In re: Seresto Flea

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-2401
I N RE:
S ERESTO F LEA AND TICK C OLLAR M ARKETING,
S ALES PRACTICES , AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
A PPEAL OF :
LAURA R EVOLINSKY ,
Plaintiff-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:21-cv-04447 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED F EBRUARY 13, 2026 — DECIDED J UNE 10, 2026
____________________
Before BRENNAN , Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and S CUDDER ,
Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON , Circuit Judge. We affirm denial of appellant
Laura Revolinsky’s motion challenging the allocation of fees
among plaintiffs’ attorneys in the settlement of a multidistrict
litigation. To the extent the district court’s orders might be
understood as having delegated final authority to lead

-- 1 of 13 --

2 No. 25-2401
plaintiffs’ counsel to distribute the total fee award among
many attorneys and firms, we would have serious misgivings.
The district court did not abuse its discretion, however, by
enforcing its prior orders establishing procedures and
requirements for seeking attorney fees and expenses.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This attorney fee appeal arises from multidistrict litigation
over marketing, sales practices, and products liability
regarding Seresto flea and tick collars, medical devices that
allegedly injured or killed thousands of pets. Plaintiffs across
the country brought class-action lawsuits against defendants
Bayer Corporation, related Bayer entities, and Elanco Animal
Health, Inc., which purchased Bayer’s animal health division,
including the Seresto product lines, in 2020. One such case
was filed in the District of New Jersey by plaintiff-appellant
Laura Revolinsky through her attorneys, Joseph LoPiccolo of
Poulos LoPiccolo PC and Bruce Nagel of Nagel Rice, LLP. The
complaint sought relief for a putative class of pet owners to
be represented by Revolinsky.
Attorneys Nagel and LoPiccolo filed and briefed a motion
asking the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to assign
Revolinsky’s case and other similar cases in other districts to
the District of New Jersey for coordinated pretrial
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. Attorney Rachel Soffin
filed another brief on behalf of several other plaintiffs, also
supporting MDL treatment but seeking transfer to the
Western District of Missouri instead. Soffin and Randee
Matloff, another Nagel Rice attorney representing
Revolinsky, both appeared at the panel hearing to argue for
MDL treatment and in support of their preferred transfer
destinations. The panel approved MDL treatment but

-- 2 of 13 --

No. 25-2401 3
transferred these and other parallel cases to the Northern
District of Illinois, as defendants had proposed.
After transfer, the district court granted a motion
supported by twelve of the now sixteen sets of plaintiffs to
appoint Soffin and attorneys Michael Reese and Michael
Williams as Class Counsel. The court also appointed attorney
Carl Malmstrom to serve as Liaison Counsel between Class
Counsel and the other plaintiffs’ attorneys. Revolinsky had
sought the appointment of two Nagel Rice attorneys as
interim lead counsel, but the court denied that proposal.
At the time of the MDL transfer, most of the cases were
still in their early stages. None had yet proceeded to formal
discovery, including Revolinsky’s. The district court asked
the parties to submit a proposed case management order. At
a status conference, Reese said that in his experience with
another MDL proceeding in the Northern District of Illinois,
establishing a time and expense protocol at the start of the
litigation would promote efficient collaboration among
plaintiffs’ counsel.
The district court entered Case Management Order No. 4:
Plaintiffs’ Counsel Time and Expense Protocol. Order No. 4
required every plaintiffs’ attorney to obtain Class Counsel’s
written approval before engaging in compensable work or
incurring expenses. The court also limited compensation as
follows: “Generally, only time and expense incurred after the
Court’s February 7, 2022 Order appointing Plaintiffs’
Leadership shall be submitted and considered as potential
Common Benefit Work.” See In re Cendant Corp. Securities
Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 191 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting importance of
ensuring that non-lead attorneys’ compensable work actually
benefits class without duplicating work of lead counsel). In a

-- 3 of 13 --

4 No. 25-2401
footnote, the district court added here: “In their discretion,
[Class] Counsel may consider time and expense incurred
before the Court’s February 7, 2022 Order as Common Benefit
Work and Common Benefit Expense if the time or expense
benefitted the proposed class members in a material and
direct way.”
Order No. 4 required attorneys to submit monthly time
and expense reports to Class Counsel and warned that failure
to make timely submissions would be grounds for denying
recovery. It also said that Class Counsel “will be responsible
for collecting and reviewing monthly common benefit time
and expense submissions from MDL Counsel and informing
MDL Counsel when their submissions do not comply with the
directives set forth in this Order.” Revolinsky’s attorneys did
not object to Order No. 4 or propose any alternative time and
expense management order.
Revolinsky’s attorneys received notice of Order No. 4 via
the electronic case filing system and by email. Reese’s email
to Nagel Rice, which the firm forwarded to LoPiccolo,
referred to the “CMO entered by the Court” and advised: “For
this first time and expense report, you should include all time
from inception to date through March 31, 2022.” Apparently,
LoPiccolo did not seek clarification regarding the order to
which Reese referred or what Reese meant by “inception.”
Instead, both the Nagel Rice and Poulos LoPiccolo firms
submitted their first time and expense reports on time. The
majority of time and expenses sought was for pre-transfer
work on the motion before the JPML. Class Counsel did not
respond to these submissions to inform the firms that pre-
appointment time would not be compensated.

