregious in itself, also
were part of a long-haul campaign of attrition to make
Ms. Sanchez’s time at El Milagro miserable. 36 And the com-
ments Ms. Sanchez later overheard from coworkers could be
seen to have contributed. When viewing these incidents in
their totality, and when viewed in light of the apparent pur-
pose of attempting to induce Ms. Sanchez to leave the com-
pany, they are the type of sexual harassment that the law was
designed to prevent.
2
We now turn to El Milagro’s liability for the conduct of its
employees. Gutierrez, along with the individuals who made
comments about Ms. Sanchez, are Ms. Sanchez’s co-
lot,’ and a coworker grabbed her butt once and hugged her inappropri-
ately two or three times. [The bar manager] called her a ‘bitch,’ and [the
co-owner] told her to wear tight, form-fitting clothing because it looked
better on her.” Anderson v. Mott Street, 104 F.4th 646, 651 (7th Cir. 2024).
We rejected a plaintiff’s claim where a coworker crawled into her bed in a
hotel on a work trip after he had touched her arm and lower back on their
way to an earlier dinner. Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp., 911 F.3d 874, 882 (7th
Cir. 2018).
36 Cf. Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 361 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding
no hostile work environment after “four isolated incidents in which a co-
worker briefly touched her arm, fingers, or buttocks”).

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No. 24-3250 15
workers. 37 Consequently, El Milagro “is liable only if it was
negligent in controlling working conditions.” Vance v. Ball
State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013). To prove such negligence,
Ms. Sanchez must establish two points: first, that El Milagro
had “notice or knowledge of the harassment,” Parkins v. Civ.
Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1035 (7th Cir. 1998), and
second, that El Milagro did not take “prompt and appropriate
corrective action reasonably likely to prevent the harassment
from recurring.” Cole v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Illinois Univ., 838 F.3d
888, 898 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Porter v. Erie Foods Int’l, Inc.,
576 F.3d 629, 636 (7th Cir. 2009)). 38
a
“With respect to the extent of the notice given to an em-
ployer, a plaintiff ‘cannot withstand summary judgment
without presenting evidence that she gave the employer
enough information to make a reasonable employer think
there was some probability that she was being sexually har-
assed.’” Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Zimmerman v. Cook
Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 96 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 1996)).
At the outset, the parties dispute whether Brito was a “su-
pervisor.” El Milagro maintains that Brito had “no authority
to terminate, transfer, or otherwise discipline employees” be-
cause he was a “low-level supervisor.” 39 But El Milagro’s pol-
icies designate Brito as one of the individuals in the
37 R.145 at ¶¶ 31, 71–73.
38 The IHRA holds employers liable for sexual harassment by nonsuper-
visory employees “only if the employer becomes aware of the conduct and
fails to take reasonable corrective measures.” 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/2-
102(D).
39 Appellee’s Br. 53.

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16 No. 24-3250
management chain of command to whom Ms. Sanchez could
report harassment. El Milagro admits that Brito is the “second
shift Supervisor in the Production department.” 40 The El Mil-
agro employee handbook policies state that “any employee
who becomes aware of an incident of sexual harassment,
whether by witnessing the incident or being told of it, must
report it to their immediate supervisor, to the Human Re-
sources department, or to any other member of management
with whom the employee feels comfortable.” 41 “Prompt re-
porting to one of these individuals allows El Milagro to take
prompt investigation and appropriate disciplinary action.” 42
If a jury accepts Ms. Sanchez’s assertion that she reported the
harassment to Brito, as the handbook instructed her, El Mil-
agro is “accountable to the standard of care that it created for
itself.” Nischan v. Stratosphere Quality, LLC, 865 F.3d 922, 932
(7th Cir. 2017). Whatever Ms. Sanchez told Brito about
Gutierrez’s harassment, El Milagro was on notice of it.
b
Ms. Sanchez also must establish the adequacy of her notice
to El Milagro. She must have provided Brito with “enough
information to make a reasonable employer think there was
some probability that she was being sexually harassed.” Par-
kins, 163 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Zimmerman, 96 F.3d at 1019). It
is undisputed that HR learned of Ms. Sanchez’s allegation of
harassment no earlier than August 30, 2020. 43 El Milagro,
40 R.135 at ¶ 30.
41 R.135-7 at 18.
42 Id.
43 R.145 at ¶ 46.

