John R. Zemater, Jr. v. PUBLIC ACTION TO DELIVER SHELTER, INC., d/b/a HESED HOUSE

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 26, 2026*
Decided May 28, 2026
Before
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1865
JOHN R. ZEMATER, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PUBLIC ACTION TO DELIVER
SHELTER, INC., d/b/a HESED HOUSE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 22 CV 6712
Jeremy C. Daniel,
Judge.
O R D E R
John Zemater sued a homeless shelter, Public Action to Deliver Shelter, Inc.
(d/b/a Hesed House), alleging it discriminated against him by enforcing its 7:00am
wake-up policy despite his self-diagnosed sleep disorder. This, he claimed, violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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§ 794, and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-102. The district court granted
Hesed House’s motion to dismiss Zemater’s third amended complaint. We affirm.
We recite the facts as alleged, drawing all reasonable inferences in Zemater’s
favor. Wilson v. Castaneda, 143 F.4th 814, 817 (7th Cir. 2025). Zemater was a temporary
resident of Hesed House’s men’s homeless shelter. The shelter had a wake-up time of
7:00am so that employees could sweep and mop the dormitory floors. Hesed House
provided an exception to the policy for those who provided documentation from a
doctor or employer supporting a need to sleep during the day, allowing them to sleep
in a separate, smaller dormitory. Zemater had previously been afforded this exception
on several occasions, including when he had strep throat and after he received the
COVID-19 booster vaccination.
Zemater sought an exception to the policy because he “suspect[ed]” that he had
“Delayed Sleep Phase Disorder.” He alleged he “fit the profile” of a person with this
disorder because he has always been a “night person” and has a “pattern” of sleeping
from 2:00am to 10:00am “most of the time.” He stated that it was “very difficult” for
him to wake up at 7:00am, and that when he does, he is drowsy and cannot function
well. He acknowledged he had not seen a doctor, but he claimed he was able to
diagnose himself with a sleep disorder based on his research and that a diagnosis or
treatment was not necessary because he did not work morning hours.
A case manager at Hesed House denied Zemater an exception to the policy
because he had not provided a note from a doctor or employer. The case manager told
him he either had to wake up at 7:00am or find another place to live. Zemater alleged
that Hesed House could easily accommodate a later wake-up time for him without
undue hardship but chose not to accommodate him. Zemater alleged that he suffered
negative health consequences, such as getting only five to six hours of sleep per night
instead of his usual eight to nine hours, as a result. He further alleged that he fell asleep
involuntarily during the day due to sleep deprivation: once at the public library and
once while sitting in his car.
In 2022, Zemater sued Hesed House under Titles II and III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the
Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA), 775 ILCS 5/1-102. After years of pretrial litigation
during which two complaints were dismissed, Zemater filed a third amended
complaint—the operative complaint for this appeal. Shortly thereafter, Zemater moved
for leave to amend the complaint a fourth time. He sought to add a retaliation claim

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No. 25-1865 Page 3
because Hesed House had recently told him that he was no longer welcome at the
shelter. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203.
The district court dismissed Zemater’s third amended complaint for failure to
state a claim. The court concluded, in relevant part, that Zemater had not plausibly
alleged a disability because his allegations that he had a sleep disorder based on his
perceived pattern of sleeping from 2:00am to 10:00am were “non-verified” and
speculative. Even if it were a disability, requiring a doctor’s note was a reasonable
condition to providing an accommodation and nothing suggested that Zemater’s
alleged condition was so “obvious[ly]” disabling that a doctor’s note was unnecessary.
The district court also denied Zemater leave to file a fourth amended complaint.
The court reasoned that the new claim of retaliation was unrelated to the original claims
regarding the wake-up policy and was consistent with a dilatory motive, observing that
Zemater moved to amend his complaint each time Hesed House moved to dismiss.
Further, the court explained, allowing Zemater to amend his complaint yet again would
be unduly prejudicial to Hesed House, which had already filed four motions to dismiss,
and Zemater himself alleged that the shelter was at risk of shutting down because of the
costs from three years of litigation.
While the suit was pending, Hesed House relocated and, as part of its relocation,
directed all residents to remove their cars from the parking lot that it no longer
operated. Zemater moved for sanctions, accusing the shelter of retaliating against him
by ordering him to move his inoperable car. The district court denied the motion. The
court later learned that Zemater had been contacting Hesed House’s executive director
about the case and ordered him to communicate about the litigation with only defense
counsel.
Zemater appeals, arguing that his disability is sufficiently obvious that the
shelter was required to accommodate his condition without further support from a
doctor. To avoid dismissal, he needed to plausibly allege that he has a disability as
defined by the IHRA, ADA, or Rehabilitation Act. We analyze claims under each act
using the same framework. Tate v. Dart, 51 F.4th 789, 793 (7th Cir. 2022); Wagoner v.
Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015). Each of the acts requires the plaintiff to have
“a physical or mental impairment,” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), that “substantially limits
the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people
in the general population.” E.E.O.C. v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, 75 F.4th 729, 733–34