-- 4 of 13 --

No. 25-2401 5
Nagel Rice timely submitted all subsequent reports.
Poulos LoPiccolo, on the other hand, did not submit another
report until June 2023. Attorney LoPiccolo incorrectly
assumed that Class Counsel would request submissions as
necessary. When LoPiccolo asked to submit belatedly his
firm’s time and expenses for August 2022 to April 2023,
Liaison Counsel Malmstrom responded: “If you want to send
on your hours to myself, [my paralegal] and the three co-
leads, they can make a determination as to what hours are
eligible for submission to the Court.” (Alteration in original).
LoPiccolo submitted the report but apparently did not follow
up with Malmstrom or Class Counsel.
In December 2023, after negotiations conducted by Class
Counsel, the parties reached a nationwide settlement
agreement to establish a $15 million fund to compensate
plaintiffs and to pay attorney fees and litigation costs. The
proposed agreement capped the combined recoverable fees
for all plaintiffs’ attorneys at 38% of the settlement fund. In
January 2024, the court granted preliminary approval of the
proposed settlement, set the deadline for the attorney fee
application as June 17, 2024, and set the deadline for opt-outs
and objections to the settlement and to the fee application as
July 22, 2024.
Class Counsel requested just over $4.5 million in fees,
calculated based on a lodestar of 6101 hours across all firms,
for a mean rate of around $750 per hour. They also sought just
over $150,000 in litigation expenses. Neither the motion, the
accompanying memorandum of law, nor the supporting
declaration set forth the specific fee amount allocated to each
firm. Instead, the declaration referred to the monthly time and
expense reports submitted to the court in camera pursuant to

-- 5 of 13 --

6 No. 25-2401
Order No. 4. Relevant to Revolinksy’s appeal here, the
memorandum cited Order No. 4 and said in a footnote that it
included “only time billed after the formation of the MDL and
the appointment of leadership counsel, which was timely
submitted to the Court.” In other words, the memorandum
said Class Counsel were not asking for an award covering
Nagel Rice’s and Poulos LoPiccolo’s time and expenses on the
case before the MDL transfer. Revolinsky and her attorneys
did not object to the fee request.
The district court held the fairness hearing on January 3,
2025, and granted final approval of the settlement on January
6, 2025. The court also granted in full Class Counsel’s motion
for fees and expenses. Nagel learned on February 13, 2025,
however, that Nagel Rice would receive only $6,010 in fees,
approximately $130,000 less than he expected, due to the
exclusion of pre-MDL time. LoPiccolo learned on February 24,
2025, that Poulos LoPiccolo would receive only $12,320 in
fees. On a call with attorney Williams on March 4, 2025,
LoPiccolo learned that this figure excluded over $49,000 in
pre-MDL time and expenses and over $14,000 for work
between August 2022 and April 2023 that was not timely
reported to Class Counsel. LoPiccolo asked Williams to
reconsider. On March 10, 2025, Williams responded that there
would be no adjustment.
Instead of moving for reconsideration or extraordinary
relief from the final approval order, Revolinsky and her
attorneys filed a separate motion for attorney fees on April 16,
2025, over one month after Williams told LoPiccolo that he
would not budge and nearly nine months after the deadline
for objections to the fee application. Revolinsky and her
attorneys sought compensation for both firms’ pre-MDL time

-- 6 of 13 --

No. 25-2401 7
and expenses, as well as Poulos LoPiccolo’s untimely reports.
The motion was accompanied by declarations from LoPiccolo
and Nagel. Nagel called his firm’s unexpectedly low award a
“shock.” On July 25, 2025, the district court denied the motion
in a minute order, explaining that, given Order No. 4 and the
fee application, “the disallowance of pre-MDL time and
expenses should not have come as a surprise.” The court also
noted that Order No. 4 was “clear on the point” that reports
were due monthly. On August 11, 2025, Revolinsky filed a
timely notice of appeal from that order.
II. Appellate Jurisdiction
The thirty-day statutory deadline to file a notice of appeal
in a private civil case is jurisdictional. Upchurch v. O’Brien, 111
F.4th 805, 811 (7th Cir. 2024), citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S.
205, 214 (2007); 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a). The deadline to appeal the
January 6, 2025, order granting final approval of the
settlement and granting Class Counsel’s application and
allocating fees and expenses pursuant to Order No. 4 expired
in early February 2025 without extension. See § 2107(c).
Under the final approval order, however, the district court
“retain[ed] jurisdiction to enforce its orders, as well as the
settlement agreement … including the terms relating to the
processing of claims and the distribution of all settlement
funds.” Revolinsky’s separate motion relates to the
distribution of settlement funds, so the district court had
jurisdiction to decide it. And Revolinsky timely appealed the
denial of her motion. Accordingly, as we said in an earlier
order in this appeal, we have appellate jurisdiction over the
district court’s denial of Revolinsky’s separate application but
not over the original order awarding and allocating fees. 28
U.S.C. § 1291. See Dkt. No. 11.

