GARY BETTS and EARL BETTS v. BOONE COUNTY , ILLINOIS , and REBECCA WIGGET

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1685
GARY BETTS and EARL BETTS ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
BOONE C OUNTY , I LLINOIS , and R EBECCA WIGGET,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.
No. 3:23-cv-50418 — Iain D. Johnston, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED F EBRUARY 13, 2026 — DECIDED J UNE 15, 2026
____________________
Before BRENNAN , Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and
S CUDDER , Circuit Judges.
BRENNAN , Chief Judge. The Coroner of Boone County, Illi-
nois, engaged in abhorrent and macabre behavior. Wesley
Hyland kept several skulls as trophies from the deceased he
examined. One was that of Louise Betts. Over four decades
later, after the coroner’s death, the County returned her skull
to the Betts family. The family sued the County under 42

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2 No. 25-1685
U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
The question in this appeal is whether Hyland’s actions
established an “official policy” of unconstitutionally retaining
human remains. We hold the answer is no. The County is not
liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), because state law requires that
coroners return bodily remains to families. Hyland frustrated
an official policy rather than established one.
I
In September 1977 high school student Louise Betts was
kidnapped, raped, and murdered. Her body was disposed of
in a field in Boone County in northeast Illinois. As part of the
investigation into her murder, Boone County Coroner Wesley
Hyland examined Louise’s body. After Hyland concluded, he
returned the remains to the Betts family, who then buried her.
A state statute instructs how coroners are to handle bodily
remains: “That as soon as may be consistent with the perfor-
mance of his duties under this [statute] the coroner shall re-
lease the body of the decedent to the decedent’s next of kin.”
55 ILCS 5/3-3021. But unknown to the family, Hyland kept
Louise’s skull.
In November 2022 the Boone County Coroner contacted
Louise’s brothers, Gary and Earl (“the Bettses”). The Coroner
revealed that Hyland possessed at least three skulls, one of
which was Louise’s. To ensure she received a proper burial,
the Bettses were forced to exhume Louise’s casket to place her
skull with her remains.
The ordeal was understandably painful for the Bettses.
They sued Boone County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the

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No. 25-1685 3
County violated the Fourteenth Amendment. They claimed
that Hyland’s actions—keeping Louise’s skull without first
notifying them—established a policy of unconstitutionally re-
taining property without due process. The district court al-
lowed the Bettses to amend their complaint several times, and
the County moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
The district court agreed with the County. Because the
Bettses sued a municipality, they had to meet the elements set
forth in Monell. That required the Bettses show that Hyland’s
actions established an official County policy, which they
failed to do. The Bettses appeal.
II
We review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6). Chi. Tchrs. Union, Loc. 1 v. Educators for Excel-
lence, Inc., 159 F.4th 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2025). And “we construe
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, ac-
cepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged, and drawing all
possible inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. (citation omit-
ted).
A. Property Right
The Bettses’ § 1983 suit alleges that the County violated
the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving them of property
without due process. The first question is whether they have
a property interest in their sister’s remains. Simpson v. Brown
County, 860 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Procedural due
process … generally involves a familiar line of inquiry: (1) is
there a property or liberty interest protected by due pro-
cess[?]”). A plaintiff with no right to something cannot com-
plain when it is taken.

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4 No. 25-1685
The Constitution does not create property interests. Leis v.
Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 441 (1979) (per curiam). Rather, an “inde-
pendent source such as state law” creates those rights, and the
Constitution “extends various procedural safeguards.” Id.
(quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). So, to
identify property interests, courts often look to state law.
Illinois recognizes that family members have a property
right to a next of kin’s remains, as the district court concluded,
and on appeal the County does not appear to disagree. As the
Supreme Court of Illinois has held, “while in the ordinary
sense, there is no property right in a dead body, a right of pos-
session of a decedent’s remains devolves upon the next of kin
in order to make appropriate disposition thereof, whether by
burial or otherwise.” Cochran v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc.,
419 Ill. Dec. 374, 93 N.E.3d 493, 497 (Ill. 2017) (quoting Leno v.
St. Joseph Hosp., 55 Ill.2d 114, 302 N.E.2d 58, 59–60 (Ill. 1973)).
The district court also cited Mensinger v. O’Hara, 189 Ill.
App. 48 (Ill. App. 1914). There, the plaintiff’s wife died, and
the defendants were entrusted to bury her body. Id. at 49. But
before burying her, they cut the hair from her head, and plain-
tiff sued. Id. The state court reasoned, “while a dead body is
not considered as property, in the ordinary, technical sense in
which that word is usually employed, yet the law does recog-
nize a right, somewhat akin, perhaps, to a property right, aris-
ing out of the duty of the nearest relatives of the deceased to
bury their dead.” Id. at 53. Other states have also recognized
a property right in a deceased family member’s remains. See
Martinez v. Wayne County, 142 F.4th 828, 837–38 (6th Cir. 2025)
(Ohio and Michigan).
We see no reason to disagree with the district court, so we
move to the next question: whether Monell has been satisfied.

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No. 25-1685 5
B. Monell Liability
Section 1983 imposes liability on “[e]very person who, un-
der color” of state law, deprives another of a constitutional
right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell holds that a local government
can be sued for an “[official] policy or custom” that violates
the Constitution. 436 U.S. at 694. A local government “may
therefore be sued directly if it is alleged to have caused a con-
stitutional tort through a policy statement, ordinance, regula-
tion, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body’s officers.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121
(1988) (plurality opinion) (citation modified). That is true even
though the custom “has not received formal approval
through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Id. (ci-
tation omitted).
But there is an important limit: liability under Monell is not
respondeat superior. “[A] local government may not be sued
under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or
agents.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Vicarious liability, the Court
has explained, is “incompatible with the causation require-
ment set out on the face of § 1983.” Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 122.
The municipality, as the actor, must have an “official policy.”
Id. at 121–22. That “distinguish[es] acts of the municipal-
ity from acts of employees of the municipality.” Pembaur v. City
of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986).
So, a municipality is not liable under § 1983 unless the
deprivation of a constitutional right is caused by a municipal
policy or custom. The problem, however, is defining “policy,”
as § 1983 does not use that term. To fill the gap, caselaw has
established that a plaintiff may demonstrate a policy or cus-
tom that causes a constitutional deprivation in one of three
ways: (1) an express policy of the municipality; (2) a