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No. 24-3250 17
however, disputes that Ms. Sanchez reported the first two in-
cidents of harassment to Brito shortly after they happened. At
summary judgment, we assume that she did so, based on her
assertions in her depositions. 44
Ms. Sanchez testified in her deposition that she reported
the first incident of touching to Brito about two hours after it
occurred. Ms. Sanchez recounts that, during the conversation
with Brito, she told him that “Mr. Gutierrez had rubbed his
genitals on my buttocks.” 45 She told him “that I felt very bad
and I felt very uncomfortable with what had happened.” 46
Ms. Sanchez claims at one point that she told Brito the touch-
ing was intentional. 47 But she said at another point in the dep-
osition, while she was describing the written statement she
had made to HR, that while she “knew that it wasn’t an acci-
dent, I tried to see it that way.” 48 In the written statement, she
wrote that “[a]t first I wanted to see it as an accident, but as
time has passed and it has happened other times I don’t think
so.” 49
44 We describe the record inconsistencies on this point above. But El Mil-
agro also contends that, even if Ms. Sanchez did immediately report the
first two incidents to Brito, she did not identify Gutierrez. As we note in
the text, the problem for Ms. Sanchez is that in her deposition the descrip-
tion of what she told Brito gave him a basis to believe the first two inci-
dents of touching were accidents.
45 R.145-4 at 84:23–24.
46 Id. at 85:03–04.
47 Id. at 85:08.
48 R.135-15 at 11:18–19.
49 R.135-16 at *7.

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18 No. 24-3250
Ms. Sanchez said that Brito responded to her verbal com-
plaint by saying she should “try to not put myself in places
where I would be exposed, to look for another place for me
[sic] work area where I would not be exposed to being
touched.” 50 In response, she asked him “what am I going to
do if that’s my work area?” 51 He said, “you have to try to put
yourself in another area where you’re not exposed.” 52 She
told him, “why don’t you tell them they should say, ‘excuse
me,’ or if they don’t want to say excuse me, they can say
‘move’ or ‘get away from there because I have to go
through.’” 53 Brito responded that “that’s the way they had
been educated and he couldn’t do anything regarding that.” 54
She “didn’t respond” because she “felt very uncomfortable”
and “very frustrated.” 55 The conversation lasted between fif-
teen and twenty minutes. Ms. Sanchez said that she knew
Brito took no further action to investigate or reprimand
Gutierrez after this conversation “[b]ecause he took it as an
accident.” 56
Ms. Sanchez testified that after the second incident in July
2020, she complained to Brito the following day. She “told
him that again a new accident had happened to me with
50 R.145-4 at 85:11–14.
51 Id. at 85:16–17.
52 Id. at 85:19–20.
53 Id. at 85:22–86:01.
54 Id. at 86:03–05.
55 Id. at 86:07–08.
56 Id. at 86:24.

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No. 24-3250 19
Gutierrez.” 57 Ms. Sanchez, at the time of the deposition, did
not believe it was an accident, but in a conversation with
Brito, she told him “that again an accident had happened but
that is an expression. That is a way I express myself.” 58 She
described the incident to Brito by explaining “that
Mr. Gutierrez had lowered his […] hand touching my buttock
on the left.” 59 Brito, in response, asked her, “Could it be an
accident?” 60 Ms. Sanchez claimed she responded that she
“didn’t think it was an accident.” 61 Brito “told me to try not
to get too close to Gutierrez.” 62 She then “told him that it
wasn’t fair for me to be the one having to watch out for him
and not him.” 63 Brito responded that “it was to avoid more
problems.” 64 Then Ms. Sanchez walked away, ending the con-
versation, which was about ten minutes.
Brito denies that either of these conversations took place.
He testified in his deposition that he first learned of these
events when Ms. Sanchez reported the third incident and that
he promptly conducted the initial investigation and for-
warded his report to HR, as mandated by company policy.
57 Id. at 92:08–09.
58 Id. at 92:14–16.
59 Id. at 92:20–93:01.
60 Id. at 93:04.
61 Id. at 93:06.
62 Id. at 93:08–09.
63 Id. at 93:11–12.
64 Id. at 93:14–15.

