Arnel Robinson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 30, 2026*
Decided July 1, 2026
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3077
ARNEL ROBINSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 21-1295-CSB
Colin S. Bruce,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Arnel Robinson sued prison officials and medical staff, alleging they violated his
rights under the First and Eighth Amendments by acting with deliberate indifference to
his chronic kidney disease and diabetes and retaliating against him because of his
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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advocacy for other inmates. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court entered summary
judgment for the defendants, and we affirm.
Robinson’s allegations center on the treatment of his chronic kidney disease and
diabetes while he was incarcerated at Illinois River Correctional Center. Robinson
asserted that between August 2019 and July 2020 Brittany Miller, a nurse practitioner,
and Dr. Kurt Osmundson did “nothing” to treat his medical conditions and did not
provide him with medication adequate to treat his pain.
In August 2019, an off-site nephrologist diagnosed Robinson with stage three
chronic kidney disease and ordered an ultrasound and medication changes. A few
months after this visit, Robinson filed a grievance asserting that Miller and Dr.
Osmundson failed to comply with the nephrologist’s recommendations. He further
alleged that the prison’s warden, Cherryle Hinthorne, a prison counselor, Brian Piper,
and a prison sergeant, Justin Howarter, were aware of his medical needs but did
nothing to intervene. He also asserted that the officials’ failure to act was due in part to
an unconstitutional “practice of inadequate healthcare” maintained by Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., the prison’s contracted medical provider.
Then in December 2019, Robinson suffered a hypoglycemic episode in his cell
and lost consciousness. He alleged that Sergeant Howarter found him on the floor but
did not summon medical attention for him. Robinson averred that Sergeant Howarter’s
failure to act was in retaliation for Robinson’s advocacy work on behalf of other inmates
through his work as a law library clerk.
Robinson sued Miller, Dr. Osmundson, Hinthorne, Piper, Howarter, and
Wexford under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court screened the complaint, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, and allowed Robinson to proceed on claims that: (1) Hinthorne, Piper,
Howarter, Miller, and Dr. Osmundson acted with deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (2) Howarter retaliated against
Robinson in violation of his First Amendment rights; and (3) Wexford maintained a
policy or practice that violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment, see Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Robinson filed several motions for recruitment of counsel. He argued that the
medical issues were complex, he lacked legal knowledge, and he had limited ability to
review the large record. The district court rejected his first five motions, explaining that
lack of legal knowledge is not a sufficient reason to recruit counsel, and that Robinson

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No. 24-3077 Page 3
had been able to comply with court orders up to that point. But when the case reached
discovery, and Robinson moved for counsel a sixth time, the court conditionally
granted the motion, explaining that it would attempt to find a volunteer attorney. The
court then contacted eleven local attorneys and sent a mass email to all members of the
Seventh Circuit Bar Association, seeking a volunteer attorney. But when no attorney
was willing to take Robinson’s case, the district court vacated the order conditionally
granting the motion for counsel. Robinson again moved for counsel, but the court
denied the motion as futile, noting that it had attempted to recruit counsel to no avail.
The defendants then moved for summary judgment, and the district court
granted the motions. The court determined that no reasonable juror could conclude that
Miller and Dr. Osmundson provided Robinson with constitutionally deficient medical
care, or that Wexford maintained a policy or practice that was the moving force behind
any constitutional violation. The court also concluded that Hinthorne, Piper, and
Howarter had no control over Robinson’s medical treatment and were entitled to defer
to the judgment of medical professionals.
Robinson appeals, primarily challenging the district court’s handling of his
motions to recruit counsel. In evaluating whether to recruit counsel, the district court
must examine “whether the difficulty of the case—factually and legally—exceeds the
particular plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson to coherently present it.” Pruitt v. Mote,
503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). The district court complied with this
requirement in denying Robinson’s first five motions, explaining that Robinson had
proven himself capable of responding to the court’s instructions by meeting filing
deadlines and successfully amending his complaint. When the district court later
determined that the discovery process would exceed Robinson’s capacity, the court
granted the sixth motion for counsel but could not find a volunteer. Although Robinson
insists that the court should have done more to find an attorney to take his case, the
Constitution does not entitle civil litigants to counsel, nor are district courts required to
search for pro bono counsel indefinitely. Austin v. Hansen, 139 F.4th 604, 607 (7th Cir.
2025) (citation omitted). The court made a reasonable effort to recruit counsel by
contacting several local attorneys and reaching out to the Seventh Circuit bar
association. See id. (discussing scarcity of pro bono attorneys in Central District of
Illinois).
Robinson also briefly argues that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment for the defendants, insisting that Howarter attempted to kill him and other
unnamed persons retaliated against him. But these conclusory arguments, which do not

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meaningfully engage with the district court’s reasoning at summary judgment, are
waived. See Shipley v. Chi. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 947 F.3d 1056, 1062–63 (7th Cir. 2020)
(“Arguments that are underdeveloped, cursory, and lack supporting authority are
waived.”); Cole v. Comm'r, 637 F.3d 767, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that briefs
must contain more than generalized assertions of error); see also F ED. R. A PP .
P. 28(a)(8)(A) (explaining that brief must contain “appellant’s contentions and the
reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the records on which
appellant relies”).
AFFIRMED.

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