United States of America v. Nikki Houston

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued July 7, 2026
Decided July 10, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1937
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
NIKKI HOUSTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:23-CR-00277(8)
Mary M. Rowland,
Judge.
O R D E R
Nikki Houston pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343,
1346, and the district court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of twelve months’ and
one day imprisonment. On appeal, she argues that the district court failed to consider
her arguments in mitigation and created an unwarranted sentencing disparity. We
affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

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No. 25-1937 Page 2
Background
From 2016 to 2022, Houston and fifteen codefendants participated in a scheme to
defraud the State of Illinois. One codefendant, who was an employee at the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services (IDCFS), arranged for Houston and other
codefendants to pose as foster parents to receive monthly funds from the state. Houston
sent half of her earnings to the IDCFS codefendant as a bribe or kickback for arranging
this system. Over the course of six years, Houston received a total of $495,802 in state
funds.
A grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging the defendants with 44
counts of fraud, including Houston’s three counts of wire fraud. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343,
1346. Houston pleaded guilty to one count.
Following Houston’s guilty plea, a probation officer prepared a presentence
investigation report, which calculated a guidelines range of 37 to 46 months’
imprisonment, based on a total offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of I.
The PSR discussed several mitigating factors, including, as relevant to this appeal,
Houston’s lupus, arthritis, high blood pressure, neuropathy, and mental health
struggles. It also discussed care options for her eleven-year-old son, noting that
multiple family members would be able to care for him.
Before sentencing, both parties submitted a sentencing memorandum. In her
memorandum, Houston did not discuss any of her personal health issues. Instead, she
focused on her son’s mental-health struggles. Like the PSR, Houston stated that other
family members could care for him in her absence, but she argued that she should be
with him while he receives mental-health treatment.
At the sentencing hearing, the court adopted the PSR and imposed a below-
guidelines sentence of twelve months’ and one day imprisonment. Houston’s argument
and allocution to the court again did not mention her personal health struggles, and she
focused instead on the health of her son. The court considered this argument in
mitigation, as well as the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), namely: Houston’s
history and characteristics; the nature and circumstances of the offense; and the need to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. In its explanation, the court compared
Houston to a codefendant who had taken $200,000 less than Houston and been
sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, noting it would not be “very fair” to sentence
Houston to less. Yet, the court acknowledged Houston’s unique circumstances with her

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No. 25-1937 Page 3
son, imposed a lesser sentence, and delayed the start of her sentence by several months
so that she could begin her term of incarceration after her son’s school year started.
Two months later, the court held the sentencing hearing for another of Houston’s
codefendants, Tahndrea Harper. Harper had taken about $3,000 more than Houston but
suffered from several health conditions, including end-stage kidney failure, which
required dialysis and resulted in her being hospitalized three times in the months
before her sentencing. At the hearing, the court compared Harper to Houston, noting
that they had taken a similar amount, but the court acknowledged that incarceration
might exacerbate Harper’s health conditions. The court continued the sentencing
hearing for a few months to allow Harper time to gather medical records for the court
to better evaluate her health condition.
Four months later, the court sentenced Harper to three years’ probation. At the
hearing, Harper informed the court that she was on the kidney transplant list and that if
she were to go into custody, she would be removed from the list and placed on a
different list at her facility. Because of Harper’s rapidly declining health and a concern
about the availability of a transplant, the court imposed a noncustodial sentence.
Harper died three months later.
Analysis
On appeal, Houston challenges only her sentence. She first argues that the
district court did not meaningfully consider her arguments in mitigation, namely her
health issues and family circumstances. This court reviews de novo whether a district
court procedurally erred at sentencing by failing to address a defendant’s principal
arguments in mitigation or explaining inadequately the § 3553(a) factors.
See United States v. Castaneda, 77 F.4th 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2023).*
Houston contends that the district court failed to meaningfully weigh the effect
that her incarceration would have on her son. But the court is not required to “give any
particular weight” to a defendant’s family circumstances. See United States v. Sykes,
774 F.3d 1145, 1153 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Gary, 613 F.3d 706, 711
(7th Cir. 2010)). And the court acknowledged her son’s mental health struggles,
explaining that Houston is “such a good person” and that it is “really impressive” how
* The district court did not ask Houston at the end of the sentencing hearing
whether it had adequately addressed her main arguments in mitigation as this court has
recommended. See United States v. Stephens, 986 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir. 2021).

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No. 25-1937 Page 4
she cares for him, before imposing a below-guidelines sentence. The court also agreed
to delay Houston’s reporting date until after her son’s school year started.
Next, Houston argues that the district court should have addressed her medical
ailments before imposing sentence. But the parties disagree about whether Houston’s
medical condition was a principal argument in mitigation that the court was required to
address. The district court is not required to respond to every mitigation argument,
only principal mitigation arguments. See Castaneda, 77 F.4th at 616. Deciding whether a
mitigation argument ranks as “principal” is a contextual inquiry, and the amount of
time defense counsel devoted to one argument relative to others at the sentencing
hearing is a key―although not dispositive―factor. See Stephens, 986 F.3d at 1010–11.
Although the PSR detailed Houston’s health issues, Houston did not explore them in
her sentencing memorandum or at the sentencing hearing. See id. at 1011; see also
United States v. Chapman, 694 F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2012) (argument not raised during
sentencing hearing “cannot be characterized as a principal argument” in mitigation).
Instead, Houston discussed primarily the need for her sentence to account for her
caretaking responsibilities related to her son. Because Houston’s health was not
presented as a principal argument in mitigation, the court did not need to address it.
See Castaneda, 77 F.4th at 616.
Houston next argues that the district court created an unwarranted and
unexplained sentencing disparity between herself and Harper. She highlights that she
took less money than Harper, but Harper received a noncustodial sentence while she
received twelve months’ and one day imprisonment. To the extent that Houston frames
this argument as a procedural error, her argument lacks merit. Harper was sentenced
months after Houston, so the court could not have explained a sentencing disparity that
did not exist yet. See United States v. Guzman-Ramirez, 949 F.3d 1034, 1039 (7th Cir. 2020).
Moreover, the court’s explanation of Houston’s sentence was “consistent with the
sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Porraz, 943 F.3d
1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2019). The court focused on the seriousness of Houston’s offense,
highlighting that the offense “went after the most vulnerable” and spanned six years;
Houston’s history and characteristics, noting that it was her first offense and
acknowledging her role in raising her son; and the need to avoid sentencing disparities
between Houston and her codefendants who already had been sentenced.
To the extent that Houston contends that the sentencing disparity with Harper
made her sentence substantively unreasonable, her argument also fails. A below-
guidelines sentence “cannot be an unwarranted disparity.” United States v. Gonzalez,
765 F.3d 732, 740 (7th Cir. 2014); see United States v. Power, 170 F.4th 640, 647 (7th Cir.

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No. 25-1937 Page 5
2026) (“An unwarranted-disparity challenge to a below-Guidelines sentence is a
nonstarter.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The guidelines “are themselves an
anti-disparity formula … [and] to base a sentence on a properly determined Guidelines
range is to give adequate consideration to the relation between the defendant’s sentence
and those of other persons.” United States v. Blagojevich, 854 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 2017).
Finally, and with the benefit of hindsight, the disparity between Houston and
Harper’s sentences was warranted. Harper suffered from a rapidly declining health
condition that would have been difficult to treat in prison because it required daily,
“life-sustaining dialysis.” Moreover, incarceration could have delayed Harper’s possible
kidney transplant. Nothing in the PSR or in Houston’s filings reflects that she suffered
from any similarly serious or difficult-to-treat condition.
AFFIRMED

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