CLAY WORTHAM and ANITA WORTHAM v. Village of Barrington Hills

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued May 19, 2026
Decided June 9, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-3072
CLAY WORTHAM and ANITA
WORTHAM,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
VILLAGE OF BARRINGTON HILLS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 23-cv-04115
April M. Perry,
Judge.
O R D E R
The Village of Barrington Hills charged Clay and Anita Wortham with using
their residential home to operate a short-term rental business in violation of the
Village’s municipal code. After a hearing officer and reviewing state courts agreed, the
Worthams brought a federal complaint alleging violations of the Due Process Clause
and the First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. The district
court entered judgment against the Worthams on the grounds that res judicata
precluded their claims, and the Worthams appealed. We affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-3072 Page 2
The Worthams’ claims stem from their business of leasing their primary
residence in the Village of Barrington Hills, Illinois (“the Village”) during periods they
were away. The Worthams used an online leasing platform called Vrbo to offer stays at
their home for as brief as three days.1 Beginning in March 2020, the Village requested
the Worthams discontinue leasing their home and communicated that the Village’s
municipal code prohibited short-term leasing of properties like the Worthams’. Despite
additional warnings, the Worthams continued leasing their property through Vrbo.
In the fall of 2020, the Village initiated administrative adjudications to fine the
Worthams for their infractions and to bar the Worthams from leasing their home. The
Worthams sought administrative review in state court after they lost those
adjudications. The Worthams argued they had not violated the municipal code because,
under their interpretation, the code permitted leases for durations not exceeding thirty
days. The Worthams also argued that if the municipal code did prohibit “short-term”
leasing, as the Village argued, the code’s failure to quantify the term meant the
prohibition was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Illinois appellate court affirmed the final administrative decisions. In
addition to finding that the municipal code prohibited the Worthams’ short-term
leasing business, the court deemed the Worthams’ vagueness challenge baseless absent
any argument the code was vague as to the Worthams’ specific conduct. See Wortham v.
Village of Barrington Hills, 202 N.E.3d 987, 997 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022) (citing Shachter v. City
of Chicago, 962 N.E.2d 586, 606 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)).
The Village enforced the administrative orders through proceedings in state
court in April 2022, and the Worthams discontinued leasing their home and paid the
fines. The administrative decisions did not order the Worthams to remove their online
Vrbo listing. During the course of the enforcement proceedings, however, the Village
demanded the Worthams remove their Vrbo listing or face future enforcement actions.
In June 2023, the Worthams filed a federal complaint. They asserted that the
Village’s zoning code was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause and
that the Village’s demand that they remove their Vrbo listing violated the First
1 In describing this background, we draw from state court records alongside the
Worthams’ complaint. See Wortham v. Village of Barrington Hills, 202 N.E.3d 987 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2022).

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No. 25-3072 Page 3
Amendment.2 The Village filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, raising res judicata
and the statute of limitations as affirmative defenses.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The court found res judicata
barred the Worthams’ First Amendment claim because they had not raised it during the
enforcement proceedings, and in doing so noted the Worthams never argued they were
prevented from litigating the claim in those proceedings. The district court’s decision on
the vagueness claim was more complicated. To the extent the Worthams’ federal
complaint brought an as-applied challenge, the district court concluded Rooker-Feldman
or res judicata, depending on whether they brought that claim before the Illinois
appellate court, would bar their claim. To the extent the Worthams brought a facial
challenge, the court found the claim raised a series of issues, including res judicata,
mootness, and inadequate pleading. After the Worthams failed to file an amended
complaint, the district court entered judgment for the Village. The Worthams appeal,
contesting the court’s application of res judicata.
“We review a dismissal on res judicata grounds de novo.” Baek v. Clausen, 886
F.3d 652, 660 (7th Cir. 2018). In doing so, we view the facts in the light most favorable to
the Worthams and “sustain the entry of judgment only if it is beyond doubt that the
nonmoving party cannot prove facts sufficient to support its position and that the
movant is entitled to relief.” Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Wynndalco Enters., LLC, 70 F.4th
987, 994 (7th Cir. 2023). In addition to considering the complaint, “[w]e may take
judicial notice of public records, including public court documents ….” White v. Keely,
814 F.3d 883, 885 n.2 (7th Cir. 2016).
Although neither party advances the prospect raised by the district court that
Rooker-Feldman bars the Worthams’ due process claim, we “have an independent
obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence
of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). “The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that Congress has not ‘authorize[d] district courts to
exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments.’” Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep’t
of Hum. Servs., 111 F.4th 754, 765 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (alteration in original)
(quoting Verizon Md., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002)). In
order for Rooker-Feldman to apply, “the claim must invite the federal district court to
review and reject the state-court judgment.” Id. at 766. We consider the relief the
2 The Worthams also brought a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, but they
do not appeal the district court’s entry of judgment on that claim.

