City of Hammond, Indiana v. Lake County Board of Elections

In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-1125
C ITY OF HAMMOND, I NDIANA , et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
LAKE C OUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:21CV160-PPS — Philip P. Simon, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2024 — D ECIDED J ULY 2, 2026
____________________
Before S YKES , ST . EVE , and LEE , Circuit Judges.
SYKES , Circuit Judge. Most state trial judges in Indiana are
elected. But in three of Indiana’s most populous counties—
Lake, Marion, and St. Joseph—the governor appoints the
judges who serve on the superior court, a trial-level court
with jurisdiction much like the state circuit court. In these
counties the governor fills superior-court vacancies by ap-
pointment from a list of nominees submitted by a nonparti-
san commission tasked with recommending the most quali-
fied candidates. The appointed judges then face periodic re-

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2 No. 24-1125
tention elections in which the county’s voters decide only
whether to keep them in office; the ballot is not open to other
candidates. This hybrid, merit-based method of selecting
judges is known as the “Missouri Plan,” named for the state
that developed it.
The City of Hammond and three voters sued election
agencies and officials claiming that Indiana’s use of this
method of judicial selection in Lake County violates § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits the states from im-
posing any voting “standard, practice, or procedure” that
abridges the right to vote “on account of race or color.”
52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). The suit alleges that the Missouri Plan
gives the county’s minority voters “less opportunity” than
“other members of the electorate” to elect trial judges “of
their choice.” Id. § 10301(b). For support the plaintiffs rely
mostly on demographic data, noting that in Lake County ra-
cial minorities comprise over 40% of the voting-age popula-
tion, while elsewhere in Indiana—where open superior-
court elections are the norm—less than 20% of the voting-
age population is nonwhite.
As the case came to us, the § 2 claim presented a doctri-
nal puzzle. The Supreme Court has never recognized one
like it. Section 2 litigation usually concerns redistricting
maps, see, e.g., Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1 (2023), or rules
governing the time, place, or manner of an election, see
Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 594 U.S. 647 (2021). But
this case challenges what the Missouri Plan is—
appointment + retention election—not how any election is
run. The claim also falls within crosscutting circuit prece-
dent. We’ve held that § 2 doesn’t require any public officer
to be elected rather than appointed, Quinn v. Illinois, 887 F.3d
322, 323–24 (7th Cir. 2018), but we’ve also held that § 2 ap-

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No. 24-1125 3
plies to Indiana’s use of the Missouri Plan to select superior-
court judges in Lake County, Bradley v. Work, 154 F.3d 704,
709 (7th Cir. 1998).
The district judge concluded that Quinn applies and fore-
closes this claim, so he entered summary judgment for the
defendants. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that Quinn is
distinguishable or should be overruled.
The legal landscape has changed since the case was
briefed and argued, making it unnecessary to address the
conflict in circuit precedent. In Louisiana v. Callais, the
Supreme Court held that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act “im-
poses liability only when the circumstances give rise to a
strong inference that intentional discrimination occurred.”
146 S. Ct. 1131, 1146 (2026). No such inference is possible
here. Indiana adopted the Missouri Plan for use in Lake
County after a 1972 study showed broad dissatisfaction with
the functioning of the county’s superior courts because of
the pressures and distractions of partisan judicial elections.
The circumstances of that decision do not support a strong
inference that it was the product of intentional racial dis-
crimination. We affirm the judgment.
I. Background
“Indiana has one of the most complicated trial court sys-
tems in the United States … .” John G. Baker, Now or Never:
Reforming Indiana’s Court System, 41 IND. L. R EV. 817, 817
(2008).1 To start, the Indiana Constitution provides for a sys-
tem of circuit courts, each with general jurisdiction over all
1 Judge Baker is the former Chief Judge of the Indiana Court of Appeals.
When he retired from full service in 2020, he was the state’s longest-
serving judge. Judge John G. Baker, IND . J UD . BRANCH , https://www.in.gov/
courts/appeals/judges/john-baker/ (last visited July 2, 2026).