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6 No. 25-1685
widespread practice constituting custom or usage; or (3) an
act by a person with final policymaking authority. Kujawski v.
Bd. of Comm'rs of Bartholomew Cnty., 183 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir.
1999); see also Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214,
235 (7th Cir. 2021). This appeal concerns the third way.
A single unconstitutional act of a final policymaker can es-
tablish municipal policy, leading to Monell liability. McGreal
v. Ostrov, 368 F.3d 657, 685 (7th Cir. 2004). Showing that, how-
ever, is hard: “That’s because it's difficult to infer from a single
event that a municipality is not just negligent, but deliberately
indifferent to its employees’ unconstitutional conduct.” Cam-
bric v. City of Corpus Christi, 170 F.4th 321, 327 (5th Cir. 2026)
(Oldham, J., concurring).
To have final policymaking authority means the govern-
ment agent possesses “final authority to establish municipal
policy with respect to the action ordered.” Pembaur, 475 U.S.
at 481 (plurality). This means the agent’s “edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy.” Monell, 436 U.S. at
694 (emphasis added). To determine that, the Court tells us,
we examine state law. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483. Often, “[f]inal
policymaking authority may be granted directly by statute or
delegated or ratified by an official having policymaking au-
thority.” Kujawski, 183 F.3d at 737. But answering who has fi-
nal policymaking authority entails more than just asking who
sits at the top; the city’s organizational chart alone will not
provide the answer. As we have explained: “Any city acts ex-
clusively through agents; the city is just a name for a complex
of persons. … That a particular agent is the apex of a bureau-
cracy makes the decision ‘final’ but does not forge a link be-
tween ‘finality’ and ‘policy.’” Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397,
400 (7th Cir. 1992).

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No. 25-1685 7
Our holding in Auriemma also teaches that local law is a
lens through which to view the final policymaker question. Id.
at 401. There, the Superintendent of Police in Chicago, Fred
Rice, allegedly promoted certain officers based on their race
and politics. Id. at 398. Aggrieved officers sued the City of Chi-
cago under Monell. Id. at 398–99.
This court held that Chicago was not liable because city
ordinances “applicable to the police department unequivo-
cally ban racial and political discrimination.” Id. at 399. And,
as police superintendent, Rice could not countermand those
ordinances. Id. at 401. Rice’s decision to discriminate, then,
was not an official government policy. “Liability for unau-
thorized acts is personal; to hold the municipality liable, Mo-
nell tells us, the agent’s action must implement rather than
frustrate the government’s policy.” Id. at 400. So, “[i]f, in the
course of selecting senior staff, Rice discriminated on account
of race and politics, he violated rather than implemented the
policy of Chicago. On Rice falls the responsibility for his
deeds.” Id. at 401. As this court later described Auriemma’s
rule, “[c]ertainly someone with executive authority whose ac-
tions fly in the face of state or local law is not a policymaker
under Monell and its progeny.” Cornfield ex rel. Lewis v. Consol.
High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1325 (7th Cir. 1993).
This court applied Auriemma’s rule in Killinger v. Johnson,
389 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2004). During a town celebration, the
mayor suspected a bar was serving alcohol to the underage.
Id. at 768. With the chief of police’s approval, the mayor or-
dered the bar closed. Id. Killinger, the bar owner, sued the
mayor and the municipality under § 1983. Id.
The thrust of his claim was “that the mayor violated his
due process rights by failing to observe the procedures

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8 No. 25-1685
mandated by the Liquor Act” when closing his bar. Id. at 772.
But the nature of Killinger’s claim proved why he failed to
establish a Monell violation: the mayor was not a final policy-
maker if state law withdrew his authority. “The Illinois Gen-
eral Assembly, not the mayor, established the procedures ap-
plicable to temporary closings, suspensions, and fines under
the [Liquor] Act. If the mayor violated these procedures, he
was acting contrary to—not setting—the policy of the State.”
Id.
Here, a state statute unequivocally prohibited Hyland’s
actions: “That as soon as may be consistent with the perfor-
mance of his duties under this [statute] the coroner shall re-
lease the body of the decedent to the decedent’s next of kin.”
55 ILCS 5/3-3021. Hyland, after his investigation, kept
Louise’s skull; he did not “release the body of the decedent.”
Hyland acted contrary to this unequivocal statutory com-
mand, just like the police superintendent in Auriemma and the
mayor in Killinger. Hyland “frustrated,” rather than “imple-
mented,” the government’s policy. Auriemma, 957 F.2d at 400.
Responsibility thus falls on him, not Boone County.
Contrast Vodak v. City of Chicago, which applied Au-
riemma’s rule. 639 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 2011). There, the police
superintendent initially permitted a protest, but then unilat-
erally revoked permission and arrested protestors. Id. at 740–
41, 748. They sued the City of Chicago, and the City’s defense
was that the police superintendent lacked authority to deal
“with demonstrations and mass arrests.” Id. at 748. “But no
ordinance constrained him,” in contrast to Auriemma, where
the City Council “had by ordinance limited the police super-
intendent’s discretion with respect to employment decisions.”
Id. at 748–49. Here, like Auriemma but not Vodak, state law did

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No. 25-1685 9
“constrain” and “limit” what Hyland could do with re-
mains—the law required him to return them to the decedent’s
family members.
The Bettses disagree. As they see it, the state statute does
not constrain the coroner. Rather, it offers guidance to the cor-
oner on how to return remains. The language is therefore dis-
tinguishable from the unequivocal command in Auriemma.
But consider how an ordinary English speaker would un-
derstand the state statute. It says the coroner “shall release the
body of the decedent” to the family “as soon as may be con-
sistent with the performance of his duties.” 55 ILCS 5/3-3021.
“Shall” certainly imposes a requirement. See, e.g., BLACK’ S
LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (defining “shall” as “Has a
duty to; more broadly, is required to.”); A MERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 1598 (4th ed. 2000) (defining “shall” as “[a]n or-
der, promise, requirement, or obligation.”). And “the body”
includes the principal parts of the corpse—a family indeed
would be surprised to receive a body from the coroner with-
out its arms, legs, or head. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923
F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991) (property right in a body includes
corneas); Adams v. King County, 192 P.3d 891, 900–01 (Wash.
2008) (tortious interference with a dead “body” claim can be
maintained against “the unauthorized removal of a brain”).
Illinois caselaw aligns with how an ordinary English
speaker would read the state statute. “Shall” in a statute is a
mandatory command. People v. Cooper, 487 Ill. Dec. 411, 272
N.E.3d 465, 475 (Ill. 2025); Berz v. City of Evanston, 375 Ill. Dec.
422, 997 N.E.2d 733, 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (Gordon, J., con-
curring in part) (collecting cases). And the Supreme Court of
Illinois has presumed the coroner must return the body and
the remains under the state statute: “These remains were