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20 No. 24-3250
El Milagro “can avoid liability for coworker harassment ‘if
it [took] prompt and appropriate corrective action reasonably
likely to prevent the harassment from recurring.’” Porter, 576
F.3d at 636 (quoting Tutman v. WBBM-TV, Inc./CBS, Inc., 209
F.3d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir. 2000)). We do not believe that a rea-
sonable jury could conclude, from Ms. Sanchez’s deposition
testimony, or any other evidence in the record related to her
reporting of the first two incidents, that she gave Brito
“enough information to make a reasonable employer think
there was some probability that she was being sexually har-
assed.” Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Zimmerman, 96 F.3d
at 1019). As Ms. Sanchez described it in her deposition, what
she told Brito led him to believe that she was complaining of
accidental touching that happened because the production
lines on which she and Gutierrez worked had close quarters.
When she reported the second incident to him, for example,
she told him that a “new accident had happened to me with
Gutierrez.” 65
Notably, after Ms. Sanchez reported the third incident to
Brito and he submitted a written report to HR on August 30,
2020, HR undertook its investigation. An HR employee inter-
viewed Ms. Sanchez and Gutierrez separately on September
2. 66 HR concluded that the events described by Ms. Sanchez
could not be substantiated. It provided Ms. Sanchez with a
letter, dated September 16, informing her that the case was
closed and that it had told Gutierrez, in a “call of attention”
letter, to immediately change his behavior toward her. 67 “A
65 Id. at 92:08–09.
66 R.145 at ¶¶ 48, 53.
67 Id. at ¶ 59.

-- 20 of 27 --

No. 24-3250 21
prompt investigation is the ‘hallmark of a reasonable correc-
tive action.’” Porter, 576 F.3d at 636 (quoting Lapka v. Chertoff,
517 F.3d 974, 984 (7th Cir. 2008)). Although El Milagro did not
interview any witnesses, Ms. Sanchez did not identify any. 68
Ms. Sanchez also did not report to anyone the names of the
people who made the harassing comments that she overheard
after the investigation concluded, 69 so El Milagro could not
investigate them. And Ms. Sanchez agrees that Gutierrez has
not sexually harassed her since. 70 El Milagro’s investigation
shows that it “took the harassment seriously and took appro-
priate steps to bring the harassment to an end.” Id. It had in
place a viable and appropriate mechanism for reporting the
misbehavior.
Conclusion
A reasonable jury could find that the harassment
Ms. Sanchez suffered amounted to a hostile working environ-
ment. A jury could not reasonably conclude, however, that El
Milagro was negligent in fulfilling its responsibilities in re-
sponding to the situation. The judgment of the district court
is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
68 R.145-4 at 78:20, 89:10, 94:16.
69 R.145 at ¶¶ 71–74.
70 Id. at ¶ 61.

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22 No. 24-3250
K IRSCH , Circuit Judge, concurring. I join all of the majority
opinion except its conclusion in part II.B.1 regarding an issue
that we need not reach at all to resolve this appeal. The major-
ity states that Alma Sanchez’s allegations establish a hostile
work environment within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. I respectfully disagree that a reasonable
™Ž›œ˜—ȱŒ˜ž•ȱꗍ the alleged conduct so objectively severe or
pervasive as to “ŠěŽŒȱ ‘Žȱ Ž›–œȱ Š—ȱ Œ˜—’’˜—œȱ ˜ȱ Ž–™•˜¢Ȭ
ment.” Anderson v. Street, 104 F.4th 646, 652 (7th Cir. 2024) (ci-
Š’˜—ȱ –˜’ꮍǼǯ ȱ ˜ž•ȱ ŠĜ›–ȱ ‘Žȱ ’œ›’Œȱ Œ˜ž› on this
ground as well.
Title VII protects individuals from sexual harassment “so
severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment
and create a hostile or abusive working environment.” Id. (ci-
Š’˜—ȱ–˜’ꮍǼǯ It is not, however, a “general civility code,”
Alamo v. Bliss, 864 F.3d 541, 550 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation modi-
ꎍǼ, making employers potentially liable for the “isolated in-
cidents, teasing, and other unpleasantries” that are “unfortu-
nately, not uncommon in the workplace,” Swyear v. Fare Foods
Corp., 911 F.3d 874, 881 (7th Cir. 2018). Our inquiry is there-
fore whether the ™•Š’—’ěȱcan clear Title VII’s “high bar.” Id.
Here, Sanchez alleges that Francisco Gutierrez, another
employee at El Milagro, touched her inappropriately on three
occasions. As the majority recognizes, assessing such interac-
tions often presents a ’ĜŒž•ȱ•’—Ž-drawing exercise. See id. at
882. But the misconduct that Sanchez alleges—that Gutierrez
made contact with ‘Ž›ȱ‹žĴ˜Œ”œȱ ‘’•Žȱhe passed behind her,
and that he subsequently ˜žŒ‘Žȱ‘Ž›ȱ‹žĴ˜Œ”œȱ˜—ȱ ˜ȱ˜‘Ž›ȱ
occasions—falls short of establishing a hostile work environ-
ment. In concluding otherwise, the majority characterizes
these incidents between Sanchez and Gutierrez as “unwanted