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4 No. 24-1125
criminal and civil matters. IND. C ONST. art. 7, § 8; IND. C ODE
§ 33-28-1-2. The Indiana Constitution further specifies that
the “Judge for each circuit shall be elected by the voters”
who live within it. Art. 7, § 7. Today, Indiana is divided into
91 judicial circuits; except for the Seventh Judicial Circuit,
which encompasses both Dearborn and Ohio Counties in the
southeast corner of the state, each circuit corresponds to one
of Indiana’s 92 counties. See generally IND. C ODE tit. 33,
art. 33.
The Indiana Constitution also authorizes the state legisla-
ture to establish other courts as it sees fit. Art. 7, § 1. To ac-
commodate Indiana’s growing population, in 1871 the legis-
lature created a system of superior courts—one for every
county with at least 40,000 residents. 1871 Ind. Acts 48, 48–
49; see John G. Baker, The History of the Indiana Trial Court
System and Attempts at Renovation, 30 IND. L. R EV. 233, 247
(1997). As originally designed, the jurisdiction of the circuit
and superior courts largely overlapped (together with the
now-defunct courts of common pleas). 1871 Ind. Acts at 49.
Each county superior court consisted of three elected judges
who served staggered four-year terms. Id. at 50.
Since then, Indiana’s superior courts have grown in
number and in size, but their structure has remained mostly
the same. Some of Indiana’s counties are still too small to
warrant the creation of a separate superior court. E.g., IND .
C ODE §§ 33-33-4 (Benton County), -13 (Crawford County).
But in a few counties, there are several. E.g., id. §§ -27.2
(Grant County Superior Court No. 2), -79.4 (Tippecanoe
County Superior Courts No. 4, No. 5, and No. 6). In short,
most—but not all—of Indiana’s 92 counties have at least one
superior court, and the number of judges on each court
loosely correlates to the county’s population. E.g., id. §§ -49-6

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No. 24-1125 5
(36 judges in Marion County); -71-5 (8 judges in St. Joseph
County).
As they exist today, Indiana’s superior courts resemble
the circuit courts in both form and function; like the circuit
courts, the superior courts possess “original and concurrent
jurisdiction” over all civil and criminal cases. Id. §§ 33-29-1-
1.5 (standard superior courts), -1.5-2 (nonstandard superior
courts). So although the dockets of the circuit and superior
courts vary in some respects, the difference in nomenclature
is “primarily due to accidents of legislative history” and
doesn’t reflect a “true difference[] in the[ir] nature or pur-
pose.” About the Judicial Branch, IND. J UD. BRANCH ,
https://www.in.gov/courts/about (last visited July 2, 2026).
Both are trial courts of “general jurisdiction.” State v.
Monfort, 723 N.E.2d 407, 414 (Ind. 2000).
Throughout most of Indiana, superior-court judges are
still elected, though their terms are now six years instead of
four. IND. C ODE § 33-29-1-3(a). Not so, however, in Lake,
Marion, and St. Joseph Counties.2 In these highly populated
counties, the governor appoints the superior-court judges
from a small list of candidates vetted by a nonpartisan
commission. Id. §§ 33-33-45-38 (Lake County), -49-13.4
(Marion County); -71-38 (St. Joseph County). The appointed
judges thereafter face periodic retention elections in which
the county’s voters decide only whether to keep them in of-
fice. Id. §§ -45-42, -49-13.3, -71-43. As mentioned, this method
of judicial selection is often called the “Missouri Plan”:
Missouri was the first state to adopt it in 1940. Sandra Day
2 The City of Hammond is in Lake County, as is Gary. Marion County
encompasses Indianapolis and its suburbs, while the City of South Bend
anchors St. Joseph County.

