Shawanda V. Collins v. Team Management LLC

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 16, 2026*
Decided June 17, 2026
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2736
SHAWANDA V. COLLINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TEAM MANAGEMENT LLC, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 23-cv-1313-bhl
Brett H. Ludwig,
Judge.
O R D E R
Shawanda Collins sued the manager and owner of an apartment complex for
discriminating and retaliating against her while she was applying for a subsidized
apartment. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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after determining that Collins voluntarily withdrew her application and thus was never
denied housing. We affirm.
We view the facts in the light most favorable to Collins, drawing all reasonable
inferences in her favor. See Riley v. City of Kokomo, 909 F.3d 182, 187 (7th Cir. 2018).
Collins is an African-American woman with decades-old criminal convictions and a
physical disability that makes it difficult to stand for prolonged periods.
In June 2023, Collins completed a pre-leasing waitlist form for an apartment in a
new housing complex managed by Team Management LLC and owned by Eighteen87
on Water LLC. The complex was advertised as including subsidized units set aside for
people with disabilities under the federal Section 811 program. Its website also specified
that an applicant’s income must be at least 40% of the rent amount and under the
maximum gross income limits set for subsidies in Milwaukee County.
The pre-leasing waitlist form asked a variety of questions, including whether the
applicant had a criminal record and whether her convictions were more or less than
three years old. Collins indicated that she had older convictions. When she submitted
the form, she received an automated message telling her that she did not meet the
eligibility criteria. Collins tried filling out the form with different answers several times
to figure out why she was ineligible. She discovered that when she indicated that she
had no criminal record, she received a message telling her she was eligible. Collins
attempted to call Team Management to ask about the eligibility requirements, but she
never received a response. Team Management asserts that it intended to make
applicants with older convictions eligible and applicants with recent convictions
ineligible but that it reversed these parameters by mistake. Collins never tried
indicating she had a recent conviction, which, according to Team Management, would
have triggered a message telling her she was eligible.
Collins filed a complaint against Team Management with the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, which declined to investigate and issued a right-to-
sue letter. She also filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Department of Workforce
Development, which found no probable cause for a fair-housing violation. Collins
initially appealed that determination but later withdrew the appeal.
While Collins’s state administrative complaint was pending, Team Management
invited Collins to join a new waitlist. Team Management works with Movin’ Out Inc., a
housing nonprofit, to assist potential renters with applications for housing subsidies.
Movin’ Out submitted Collins’s information to the Wisconsin Department of Health

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No. 25-2736 Page 3
Services, which approved her for a subsidized unit in the new complex in February
2024. Team Management then sent Collins a move-in application and invited her to tour
the unit. During the tour, Collins informed Team Management that the unit did not
meet her disability-related needs because it had a shower instead of a bathtub. A week
later, Collins asked the state to remove her from the waitlist for the subsidy at the
complex but asked to remain on the waitlist for subsidies at other properties. Team
Management closed Collins’s application after learning that she asked to be removed
from the subsidy waitlist.
The next month, Collins filed this lawsuit against Team Management, Eighteen87
on Water, and Movin’ Out. She alleged that the defendants (1) made housing
unavailable based on her criminal record, which has a disparate impact on African
Americans, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a); (2) retaliated
against her for filing an administrative complaint, also in violation of the Act, id. § 3617;
and (3) discouraged disabled adults like Collins from applying for housing with its
advertised income requirement, in violation of a state statute, W IS . S TAT. § 106.50. The
district court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, concluding
(1) that Collins’s disparate-impact and retaliation claims failed because she withdrew
her application voluntarily and thus was not denied housing, and (2) that Collins lacked
Article III standing to bring her state-law claim because she was not in fact deterred
from applying.
On appeal, Collins first argues that Team Management’s eventual offer of a unit
does not defeat her disparate-impact claim under the Fair Housing Act because the
criminal-history parameters on the pre-leasing waitlist form made it more difficult for
her to apply. According to her, the Act’s “otherwise make unavailable or deny”
language covers discriminatory practices throughout the application process, regardless
of whether the process ends in an offer. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). But Team Management
offered her housing, which she declined to pursue, so the form did not make housing
unavailable to her.
Moreover, Collins did not marshal sufficient evidence to support her disparate-
impact claim. Because the waitlist form did not facially discriminate based on race,
Collins must make a prima facie showing that the waitlist form had a disparate impact
on potential African-American applicants. See Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v.
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 543 (2015). To establish a prima facie case,
Collins would need “statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection” between
the defendants’ policy and the disparity. Id. This “robust causality requirement ensures

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that ‘[r]acial imbalance … does not, without more, establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact.’” Id. at 542 (alterations in original) (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989)). Collins argues that it is foreseeable that African
Americans would be discouraged from applying for housing at the complex at a greater
rate than others because they are more likely to have criminal convictions. But
foreseeability alone is not sufficient. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 581 U.S. 189,
202 (2017). Moreover, the general demographic data Collins submitted at summary
judgment suggesting that African Americans in Milwaukee County are more likely to
have a criminal record than the general population does not establish that the
defendants’ policy had a disparate impact on potential African-American applicants.
Next, for her retaliation claim, Collins contends that a jury could view Team
Management’s failure to contact her until after she submitted her administrative
complaints as evidence of retaliatory intent. But Collins has not put forth any evidence
of an adverse action taken against her after her complaints. To survive summary
judgment, she must show that the defendants coerced, threatened, intimidated, or
interfered with her because of her protected activity. See Riley, 909 F.3d at 191–92;
42 U.S.C. § 3617. The record here shows that Team Management offered her housing,
and even if we assume it did so only because of her complaints, that is not an adverse
action. Collins voluntarily withdrew from consideration for the apartment because she
found the circumstances “suspect,” but suspicion does not establish retaliation.
See Riley, 909 F.3d at 188–89.
Finally, Collins argues that she has Article III standing to bring her state-law
claim because she suffered emotional distress. She explains that the complex’s
advertised income requirement would make it impossible for the average disabled
adult to apply, which made her feel rejected and defeated. But even if the income
requirements were discriminatory, “dignitary harm stemming from the mere
knowledge that discriminatory conduct is occurring is an ‘abstract stigmatic injury,’”
not a concrete injury that would create standing. Carello v. Aurora Policemen Credit
Union, 930 F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755–56
(1984)). Rather, Collins must have been denied equal treatment herself. See id. And here,
she was not actually deterred from applying for an apartment.
We have considered Collins’s other arguments, and none merits discussion.
AFFIRMED

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