Jeffrey Luffman v. Collinsville Community Unit School District 10

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 23, 2026*
Decided June 24, 2026
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2049
JEFFREY LUFFMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COLLINSVILLE COMMUNITY UNIT
SCHOOL DISTRICT #10, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 25-CV-00842-SPM
Stephen P. McGlynn,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jeffrey Luffman appeals the dismissal of his civil-rights action for failure to state
a claim and failure to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We
affirm.
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-2049 Page 2
In May 2025, Luffman filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, alleging a
broad conspiracy between over 30 public officials, government agencies, and law
enforcement officers to suppress his protected speech, obstruct his access to public
records, conduct unlawful searches and welfare checks, and retaliate against him for
what he described without elaboration as his “advocacy efforts.” He asserted that this
conspiracy violated his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as
well as the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, and—due to his claimed status
as a disabled veteran—Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12131–12165. Because of his purported disability status, he requested counsel to
obtain meaningful access to the court.
But his complaint lacked factual support, and it was not clear which claims
applied to which defendants. Observing that the complaint failed to include “simple,
concise, and direct allegations,” the court dismissed the case without prejudice for
failure to state a claim and failure to comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. In the same order, the court ordered Luffman to file an amended
complaint that complied with Rules 8 and 10, and to show cause why his case should
not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Luffman then filed an amended complaint which, including its attachments and
exhibits, spanned nearly 300 pages and alleged “repeated, ongoing, and coordinated
violations of his constitutional, civil, parental, and disability rights.” The district court
screened the amended complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and observed that it
contained conclusory allegations, was “unnecessarily and confusingly duplicative and
lengthy,” and the face of the complaint “essentially allege[d] no facts whatsoever.” The
court noted that Luffman had attempted to “incorporate by reference” over 200 pages of
exhibits and attachments in support of his allegations, but that neither the court nor the
defendants could be expected to parse these documents to find facts that would support
his claims. The court also expressed concern that, because of the confusing way in
which Luffman had written his complaint, the defendants would not be able to
understand the scope of the allegations against them. The court explained that it was
not required to give Luffman another opportunity to amend, and dismissed the
complaint with prejudice for failure to provide the defendants adequate notice of the
claims against them and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
See F ED. R. C IV. P. 8(a)(2), 12(b)(6).
After the court entered judgment, Luffman filed several motions in which he
renewed his request for court-recruited counsel on the basis of his disability, among

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No. 25-2049 Page 3
other requests for post-judgment relief. In an order denying these motions, the court
observed that Luffman failed to explain how he is disabled within the meaning of the
ADA or why recruitment of counsel is a reasonable accommodation. The court also
explained that Luffman had failed to demonstrate that he had made any attempts to
obtain counsel for his case, as is required of indigent litigants requesting court-recruited
counsel under Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007). The court therefore
denied Luffman’s requests.
Luffman appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it
dismissed his amended complaint for what he contends were merely “technical
deficiencies,” insisting that his complaint was necessarily lengthy because of the
duration and complexity of the alleged conspiracy. He further contends that dismissal
with prejudice was improper because his complaint, though lengthy, was not
unintelligible as it contained factual allegations supported by the attached exhibits.
But the court permissibly determined that Luffman’s complaint ran afoul of
Rule 8. That rule requires a complaint to contain a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and Luffman’s amended
complaint—spanning nearly 300 pages, including attachments, and containing 15
counts against 37 defendants—does not include such a statement. Instead, the
complaint contains conclusory allegations that the defendants engaged in unlawful
behavior and violated his rights without explaining how they did so or how the
defendants’ supposed acts relate to one another. In the “factual allegations” section of
the complaint, Luffman attempts to “incorporate by reference” the remaining 281 pages
of attached appendices and exhibits. Regardless of whether Luffman’s allegations are
supported by the attachments, attaching exhibits to substantiate a claim does not
substitute a “short and plain statement.” See FED. R. C IV. P. 8(a)(2); United States ex rel.
Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378–79 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding that a
155-page complaint followed by 99 attachments was insufficiently straightforward to
satisfy Rule 8(a)). The result is unintelligible, as the lack of “basic coherence renders [it]
too confusing to determine the facts that constitute the alleged wrongful conduct.”
See Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 2011). It is inadequate notice to the
defendants of Luffman’s allegations against them. Dismissal of a complaint on these
grounds is “unexceptionable.” Garst, 328 F.3d at 378. The court was well within its
discretion to dismiss the amended complaint. See Stanard, 658 F.3d at 798.
We further agree with the district court that Luffman failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. To state a claim, a complaint must “contain allegations that

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plausibly suggest the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a
speculative level.” Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation omitted); see F ED. R. C IV. P. 12(b)(6). Luffman’s complaint fails to suggest a
non-speculative right to relief. Instead, he alleges a wide-ranging conspiracy without
demonstrating a logical connection between the defendants, their alleged acts, his
claimed injuries, and the relief he seeks. See Wilson v. Price, 624 F.3d 389, 395 (7th Cir.
2010) (“The plaintiffs may not avoid dismissal … simply by attaching bare legal
conclusions to narrated facts which fail to outline the basis of their claims.” (internal
quotation omitted)).
Luffman also argues that the district court erred by dismissing his complaint
without giving him another chance to amend. But “[a] district court does not abuse its
discretion when it had explained what was wrong with the initial complaint and had
already provided one opportunity to amend.” Knowlton v. City of Wauwatosa, 119 F.4th
507, 520 (7th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation omitted). In dismissing Luffman’s initial
complaint without prejudice, the court explained that he failed to include direct and
concise allegations. The court then gave Luffman the chance to amend his complaint to
cure its defects, instructing him to ensure that the amended complaint met the
requirements of Rules 8 and 10 and stated a claim for relief. That Luffman’s amended
complaint was still defective did not entitle him to a third attempt.
Luffman next argues that the court should have recruited counsel to assist him.
He suggests that he had a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment because he
eventually faced criminal sanctions in state court for stalking some of the defendants in
this suit. But this case is a civil proceeding, so he does not have a Sixth Amendment
right to representation. See Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 682 (7th Cir. 2021). Luffman
also disputes the court’s determination that he failed to demonstrate efforts to obtain
counsel, as is required before attempting to recruit counsel. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647,
654 (7th Cir. 2007). He insists that his efforts to obtain counsel were “frustrated by
systemic hostility, judicial sanctions, and barriers tied to his disability.” But Luffman
does nothing to upset the district court’s determination that he failed to make any
showing that he had attempted to obtain counsel on his own to begin with. The district
court properly denied his request. See Balle v. Kennedy, 73 F.4th 545, 559–60 (7th Cir.
2023).
Finally, Luffman asserts that he was entitled to counsel as a reasonable
accommodation under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. But a federal court
is not a public entity within the meaning of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131; Tennessee v.

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Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004). Even if it were, Luffman has identified no authority that
court-provided counsel is a mandated accommodation under the Act, nor are we aware
of any. And in any case, as the district court noted, Luffman never demonstrated that he
is disabled within the meaning of the Act, so he cannot show that he is entitled to an
accommodation.
We have considered Luffman’s remaining arguments, and none has merit.†
AFFIRMED
† All of Luffman’s pending motions are DENIED.

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