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6 No. 24-1125
O’Connor, The Essentials and Expendables of the Missouri Plan,
74 MO. L. R EV. 479, 485–86 (2009).
Our focus here is Lake County, which sits in the north-
west corner of the state on the southern shores of Lake
Michigan. Lake County encompasses the cities of Gary and
Hammond and has about 500,000 residents, making it one of
Indiana’s most populous counties.3
When a vacancy arises on the Lake County Superior
Court, a local nominating commission screens applicants
and recommends the five “most highly qualified” to the
governor. I ND. C ODE § 33-33-45-35(1). Permissible considera-
tions include the applicant’s law-school record, public ser-
vice, legal experience, judicial temperament, possible con-
flicts of interest, age, and personality traits. Id. § -35(2). The
commission may not, however, consider a candidate’s politi-
cal affiliation. Id. § -35(4).
The nominating commission is itself nonpartisan. It has
seven members: three appointed by the governor; three ap-
pointed by the Lake County Board of Commissioners; and
the Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court, who serves
ex officio as the chairperson but votes only when necessary
to resolve a tie. Id. § -28(a), (b). At least two members must
be nonlawyers who have “never been licensed to practice
law,” one must be a woman, and one “must be an individual
from a minority group.” Id. No member may hold “any oth-
er elected public office” or “office in a political party or or-
ganization.” Id. § -28(c).
3 Lake County, Indiana, U.S. CENSUS B UREAU, https://data.census.gov/
profile/Lake_County,_Indiana?g=050XX00US18089 (last visited July 2,
2026).

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No. 24-1125 7
Once the commission submits its list of the five most
qualified candidates, the governor fills the vacancy by ap-
pointing a nominee from the commission’s list. § -38(a). The
governor must consider the same merit-based criteria as the
nominating commission and likewise must disregard the
nominees’ political affiliation. Id. § -38(b). Newly appointed
judges serve an initial term of two years and then face a
countywide retention election; if retained, the judges are
subject to retention elections every six years. Id. §§ -41, -42.
As noted, superior-court judges in Lake County have not
always been selected this way; previously they were elected
in partisan countywide elections. See 1895 Ind. Acts 210, 210–
11. In 1971 the state legislature directed the Indiana Judicial
Study Commission to evaluate the administration of Lake
County’s courts—and more particularly, the selection and
tenure of its judges. 1971 Ind. Acts 2272, 2272–73.
The Judicial Study Commission retained the Institute for
Court Management, a national nonprofit, which conducted
an extensive study of Lake County’s trial courts. Its findings
were striking. Despite conducting “some 25 in-depth studies
of courts throughout the country,” the Institute had never
found “such pervasive dissatisfaction with the functioning
of the courts” as it had in Lake County.4 It identified signifi-
cant backlogs of civil and criminal cases and unequal work-
loads between the judges. The political pressures of the elec-
toral process contributed to these problems: The system of
partisan judicial elections, the Institute concluded, had “not
4 INST. FOR CT. M GMT., A P ROGRAM FOR THE IMPROVED A DMINISTRATION OF
J USTICE IN LAKE COUNTY (I NDIANA) 2 (Oct. 1972) (on file with the Nat’l
Ctr. for State Cts.), https://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/
collection/ctadmin/id/947/.

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8 No. 24-1125
always resulted in a top-quality judiciary” because the
judges spent significant time campaigning and prioritized
their “individual operations” over the effective administra-
tion of justice as a whole. 5 Among many other reforms, the
Institute recommended shifting to a merit-based appoint-
ment method for selecting Lake County’s superior-court
judges.
The state legislature accepted the Institute’s recommen-
dation and in 1973 enacted a version of the Missouri Plan for
use in Lake County’s superior court. 1973 Ind. Acts 1651,
1658–70. Some details of that system, such as the composi-
tion of the nominating commission and the number of can-
didates it advances when a vacancy arises, have changed
over time. But in all relevant respects, the merit-based
Missouri Plan for appointing Lake County’s superior-court
judges—as we’ve summarized it above—is the same today
as when it was adopted by the state legislature in the 1973
reform initiative.
In 2021 the City of Hammond and three voters, including
Hammond’s mayor Thomas McDermott and Indiana State
Senator Lonnie Randolph, filed this lawsuit challenging
Indiana’s use of the merit-selection system for Lake County’s
superior-court judges. They raised claims under § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act and the Indiana Constitution. (The state
constitutional claim has no bearing here, so we’ll say no
more about it.) The suit named the Indiana Secretary of
State, the Lake County Board of Elections, and the Lake
County Judicial Nominating Commission as defendants.
The State of Indiana quickly sought to intervene to de-
fend the challenged state statutes. That motion was granted,
5 Id. at 2–6.