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10 No. 25-1685
taken to the Will County coroner … When the examination
was completed … [t]he remains were then returned to the vic-
tim’s family in accordance with [the statute].” People v. Jordan,
82 Ill. Dec. 925, 469 N.E.2d 569, 571 (Ill. 1984).1
Hyland had concluded his investigation of Louise’s mur-
der. State law thus required that “[he] shall release the body
of the decedent.” 55 ILCS 5/3-3021. But he kept her skull, a
part of the “body” he should have returned.2 The state statute,
then, unequivocally restrained Hyland’s authority. Because
he acted ultra vires, flouting that restraint, he did not establish
County policy.
The Bettses point to other state laws to contend that Hy-
land had discretionary power over all decisions involving his
position. For example, 55 ILCS 5/3-3003 empowers the coro-
ner to “control the internal operations of his office,” and to
“procure necessary equipment, materials, supplies, and ser-
vices to perform the duties of the office.” Section 5/3-3013 con-
fers certain investigatory powers on the coroner, and 5/3-3019
provides that only the coroner can give permission to another
to move or handle a dead body. Because state law confers
broad authority on Hyland to run his office as he pleases, the
Bettses claim, he made unconstitutional policy by keeping
Louise’s skull.
1 The Bettses’ complaint alleged that “[Hyland] had a duty by statute
to provide Louise’s complete remains to her next of kin.” They walked
back that contention in their reply brief, however.
2 Cf. Adams, 192 P.3d at 901 (“[A]uthority to remove organs while con-
ducting an autopsy … does not imply that the medical examiner has au-
thority to retain the brain.”).

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No. 25-1685 11
But the Bettses cannot point to a statute conferring author-
ity over the action at issue—how bodily remains are returned.
“The official must also be responsible for establishing final
government policy respecting such activity before the munic-
ipality can be held liable.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 482–83 (plural-
ity). As this court recognized in Vodak, “one can be an official
policymaker in one domain but not in another.” 639 F.3d at
748 (citing McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785
(1997)). So, Hyland had authority to decide how many scal-
pels to buy. 55 ILCS 5/3-3003 (coroner can “procure necessary
equipment, materials, supplies and services”). But that does
not mean he had final policymaking authority over returning
remains. The coroner decides when it is necessary to exhume
a body for an autopsy, 55 ILCS 5/3-3015(c), yet he does not get
to keep a body part. Under state statute, Hyland was com-
pelled to return all remains to the Bettses but did not. Like the
police superintendent in Auriemma, the coroner lacks unfet-
tered power to make final decisions over remains.
Nor does it matter that Hyland was the top official in the
coroner’s office, elected by the people of the county and an-
swerable to them.3 Auriemma tells us “[a]uthority to make a
final decision need not imply authority to establish rules.” Id.
at 401. Consider Killinger, where the mayor—presumably an
elected position—did not establish an official policy because
he acted contrary to state law. 389 F.3d at 772. Here, the
3 The dissenting opinion attempts to distinguish Auriemma by noting
that the coroner here was elected. But the “elected” status of the police
superintendent was not important in Auriemma’s analysis. Indeed, the
word “elected” does not appear in that opinion. And that the City’s
elected mayor played a role in the discriminatory hiring decisions was
“immaterial.” 957 F.2d at 400.

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12 No. 25-1685
coroner has no authority to countermand state law. Hyland
was required to follow 55 ILCS 5/3-3021, just as he was re-
quired to follow the Illinois Constitution and the United
States Constitution. See 55 ILCS 5/3-3005 (Coroner’s Oath).
Hyland’s choice to keep Louise’s skull “violated rather than
implemented” Boone County policy. Auriemma, 957 F.2d at
401.
Last, the Bettses submit that Bradley v. Village of University
Park, 929 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2019), implicitly overruled Au-
riemma. They point to a single statement in Bradley, which
reads: “[A]n unconstitutional act of municipal decisionmak-
ers can result in municipal liability even if their act also vio-
lated state law.” Id. at 885. So, to the Bettses, even if Hyland
violated state law, the County can still be held liable.
That statement cited Owen v. City of Independence for the
proposition “that both a city and its manager could be held
liable under § 1983 for firing the city police chief without due
process, even if the defendants’ actions also violated state
law.” Id. (citing 445 U.S. 622, 627 n.4, 633 (1980)). In Owen, a
City Manager fired the Chief of Police, who then sued under
§ 1983. 445 U.S. at 629–33. A footnote describes a letter the
chief wrote to the manager, which says in part: “My coun-
sel … have advised me … your relief and discharge of
me … would be in violation of the Missouri Administrative
Procedure Act.” Id. at 627 n.4. This is the state law violation
that Bradley says occurred.
That is an insufficient foundation to support Bradley’s de-
scription that the Supreme Court “made clear that both a city
and its manager could be held liable under § 1983 for firing
the city police chief without due process, even if the defend-
ants’ actions also violated state law.” Bradley, 929 F.3d at 885.

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No. 25-1685 13
Owen did not resolve whether the city violated state law when
it fired the police chief, as the letter claims. It did not need to.
So, Owen does not concern the implications of a state law vio-
lation for Monell liability. Rather, the Court “declined to af-
ford qualified immunity to a municipality despite the good
faith of its individual officers.” Capra v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Rev.,
733 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Pembaur, 475 U.S. at
480; Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877
F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2017).
Nor is Bradley about state law violations and Monell, as fi-
nal decision-making authority in that case was conceded. 929
F.3d at 885 (“The mayor and the board concede that they had
sole discretion and authority to fire Bradley.”). The case
largely concerns Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), and the
process that is due under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
885–86. In Bradley, the majority rejected the defendant’s read-
ing of Parratt as a defense to Monell liability, id. at 898, which
is how the case has been subsequently understood. Luster v.
Village of Ashmore, 76 F.4th 535, 537 (7th Cir. 2023) (“We ad-
dressed [Parratt] at some length in Bradley.”).
III
The dissenting opinion submits that as long as the relevant
official is elected and has general authority over a particular
domain, his actions make the municipality liable—even if a
law constrains his authority or discretion. This is respondeat
superior by another name. It is not supported in our caselaw
or that of other circuits, and it extends Monell liability too far.
We decline to break with the great weight of the caselaw until
instructed differently.

