KIA & KAT, LLC and SIAVASH KHOSRAVIKARAJI v. Todd Barnhardt

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued July 7, 2026
Decided July 10, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2592
KIA & KAT, LLC and SIAVASH
KHOSRAVIKARAJI,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
TODD BARNHARDT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 19 C 3407
LaShonda A. Hunt,
Judge.
O R D E R
Kia & Kat, LLC, and its sole member Siavash Khosravikaraji brought claims
related to their failed childcare franchise locations against the licensors and managers of
the franchises, who countersued. The plaintiffs twice requested a last-minute
continuance of trial based on their counsel’s detention in Italy. The district court
granted the first request but denied the second. No qualified counsel for the plaintiffs
appeared at the bench trial and the court entered judgment in favor of defendants. The
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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plaintiffs appealed, challenging the court’s decision to hold the trial under these
circumstances. We affirm.
Todd Barnhardt operates a childcare center business called Little Minds Learning
Center (LMLC) through several corporate entities that license and manage franchise
centers. Barnhardt sought to attract foreign franchisees through the EB-5 Immigrant
Investor Program, which offers visas to foreign nationals who invest in businesses that
create jobs in the United States. Khosravikaraji, an Iranian national, formed Kia & Kat,
LLC, and invested in two new LMLC centers in Illinois. The parties executed
agreements under which Kia & Kat purchased operating licenses from LMLC’s
franchising entity and delegated operations to LMLC’s management entity. Both centers
eventually failed and both LMLC entities filed for bankruptcy. Khosravikaraji and Kia
& Kat sued Barnhardt and the LMLC entities for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary
duty, and fraudulent misrepresentation. The defendants countersued both plaintiffs for
breach of contract and interference with business.
In December 2024, the plaintiffs’ counsel, Taher Kameli, failed to appear at the
final pretrial conference because, according to his paralegal, he was “held in transit” in
Rome, Italy. Two days later, the plaintiffs moved for an emergency continuance of the
December 18 trial date, explaining that Kameli remained detained in Italy and was the
only qualified attorney familiar with the case. They asked the court to reschedule trial to
a date after January 15.
At a hearing on the motion, the court agreed to postpone trial to January 16 but
made clear that it would not issue additional continuances absent extraordinary
circumstances. The court added that if Kameli remained unavailable, the plaintiffs
would need to find a new trial lawyer. Though Kameli’s associate, Steven Burke, was
not barred in the district, the court said he (or any other lawyer) could apply to the
court’s general bar and receive waiver of the trial-bar requirement. A new lawyer could
get up to speed by reviewing the opinion and record in a related case against the same
defendants that the court had tried recently. See Aylin & Ramtin, LLC v. Barnhardt,
No. 19 C 3402, 2024 WL 4922041 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 2024).
Less than a week before the January 16 trial date, the plaintiffs again moved for a
continuance based on Kameli’s continued detention. The court denied the motion
because it was last minute, the new date was consistent with the plaintiffs’ previous
request, and any competent trial lawyer could prepare to replace Kameli by reviewing
the Aylin & Ramtin case.

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No. 25-2592 Page 3
At trial, Burke appeared to represent the plaintiffs. But the court determined he
could not appear before it because he had not applied to the general bar as the court
had instructed. During the trial, only Barnhardt testified, responding to questions from
both his counsel and the court. The court issued a verdict for the defendants on the
plaintiffs’ claims and two of the defendants’ counterclaims, relying on Barnhardt’s
testimony, testimony from witnesses in the Aylin & Ramtin trial, the stipulated facts, the
parties’ exhibits, and judicial notice of filings in the defendants’ bankruptcy cases. The
court later denied the plaintiffs’ motion to reopen the case under Rules 59(a)(2) and
60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
On appeal, the plaintiffs first challenge the district court’s refusal to continue the
January 2025 trial date. The plaintiffs emphasize that the court’s decision to proceed
with trial created an unfair, one-sided proceeding.1 But the district court’s refusal to
further delay this six-year-old case was within its broad discretion over scheduling
matters. See Rainey v. Taylor, 941 F.3d 243, 250 (7th Cir. 2019). The court had already
granted the plaintiffs a continuance, acknowledging the risk of prejudice from Kameli’s
unexpected absence. By postponing trial a month, the court gave the plaintiffs an
opportunity to seek alternative representation in case Kameli’s detention continued.
The rescheduled trial date was after January 15, just as the plaintiffs had requested, and
the court was “crystal clear” that it would not be delayed further. Yet the plaintiffs still
failed to take advantage of this accommodation by retaining a qualified lawyer to
replace Kameli. Instead, they requested a second last-minute continuance based again
on Kameli’s detention, which was no longer an unexpected circumstance.
Next, the plaintiffs argue that the district court should have allowed Burke to
serve as trial counsel even though he was not a member of the general bar of the
Northern District of Illinois. The court’s Local Rule 83.12 provides that only a member
of the trial bar (or, upon a request for waiver, its general bar) may serve as the lead
attorney at trial. We review the district court’s enforcement of its local rules for abuse of
discretion, see Frakes v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, 872 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2017), and we
see none here. As the court explained, Burke could have easily applied to the general
bar and received waiver of the court’s trial-bar requirement. Indeed, the court noted
this option when granting the first continuance, giving the plaintiffs a full month to get
Burke or any other attorney admitted. Burke instead appeared at trial without having
1 In their brief, the plaintiffs also argued that the denial of the continuance
violated their due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, but they withdrew that
argument at oral argument.

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applied to the general bar and without any advance notice that he intended to
participate or seek waiver of the court’s rules.
Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the district court erred by disregarding the
materials they included in their exhibit list for trial. But the plaintiffs do not explain
which exhibits the court failed to consider in its opinion nor how they would have
supported the plaintiffs’ claims and defenses, so this argument is waived. See Bradley v.
Vill. of University Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023). And in any event, the court cites
the plaintiffs’ exhibits throughout its detailed opinion, belying their contention that the
court failed to consider material portions of the record.
AFFIRMED

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