-- 7 of 13 --

8 No. 25-2401
III. Analysis
“We review class action fee awards deferentially,
for abuse of discretion, recognizing that the district court is
closer to the case than we are, and that a reasonable fee will
often fall within a broad range.” In re Stericycle Securities Litig.,
35 F.4th 555, 559 (7th Cir. 2022). Deference is particularly
appropriate when it comes to allocations of fees among
attorneys that will not affect directly the interests of class
members, and to enforcing court-ordered procedures and
deadlines relevant to such allocation issues.
To be clear, Revolinksy cannot obtain, and we do not
understand her to have sought, an additional fee award from
defendants. The settlement agreement establishing the
common fund released her claims against defendants in full,
including any claim to attorney fees and litigation expenses.
Rather, Revolinsky writes that she is “simply seeking to have
the allocation of the fee award submitted to the district court
for its review and oversight consistent with its obligations
under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 23(h), and for the district court to
consider whether the pre-appointment time and expenses of
[Nagel Rice] and [Poulos LoPiccolo] should be awarded
where they were incurred for the common benefit of the
class.” Pl. Reply Br. at 9. In effect, Revolinsky and her
attorneys are seeking money from other plaintiffs’ attorney
fees awarded from the common fund of the settlement.
This request is a problem because the district court has
already decided the allocation of the fee award and because,
according to Class Counsel, all funds have already been
distributed. All the funds, that is, except the amounts due to
Nagel Rice and Poulos LoPiccolo, which are sitting in escrow
and may be claimed by the firms at any time.

-- 8 of 13 --

No. 25-2401 9
After conducting the fairness hearing and reviewing the
time and expense reports submitted in camera, the district
court found Class Counsel’s application to be “fair,
reasonable, and in keeping with this Circuit’s precedent.”
Accordingly, it awarded the full amount Class Counsel
requested for fees and expenses and “vest[ed] Class Counsel
with the authority to distribute those fees [and expenses] to
other Plaintiffs’ counsel based upon their best judgment and
in keeping with the Time and Expense Protocol that has
governed the submission of time and expenses in this
Litigation.” Given the limits of the fee request, the court
effectively approved rejection of the pre-MDL time and
expenses that Revolinsky and her lawyers seek in this appeal.
The time to object to this allocation had passed long before
Revolinsky filed her separate motion in April 2025. As the
district court noted, Order No. 4 made clear that time and
expense reports were due monthly and that pre-MDL time
and expenses would not be compensable except at the
discretion of Class Counsel. Class Counsel’s fee application
also disclosed that it included only time and expenses “timely
submitted to the Court” and that no attorney or firm would
receive pre-appointment time or expense. The court’s
deadline for opt-outs or objections to the fee award came and
went, and Revolinksy did not raise these issues at the fairness
hearing.
The district court acted well within its discretion by
rejecting Revolinsky’s application. Her attorneys sought
compensation for pre-MDL time excluded from the fee
request and award, and they sought post-MDL time that was
not submitted to Class Counsel under the terms of Order No.
4. The right time to object would have been when Class

-- 9 of 13 --

10 No. 25-2401
Counsel submitted a fee request that did not include pre-MDL
time for any attorneys. And of course, if Revolinsky and her
lawyers were to prevail here, prejudice to the other plaintiffs’
attorneys would be a mathematical certainty. With a fixed
sum set aside by the settlement in full satisfaction of all claims
for attorney fees and litigation expenses, some firms must
receive less for any firm to receive more. The district court’s
approval of Class Counsel’s plan not to approve any pre-MDL
time and expense for any attorneys—in line with the default
assumption reflected in the case management order under
which attorneys had been working for two years—was not an
abuse of discretion.
To be sure, Revolinsky identifies some legitimate concerns
with the fee award. If she had timely objected, the district
court might have found it unwise, or this court might have
found it reversible error, to delegate to Class Counsel final
and sole discretion to determine whether pre-appointment
time was for the common benefit of the class, especially given
the past disputes over centralization and leadership
appointment. See In re High Sulfur Content Gasoline Products
Liability Litig., 517 F.3d 220, 227, 229 (5th Cir. 2008) (vacating
allocation of fee award where court “abdicated its
responsibility” and “rubber-stamped” fee committee’s
recommendation); In re TikTok, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litig.,
617 F. Supp. 3d 904, 943–44 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (Lee, J.) (“[A]
blanket delegation to lead counsel is inappropriate where the
attorneys for the class disagree among themselves about
fees.”). Further, the district court did not specifically set forth
the allocation of the fee award in its final approval order, an
omission that kept out of the record the amount each firm
received and thereby hindered the public’s ability to know the
details of what happens in its courts. See In re Specht, 622 F.3d