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No. 25-3072 Page 4
plaintiff requests to “determin[e] if the plaintiff has indeed asked the court to reject a
state court judgment.” Id. at 792. Though the Worthams seek reimbursement for the
fines they paid, they also seek lost revenue stemming from the order enjoining them
from leasing their home, and “awarding damages usually does not affect a state court
judgment not sounding in monetary terms.” Id. So, at least some of the relief the
Worthams seek “does not seek to reverse a state court judgment.” Id. at 793. Rooker-
Feldman therefore does not bar jurisdiction over the Worthams’ due process claim to the
extent it seeks lost revenue.
While an aspect of the Worthams’ due process claim is not jurisdictionally
barred, the claim is barred by res judicata. “Because the prior adjudication was in
Illinois state court, we apply Illinois res judicata principles.” Chi. Title Land Tr. Co. v.
Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan Sales Ltd., 664 F.3d 1075, 1079 (7th Cir. 2011). “There are
three requirements for res judicata in Illinois: ‘(1) a final judgment on the merits ...
entered in the first lawsuit by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) an identity of causes
of action exists; (3) the parties or their privies are identical in both lawsuits.’” Doherty v.
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 932 F.3d 978, 983 (7th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting
DeLuna v. Treister, 708 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ill. 1999)). If satisfied, res judicata’s “bar to
subsequent litigation ‘extends to what was actually decided in the first action, as well as
those matters that could have been decided in that suit.’” Baek, 886 F.3d at 660 (quoting
River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 703 N.E.2d 883, 889 (Ill. 1998)). The Worthams
dispute the first element alone. They claim there was no final judgment on the merits
because the Illinois appellate court declined to reach their as-applied and facial claims.
We disagree. The Illinois court rendered a merits ruling by rejecting the
Worthams’ vagueness argument on the grounds they lacked any argument that the
ordinance was vague as applied to them—a requirement for litigants bringing a
vagueness challenge outside of the First Amendment. See United States v. Pacilio, 85
F.4th 450, 458 (7th Cir. 2023) (“A vagueness challenge not premised on the First
Amendment is evaluated as-applied, rather than facially.” (quoting United States v.
Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 2008))). The Worthams may disagree with the
Illinois appellate court, but res judicata bars them from challenging the state court’s
conclusion through a separate action.3
3 We abstain from the district court’s approach in two ways. First, we do not split
the due process claim into as-applied and facial components because that distinction
does not control the sufficiency of a complaint, where our analysis is less rigid. See Six

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We also affirm the district court’s conclusion that res judicata barred the
Worthams’ First Amendment claim. In the district court, the Village argued in its
motion to dismiss that res judicata barred the Worthams’ First Amendment claim
because the Worthams could have brought their claim during the April 2022
enforcement proceedings. But the Worthams did not respond to this argument in their
response brief. By failing to raise an argument against res judicata in the district court,
they have waived any such argument on appeal. See Bradley v. Village of University Park,
59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023). Nor would the Worthams’ argument on appeal help
them. They contend their claim arose only after the March 2022 decision, but this
ignores the district court’s reasoning that they failed to bring their First Amendment
claim in the subsequent enforcement proceedings.
AFFIRMED
Star Holdings, LLC v. City of Milwaukee, 821 F.3d 795, 803 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010)). Second, the district court
offered a range of bases for dismissing the due process claim without committing to a
specific ground. The court’s conclusory Rooker-Feldman analysis reflects the danger in
this approach.

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