-- 22 of 27 --

No. 24-3250 23
intimate bodily intrusions.” Ante, at 13. But the majority ig-
—˜›Žœȱ‘Žȱ—Šž›Žȱ˜ȱ‘˜œŽȱ’—Ž›ŠŒ’˜—œǰȱ‘Žȱꛜȱtwo of which
were œžĜŒ’Ž—•¢ȱ̎Ž’—ȱŠ—ȱŠ–‹’ž˜žœȱ‘ŠȱŠ—Œ‘Ž£ȱ‘Ž›œŽ•ȱ
referred to them as accidents. Ante, at 17–19. These incidents
are far less threatening and severe than the intimate contact
ŽȂŸŽȱ˜ž—ȱœžĜŒ’Ž—ȱ˜ȱŒ›ŽŠŽȱŠȱ‘˜œ’•Žȱ ˜›”ȱŽ—Ÿ’›˜—–Ž—ǯ
Compare Turner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir.
ŘŖŗŖǼȱ ǻ’Ž—’¢’—ȱ Œ˜—ŠŒȱ ’‘ȱ Š—ȱ ’—’–ŠŽȱ ‹˜¢ȱ ™Š›ȱ œžĜȬ
cient to establish a hostile work environment, such as when a
ŽŽ—Š—ȱ™•ŠŒŽȱ‘’œȱ‘Š—ȱ˜—ȱ‘Žȱ™•Š’—’ěȂœȱ‹›ŽŠœȱ˜›ȱœŽŸŽ›Š•ȱ
seconds, when a coworker forcibly kissed ‘Žȱ ™•Š’—’ěȱ Š—ȱ
nearly removed her bra, and when a manager put his hand
inside the ™•Š’—’ěȂœȱ œ‘˜›œǰȱ ›ŽŠŒ‘’—ȱ ‘Ž›ȱ ž—Ž› ŽŠ›Ǽǰȱ ’‘ȱ
AndersonǰȱŗŖŚȱǯŚ‘ȱŠȱŜśŘȱǻꗍ’—ȱ—˜ȱ‘˜œ’•Žȱ ˜›”ȱŽ—Ÿ’›˜—Ȭ
ment when the ™•Š’—’ěȱŠ••ŽŽȱ‘ŠȱŠȱŒ˜ ˜›”Ž›ȱ˜žŒ‘Žȱ‘Ž›ȱ
inappropriately three or four times, including grabbing her
‹žĴocks).
The comments from other coworkers that Sanchez over-
heard don’t save her claim against El Milagro, either. She al-
leges that crude remarks were made about her and other fe-
male employees. But Title VII does not prohibit all verbal har-
assment in the workplace, because “vulgar banter … gener-
ally does not create a work environment that a reasonable per-
œ˜—ȱ ˜ž•ȱꗍȱ’—˜•Ž›Š‹•Žǯ” Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282
F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2002) ǻŒ’Š’˜—ȱ –˜’ꮍǼ. The com-
ments alleged here don’t cross that threshold. They were
made by coworkers, entitling them to less weight than, for in-
stance, harassing remarks made by a direct supervisor. See
Scaife v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans ěœǯ, 49 F.4th 1109, 1117 (7th Cir.
2022). And most of these remarks weren’t even directed to-
wards Sanchez, further lessening their impact. EEOC v. Vill.
At Hamilton Pointe LLC, 102 F.4th 387, 402 (7th Cir. 2024)