-- 10 of 13 --

No. 25-2401 11
697, 701 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Documents that affect the
disposition of federal litigation are presumptively open to
public view ….”); High Sulfur Content Gasoline, 517 F.3d at 229
(noting sealing of exhibits and gag order concerning fee
awards “kept the public in the dark”).
The law is well-established that in a class action, the
district court must scrutinize a proposed fee award to
determine that it is reasonable and must act as a fiduciary by
considering carefully the interests of the class, even when no
one objects. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2), (h); see Pearson v. Target
Corp., 968 F.3d 827, 838 (7th Cir. 2020); Eubank v. Pella Corp.,
753 F.3d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2014). Here, the court fulfilled its
obligations in finding reasonable the total amount of the
settlement fund, its allocation among the class members, and
the amount of fees claimed from the settlement fund by the
attorneys. All counsel had an opportunity to object to the
ground rules for fee allocations, and the court scrutinized the
time and expense reports.
The court’s fiduciary duty to the class, and therefore its
obligation to consider the interests of the class from every
angle even without an objection, does not extend to the class’s
lawyers. They are sophisticated professionals responsible for
securing payment for their services. To be sure, the court has
the authority under Rule 23 and has always had the equitable
authority to reject a proposed fee allocation of a common fund
even where all attorneys have affirmatively agreed. See In re
Synthroid Marketing Litig., 325 F.3d 974, 977 (7th Cir. 2003) (“At
all events, until a contract is signed—and, in class litigation,
approved by the court under [Rule 23(e)]—no one is bound
by any of the proposed terms.”); Allapattah Services, Inc. v.
Exxon Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1224–27 (S.D. Fla. 2006)

-- 11 of 13 --

12 No. 25-2401
(collecting cases). Even late objections may well be acceptable
if there was no adequate opportunity to be heard. Redman v.
RadioShack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 637–38 (7th Cir. 2014)
(reversing approval of settlement; “no excuse for permitting
so irregular, indeed unlawful” procedure where objection
deadline expired before fee petition was even filed); High
Sulfur Content Gasoline, 517 F.3d at 232 (ex parte hearing and
gag order made procedure “inherently flawed”). That said,
attorneys need not be allowed to “play the game and see the
result” before deciding whether to act. Compare In re
Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 61 F.4th 1126, 1203 n.49 (10th
Cir. 2023) (noting wait-and-see tactics “undercut[] the orderly
and efficient judicial process that objection opportunities are
designed to ensure”).
By doubting a court’s power to delegate final control over
allocation to class counsel, we do not intend to interfere with
the “tried and true ‘trust but verify’ approach allowing
counsel to take the first crack at a fee allocation subject to
court review later on.” In re East Palestine Train Derailment, 160
F.4th 751, 760 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted); see also TikTok,
617 F. Supp. 3d at 943 (“Such delegation is common when all
the attorneys agree about how the fees should be
distributed.”), citing first In re Life Time Fitness, Inc., Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) Litig., 847 F.3d 619, 623–24 (8th
Cir. 2017), and then In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391
F.3d 516, 533 n.15 (3d Cir. 2004).
We recognize that courts are reluctant to get involved in
fee allocation disputes. “Ideally, allocation of the fee award is
a private matter to be handled among class counsel.” Spicer v.
Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1226, 1256
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (emphasis added). That statement does not

-- 12 of 13 --

No. 25-2401 13
suggest the court could have no role in case of disagreement.
The court must be able to invite objections and to resolve
disputes, or at least to refer them to a special master or
magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(2), (4). The court should
also place the allocation into the record. In this case, however,
the unhappy lawyers failed to comply with the court’s orders
setting procedures and deadline for seeking fees and
expenses. Class Counsel gave ample warning that they were
not seeking an award for any lawyer’s pre-MDL time. We
therefore need not reach a final determination on the extent of
the judge’s duty to resolve disputes among plaintiffs’ counsel.
Our decision here is narrow. The fairness to the class of
Class Counsel’s application is unchallenged. The allocation
was supported by the monthly reports submitted to and
scrutinized by the court, and it was consistent with what
anyone who read the applicable case management order or
the fee application could have expected.
AFFIRMED.

-- 13 of 13 --