Brock Fredin v. Adam Klasfeld

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 23, 2026*
Decided June 26, 2026
By the Court:
No. 25-2641
BROCK FREDIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ADAM KLASFELD, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.
No. 24-cv-45-jdp
James D. Peterson,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Brock Fredin, a social media commentator, appeals the dismissal of his diversity
action alleging that a journalist (and others) defamed him by reporting on his well-
documented history of harassing women and comparing that conduct to his recent
criticism of a judicial law clerk in a high-profile legal proceeding. We affirm.
I
We recount the facts as alleged in Fredin’s complaint, accepting his well-pleaded
factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. See O'Brien
v. Village of Lincolnshire, 955 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2020). We also draw upon the
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-2641 Page 2
documents Fredin attached to his complaint, including the allegedly defamatory news
article at issue. See id.
Fredin, a Wisconsin citizen, operates an X (formerly known as Twitter) account
in which he criticized Allison Greenfield, the law clerk of the state-court judge
presiding over a civil fraud case brought by the State of New York against President
Donald Trump and others. Fredin accused Greenfield of violating ethics rules, being
politically biased against President Trump, and leaking inside information about the
trial to reporters. Fredin rose to prominence after President Trump reposted Fredin’s
criticism on social media and himself criticized Greenfield.
Soon thereafter, a reporter named Adam Klasfeld, who was covering the fraud
case, wrote an article in an online publication called The Messenger that exposed Fredin’s
history of harassing women—all well-documented through court records of restraining
orders and criminal charges against Fredin. Adam Klasfeld, The Story Behind Trump’s
Gag Order Involves a Man Under Criminal Investigation for Stalking, THE M ESSENGER
(Dec. 14, 2023), https://perma.cc/C9DG-CWF2?type=image. Klasfeld reported that
Fredin had harassed multiple women by creating websites in their names, emailing
their employers and colleagues with accusations of criminal conduct, and filing
complaints with their professional organizations. We will later examine the specific
statements, but for now it suffices to say that Klasfeld made clear he was relying on
court records. Klasfeld, for instance, repeatedly qualified the accusations against Fredin
with phrases like “a court found,” “court records show,” and “[the judge] wrote.”
Klasfeld compared Fredin’s past harassment of these women to his treatment of
Greenfield. According to Klasfeld, Fredin filed a bar complaint against Greenfield,
reported her to various state agencies and disciplinary committees, and posted on his
social media a website (with a URL using Greenfield’s name) inviting viewers to
criticize her and call for her disbarment.
The civil-fraud trial and Fredin’s claims of misconduct against Greenfield were
also covered by a journalist for Law360 named Frank Runyeon. Frank Runyeon, Trump
Attys Hit With Gag Order Over Law Clerk Comments, LAW 360 (Nov. 3, 2023),
https://perma.cc/REQ4-MMML. Runyeon posted a link to the article on X, summarizing
the contents as “Law clerk Allison Greenfield did not violate ethics rules with her >$500
political campaign donations, legal experts told @Law360 … .”
Before these articles were released, a “third party” (who Fredin “believed” to be
Klasfeld, Runyeon, and Greenfield) contacted Fredin’s employer. Fredin did not allege
what the third party said to his employer. Fredin was later fired.