-- 23 of 27 --

24 No. 24-3250
(observing that comments made to non-™•Š’—’ěœȱ ŒŠ››¢ȱ •Žœœȱ
weight than comments made ˜ȱ‘Žȱ™•Š’—’ěǼǯȱSo, even consid-
ering these comments alongside Gutierrez’s actions, no rea-
œ˜—Š‹•Žȱ™Ž›œ˜—ȱŒ˜ž•ȱꗍȱŠ—Œ‘Ž£Ȃœȱ ˜›”’—ȱŒ˜—’’˜—œȱob-
jectively hostile. See Anderson, 104 F.4th at 652 ǻꗍ’—ȱ —˜ȱ
hostile work environment where, in addition to inappropriate
touching on three or four occasionsǰȱ‘Žȱ™•Š’—’ěȱ Šœȱ’›ŽŒŽȱ
to wear tight, form-ęĴ’—ȱŒ•˜‘’—ȱŠ—ȱ ŠœȱŒŠ••ŽȱŠȱȃ‹’Œ‘ȄǼ.
Finally, to the extent that the majority is suggesting that
Gutierrez’s subjective motivations bolster Sanchez’s ability to
establish an objectively hostile work environment, ante, at 14,
that ™›˜™˜œ’’˜—ȱ ꗍœȱ —˜ȱ œž™™˜›ȱ ’—ȱ ˜ž›ȱ •Š . Perhaps
Gutierrez behaved as he did because he wanted to force
Sanchez out of El Milagro; perhaps not. But our inquiry is
whether the conduct alleged “transform[ed] the workplace to
a degree that implicates Title VII.” Hostetler v. Quality Dining,
Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 808 (7th Cir. 2000). No reasonable person
Œ˜ž•ȱꗍȱ‘Šȱ’ȱ’.

-- 24 of 27 --

No. 24-3250 25
LEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part. I join Judge Ripple’s opinion as to Sections I, II.A, and
II.B.1. First, I agree that the facts here could lead a reasonable
“ž›¢ȱ ˜ȱ ꗍȱ Šȱ ‘˜œ’•Žȱ ˜›”ȱ Ž—Ÿ’›˜—–Ž—ȱ ž—Ž›ȱ ˜ž›ȱ Ž¡’œ’—ȱ
ŒŠœŽ•Š ǯȱ ȱŠ•œ˜ȱŠ›ŽŽȱ‘Š, on these facts, any notice to Arturo