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No. 24-1125 9
and the parties later agreed to dismiss the Nominating
Commission from the suit.
The plaintiffs insist that their § 2 claim challenges only
the retention-election feature of the Missouri Plan. That posi-
tion makes little sense. The appointment and retention-
election components of the Missouri Plan function together
and can’t be decoupled. The plaintiffs seek an injunction re-
quiring Indiana to discard retention elections and implement
open, contested elections for Lake County’s superior-court
judges. They seek, in other words, to judicially repeal the
Missouri Plan and return to an elected judiciary in Lake
County’s superior courts. That’s an attack on the county’s
judicial-selection system as a whole. We therefore construe
this suit as a § 2 challenge to the use of the Missouri Plan in
Lake County.
To support their claim, the plaintiffs rely almost entirely
on a comparison of the racial demographics in Lake, Marion,
and St. Joseph Counties and in the rest of the state. In Lake
and Marion Counties, racial minorities comprise over 40% of
the voting-age population; the same is true of about 25% of
the voting-age population in St. Joseph County. In the rest of
Indiana, less than 20% of the voting-age population is
nonwhite. Parsing the demographic data somewhat differ-
ently, almost two-thirds of Indiana’s black voters live in
Lake, Marion, or St. Joseph Counties. In effect, then, most
black voters in Indiana cast only up-or-down retention bal-
lots for their county’s appointed superior-court judges. Most
of Indiana’s white voters, by contrast, select their superior-
court judges through open, contested elections. This dis-
crepancy, the plaintiffs claim, violates § 2 because it gives
black citizens in Indiana “less opportunity” than white citi-

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10 No. 24-1125
zens to select the superior-court judges “of their choice.”
§ 10301(b).
In addition to the demographic data we’ve just men-
tioned, the plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from Jerold
Bonnet, general counsel in the office of the Indiana Secretary
of State. Bonnet traced the history of judicial selection in
Lake County and attested that a merit-based approach like
the Missouri Plan “is essential in a highly populated and
highly diverse jurisdiction like Lake County to provide safe-
guards for limiting political influence in Lake County supe-
rior courts.” The plaintiffs maintain that Bonnet’s use of the
word “diverse” is evidence that Indiana’s enactment of the
Missouri Plan for Lake County was racially motivated.
Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the dis-
trict judge rejected the plaintiffs’ § 2 claim, holding that our
decision in Quinn foreclosed it. Quinn raised an analogous
§ 2 claim challenging the selection method for members of
the Chicago Board of Education. 887 F.3d at 323. Under
Illinois law, the Chicago mayor appoints the members of the
city’s school board, while school boards in other parts of the
state are elected. Id. at 324. The plaintiffs in Quinn argued
that the state legislature’s choice of an appointment system
for Chicago’s school board had “a disproportionate effect on
minority voters” in violation of § 2. Id. at 323. We rejected
the claim, explaining that Ҥ 2 governs the conduct of elec-
tions[;] it does not guarantee that any given public office be
filled by election rather than appointment, a civil-service
system, or some other means.” Id.
The judge found Quinn controlling, though he ques-
tioned whether the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in
Brnovich had undermined it. He also took note of contrary
circuit precedent—namely, our decision in Bradley, which