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No. 25-2641 Page 3
II
Fredin sued Klasfeld, Runyeon, Greenfield, and The Messenger’s owner
(JAF Communications) in federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction to bring claims
under Wisconsin law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Fredin alleged that (1) Klasfeld’s article was
defamatory because, in Fredin’s view, the accusations of stalking and harassment were
lies and the article implied he had “criminally harass[ed]” a public official; (2) the
defendants conspired to discourage Fredin from seeking proof of Greenfield’s
misconduct by publishing those allegedly defamatory articles; (3) the defamation
amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4) the defendants had
conspired to tortiously interfere with his employment.†
Upon the defendants’ motions, the district court dismissed Fredin’s complaint
without prejudice. Each claim, the court ruled, was defective under both Wisconsin law
and New York law (the parties disputed which state’s law controlled). In relevant part,
the court explained that Fredin’s defamation claim against Klasfeld failed because
(1) Klasfeld’s reporting on Fredin’s history of harassment was substantially true based
on court records, and (2) Klasfeld’s comparison of that history to Fredin’s behavior
towards Greenfield was protected opinion. Turning to Fredin’s claims about a
conspiracy between the defendants to defame him and interfere with his employment,
the court explained that the allegations were too vague and conclusory to state a claim.
And for substantially the same reasons, the court ruled that Fredin’s allegations of
intentionally inflicting emotional distress were insufficient.
Despite dismissing the complaint, the district court granted Fredin time to file an
amended complaint. But Fredin did not do so. After the time to amend passed, the court
entered final judgment for the defendants.
III
In this diversity case, we apply state law for the substantive issues and federal
law to all procedural issues, including pleading standards. Wertymer v. Walmart, Inc.,
† Fredin also asserted that other portions of Klasfeld’s article were defamatory
(e.g., insinuating that he was coordinating with President Trump and that he
“physically attacked” women), but he does not renew those arguments on appeal, and
so we do not consider them. See Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897
(7th Cir. 2023). We also say nothing more about Fredin’s argument—similarly
abandoned on appeal—that Runyeon’s tweet was defamatory.

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No. 25-2641 Page 4
142 F.4th 491, 495 n.1 (7th Cir. 2025). Fredin argues that Wisconsin law should govern
over New York law. Because he cannot state a claim under either state’s law, we assume
for the sake of this analysis that Wisconsin law applies.
A. Defamation
Under Wisconsin’s defamation law, a plaintiff “must allege a false statement that
was communicated to a third person that is unprivileged and capable of defamatory
meaning.” Wagner v. Allen Media Broad., 3 N.W.3d 758, 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 2024). Truth is
an “absolute defense” to defamation. Terry v. J. Broad. Corp., 840 N.W.2d 255, 266
(Wis. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Anderson v. Hebert, 798 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Wis. Ct. App.
2011)). Wisconsin requires only that the statement at issue be “substantially true,” not
that it be true “in every particular.” Id.
i. Pleading Standards
Fredin first argues that the district court erred at the pleading stage by not
accepting as true his allegations that Klasfeld’s words were false statements and not
nonactionable opinions. But we see no error in the district court’s handling of this issue.
At the pleading stage, courts can and do adjudicate whether a statement is factually
true or a matter of protected opinion. See, e.g., Fin. Fiduciaries, LLC v. Gannett Co., 46
F.4th 654, 665–66 (7th Cir. 2022) (applying Wisconsin law); Pippen v. NBCUniversal
Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610, 612, 616 (7th Cir. 2013); Ladd v. Uecker, 780 N.W.2d 216, 218,
220–21 & 220 n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010). Courts must accept only well-pleaded facts as true
when deciding a motion to dismiss. See O’Brien, 955 F.3d at 621. Courts need not, and
should not, accept conclusory allegations that are contradicted by documents attached
to the pleadings (like Klasfeld’s article) or central to the claims (like the court records
Klasfeld relied on). See Fin. Fiduciaries, 46 F.4th at 663–64.
ii. Substantial Truth
Fredin next challenges the district court’s conclusion that Klasfeld’s reporting
was substantially true. As best we can tell, he faults Klasfeld for disseminating false
accusations by his victims. But that argument misrepresents the nature of Klasfeld’s
article. Klasfeld did not report that he had spoken with the women and repeated their
accusations but rather that he was relaying what courts have said about Fredin’s
interactions with women. By limiting his reporting in this way, Klasfeld inoculated
himself from liability. See Fin. Fiduciaries, 46 F.4th at 666 (applying Wisconsin law to
distinguish non-defamatory reporting on what a court said the plaintiff did from

