ANTHONY M. CZESAK and BOGUSLAW D. CZESAK v. Ravindra Kashyap

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 16, 2026*
Decided June 17, 2026
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1819
ANTHONY M. CZESAK and
BOGUSLAW D. CZESAK,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
RAVINDRA KASHYAP, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 1:24-cv-01006-JEH
Jonathan E. Hawley,
Judge.
O R D E R
Anthony Czesak and his father Boguslaw Czesak sued healthcare providers and
a hospital over alleged threats to end Boguslaw’s life-support care without Anthony’s
approval. The district court determined that they failed to state a federal claim, declined
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims, and dismissed the case
with prejudice. We modify the judgment to reflect that the state claims are dismissed
without prejudice, but in all other respects we affirm.
Between November 2021 and March 2022, Boguslaw was hospitalized at
Methodist Hospital and put on life support to treat COVID-19 and complications
related to acute respiratory distress syndrome. Boguslaw gave Anthony power of
attorney over his healthcare decisions. The Czesaks allege that doctors threatened to
“pull the plug” on Boguslaw against Anthony’s wishes and denigrated Boguslaw’s
quality of life based on his respiratory condition. They also allege that the hospital
attempted to transfer Boguslaw to another hospital while he was fighting a serious
infection, that staff moved him to an unreasonably hot room, and that a nurse told
Anthony he was being unrealistic about Boguslaw’s chances of recovery. According to
the Czesaks, Boguslaw is now home and out of his vegetative state.
Anthony sued two doctors, a nurse, and the hospital under a host of federal and
state statutes. After the district court identified several defects in his claims, Anthony
amended the complaint and added Boguslaw as a plaintiff. They brought claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116; the Rehabilitation Act,
29 U.S.C. § 794; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182; the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd; and several state
common-law and statutory causes of action.
The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See F ED. R. C IV.
P. 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion, explaining that the Czesaks did not
allege state action under § 1983; disability discrimination under the Affordable Care
Act, the Rehabilitation Act, or the Americans with Disabilities Act; or failure to provide
stabilizing care under EMTALA. The court then declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law claims and dismissed the entire case with prejudice.
On appeal, the Czesaks challenge the district court’s dismissal of only their
discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities
Act and their claim under EMTALA. We review the court’s decision de novo. Bronson v.
Ann & Robert H. Lurie Children's Hosp., 69 F.4th 437, 447 (7th Cir. 2023).
The Czesaks first argue that the court erred by dismissing their discrimination
claims because they alleged that the doctors’ threats to take Boguslaw off life support
were made because of his preexisting acute respiratory distress syndrome. They also

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No. 25-1819 Page 3
contend that the court mischaracterized the doctors’ conduct as “suggestions” to end
life support instead of threats to act unilaterally, as their operative complaint alleged.
As an initial matter, Anthony’s statutory standing to bring these claims is
dubious. According to the Czesaks, the doctors’ threats infringed on Anthony’s rights
because he has power of attorney over Boguslaw’s healthcare decisions. Although
standing may sometimes be available for a non-disabled plaintiff, the statutes still
require that the plaintiff himself experienced discrimination because of his association
with a disabled person. See Access Living of Metro. Chicago v. Uber Techs., Inc., 958 F.3d
604, 611 (7th Cir. 2020) (discussing statutory standing under the Americans with
Disabilities Act); see also McCullum v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 768 F.3d 1135,
1143 (11th Cir. 2014) (applying same reasoning to the Rehabilitation Act). The
defendants’ alleged treatment of Boguslaw seems to have had only an indirect effect on
Anthony, which is insufficient for him to state these claims.
But in any event, the Czesaks have not plausibly alleged either claim. The
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act both prohibit denying a
person benefits because of his disability. Reed v. Columbia St. Mary's Hosp., 915 F.3d 473,
484 (7th Cir. 2019). Even accepting as true the Czesaks’ allegations that the defendants
threatened to unilaterally deny Boguslaw care because of his condition, they do not
allege that this threat was carried out, so there was no denial of care. And their other
allegations, such as the unreasonable temperature of Boguslaw’s room, concern the
quality of his care, which neither statute covers. See McDaniel v. Syed, 115 F.4th 805, 828
(7th Cir. 2024).
Next, the Czesaks argue that the district court should not have dismissed their
claim under EMTALA because they alleged that the defendants wished to end
Boguslaw’s life instead of stabilizing him. But the statute creates a cause of action only
against a hospital, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A), so the Czesaks cannot bring this claim
against the individual providers. Moreover, even taking as true their allegations about
the doctors’ threats, the attempted transfer, and the conditions of Boguslaw’s room, the
Czesaks do not allege that the hospital actually stopped treatment. And the statute
requires only that hospitals provide stabilizing care—it is not a federal malpractice
statute. Nartey v. Franciscan Health Hosp., 2 F.4th 1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 2021).
The Czesaks’ remaining arguments also lack merit. They contend that the district
judge was biased towards hospitals based on his responses to a Senate questionnaire
before his confirmation. But this argument is frivolous because they point to no
evidence in the record of bias. They also argue that the court should have granted their

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motions to recruit pro bono counsel. But the court appropriately considered the relative
simplicity of the case and Anthony’s competence to litigate based on his postgraduate
education, so we see no abuse of discretion. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655, 658
(7th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
Finally, the Czesaks ask us to transfer their state claims to state court if we affirm
the dismissal of their federal claims. We cannot, but we note here that the district
court’s judgment reflects dismissal with prejudice of the entire case. That is a merits
dismissal, which is not appropriate for the portion of the case over which the court
relinquished jurisdiction. See Harvey v. Town of Merrillville, 649 F.3d 526, 533 (7th Cir.
2011). The judgment must specify that the state claims are dismissed without prejudice
to refiling in the appropriate forum. We MODIFY the judgment accordingly, and as
modified, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

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