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14 No. 25-1685
Scores of plaintiffs are not left without redress for consti-
tutional wrongs done to them by government, as the dissent-
ing opinion suggests. The Bettses, or any hypothetical plain-
tiffs, are not without recourse. They can sue the sheriff in tort
or under § 1983. The state could—and should—criminally
prosecute government actors who commit crimes. But munic-
ipal liability does not arise simply because a rogue elected of-
ficial acted unconstitutionally. Concluding otherwise
stretches both Supreme Court and this court’s rulings too far.
Start with this court’s caselaw. The dissenting opinion’s
position is contrary to binding circuit precedent. Auriemma
and Killinger hold that a government official is not a final pol-
icymaker if state or local law restricts his power. See
Auriemma, 957 F.2d at 400 (“to hold the municipality liable,
Monell tells us, the agent’s action must implement rather than
frustrate the government’s policy.”); Killinger, 389 F.3d at 772
(“If the mayor violated these procedures, he was acting con-
trary to—not setting—the policy of the State.”). The dissent-
ing opinion cannot point to a Seventh Circuit case supporting
its view.4 This case is an application of Auriemma, Killinger,
Cornfield, and Vodak—binding precedents. We make no new
law.
Those cases, read together, stand for the same rule—that
an official is not a final policymaker for a given issue when
state or local law withdraws his or her authority over that
area. An official’s actions, therefore, cannot be viewed as
4 The dissenting opinion states that Vodak distinguishes Auriemma. But
Vodak cited Auriemma with approval and applied its framework. 639 F.3d
at 747. The court in Vodak held that no ordinance constrained the police
superintendent, id. at 748–49, unlike the ordinance in Auriemma. Had that
not been true, the city may not have been liable in Vodak.

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No. 25-1685 15
municipal “policy” in cases where they contradict state law.
No such law existed in Vodak, but the existence of such laws
dictated the holdings of both Auriemma and Killinger.
There is also a tension in the dissenting opinion’s position.
Our colleague concludes that Hyland was a final policymaker
because state law gives coroners the sole power to release a
dead body after an autopsy. But if a state law’s grant of power
to the coroner defines whether he is a final policymaker, why
then does a state law’s restriction of power play no role in an-
swering the same question?
Recall that under the final policymaker rule, when the mu-
nicipality confers its powers, the final policymaker’s acts are
those of the municipality. Municipalities in Illinois are bound
by state law. Newsome v. Thompson, 560 N.E.2d 974, 978 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990). Under state law, Boone County coroners can-
not do what they please with bodily remains. How, then,
could Boone County bestow that power in unrestrained form?
The principles established in our caselaw are consistent
with the Supreme Court’s Monell precedent. Though the dis-
senting opinion relies on Pembaur, several aspects of that case
support our view. For one, a majority of the Court reaffirmed
the principle that “whether an official had final policymaking
authority is a question of state law.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483
(plurality); id. at 491 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment) (looking to state law to define the
scope of the officials’ authority).
For another, two justices whose votes were essential to the
majority expressly considered the fact that the alleged uncon-
stitutional action was not illegal under federal, state, or local
law at the time of the violation for their conclusion that Monell

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16 No. 25-1685
liability could attach. As Justice White explained, “[l]ocal law
enforcement officers are expected to obey the law and ordi-
narily swear to do so when they take office. Where the con-
trolling law places limits on their authority, they cannot be
said to have the authority to make contrary policy.” Id. at 486
(White, J., concurring). That point was critical to Justice
O’Connor, too, “[g]iven that [the county’s] procedure was
consistent with federal, state, and local law at the time the case
arose,” it represented the county’s policy. Id. at 491 (O’Con-
nor, J., concurring in part). Taken together, these points help
show that our caselaw’s focus on whether the official’s actions
violate state law is relevant to the Monell inquiry.
Nor is this case’s holding contrary to Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961). The dissenting opinion posits that individual
officers can be held liable under § 1983 even if their unconsti-
tutional conduct also violates state law. Id. at 172. While true,
individual liability is not municipal liability. Monell teaches that
a municipality can be held liable only for its own actions, not
solely “because it employs a tort-feasor.” 436 U.S. at 691. Un-
der the dissent’s reasoning, however, these forms of liability
are the same: when a rogue elected official acts unconstitu-
tionally, the municipality is liable. Thus, Monell liability is
limitless, courting respondeat superior.
So, it is no surprise several circuits have raised similar con-
cerns and disclaimed the same theory the dissenting opinion
embraces. Consider Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31 (2d
Cir. 2008). Philip Giordano was elected city mayor, and as
mayor, sexually abused two young girls. Id. at 34. After his
arrest, the victims sued the City under § 1983 and Monell. As
a final policymaker over law enforcement, safety, and social
issues, they argued, the mayor’s actions established that the

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No. 25-1685 17
City’s official policy was to permit his abusive crimes. Id. at
37.
The Second Circuit disagreed. “Regardless of what broad
powers he had as a mayor, the state of Connecticut has made
the policy (and the laws) prohibiting such conduct.” Id. at 40.
And there was nothing in the mayor’s “behavior that could
have advanced any conceivable job function or any conceiva-
ble policy goal or interest of the City.” Id. at 40. That reasoning
is consistent with Auriemma’s principle and the conclusion we
reach here. Yet, the dissenting opinion would hold the mayor
liable in City of Waterbury. Indeed, the dissent’s cautionary hy-
pothetical is remarkably similar to that case’s facts. But “a
finding of municipal liability in this case,” the Second Circuit
warned, “would amount to a finding of respondeat superior.”
Id. at 41 (citation modified).
Granted, the dissenting opinion finds support in Bennett v.
Pippin, 74 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 1996), but that case has been func-
tionally overruled. Recent cases from the Fifth Circuit cast se-
rious doubt on Bennett’s holding. In Bolton v. City of Dallas, 541
F.3d 545 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), the chief of police was
fired by the Dallas city manager, so he sued the City under
Monell for the city manager’s acts of violating his due process
rights. Id. at 546–47. First, the Fifth Circuit observed that it had
previously adopted the holding in Auriemma. Id. at 549. Sec-
ond, it held that the city manager was not a final policymaker
because neither state nor local law gave him the power to fire
the chief of police. Id. Just as here, local law prohibited the city
manager from firing the chief, “the relevant local law … pro-
hibits the specific action.” Id. at 551. So, “absent some contrary
custom not shown here, Benavides’s action clearly does not
represent final policy with respect to the removal of city

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18 No. 25-1685
officials like Bolton. It is the Charter that announces the City’s
policy in this regard.” Id. (citing Auriemma, 957 F.2d at 400).
And in Doe v. Burleson County, 86 F.4th 172, 177–78 (5th Cir.
2023), the court held that a judge’s sexual assault cannot lead
to Monell liability because “the broad ability to make deci-
sions … for the county’s business generally is distinguishable
from [defendant’s] personal responsibility for his alleged sex-
ual misconduct against an employee.” Id. at 178. To rule oth-
erwise would “seem to sound instead in respondeat supe-
rior.” Id. (citation modified). Accordingly, Bolton and Burleson
County cast serious doubt on the viability of Bennett.
Next, the dissenting opinion submits that Simmons v. Uin-
tah Health Care Special Dist., 506 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir.
2007), conflicts with our holding. Simmons held that when a
final policymaker flouts a municipality’s policy, Monell liabil-
ity can be established. Id. That holding may conflict with Au-
riemma.5 But Simmons is distinguishable from this case: there,
the municipality set the policy; here, the state did. Our dissent-
ing colleague acknowledges this, but we see a critical differ-
ence. Simmons makes the point in a footnote: “We have previ-
ously held that the fact an official is meaningfully bound by
policies developed by others often signals that he or she is not
a final policymaker. That test, however, does not bear on our
current situation—where the Board in question has
5 Simmons also may be distinguishable from Auriemma. In Simmons,
the county formed a district, and the district constituted a board, which
adopted polices for the management of a nursing home. Id. at 1283. When
the board violated one of those policies, the court held the municipality
was still liable: “Actions taken by a municipality's final policymakers,
even in contravention of their own written policies, are fairly attributable
to the municipality.” Id. at 1287. But in Auriemma, the superintendent of
police did not violate the policies he established but rather city ordinances.