›’˜ȱ ould be œžĜŒ’Ž—ȱ ˜ȱ Œ˜—œ’žŽȱ —˜’ŒŽȱ ˜ȱ •ȱ ’•Š›˜ǯȱ
Lastly, I agree that once •–Š Š—Œ‘Ž£ȱ™›˜Ÿ’Žȱ—˜’ŒŽȱ˜ȱ•ȱ
’•Š›˜ȱŠŽ›ȱ‘Žȱ‘’›ȱ’—Œ’Ž—ǰȱ‘ŽȱŒ˜–™Š—¢ȱ˜˜”ȱœžĜŒ’Ž—ȱ
œŽ™œȱ˜ȱŠ›Žœœȱ‘ŽȱŠ••ŽŽȱ‘Š›Šœœ–Ž—ǯ
That said, ˜›ȱ‘Žȱ›ŽŠœ˜—œȱ ȱ ’••ȱŽ¡™•Š’—ǰȱ ȱ‹Ž•’ŽŸŽ there is a
Ž—ž’—Žȱ ’œ™žŽȱ ˜ȱ –ŠŽ›’Š•ȱ ŠŒȱ Šœȱ ˜ȱ ‘Ž‘Ž›ȱ Š—Œ‘Ž£ȱ ’—Ȭ
˜›–Žȱ›’˜ȱŠŽ›ȱ‘ŽȱꛜȱŠ—ȱœŽŒ˜—ȱ’—Œ’Ž—ȱ‘ŠȱFrancisco
ž’Ž››Ž£ȱ ‘Šȱ ŠŒŽȱ ’—Ž—’˜—Š••¢ȱ ‘Ž—ȱ ˜žŒ‘’—ȱ ‘Ž›ǯ As
œžŒ‘ǰȱ ȱ ˜ž•ȱ›ŽŸŽ›œŽȱ‘Žȱ“ž–Ž—ȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ’œ›’ŒȱŒ˜ž›ȱŠ—ȱ
›Ž–Š—ȱ˜›ȱž›‘Ž›ȱ™›˜ŒŽŽ’—œǯ
œȱŠȱ‘›Žœ‘˜•ȱ–ŠĴŽ›ǰȱ ȱŽ—ȱ˜ȱ‹Ž•’ŽŸŽȱthat, Ÿ’Ž Žȱ’—ȱ‘Žȱ
•’‘ȱ –˜œȱ ŠŸ˜›Š‹•Žȱ ˜ȱ Š—Œ‘Ž£ǰȱ ‘Žȱ ꛜȱ ’—Œ’Ž—ǰȱ ‘Ž›Žȱ
ž’Ž››Ž£ȱ ’œȱ Š••ŽŽȱ ˜ȱ ‘ŠŸŽȱ ȃ›ž‹‹Žȱ ‘’œȱ Ž—’Š•œȄȱ ŠŠ’—œȱ
Š—Œ‘Ž£Ȃœȱ ‹žĴ˜Œ”œȱ Šœȱ ‘Žȱ ™ŠœœŽȱ ‹¢ȱ ‘Ž›ǰȱ ’œȱ œžĜŒ’Ž—ȱ ˜ȱ ’ŸŽȱ
›’œŽȱ ˜ȱ Šȱ ‘˜œ’•Žȱ ˜›”ȱ Ž—Ÿ’›˜—–Ž—ǯȱ R.145-4 at 77:21–22; see
Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 901 (7th
Cir. 2018) (ȃ‘Ž‘Ž›ȱ‘Š›Šœœ–Ž—ȱ Šœȱœ˜ȱœŽŸŽ›Žȱ˜›ȱ™Ž›ŸŠœ’ŸŽȱ
Šœȱ ˜ȱ Œ˜—œ’žŽȱ Šȱ ‘˜œ’•Žȱ ˜›”ȱ Ž—Ÿ’›˜—–Ž—ȱ ’œȱ Ž—Ž›Š••¢ȱ Šȱ
question of fact for the jury.ȄǼǯ
œȱ˜ž›ȱŒ’›Œž’ȱ–Š”ŽœȱŒ•ŽŠ›ǰȱȃǽǾhere is no ‘–Š’Œȱ—ž–‹Ž›’
˜ȱ ’—Œ’Ž—œȱ ›Žšž’›Žȱ ˜ȱ ŽœŠ‹•’œ‘ȱ Šȱ ‘˜œ’•Žȱ Ž—Ÿ’›˜—–Ž—ǯȄ
Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 808 (7th Cir.
2000) (quoting Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439,
445 (7th Cir. 1994)ǼǯȱȃǽǾŸŽ—ȱ˜—ŽȱŠŒȱ˜ȱ‘Š›Šœœ–Ž—ȱ ’••ȱœžĜŒŽȱ
if it is egregious.ȄȱId. œœž–’— the truthfulness of Sanchez’s
account ǻœ˜–Ž‘’—ȱ Žȱ –žœȱ ˜ȱ Šȱ ‘’œȱ œŠŽǼ, a reasonable

