United States of America v. Thomas L. Hawkins

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-3133
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
THOMAS L. HAWKINS ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.
No. 3:07-cr-50058-3 — Iain D. Johnston, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 8, 2026 — DECIDED J UNE 2, 2026
____________________
Before S CUDDER , S T. EVE, and K OLAR , Circuit Judges.
S CUDDER , Circuit Judge. While on federal supervised re-
lease for prior robberies, Thomas Hawkins committed two
more. New convictions followed, and in a combined hearing,
the district court revoked Hawkins’ supervised release and
sentenced him on both the new robberies and for the super-
vised release violations. On appeal Hawkins invokes the Su-
preme Court’s recent decision in Esteras v. United States, 606
U.S. 185 (2025), and contends that the district court considered

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2 No. 24-3133
an impermissible factor—retribution—in imposing the maxi-
mum possible revocation sentence. He also sees his revoca-
tion sentence as excessive and reflecting an unwarranted dis-
parity with the sentences imposed on others who violate their
supervised release in similar ways. While Hawkins makes
some fair observations about the sentencing proceeding in the
district court, he falls short of demonstrating error, leaving us
to affirm.
I
In 2008 Thomas Hawkins pleaded guilty in federal court
to committing two commercial robberies in Rockford, Illinois,
and using a firearm in one of them. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a),
924(c)(1)(A). The district court sentenced him to 136 months’
imprisonment and five years of supervised release.
Hawkins began his supervised release in July 2018. Trou-
ble followed. In October 2020, he participated in an armed
home invasion robbery during which his accomplice shot and
killed a woman. In return for his cooperation, the state opted
not to charge Hawkins with any crime.
Hawkins also committed two more commercial robberies
around the same time. In September 2020, he robbed a Red
Roof Inn in Rockford, armed with something resembling a
gun. A month later he robbed a Mobil gas station in Rockford,
this time unquestionably armed with a gun that he pointed at
the station attendant.
A new round of federal charges followed for the two new
commercial robberies, and Hawkins once again pleaded
guilty. The government pointed to these robberies in asking
the district court to revoke his supervised release.

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No. 24-3133 3
The district court conducted Hawkins’ new sentencing
and his revocation sentencing in the same hearing. The court
sentenced Hawkins for the new robberies first. After deter-
mining the advisory Guidelines range of 108–135 months, the
court heard arguments from the parties and a statement from
Hawkins. It then considered the sentencing factors in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the purposes of punishment generally,
including retribution. The district court also recognized the
challenges Hawkins had faced growing up while emphasiz-
ing the leniency he received in his 2008 sentence and the dan-
gerousness of the two new robberies. In the end, the district
court sentenced Hawkins to 135 months and three years of
supervised release.
The district court then turned to the supervised release vi-
olations. After Hawkins admitted that he violated his super-
vised release, the court revoked it. Everyone agreed that rev-
ocation sentencing range was 18–24 months.
The district court acknowledged that Congress enumer-
ated the factors that inform revocation sentences in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e). In identifying those factors, the court made no ref-
erence to retribution. Put another way, the court implicitly
recognized that, when it comes to revocation sentences,
§ 3583(e) disallows consideration of “the need for the sentence
imposed … to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to pro-
mote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense”—a factor Congress expressly requires to be con-
sidered at an original sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A); id.
§ 3583(e) (omitting reference to § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the item-
ized list of factors allowed to be considered for revocation
sentences).

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4 No. 24-3133
Before announcing and explaining the revocation sen-
tence, the district court incorporated its earlier reasoning
when sentencing Hawkins for the new criminal convictions—
the two robberies in September and October 2020 in Rockford.
It then imposed a revocation sentence of 108 months, the stat-
utory maximum under § 3583(e)(3) given the underlying of-
fense classifications. Above all else, the district court made
plain that Hawkins’ pattern of violent conduct demonstrated
that the “public needs protection.”
Hawkins now appeals, challenging only his revocation
sentence.
II
Pointing to § 3583(e) and the Supreme Court’s decision in
Esteras, Hawkins underscores that district courts cannot con-
sider retribution when imposing revocation sentences. He is
correct on the law. See Esteras, 606 U.S. at 195 (“District courts
cannot consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised re-
lease.”). But where Hawkins comes up short is in convincing
us that the district court considered retribution.
To the contrary, the district court recognized it must ap-
proach the new sentence and revocation sentence differently.
And recall that in listing the factors it could consider under
§ 3583(e), the court omitted any reference to retribution. Nor
did retribution enter the mix when the court explained the
reasons for the 108-month revocation sentence. Indeed, we
see no reference anywhere to the revocation sentence being
connected to Hawkins’ original 2008 conviction and sentence.
What dominated the district court’s reasoning was protecting
the public.

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No. 24-3133 5
Hawkins pushes back by emphasizing that the district
court wholesale incorporated its reasoning for the new sen-
tence, which included retributive concerns, into its reasoning
for the revocation sentence. So this must mean, he continues,
that retribution informed the revocation sentence. Hawkins’
general observation is fair in two ways. First, the district court
did say it was incorporating its prior reasoning into its deter-
mination of the appropriate revocation sentence. Second,
Hawkins is right to underscore that district courts, especially
when conducting a combined sentencing and supervised re-
lease revocation proceeding, must respect the limitations
Congress imposed on the considerations allowed to inform
revocation sentences.
But having reviewed the transcript many times over, we
are not convinced the district court considered impermissible
factors in imposing the revocation sentence. The court omit-
ted retribution from its listing of factors it could consider and
instead emphasized the need to protect the public. If by incor-
porating its prior reasoning the court considered retribution
at all, it was solely limited to the conduct that served as the
basis to revoke Hawkins’ supervised release—the two new
commercial robberies from 2020. And this consideration is
something we have observed is altogether proper. See United
States v. Bradford, 170 F.4th 618, 623 (7th Cir. 2026) (citing
Esteras and explaining that “weighing the seriousness of the
defendant’s supervised-release violations” is consistent with
the statutory scheme of § 3583(e)). In the final analysis, we
cannot conclude that the district court failed to respect the
limitations of § 3583(e) in imposing the 108-month revocation
sentence.

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6 No. 24-3133
III
Hawkins presses two more challenges to his revocation
sentence. He first asserts that the district court failed to “con-
sider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records.” United States v.
Sanchez, 989 F.3d 523, 539 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Here,
too, we are unpersuaded. The district court not only specifi-
cally identified that concern but also stated that the Guide-
lines range of 18–24 months was “woefully inadequate.” The
need to protect the public took priority, as Hawkins “posed a
special danger to the public” and “presented as something
other than the usual” defendant with a similar criminal his-
tory. United States v. Dickerson, 42 F.4th 799, 805 (7th Cir. 2022).
Hawkins also insists that his revocation sentence is sub-
stantively unreasonable. District courts “have particularly
broad discretion when revoking supervised release.” Brad-
ford, 170 F.4th at 622. We will reverse only when a term of re-
imprisonment is “plainly unreasonable.” United States v.
Durham, 967 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2020). Even more, “we give
greater deference to a sentencing court revoking supervised
release than we do to a court imposing a sentence for an orig-
inal offense.” United States v. Snake, 140 F.4th 379, 384 (7th Cir.
2025).
No error occurred here, as Hawkins violated his super-
vised release by returning to violent crime and once again
demonstrating that he presented a grave risk to the commu-
nity. The 108-month revocation sentence was not plainly un-
reasonable.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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