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No. 25-1685 19
demonstrated that it is not meaningfully bound by
its own policies.” Id. at 1285 n.4 (citation modified).
Footnote 4 in Simmons also included a reference to Randle
v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441 (10th Cir. 1995). There, the court
identified considerations to determine who is a final policy-
maker. One is whether he “is meaningfully constrained by
policies not of that official’s own making.” Id. at 448 (citation
modified). Here, the policy that restrained Hyland was devel-
oped by others—the state legislature. That was also true in
Killinger: the mayor did not establish policy by closing the bar
during a town celebration because state law forbade such acts.
389 F.3d at 765. Simmons, thus, is consistent with Killinger and
this case.
Finally, the dissenting opinion raises a separate and unre-
lated fact scenario in which a sheriff rapes a prisoner. To our
dissenting colleague, under this case’s holding, such a
circumstance would not present Monell liability. Yet as the
Second Circuit has explained, for example, “authorizing, con-
doning, or promoting the sexual abuse of children” cannot be
a municipality’s official policy because “the state of Connect-
icut has made the policy (and the laws) prohibiting such con-
duct.” City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d at 40; see also Bolton, 541 F.3d
at 545 (“[T]he relevant local law … prohibits the specific ac-
tion.”). This court’s caselaw follows the same line of reason-
ing. Our holding here is an application of that caselaw: When
a state unequivocally restricts a final policymaker’s power
over a subject, he does not establish policy when violating that
prohibition. Illinois state law mandates that coroners may not
keep bodily remains. The coroner’s rogue, purely personal ac-
tions to the contrary do not establish an official municipal pol-
icy.

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20 No. 25-1685
IV
Hyland’s behavior was heinous. But federal law does not
right every wrong. See Educators for Excellence, 159 F.4th at 532.
Because state law required coroners to return all remains to
the next of kin, Hyland did not implement an “official policy”
when he kept Louise’s skull. Much the opposite—he violated
the law. So, the Bettses cannot establish that Boone County
was liable for Hyland’s actions under Monell, and the district
court properly dismissed their case.
A FFIRMED

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No. 25-1685 21
HAMILTON , Circuit Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent.
We should reverse the dismissal of the Betts family’s
constitutional claim. An elementary point of Section 1983 law
is that an individual defendant’s violation of state law is not
a defense to federal liability under Section 1983. Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172, 183–87 (1961). We should hold here,
similarly, that a local policymaking official’s violation of state
law also is not a defense to Monell liability for his or her local
government.
The majority affirms dismissal of the Betts family’s
constitutional claim because Coroner Hyland violated a state
law as he also violated the family’s federal constitutional
rights. That reasoning disregards the history and purposes of
Section 1983. It also conflicts with the reasoning of Monroe v.
Pape and the judicial glosses on municipal liability stemming
from Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
To pose the issue starkly, by the majority’s reasoning,
Monell liability would not apply to a county whose elected
sheriff raped a prisoner while on the job. Nor would Monell
liability apply when a mayor orders police to shut down a
political march by his opponents or discriminates on the basis
of religion or race. After all, rape is a crime in every state.
Political speech, freedom of religion, and racial equality are
protected by every state constitution. On the majority’s
reasoning, rape, political suppression, and religious and
racial discrimination must therefore be contrary to every
county’s or city’s policy, no matter what elected officials do
under color of state law. Other circuits have had little
difficulty in allowing Monell liability in, for example, cases of
rape by elected sheriffs, Whitson v. Board of County Comm’rs of
County of Sedgwick, 106 F.4th 1063 (10th Cir. 2024); Bennett v.

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22 No. 25-1685
Pippin, 74 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 1996), or unconstitutional arrests
of political opponents ordered by a mayor. Hollins v. Powell,
773 F.2d 191, 195–96 (8th Cir. 1985). We should follow that
course here.
The unusual facts of this case might distract us from the
broad and important issues the majority opinion puts at stake.
In Monell, the Supreme Court held that municipal
governments could be held liable under Section 1983 for
constitutional violations. At the same time, the Court rejected
common-law principles of respondeat superior liability for
such governments. Instead, the Court held that a municipal
government may be held liable only for a constitutional
violation that reflects a municipal policy or custom. 436 U.S.
at 690–91. Justices, scholars, and lower courts have criticized
the reasoning of Monell, see, e.g., Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639
F.3d 738, 747 (7th Cir. 2011) (collecting sources), but the policy
or custom standard has endured.
Nearly fifty years of case law have recognized three paths
to showing such a municipal policy or custom. As my
colleagues explain, the first path is an express municipal
policy, and the second is a widespread custom or practice
with the practical effect of an express policy. Those two paths
are not available here.
The focus here is the third path, an act by a person with
final policymaking authority for the municipal government,
phrased in Monell as “those whose edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy.” 436 U.S. at 694. Monell did
not develop that concept further, but the Court held in
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati that a single unconstitutional act
of an executive branch official could amount to local
government policy. 475 U.S. 469, 480–81, 484 (1986) (elected

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No. 25-1685 23
county prosecutor was final policymaker on subject and
single decision could support Monell liability).
In this case, Coroner Hyland was an independently
elected county official. See 55 ILCS 5/3-3002. In his work, he
was accountable to the voters rather than to another county
governing body or official. See 55 ILCS 5/3-3003 (“The county
coroner shall control the internal operations of his office.”).
Under Illinois law, the elected coroner is the only person who
may authorize the release of a body after an autopsy. 55 ILCS
5/3-3019. In his work as coroner in general and for the purpose
of releasing bodies in particular, he was the county’s final
policymaker.
My colleagues assume that Coroner Hyland, by having
allegedly kept a murder victim’s skull for his bizarre
collection, violated both Illinois state law and the
constitutional rights of her family. My colleagues affirm
dismissal of her family’s Monell claim on the theory that it was
the Illinois legislature that established the relevant “policy”
for the county. In their view, an Illinois statute has long
provided that the “public policy” of state is for a county
coroner to release the body of a decedent to her next of kin as
soon as may be consistent with the coroner’s official duties. 55
ILCS 5/3-3021. Because Coroner Hyland also violated this
state law, my colleagues reason, he was acting to “frustrate”
what they deem to be county policy rather than to
“implement” it. See ante at 7–8.
This reasoning is flawed. Taking the Monell standard and
the majority’s view of the Illinois statute as given, the
majority’s logic contradicts itself. It also undermines the
powerful remedial purposes of Section 1983 as first adopted
by the Reconstruction-era Congress in 1871. As explained

