Dante Small v. Lynn Pittman

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 14, 2026*
Decided July 15, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3241
DANTE SMALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LYNN PITTMAN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 3:21-CV-1585-MAB
Mark A. Beatty,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
Dante Small, an Illinois prisoner, challenges the summary judgment entered
against his claims that he was subjected to excessive force and deliberate indifference to
his medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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We draw the following facts from the evidence presented at summary judgment,
drawing reasonable inferences and resolving evidentiary conflicts in Small’s favor.
Kluge v. Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 150 F.4th 792, 804 (7th Cir. 2025). On the evening
of November 23, 2019, Small, then housed at Lawrence Correctional Center in Sumner,
Illinois,† tried to leave his cell to take a shower at a time when the cells in his block
were being locked for the evening. Sergeant Patrick Riggs blocked the exit to Small’s
cell and told him that he could not leave. Small, who was wearing shower shoes, put his
left foot between the door and the frame. Riggs pushed the door against Small’s foot.
Small objected that Riggs should not be doing this. According to Small, Riggs then
slammed the door on his foot.
Small fell over and cried out in pain. Riggs left the cell. When Riggs returned
thirty minutes later, Small asked to be taken to the medical unit. Riggs took no action.
The next morning, Small was brought by another sergeant to the medical unit. The
record for that visit indicated swelling and possible bruising but no signs of a more
serious injury.
For several days after the incident, Small complained of pain in that foot and an
inability to put weight on it. On November 27, Small saw Dr. Lynn Pittman, a prison
doctor, and Noreen Baker, a licensed practical nurse. Dr. Pittman gave Small crutches
and a permit to use a low bunk, but she did not give him a permit to be placed in a
low-gallery cell. She also authorized Small to receive an x-ray of his foot. On December
4, a radiologist reported that the alignment of Small’s bones was normal and there was
no evidence of a fracture.
On December 9, Small tried to descend the stairs on crutches from the
second-floor cell gallery and fell, causing more serious injuries.
Small sued Riggs for using excessive force when closing the door on his foot, as
well as Dr. Pittman and Nurse Baker for being deliberately indifferent to his injuries by
failing to issue him a low-gallery permit—all in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The court entered summary judgment for the defendants. As to Riggs, the court
determined that no jury could find that he used excessive force when closing the cell
door because there was no evidence that Small suffered a serious injury. As to
† Small has since been transferred to Sheridan Correctional Center in Sheridan,
Illinois.

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Dr. Pittman and Nurse Baker, the court concluded that there was no evidence from
which a jury could find that either acted with deliberate indifference. Small, the court
explained, did not provide any evidence that Dr. Pittman’s and Nurse Baker’s refusal to
issue a low-gallery permit was blatantly inappropriate or beyond the bounds of
professional judgment. (And Nurse Baker, the court added, had no authority even to
prescribe medical permits on her own.)
On appeal, Small first challenges the summary judgment for Riggs on his claim
of excessive force. Small argues that his testimony that Riggs slammed the door on his
foot would be sufficient for a jury to find that Riggs intended to hurt him. Small also
disputes the court’s determination that his injuries were only minimal. That Dr. Pittman
gave him crutches, he says, is evidence of a serious injury, and the medical records did
not exclude the possibility of worse injuries.
For an excessive-force claim arising in a prison setting, “the central question is
whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Jones v. Anderson,
116 F.4th 669, 677 (7th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986)). Among the relevant factors is the extent of the
injuries caused by the defendant’s use of force. Id. A de minimis amount of force,
applied in response to a legitimate security concern, does not violate the Eighth
Amendment. Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 839 (7th Cir. 2001). And when a defendant
presents evidence that the extent of the injury cannot “support an inference of malice,”
the burden shifts to the plaintiff “to present evidence suggesting that the incident was
neither accidental nor justified, and that [the defendant] applied more than de minimis
physical force.” Id. at 841 (7th Cir. 2001) (italics removed).
The district court correctly determined that Small’s evidence was insufficient for
a jury to find that Riggs used excessive force. Small presented no evidence to refute the
defendants’ objective medical evidence, which established that his injuries were only
minimal. Evidence of swelling and some treatment provided by Dr. Pittman would not
permit a reasonable jury to find that the force applied by Riggs was more than de
minimis. See id. at 839–40. And Small’s speculation that his injuries may have been
worse than the records suggested cannot defeat summary judgment. See Barnes v.
Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 177 F.4th 825, 831 (7th Cir. 2026).
Small next challenges the summary judgment entered in favor of Dr. Pittman and
Nurse Baker. He contends that Dr. Pittman’s decision to provide him crutches but not a
low-gallery permit created an obvious risk that he would fall down the stairs. He

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further argues that he presented evidence—a low-gallery permit signed by another
nurse—showing that nurses at Lawrence have authority to issue these permits, and so
Nurse Baker should be held liable for failing to issue one to him.
The district court correctly concluded that a reasonable jury could not find
Dr. Pittman or Nurse Baker liable for not issuing him a low-gallery permit. To establish
his claim of deliberate indifference, Small needed to provide evidence that these
defendants knew that their decision created an excessive risk of harm and that they
disregarded that risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). But the evidence
Small presented did not show that Dr. Pittman or Nurse Baker knew of such a risk.
When Dr. Pittman saw Small on November 27, 2019, for instance, there was no evidence
she was aware of a serious condition that prevented him from safely using stairs
without crutches. And as to Nurse Baker’s alleged authority to issue permits, that is
beside the point because Small has not raised any material dispute that Nurse Baker
was aware of any excessive risk arising from the permit decision.
Small raises additional procedural arguments. He challenges the court’s decision
to accept Dr. Pittman’s unsigned declaration in support of her motion for summary
judgment. (She later submitted a signed version after filing her reply brief.) Small
argues that the signed version was untimely and that he was prejudiced because he
drafted his response on the assumption that the declaration would not be accepted. But
when a party fails to properly support an assertion at summary judgment, a district
court is permitted to give a party the opportunity to support that fact, and the court
properly exercised its discretion to do so here. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(e)(1), see also id.
advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment (expressing policy of avoiding denial of
summary judgment by default and anticipating that “the court’s preferred first step”
will be to provide an opportunity to support a fact).
Finally, Small argues that the district court should have granted his motions to
recruit counsel because he did not understand what evidence he would need to present
to defeat summary judgment. But the court acted within its discretion to deny the
requests based on its view that his claims were not complex; involved issues of which
he had direct, personal knowledge; and were within his competence to litigate. See
Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654–55 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th
1287, 1297–98 (7th Cir. 2025).
AFFIRMED

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