-- 25 of 27 --

26 No. 24-3250
“ž›˜›ȱŒ˜ž•ȱꗍȱ‘Šǰȱ ‘Ž—ȱ ž’Ž››Ž£ȱ’—Ž—’˜—Š••¢ȱ›ž‹‹Žȱ‘’œȱ
Ž—’Š•œȱŠŠ’—œȱŠ—Œ‘Ž£Ȃœȱ‹žĴ˜Œ”œȱǻŽœœŽ—’Š••¢ȱœ’–ž•Š’— a
œŽ¡žŠ•ȱŠŒǼǰȱ‘Žȱconduct ŠœȱœžĜŒ’Ž—•¢ȱŽ›Ž’˜žœȱto alter her
˜›”ȱ Ž—Ÿ’›˜—–Ž—ǯ ›˜–ȱ ‘Ž›Ž, ȱ ˜ž• go on to ŽŸŠ•žŠŽȱ
‘Ž‘Ž›ȱŠ—Œ‘Ž£ȱŠŸŽȱœžĜŒ’Ž—ȱ—˜’ŒŽȱ˜ȱ›’˜ of this ꛜȱ’—Ȭ
cident.
ȃŽ˜›Žȱ•’Š‹’•’¢ȱ˜›ȱœŽ¡žŠ•ȱ‘Š›Šœœ–Ž—ȱŒŠ—ȱŠ›’œŽǰȱ‘ŽȱŽ–Ȭ
™•˜¢ŽŽȱ–žœȱ’ŸŽȱ‘‘ŽȱŽ–™•˜¢Ž›ȱŽ—˜ž‘ȱ’—˜›–Š’˜—ȱ˜ȱ–Š”Žȱ
Šȱ›ŽŠœ˜—Š‹•ŽȱŽ–™•˜¢Ž›ȱ‘’—”ȱ‘Šȱ‘Ž›Žȱ Šœȱœ˜–Žȱ™›˜‹Š‹’•’¢ȱ
‘Šȱœ‘Žȱ Šœȱ‹Ž’—ȱœŽ¡žŠ••¢ȱ‘Š›ŠœœŽǯ’ȄȱErickson v. Wis. Dep’t
of Corr., 469 F.3d 600, 606 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Zimmerman
v. Cook Cnty. ‘Ž›’ěȂœȱŽ™Ȃ, 96 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 1996));
see Durkin v. City of Chicago, 341 F.3d 606, 613 (7th Cir. 2003)
ǻꗍ’—ȱ‘Šȱ™•Š’—’ěȂœȱŒ˜–™•Š’—œȱ Ž›Žȱ˜˜ȱŸŠžŽ ˜ȱ’ŸŽȱ—˜Ȭ
’ŒŽȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽ–™•˜¢Ž›ȱ‹ŽŒŠžœŽȱȃœ‘Žȱ—ŽŸŽ›ȱŽ¡™›ŽœœŽȱ‘Ž›ȱŽŽ•’—œȱ
˜ȱ ‘Š›Šœœ–Ž—ȱ ˜›ȱ˜ěŽ›Žȱ Š—¢ȱ œ™ŽŒ’ęŒȱ Ž¡Š–™•Žœȱ ˜ȱ ‘Šȱ œ‘Žȱ
Œ˜—œ’Ž›Žȱ‘Š›Šœœ’—ȱ˜›ȱŽ–ŽŠ—’—ȱŒ˜—žŒǯȄ).
Here, Sanchez Žœ’ꮍȱ that ŠŽ›ȱ ‘Žȱ ꛜȱ ’—Œ’Ž—ǰȱ she
ȃœ™ŽŒ’ęŒŠ••¢ȱ ˜•ȱ ǽ›’˜Ǿ ‘Šȱ ›ǯȱ ž’Ž››Ž£ȱ ‘Šȱ ›ž‹‹Žȱ ‘’œȱ
Ž—’Š•œȱ˜—ȱǽ‘Ž›Ǿȱ‹žĴ˜Œ”œǯȄ R.145-4 at 84 ¶ 22–24. ‘Ž—ȱŠœ”Žȱ
’ȱœ‘Žȱ˜•ȱ›’˜ȱ‘Šȱȃ ž’Ž››Ž£ȱ’—Ž—’˜—Š••¢ȱ›ž‹‹Žȱ‘’œȱŽ—Ȭ
’Š•œȱ˜—ȱǽ‘Ž›ǾǰȄȱœ‘ŽȱŠ—œ Ž›ŽȱȃŽœǯȄȱ Id. at 85 ¶¶ 5–8. As the
–Š“˜›’¢ȱ™˜’—œȱ˜žǰȱ‘’œȱœŠŽ–Ž—ȱappears to be inconsistent
’‘ȱœ˜–Žȱ˜ȱ‘Ž›ȱ•ŠŽ›ȱœŠŽ–Ž—œȱŠ—ȱ‘Žȱ ›’ĴŽ—ȱ›Ž™˜›ǯȱAnd,
™Ž›‘Š™œǰȱ‹ŽŒŠžœŽȱ˜ȱ‘’œǰȱ‘Žȱ“ž›¢ȱ–’‘ȱ’œŒ˜ž—ȱ‘Ž›ȱŒ›Ž’‹’•Ȭ
ity. But Rule 56 ˜Žœȱ—˜ȱŠ••˜ ȱžœȱ˜ȱ Ž’‘ȱ‘ŽȱŒ˜—Ě’Œ’—ȱŽœȬ
’–˜—¢ȱ Šȱ ‘Žȱ œž––Š›¢ȱ “ž–Ž—ȱ œŠŽǯ See Zemlick v.
Burkhart, 164 F.4th 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 2026) ǻȃŽȱ ˜ȱ —˜ȱ
Ž’‘ȱ ŽŸ’Ž—ŒŽȱ ˜›ȱ –Š”Žȱ Œ›Ž’‹’•’¢ȱ ŽŽ›–’—Š’˜—œ—those
Šœ”œȱŠ›ŽȱŽ—›žœŽȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŠŒę—Ž›ǯȄǼ; see Allen v. Chi. Transit
Auth., 317 F.3d 696, 699–ŝŖŖȱ ǻŝ‘ȱ ’›ǯȱ ŘŖŖřǼȱ ǻŽ¡™•Š’—’—ȱ ‘Šȱ