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No. 25-2641 Page 5
potentially defamatory reporting on what the defendant believed the plaintiff had done).
Whether Fredin’s accusers are lying—a view rejected by every court to have considered
the issue—is beside the point. What matters is whether Klasfeld’s characterization of the
court documents is substantially true.
The district court did not err by concluding that the reporting was substantially
true. A side-by-side comparison of Klasfeld’s reporting and the relevant court
documents makes this clear:
• Klasfeld reported that Fredin “has
been hit with 50-year restraining
orders barring him from
contacting three women.”
• According to a federal district
court in Minnesota, three women
“have been awarded 50-year
harassment restraining orders”
against Fredin. Fredin v.
Middlecamp, No. 17-CV-03058
(SRN/HB), 2020 WL 6867424, at *2
(D. Minn. Nov. 23, 2020) (Fredin I),
aff’d, 855 F. App’x 314 (8th Cir.
2021).
• Klasfeld reported that Fredin “has
been criminally convicted multiple
times for violating two of those
orders.”
• Another order from that court
shows Fredin has twice been
convicted of violating those orders.
Fredin v. Middlecamp,
500 F. Supp. 3d 752, 765, 767
(D. Minn. 2020) (Fredin II), aff’d,
855 F. App’x 314 (8th Cir. 2021).
• Klasfeld reported that Fredin “is
currently under criminal
investigation for more suspected
restraining order violations and
possible stalking.”
• Wisconsin court records show that
Fredin was under investigation for
stalking at the time of Klasfeld’s
article and has since been
convicted. See Wisconsin v. Fredin,
No. 2024CF000209 (St. Croix
County).
• Klasfeld reported that Fredin “has
attacked the targeted women in
their professional circles, created
• The federal district court in
Minnesota recounts that Fredin
has harassed his victims by

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No. 25-2641 Page 6
harassing websites about them,
and filed formal complaints
against them, according to court
filings.”
contacting their colleagues,
schools, and professional
organizations with accusations of
“criminal conduct,” “solicit[ing]
others to file complaints” against
them, and creating websites
revealing personal information
like home addresses. Fredin II,
500 F. Supp. 3d at 762–67. This
behavior warranted restraining
orders. Id.
• Klasfeld reported that Fredin has
filed “retaliatory lawsuits” against
his victims.
• That same court concluded that
Fredin “has used litigation in a
bad-faith effort to circumvent the
50-year [harassment restraining
orders] issued against him” and
noted that state courts have
agreed. Fredin I, 2020 WL 6867424,
at *10.
• Klasfeld reported that Fredin has
“openly threatened other
courtroom clerks whose judges
ruled in favor of one of his victims.
‘Remember, each clerk is going to
get reported to the Professional
Responsibility Board and websites
are going up exposing you for
your failure to protect,’
Fredin wrote in an appellate brief
from September 2020.”
• That same court used nearly the
same language: “Fredin has
expressly threatened to post
websites about court staff and file
ethics complaints in retaliation for
unfavorable rulings[:] …
‘Remember, each clerk is going to
get reported to the Professional
Responsibility Board and websites
are going up exposing you for
your failure to protect.’” Id. at *3.
As this comparison shows, Klasfeld’s reporting was not defamatory.
iii. Opinion
Fredin also generally challenges the district court’s conclusion that Klasfeld was
expressing an opinion when Klasfeld compared Fredin’s past harassment to Fredin’s