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(7th Cir. 2023) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)); Burks v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 464 F.3d
744, 755 (7th Cir. 2006) (same for Rehabilitation Act).†
We agree with the district court that Zemater did not plausibly allege that his
purported sleep disorder is a disability. Although sleeping is a “major life activity,”
Zemater’s allegation that he is only getting five to six hours of sleep instead of eight to
nine hours does not suggest a substantial limitation compared to the general
population. See Squibb v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that
inability to sleep more than three to four hours per night was not a disability); Burks,
464 F.3d at 757 (same). That Zemater self-diagnoses his trouble sleeping as a medical
disorder makes no difference. See Squibb, 497 F.3d at 784 (highlighting lack of medical
evidence to suggest that “generalized assertions” about sleep issues did not establish a
legal disability); Burks, 464 F.3d at 757 (same). Neither does Zemater plausibly allege
that his sleep patterns substantially limit his ability to work generally—he alleged that
he does not work morning hours.
Even if Zemater had plausibly alleged a disability, Hesed House offered him the
reasonable accommodation of a separate sleeping area with a later wake-up time so
long as he provided a doctor’s note. It is permissible to request such a note.
See, e.g., Rowlands v. United Parcel Serv. – Fort Wayne, 901 F.3d 792, 801 (7th Cir. 2018).
Although some disabilities are so obvious as to require accommodation without a
doctor’s note, Zemater’s self-diagnosed sleep disorder is not one of them. See Hedberg v.
Ind. Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 928, 932, 934 (7th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that having
frequent seizures, or being in a wheelchair, were obvious disabilities).
Zemater also argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying him
leave to amend his complaint for a fourth time. He sought to add a retaliation claim and
argues he could not have done so earlier because the retaliation was recent. But we see
no abuse of discretion. The court gave various valid reasons, including that Zemater
was seeking to delay the litigation by adding new claims each time Hesed House
moved to dismiss and that further amendment would have unduly prejudiced the
defendants, who had already suffered “significant cost[s]” by challenging Zemater’s
† The IHRA defines disability as a “determinable physical or mental
characteristic of a person … which may result from disease, injury, congenital condition
of birth or functional disorder.” 775 ILCS 5/1-103(I)(1). The disability must be
“significantly debilitating or disfiguring” and it must be “’determinable’ by recognized
clinical or laboratory techniques.” 56 Ill. Admin. Code § 2500.20(b).

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consistently defective complaints for the past three years. See Airborne Beepers & Video,
Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007).
Next, Zemater urges that the district court erred by dismissing with prejudice his
claim under the IHRA. He notes that in the court’s order dismissing the IHRA claim in
his second amended complaint, the court dismissed without prejudice for lack of
exhaustion. He now asks us to modify the district court’s judgment to a dismissal
without prejudice on the re-stated IHRA claim in the third amended complaint as well.
But the district court did not dismiss the IHRA claim for failure to exhaust this time
around. Instead, the court concluded that it failed on the merits. And it did not err in
doing so: the court had supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim, and it
correctly concluded that because Zemater failed to state a claim under the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act, he necessarily failed to state a claim under the IHRA as well. See
Golden Years Homestead, Inc. v. Buckland, 557 F.3d 457, 462 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that
a district court need not relinquish supplemental jurisdiction when the supplemental
claim is clearly meritless); Tate, 51 F.4th at 793 (IHRA framework is “practically
indistinguishable” from ADA); M.U. by and through Kelly U. v. Team Ill. Hockey Club, Inc.,
215 N.E.3d 286, 298 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022) (explaining that the IHRA was patterned after
the ADA, and Illinois courts may look to federal ADA cases for guidance in construing
the IHRA).
Finally, Zemater challenges the district court’s order barring him from
communicating directly with the executive director of Hesed House about the case and
instructing him to communicate instead with Hesed House’s counsel. Zemater asserts
this contravenes ABA rules and the First Amendment. But district courts have inherent
authority to manage judicial proceedings and regulate the conduct of litigants, and they
may impose appropriate sanctions to penalize or discourage misconduct. Ramirez v.
T&H Lemont, Inc., 845 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2016). The court’s order directing Zemater
to cease sending inappropriate emails to Hesed House’s executive director about the
case, while clarifying that Zemater was free to converse with him about other topics,
was not an abuse of discretion.
We have considered Zemater’s remaining arguments, and none merits
discussion.
AFFIRMED

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