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24 No. 25-1685
below, circuit courts have struggled to follow fragmented and
sometimes conflicting guidance from the Supreme Court in
these final-policymaker cases. I hope the Supreme Court will
step in to clarify that an unconstitutional action by a truly final
local policymaker can establish local policy even if the action
also violates state or local law.
Seventh Circuit Law: As my colleagues point out, case law
offers some support for their approach, but our circuit’s cases
pose an impossible tension that calls for resolution. To
explain, language in Auriemma v. Rice supports the majority’s
result here. 957 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1992). In Auriemma, senior
white police officers in Chicago alleged that the
Superintendent of Police had used race to make decisions to
promote and demote his senior staff. The City of Chicago had
adopted ordinances that flatly prohibited both racial and
political discrimination in the police department, including in
the most senior positions. The superintendent had no
authority to violate those ordinances, and he was also not the
senior-most executive officer in charge of implementing
them—that would have been the mayor, at whose pleasure
the superintendent served. Id. at 399–401.
Note the key difference between Auriemma and this case,
however. The Chicago police superintendent was not an
independently elected official. Instead, he reported to such an
elected official, the mayor. To be sure, the Auriemma panel
said in dicta that those plaintiffs’ allegations that the
defendant superintendent had cleared his decisions with the
mayor did not matter. The panel explained that was because
the mayor was only another executive official, not a
legislative official with the power to change city policy
regarding discrimination in hiring decisions. Id. at 399–400.

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No. 25-1685 25
That dictum regarding the mayor was not necessary to the
panel’s reasoning and result, however. I believe the dictum
conflicts with the reasoning and holding of Pembaur, which
held that local policy could be established not only by
legislative bodies but also by executive officials with final
policymaking authority. 475 U.S. at 480.
The majority finds its strongest support in this circuit in
the odd case of Killinger v. Johnson, where the Auriemma
dictum was applied as a holding. 389 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2004).
In Killinger, a village mayor acted as a judicial officer in
summarily ordering a bar be closed for an evening and later
imposing a license suspension and fine. The plaintiff sued the
village on the theory that the mayor was a final policymaker
and had violated plaintiff’s due process rights. Id. at 768. The
panel affirmed summary judgment for the village on the
Monell claim, reasoning that the relevant procedures were
established by state statute: “If the mayor violated these
procedures, he was acting contrary to—not setting—the
policy of the State. Because the mayor does not hold final
policymaking authority to establish procedural rules, [the
village] is not liable for his actions.” Id. at 772.
On the other side of this Monell issue we have Vodak v. City
of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 2011), where we reversed
summary judgment for the city on a Monell claim. The city
was sued for actions of the police superintendent in allegedly
ordering arrests of demonstrators in the absence of arguable
probable cause to believe they had knowingly violated a
police order. Id. at 746, 748. The city made “the extravagant
claim that the only officials whose tortious conduct can ever
impose liability on it are the members of the City Council
acting through their ordinances.” Id. at 747. We reasoned that

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26 No. 25-1685
the City Council had not restrained the police
superintendent’s authority to make mass arrests at
demonstrations, leaving the superintendent as the final
policymaking authority for the relevant decision. Vodak
distinguished Auriemma. Whereas in Auriemma the City
Council had adopted ordinances prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of race, no ordinance restrained
the superintendent’s actions in ordering mass arrests in Vodak.
639 F.3d at 748–49.
With respect, however, that factual difference between
Vodak and Auriemma does not offer a sound basis for
producing opposite results under Monell. The point shows
instead the internal contradiction in the reasoning of the
Auriemma dictum, the Killinger holding, and the majority
opinion here. It is this: Local policymaking officials are subject
to federal, state, and local laws, including the United States
Constitution and state constitutions. (The police
superintendent’s actions in Vodak surely also violated the
Illinois Constitution, for example. See Ill. Const. art. I, §§ 4 &
5.) Do all those laws amount to “local policies”? If a plaintiff
can show that a local elected executive official violated his
rights under the federal Constitution, why should the local
government’s liability under Monell depend on whether the
official’s actions also violated some other law?1
1 We noted in Vodak that the police superintendent’s final policymak-
ing authority was consistent with Illinois law. 639 F.3d at 748, citing Fabi-
ano v. City of Palos Hills, 336 Ill. App. 3d 635, 657, 784 N.E.2d 258, 278 (2002).
In Fabiano, the defendant city made a Monell argument quite similar to the
majority’s position here: the police chief could not be a final policymaker
because municipal rules required him to enforce federal, state, and local

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No. 25-1685 27
For example, all three states in this circuit have state
constitutional analogs to the federal Equal Protection Clause,
and state courts ordinarily interpret them as consistent with
federal equal protection law. Caulkins v. Pritzker, 2023 IL
129453, ¶¶ 45–46, 228 N.E.3d 181, 191–92; Mayo v. Wisconsin
Injured Patients & Families Compensation Fund, 2018 WI 78,
¶ 35, 914 N.W.2d 678, 690–91; Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 75
(Ind. 1994). By the logic of the majority opinion, those state
constitutional provisions also establish “policy” for every
local government in the circuit. The state constitutional
provisions, after all, bind every local government in each
state. So by the majority’s logic, local governments could
successfully defend any equal protection claims under Monell
on the theory that they also violated the state constitution’s
equal protection provision. That would be an astonishing and
unprecedented restriction on Monell in this circuit.
Or consider free speech rights. All three states in this
circuit have state constitutional analogs to the free speech
rights in the federal First Amendment. Ill. Const. art. I, §§ 4 &
5; Ind. Const. art. I, § 9; Wis. Const. art. I, §§ 3 & 4. Political
laws (and presumably to comply with all of those laws). The Appellate
Court of Illinois rejected that argument:
At most, the rules and regulations of the police depart-
ment “constrained” [Police Chief] Hurley to enforce fed-
eral, state and local laws. We do not find this to be a mean-
ingful constraint on Hurley’s authority to direct and con-
trol the Palos Hills police department sufficient to strip
him of his final policymaking authority with respect to
law enforcement.
336 Ill. App. 3d at 657, 784 N.E.2d at 278 (reversing summary judgment on
Monell claim). That reasoning seems sound to me.