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No. 25-2641 Page 7
criticism of Greenfield. Fredin highlights Klasfeld’s references that his criticism
“echoes” and “mirror[s]” his “pattern” of “harassing” and “threatening” other women.
In Fredin’s view, Klasfeld’s references conjured notions of criminal harassment, which
the district court should have viewed as an actionable statement of fact.
Wisconsin’s defamation law distinguishes between fact and opinion. Purely
factual statements can be defamatory. Wagner, 3 N.W.3d at 775 n.9 (citing R ESTATEMENT
(S ECOND) OF TORTS § 566, 170–72 (1977)). This includes, for example, attributing a
criminal record to one who has none. See Teague v. Schimel, 896 N.W.2d 286, 301
(Wis. 2017). But a pure expression of opinion that discloses underlying facts is not
actionable “no matter how defamatory” the opinion. Wagner, 3 N.W.3d at 775 n.9. It is
not defamatory, for example, to report accurately on one’s business practices—such as
slow delivery or losing loaned items—and then characterize those practices with
phrases like “rob,” “ripped off,” “cheat,” “victim,” or “scam.” Terry, 840 N.W.2d
at 265–66. Even though the opinion might imply criminality, the characterization is not
actionable. Id.
With this distinction in mind, the district court made no error concluding that
Klasfeld’s comparison was nonactionable opinion. As the court noted, Fredin does not
dispute the factual basis for Klasfeld’s reporting. Fredin filed a complaint against
Greenfield with four disciplinary organizations and mailed the complaint to her judge.
He also posted on his social media a website that used Greenfield’s name as the URL,
branded her a “Democratic Operative and Hack,” shared her photo, and called for her
to be disbarred. Because Fredin’s defamation claim rests on whether Klasfeld came to
the correct opinion from disclosed, truthful facts, the claim fails as a matter of law.
See id.
iv. Public Figure Status & Conspiracy
The parties spill much ink over whether Fredin is a public figure. But because
public figure status determines merely how at fault the defendant must be for defaming
the plaintiff, that determination matters only if a statement is plausibly defamatory.
See Wagner, 3 N.W.3d at 768. Since we agree with the district court that Klasfeld’s article
was not defamatory, we need not address Fredin’s public figure status. And because no
individual defendant defamed Fredin, we do not address whether the defendants
conspired to defame him. See N. Highland Inc. v. Jefferson Mach. & Tool Inc., 898 N.W.2d
741, 747 & n.11 (Wis. 2017) (holding that conspiracy is dependent on individually
wrongful acts).

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No. 25-2641 Page 8
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Fredin contests only in general terms the dismissal of his claim for intentional
distress. He argues that publishing false accusations of criminal behavior qualifies as
the kind of “extreme and outrageous” behavior required to sustain his claim.
See Munger v. Seehafer, 890 N.W.2d 22, 43 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016). But as we have
explained, Klasfeld’s reporting was substantially true, and Fredin points us to no
authority suggesting that non-defamatory statements qualify as “extreme and
outrageous” behavior.
C. Tortious Interference with a Contract
Fredin asserts in only cursory fashion that his allegations about tortious
interference with a contract were sufficient to survive dismissal. The allegations concern
circumstances that preceded the publication of Klasfeld’s article: “a third party,
believed to be Defendant Klasfeld, Greenfield, and Runyeon working together,”
contacted his work, and then “continued their actions, intentionally constituting a
disruption of [Fredin’s] work, likely involving several additional instances of contact,
until present.”
We agree with the district court that these allegations are too vague and
conclusory to state a claim. Such conclusory allegations, “devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement,’” are the sort that the Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to
reject. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
D. Civil Rights Claim
Fredin next asserts that he pleaded a civil rights claim—that Greenfield, a
government employee, retaliated against him for his speech disparaging her—and that
we should remand for discovery on that issue. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But Fredin waived
this claim by not raising it in the district court. He had the responsibility to develop his
arguments and “indicate their relevance under the correct legal standard.’’ See Puffer v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Econ. Folding Box Corp. v.
Anchor Frozen Foods Corp., 515 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2008)). But unlike his other claims,
he did not list a civil rights claim in his complaint, and he never indicated he sought to
raise such a claim in response to the defendants’ motions to dismiss. And perhaps most
critically, the district court gave Fredin the chance to amend his complaint, but he

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No. 25-2641 Page 9
declined to do so, and he may not do so now on appeal. See Gonzalez v. Feinerman,
663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011).
E. Judicial Bias
Finally, we understand Fredin to argue that the district court was biased against
him and should have recused itself because, in his view, it misapplied the pleading
standards and its order “track[ed] the rhetoric of the accused publications.” But legal
error does not suggest bias (and, of course, the court did not err here), see Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994), and any purported “tracking” of the language
from Klasfeld’s article was a natural part of analyzing a defamation claim.
AFFIRMED

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