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No. 24-3250 27
ŽŸŽ—ȱ ‘Ž—ȱ Šȱ ȃ ’—Žœœȱ ›Ž™ŽŠŽ•¢ȱ Œ˜—›Š’Œœȱ ‘’–œŽ•ȱ ž—Ž›ȱ
˜Š‘ȱ˜—ȱ–ŠŽ›’Š•ȱ–ŠĴŽ›œǰȄȱ‘’œȱŒ›Ž’‹’•’¢ȱȃ‹ŽŒ˜–ŽœȱŠ—ȱ’œœžŽȱ
˜›ȱ‘Žȱ“ž›¢Dzȱ’ȱŒŠ——˜ȱ‹Žȱ›Žœ˜•ŸŽȱ’—ȱŠȱœž––Š›¢ȱ“ž–Ž—ȱ™›˜Ȭ
ŒŽŽ’—ȄǼǯ
Turning to the second incident, Sanchez Žœ’ꮍȱ ‘Šȱ
ž’Ž››Ž£ȱ‘Šȱ›˜™Žȱ‘Ž›ȱ‹žĴ˜Œ”œȱ ’‘ȱ‘’œȱ‘Š—ȱŠ—ȱ‘Šȱshe
had ŸŽ›‹Š••¢ȱ˜•ȱ›’˜ȱ‘ŠȱȃŠȱ—Ž ȱŠŒŒ’Ž—ȱ‘Šȱ‘Š™™Ž—Žȱ˜ȱ
ǽ‘Ž›Ǿȱ ’‘ȱ ž’Ž››Ž£ǯȄȱ ǯŗŚś-4 at 92 ¶¶ 6–8. True, she
ŠŒ”—˜ •ŽŽd during her deposition that she had referred to
‘Žȱ’—Œ’Ž—ȱŠœȱŠ—ȱȃŠŒŒ’Ž—.ȄȱSee R.145-4 at 92 ¶ 8. žȱ hen
Šœ”Žȱ ‘¢ȱœ‘Žȱ‘ŠȱžœŽȱ‘Žȱ ˜›ȱȃaccident,Ȅ she responded
‘Šȱ’ȱ ŠœȱȃŠ—ȱŽ¡™›Žœœ’˜—ǯȱ‘Šȱ’œȱ‘Žȱ Š¢ȱ ȱŽ¡™›Žœœȱ–¢œŽ•ǯȄȱ
Id. at 92 ¶¶ 14–16. ‘Šȱ’œȱ–˜›Žǰȱ ‘Ž—ȱ›’˜ȱŠœ”Žȱ‘Ž›ȱ’ȱ’ȱ
Œ˜ž•ȱ ‘ŠŸŽȱ ‹ŽŽ—ȱ Š—ȱ ŠŒŒ’Ž—ǰȱ œ‘Žȱ ž—Žšž’Ÿ˜ŒŠ••¢ȱ œŠŽǰ ȃ ȱ
’—Ȃȱ ‘’—”ȱ ’ȱ Šœȱ Š—ȱ ŠŒŒ’Ž—.Ȅ Id. at 93 ¶ 6. Again, such
œŠŽ–Ž—œȱ–Š¢ȱ‹ŽȱžœŽž•ȱ˜Ž›ȱ˜›ȱŠ—Œ‘Ž£ȂœȱŒ›˜œœ-Ž¡Š–’Ȭ
nation at trial, but, d›Š ’—ȱŠ••ȱ›ŽŠœ˜—Š‹•Žȱ’—Ž›Ž—ŒŽœȱ’—ȱher
ŠŸ˜› Šȱ œž––Š›¢ȱ “ž–Ž—, jurors could ‹Ž•’ŽŸŽȱ ‘Šȱ ›’˜ȱ
ŠœȱœžĜŒ’Ž—•¢ȱ˜—ȱ—˜’ŒŽȱ˜ȱŠȱ‘˜œ’•Žȱ ˜›”ȱŽ—Ÿ’›˜—–Ž—ȱŠŽ›ȱ
the second incident.
Accordingly, on this record, ȱ ˜ž•ȱ ›ŽŸŽ›œŽȱ ‘Žȱ ’œ›’Œȱ
Œ˜ž›Ȃœȱ›Š—ȱ˜ȱœž––Š›¢ȱ“ž–Ž—ȱŠ—ȱ›Ž–Š—ȱ˜›ȱž›‘Ž›ȱ
proceedings. Thus, I respectfully dissent as to Section II.B.2.

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