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28 No. 25-1685
changes in local government often produce firings that
arguably violate the federal First Amendment. If the firing
decisions are made by, let’s say, a mayor who looks like the
final policymaker, Monell liability has long been recognized.
See, e.g., Wainscott v. Henry, 315 F.3d 844, 848 (7th Cir. 2003)
(affirming liability of mayor in official capacity, which means
Monell liability for the city); Matlock v. Barnes, 932 F.2d 658,
666 n.4 (7th Cir. 1991) (city was liable for firing); Soderbeck v.
Burnett County, 752 F.2d 285, 293–94 (7th Cir. 1985) (county
would be liable for firings if members of county board
committee were liable). Under the majority’s reasoning,
however, these local governments should have had an
ironclad defense to Monell liability: not only did we violate
the federal First Amendment, we also violated our state
constitution. Our local “policy” was thus to comply with the
state constitution—the superior source of law and policy.
And that means any official’s violation must have
“frustrated” local policy rather than “implemented” it. Q.E.D.
That would be another astonishing restriction of federal rights
and remedies.2
One more example: Second Amendment rights, with a
variation on the facts from Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d
685, 707–09 (Ind. 1990) (affirming damages against city under
Monell). Suppose a city mayor today orders the local police
simply to stop issuing handgun licenses, period. Assume that
2 Perhaps one might suggest there is a difference in the degree of spec-
ificity. The requirements of the Illinois coroner statute are more specific
than those of the state constitutional provisions, for example. But the ma-
jority has not suggested this matters, and gauging Monell liability in terms
of the degree of specificity of the higher law would turn the Monell issue
into a hopeless quagmire, undermining the remedy.

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No. 25-1685 29
would be contrary to a state statute, a state constitutional
provision (such as Ind. Const. art. I, § 32), and the federal
Second Amendment as construed more recently to provide
individual rights. Should a person who suffered damages be
denied an award under Monell on the theory that the mayor
was “frustrating local policy”?
Other Circuits: Other circuits have disagreed with the
majority’s approach here. They have held that the final
policymaker branch of Monell liability can apply even where
an official with final municipal policymaking authority
violated both state law and the United States Constitution.
The most extreme cases are those where elected sheriffs
have acted under color of state law to commit rape. Under the
majority’s reasoning here, Monell liability would be blocked
by state criminal laws prohibiting rape and sexual assault. I
respectfully submit we should not go down that road any
further. We should instead reverse in this case and reject the
idea that Monell liability can be defeated because the local
official violated some other law as well as the Constitution.
A helpful guide to this area of Section 1983 law is Whitson
v. Board of County Comm’rs of County of Sedgwick, 106 F.4th 1063
(10th Cir. 2024). In Whitson, a jury found that the elected
county sheriff had sexually assaulted an intellectually
disabled prisoner and had done so under color of state law.
The sheriff assaulted the prisoner while transporting her to
the county jail. The sheriff was held liable in his individual
capacity under Section 1983, of course, but the district court
had held that the county was not liable under Monell. Id. at
1065.

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30 No. 25-1685
The Tenth Circuit reversed on grounds directly applicable
here. The sheriff was the county’s final policymaking
authority regarding the custody and care of prisoners,
making the county liable for his actions. “As we understand
controlling precedent, when an official takes action over
which he or she has final policymaking authority, the
policymaker is the municipality, so it is fair to impose liability
on that entity for that action.” Id. at 1067.
The sheriff’s sexual assault in Whitson was of course also a
crime under state law, an even more egregious violation of
state law than Coroner Hyland’s violation here. That violation
of state criminal law did not let the county off the hook of
Monell liability for a constitutional violation by its final
policymaker when it came to the treatment of prisoners. We
should apply the same reasoning here.
Whitson found direct support in the Fifth Circuit’s decision
in Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 1996), where the
county sheriff had raped a suspect after interrogating her in
her home. Some confusing procedures in the district court led
the Fifth Circuit to remand the Monell claim against the
county for a trial before a jury. Id. at 581–83. Before
remanding, however, the Fifth Circuit squarely rejected the
same theory the majority adopts here. Consistent with the
majority’s reasoning here, the county had argued that the
sheriff could not have been acting pursuant to county policy
because he also violated state law. The Fifth Circuit wrote:
“When a final policy maker makes the relevant decision, and
when that decision is within the sphere of the policy maker’s
final authority, the existence of a well-established, officially-
adopted policy will not insulate the municipality from
liability.” Id. at 586, quoting Gonzalez v. Ysleta Independent

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No. 25-1685 31
School District, 996 F.2d 745, 754 (5th Cir. 1993). The sheriff in
Bennett was exercising his power and authority as sheriff to
rape the suspect. His action was de facto county policy by
reason of his office.
The Whitson court also found strong support for its
decision in an opinion written by Justice Gorsuch when he
served on the Tenth Circuit, Simmons v. Uintah Health Care
Special District, 506 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 2007). In Simmons, the
board of a county nursing home had fired the administrator
in violation of both the board’s own written policies and the
constitutional guarantee of due process. The independent
board had final policymaking authority in its oversight of the
nursing home. Id. at 1283–84.
The district court had held that the municipal government
was not liable under Monell because the board’s actions had
violated the board’s own officially adopted policy. The Tenth
Circuit flatly rejected that reasoning:
Municipalities are equally answerable for
actions undertaken by their final policymakers,
whether or not those actions conform to their
own preexisting rules. Were the law otherwise,
a municipality’s leaders would have the very
strange incentive to flout their own policies. Or
perhaps even enact policies with the deliberate
purpose of disregarding them. While the law is
often subtle and sometimes complex, it is rarely
so unreasonable. We reverse.
Id. at 1283.
Simmons reasoned that the logic of Pembaur and Monell
must extend to “actions by final policymakers taken in

