Jermaine Applewhite v. Daniel R. Degnan

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 9, 2026*
Decided June 12, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1775
JERMAINE APPLEWHITE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DANIEL R. DEGNAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 24-cv-05743
John F. Kness,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jermaine Applewhite sued the Illinois judge who ordered him to pay child
support, alleging that the judge’s purported relationship with a state agency resulted in
constitutional violations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed the complaint
based on judicial immunity and res judicata principles. We modify the judgment to
reflect that, to the extent the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the
judgment is without prejudice. So modified, we affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

-- 1 of 4 --

No. 25-1775 Page 2
We accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of Cook County Circuit Court Judge Daniel R. Degnan, the non-
moving party. See Sherwood v. Marchiori, 76 F.4th 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2023). Also, we may
take judicial notice of the court records from the Illinois case that gave rise to this suit.
See Patrick v. City of Chicago, 81 F.4th 730, 734 n.2 (7th Cir. 2023).
Applewhite was the respondent in a child support proceeding in the Domestic
Relations Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. See Dent v. Applewhite,
No. 2016D050158 (Cook Cnty. Cir. Ct.). In April 2016, Judge Degnan presided over a
hearing in that matter and ordered Applewhite to pay temporary child support.
Applewhite did not appeal the order.
In 2023, Applewhite filed his first federal lawsuit against Judge Degnan alleging
that the judge abused his authority during the proceeding in a manner that violated the
constitution. See Compl., Applewhite v. Degnan, No. 23-cv-1034 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2023)
(Applewhite I). The district court dismissed the complaint at screening, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
Judge Degnan enjoyed judicial immunity, and Applewhite’s suit was beyond the statute
of limitations, see id. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Applewhite sued again in July 2024, alleging that Judge Degnan was a
“contractor” for the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services and his
involvement in the child-support case violated the separation of powers principle,
Applewhite’s rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and his “right to privacy” under the Ninth Amendment. Applewhite
demanded an investigation into the judge’s conduct, disciplinary measures, punitive
damages, and “adherence to constitutional principles.”
The district court concluded that Judge Degnan was acting in his judicial
capacity and was, therefore, immune from suit. To the extent that immunity was
unavailable, the court determined that because Applewhite I involved the same parties,
arose from the same operative facts, and ended in a final judgment on the merits, res
judicata barred Applewhite’s suit. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice.
Applewhite appeals and challenges only the district court’s conclusion that
Judge Degnan is entitled to immunity.
But judicial immunity is an affirmative defense. See Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304,
308 (7th Cir. 2006). We must consider jurisdiction before the merits, see Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998), and affirmative defenses, including

-- 2 of 4 --

No. 25-1775 Page 3
judicial immunity, are merits issues. See Our Country Home Enters., Inc. v. Comm’r,
855 F.3d 773, 783 (7th Cir. 2017).
The domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction divests federal courts of
the power to decide a “narrow range of domestic relations issues” involving divorce,
spousal support, and child custody orders. Kowalski v. Boliker, 893 F.3d 987, 995 (7th Cir.
2018) (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 701 (1992)); see also Struck v. Cook
Cnty. Pub. Guardian, 508 F.3d 858, 859 (7th Cir. 2007).
Some of Applewhite’s claims, unclear as they are, implicate the domestic-
relations exception. He contends that he received “inadequate notice and an insufficient
opportunity … to be heard regarding the child support obligations imposed.” And in
his brief on appeal, Applewhite makes clear that he challenges “the procedures used to
establish and enforce the child support order.” In other words, he submits that the state-
court process by which he came to owe child support violated his constitutional rights.
But, as we have explained, it “is too facile a litigation move” to avoid the domestic-
relations exception by “recast[ing] a claim of maladministration as a denial of due
process.” Jones, 465 F.3d at 308. Any challenge to, or injury arising from, the child
support order or the state court’s application of Illinois family law run straight into the
exception. See id.; see also Kowalski, 893 F.3d at 996 (exception bars challenges to state
court’s application of state family law). The district court therefore lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over those claims. See Jones, 465 F.3d at 308. And that remains true
regardless of whether Applewhite’s contention is that the order is substantively
incorrect or reached in a procedurally defective manner. See Kowalski, 893 F.3d at 996.
Next, Applewhite appears to raise a facial challenge to the constitutionality of
Illinois’s child-support regime. Here, the district court also lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, but for a different reason: the claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983). The key question is whether the relief a plaintiff seeks would
reverse or undo a state court judgment. Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,
111 F.4th 754, 792–94 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc). While the Supreme Court may review the
constitutionality of a state court judgment, lower federal courts generally lack that
authority except where specifically granted by Congress. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
Applewhite’s request that the state court judge “adhere[] to constitutional
principles” (and, on appeal, that we reverse the child-support order) implies that
Illinois’s child-support laws are unconstitutional. But, as the Supreme Court has
explained, “a federal district court cannot entertain an original action alleging that a

-- 3 of 4 --

No. 25-1775 Page 4
state court violated the Constitution by giving effect to an unconstitutional state
statute.” Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 369 n.16 (1990). Applewhite’s claim that the child
support order was the result of unconstitutional state laws was beyond the district
court’s jurisdiction. Applewhite’s remedy was to appeal the order to the Illinois
Appellate Court—a path he did not pursue.
Because the district court lacked jurisdiction over all of Applewhite’s claims, we
MODIFY the district court’s judgment to reflect that Applewhite’s complaint is
dismissed without prejudice. E.g., McHugh v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 55 F.4th 529, 535 (7th
Cir. 2022). So modified, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

-- 4 of 4 --