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No. 24-1125 11
(like this case) considered a § 2 challenge to the appointment
plus retention-election system for selecting superior-court
judges in Lake County. 154 F.3d at 706. The claim in Bradley
was mooted by changes in the relevant state statutes while
the litigation was underway. Id. at 710. Still, our opinion in
Bradley had a lot to say about the merits of the plaintiffs’
claim: we said that § 2 applies to Lake County’s retention
elections, and we analyzed the claim under the framework
of the Supreme Court’s vote-dilution precedents. Id. at 709–
11.
The judge noted all this but ultimately found Bradley un-
helpful. He considered himself bound by Quinn and entered
judgment for the defendants.
II. Discussion
In relevant part, § 2(a) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
prohibits the states from imposing a voting “standard, prac-
tice, or procedure” in a manner that denies or abridges “the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color.” § 10301(a). Section 2(b) elaborates:
A violation of subsection (a) is established if,
based on the totality of circumstances, it is
shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participa-
tion by members of a class of citizens protected
by subsection (a) in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the elec-
torate to participate in the political process and
to elect representatives of their choice.
§ 10301(b).

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12 No. 24-1125
As this case was briefed and argued, the dispute centered
on the applicability and continued force of our decision in
Quinn. The plaintiffs maintained that Quinn is distinguisha-
ble or should be reconsidered in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Brnovich, which articulated a multifactor
test for evaluating challenges to rules governing the time,
place, or manner of elections. The Court provided a nonex-
clusive list of factors that inform the question whether such a
rule violates § 2’s “equal openness” requirement. Brnovich,
594 U.S. at 668–72. Relevant factors include “the size of the
burden imposed by a challenged voting rule,” “the degree to
which [the] rule departs from what was standard practice
when § 2 was amended in 1982,” the “size of any disparities
in [the] rule’s impact on members of different racial or ethnic
groups,” “the opportunities provided by a State’s entire sys-
tem of voting,” and “the strength of the state interests.” Id.
The plaintiffs’ reliance on Brnovich is understandable. But
the Brnovich factors do not easily map onto this claim. All § 2
claims require an examination of “the totality of circum-
stances,” § 10301(b), and Brnovich makes clear that the rele-
vant circumstances necessarily depend on the nature of the
claim, 594 U.S. at 672–73. For example, the factors articulated
long ago in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), “grew
out of and were designed for use in vote-dilution cases”—
that is, cases challenging redistricting plans. Brnvovich,
594 U.S. at 672. The Court emphasized in Brnvovich that
some of the Gingles factors “are plainly inapplicable” in cases
that present other kinds of § 2 challenges. Id. The same is
true with respect to the Brnovich factors, which are tailored
to § 2 cases challenging rules governing the time, place, or
manner of elections.

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No. 24-1125 13
This case is different. The plaintiffs do not challenge a
time, place, or manner election rule. Their claim sounds in
substance, not procedure. The plaintiffs take aim at Indiana’s
substantive decision in 1973 to shift to a merit-based ap-
pointment system for superior-court judges, coupled with a
retention-only ballot-box component. The Brnovich factors
are not well-adapted to resolving a claim of this type. (Need-
less to say, the Gingles factors are even further afield.)
An additional complication is the problem of determin-
ing the relevant electorate for § 2 comparison purposes. The
statute’s “equal openness” standard requires comparing mi-
nority voters’ opportunity to elect candidates of their choice
against that of “other members of the electorate.” § 10301(b).
That, in turn, requires choosing the correct comparator.
Indiana’s superior-court judges are trial judges who sit in
and serve at the county level. Though they are state judges
of general jurisdiction, the Indiana Code separates and or-
ganizes the superior courts by county and establishes each
county’s superior court as a distinct judicial entity. E.g., IND.
C ODE §§ 33-33-45-3, -4 (establishing “a superior court in Lake
County” that “shall be known as the superior court of Lake
County”). And superior-court judges are chosen on a
county-by-county basis according to the method provided
by statute. The defendants accordingly argue that the rele-
vant electorate for comparison purposes is the Lake County
electorate.
If they’re right, then the plaintiffs’ § 2 claim fails at the
starting gate because all Lake County voters have the same
indirect say when it comes to selecting superior-court judg-
es. Quinn made precisely this point: “Black and Latino citi-
zens do not vote for the school board in Chicago, but neither