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32 No. 25-1685
defiance of a policy or custom that they themselves adopted.
Were the rule of law different, we would invite irrational
results. Holding municipalities immune from liability
whenever their final policymakers disregard their own
written policies would serve to encourage city leaders to flout
such rules. . . . Such a rule of law would thus serve to
undermine rather than enhance Section 1983’s purposes.” Id.
at 1285.
To be sure, the situation in Simmons was one where the
local government’s final policymaker (the board) was
violating its own policy, not a state statute. Id. at 1285 n.4
(distinguishing cases where defendant was “meaningfully
bound by policies developed by others,” which “often signals
that he or she is not a final policymaker”). But it’s hard to see
why a local official’s violation of a state statute should work
in the county’s favor as a federal defense when a violation of
a formal county ordinance or policy does not, as Simmons held.
See also Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191, 195 (8th Cir. 1985)
(affirming Monell liability where mayor ordered
unconstitutional arrests of local board members appointed by
his predecessor).3
3 The majority tries to defang Bennett by suggesting it is has been im-
plicitly overruled by the Fifth Circuit. Ante at 17–18. The Fifth Circuit has
not said so, and the majority offers no direct response to the Tenth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Whitson. The majority also claims support from Roe v.
City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2008), which affirmed summary
judgment for a city on Monell liability where the mayor had sexually
abused children. Contrary to the majority’s hypothesis, I do not disagree
with the result in Roe. The theory for affirmance was different there: the
mayor had not been acting as a policymaker when he engaged in his
purely personal crimes. Id. at 38–41 (mayor “had no authority to make
policy authorizing, condoning, or promoting the sexual abuse of

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No. 25-1685 33
The Broader Stakes: The majority’s reasoning here is
fundamentally at odds with the purpose and history of
Section 1983 and with the core reasoning of Monroe v. Pape
(with respect to individual defendants) and Monell (with
respect to municipal defendants).
Monroe held that the phrase “under color of” state law as
used in § 1983 embraces the “acts of an official or policeman
who can show no authority under state law, state custom, or
state usage to do what he did.” 365 U.S. at 172. In other words,
a violation of state law is not a defense to individual liability
under Section 1983. That should not be surprising, for in fact,
abuses of official authority granted by a state were the
principal targets of the Reconstruction-era Congress.
As suggested by Section 1983’s colloquial title, the Ku
Klux Act, the legislation responded to the “lawless conditions
existing in the South in 1871,” including racially and
politically motivated murder, rape, and arson, which
government officials routinely violated the law to ignore. Id.
at 172–75. The Court noted the absence of overtly
discriminatory laws (at that time) and called it “abundantly
clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford
a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of
prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state
laws”—such as colorblind criminal codes and provisions
children”). By contrast, a county’s policy of inaction in response to sexual
abuse of inmates in its jails can create Monell liability despite custodial
sexual abuse being a felony under state law, a fact mentioned several times
in this court’s en banc opinion in J.K.J. v. Polk County, 960 F.3d 367 (7th Cir.
2020). See id. at 372, 374, 376. In this case, there is no doubt that Coroner
Hyland was exercising and abusing his official power in violating the
Betts family’s rights.

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34 No. 25-1685
governing access to judicial process—“might not be
enforced.” Id. at 176–77, 180.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court rejected in Monroe the
theory that the apparent availability of a common-law
remedy (for battery, trespass, etc.) in the Illinois courts against
police officers who entered a home and arrested its occupants
defeated the federal constitutional claims. Id. at 172. Section
1983 created a federal remedy that did not depend on whether
actions complied with any state law:
It is no answer that the State has a law which if
enforced would give relief. The federal remedy
is supplementary to the state remedy, and the
latter need not be first sought and refused
before the federal one is invoked. Hence the fact
that Illinois by its constitution and laws outlaws
unreasonable searches and seizures is no barrier to
the present suit in the federal court.
Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
Then in Monell, the Court recognized direct liability
against municipalities and other units of local government,
which it concluded are “persons” as that term is used in
§ 1983. 436 U.S. at 690. The Court cautioned that a
municipality is not liable through the theory of respondeat
superior “solely because it employs a tortfeasor,” but rather
when the municipality itself, “under color of some official
policy, ‘causes’ an employee to violate another’s
constitutional rights.” Id. at 691–92.
Monell fundamentally concerns causation: did either the
relevant “lawmakers” or, as here, “those whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official policy,” “inflict[] the

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injury?” See id. at 694. Indeed, the Court’s opinion in Pembaur
construed Monell in terms of causation:
The “official policy” requirement was intended
to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts
of employees of the municipality, and thereby
make clear that municipal liability is limited to
action for which the municipality is actually
responsible. Monell reasoned that recovery
from a municipality is limited to acts that are,
properly speaking, acts “of the municipality”—
that is, acts which the municipality has officially
sanctioned or ordered.
475 U.S. at 479–80 (footnote omitted).
Viewed in its proper light as a question of causation, the
“official policy” standard of Monell has nothing to do with
whether a policy violates state law. The Congress that enacted
the Ku Klux Act knew that the southern states nominally
outlawed crimes like murder, arson, rape, kidnapping, and
other methods of terrorizing black citizens. The problem was
that local officials were not enforcing those laws and were
actively encouraging their violation in the campaigns of terror
to (re)establish white supremacy. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172–80.
It would be odd, if not actually perverse, to construe § 1983 so
as not to reach such malfeasance by local officials and
governments that was the principal target of the law. It would
also be odd if violation of state law were a defense for one
class of “persons” who may be liable under § 1983, municipal
corporations, but not for the individual liability of natural
persons. The Supreme Court has not suggested as much, and
it’s hard to see why that would be a sensible interpretation of
§ 1983.

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36 No. 25-1685
State law is significant insofar as it allocates final
policymaking authority between various officials, not in
whatever limits it imposes on how officials wield the
authority given to them. As the plurality put it in City of St.
Louis v. Praprotnik, the question is identifying which officials
act as the municipality in which “areas” of activity:
We begin by reiterating that the identification of
policymaking officials is a question of state
law. . . . The States have extremely wide latitude
in determining the form that local government
takes, and local preferences have led to a
profusion of distinct forms. Among the many
kinds of municipal corporations, political
subdivisions, and special districts of all sorts,
one may expect to find a rich variety of ways in
which the power of government is distributed
among a host of different officials and official
bodies. Without attempting to canvass the
numberless factual scenarios that may come to
light in litigation, we can be confident that state
law (which may include valid local ordinances
and regulations) will always direct a court to
some official or body that has the responsibility
for making law or setting policy in any given
area of a local government’s business.
485 U.S. 112, 124–25 (1988) (plurality) (emphasis added and
citations omitted); see also Jett v. Dallas Independent School
District, 491 U.S. 701, 737–38 (1989) (defining question
controlled by state law in general as “the identification of
those officials whose decisions represent the official policy of
the local governmental unit” and, in the particular case,

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No. 25-1685 37
“whether Superintendent Wright possessed final
policymaking authority in the area of employee transfers”).
Here, identifying the responsible official is easy. Illinois
law grants the county coroner, an independently elected
official accountable only to the voters, sole authority to release
a dead body. The fact that he was required to comply with the
Illinois Constitution, state statutes, and the common law
while exercising this authority does not take releasing bodies
outside of his area of responsibility. If the Betts family can
prove the coroner acted as they allege, they should be able to
recover damages from the county for the actions of the elected
coroner, regardless of whether he also violated state law.

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