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14 No. 24-1125
does anyone else. Every member of the electorate is treated
identically, which is what § 2 requires.” 887 F.3d at 325.
The plaintiffs, of course, frame the § 2 comparison differ-
ently. They argue that because superior-court judges have
statewide jurisdiction, the voting opportunity of minorities
in Lake County should be measured against that of nonmi-
nority voters across the entire state. They also argue that be-
cause the Missouri Plan was adopted by the state legislature,
the state electorate as a whole must be the relevant compara-
tor for their § 2 claim.
Complicating matters further is the tension between
Quinn and Bradley. We’ve already identified this concern.6
These thorny questions occupied much of the parties’
briefing and oral argument. But we need not resolve them.
After we heard oral argument, the Supreme Court noted
probable appellate jurisdiction in Louisiana v. Callais, 145 S.
Ct. 434 (mem) (2024), and has recently issued its decision.
The Court held that § 2 imposes liability “only when the cir-
cumstances give rise to a strong inference that intentional
discrimination occurred.” Callais, 146 S. Ct. at 1156. Evidence
of disparate impact is not sufficient. The Court’s new under-
standing of § 2 resolves this case: There is no evidence that
Indiana’s decision to implement the Missouri Plan in Lake
County was the product of intentional racial discrimination.
As discussed, the Indiana legislature adopted the hybrid,
merit-based judicial-selection system in Lake County within
6 We add that Bradley is perplexing for a separate reason. As we’ve not-
ed, the § 2 claim in Bradley was moot because of intervening changes in
state law, yet our opinion contains an extensive discussion of the merits
of the claim. For this reason, the precedential effect of Bradley’s merits
analysis is unclear.

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No. 24-1125 15
months of receiving a study report from the Institute for
Court Management recommending that it do so. And the
reasons for that recommendation had nothing to do with
race. Rather, the Institute found “pervasive dissatisfaction”
with the functioning of Lake County’s trial courts—the
worst it had ever seen. That dissatisfaction, the Institute ex-
plained, was due in large part to the pressures and distrac-
tions of partisan judicial elections. The Indiana legislature
accepted the Institute’s recommendation to replace Lake
County’s judicial elections with a merit-based appointment
system akin to the Missouri Plan. There’s no evidence that
its decision was motivated by the number or percentage of
minority voters in Lake County or had anything at all to do
with race.
To the extent the plaintiffs rely on the Bonnet affidavit to
show that the legislature’s decision was racially motivated, it
does no such thing. Recall that Bonnet is general counsel to
the Indiana Secretary of State; in his affidavit he recounted
the history of judicial selection in Lake County and offered
his view that a merit-based system like the Missouri Plan “is
essential in a highly populated and highly diverse jurisdic-
tion like Lake County to provide safeguards for limiting po-
litical influence in Lake County superior courts.” As the
plaintiffs see it, his use of the phrase “highly diverse” con-
firms that the adoption of the Missouri Plan in Lake County
was racially motivated.
Not so. For starters, the Indiana legislature revised Lake
County’s judicial-selection system in 1973; Bonnet didn’t join
the Indiana Secretary of State’s Office until 2005. His per-
spective thus sheds little light on whether the state legisla-
ture’s decision was motivated by race. Callais, 146 S. Ct. at
1156.

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16 No. 24-1125
Bonnet’s comment, moreover, is hardly an admission of
forbidden racial motivations. Eliminating partisanship in
state courts is obviously a legitimate goal—one that is fully
compatible with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. It may be, as
Bonnet thinks, that a “highly populated and highly diverse
jurisdiction” like Lake County is particularly susceptible to
such partisanship. But his current views on that subject do
not support an inference—much less a strong one—that the
state legislature’s 1973 enactment of the Missouri Plan for
use in Lake County’s superior court was the product of ra-
cial discrimination.
In sum, this claim fails under Callais. The circumstances
surrounding the Indiana legislature’s decision to implement
the Missouri Plan in Lake County do not “give rise to a
strong inference that intentional discrimination occurred.”
Id. Without such an inference, § 2 “cannot impose liability.”
Id. at 1157.
A FFIRMED

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