F.f. v. Valley View Community Unit School District 365u

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued January 27, 2026
Decided July 16, 2026
Before
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2735
F.F.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
VALLEY VIEW COMMUNITY UNIT
SCHOOL DISTRICT 365U, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:25-cv-09112
Sharon Johnson Coleman,
Judge.
O R D E R
In November 2024, F.F. was a junior at Bolingbrook High School. She entered
and used the girls’ bathroom. Upon exiting her stall, she saw a student who she said
was dressed in male-typical clothing without any visible indication of female identity
standing near her stall. She worried that the student could have seen her
undergarments or exposed body through the gaps in the stall door, though she did not
argue that the individual saw or tried to see her inside the stall. The incident caused her
feelings of anxiety, discomfort, and shame.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 25-2735 Page 2
F.F. informed her father about the incident, and he reported it to the school’s
principal. The principal informed F.F.’s father that the student had access to the girls’
bathrooms pursuant to a formal plan under the Illinois Department of Human Rights
(IDHR) policy relating to the student’s gender-identity accommodation. The IDHR
policy required that schools permit students to use the bathrooms aligned with their
gender identity and explicitly stated that discomfort or privacy concerns were not
reasons to deny a student access to those bathrooms. But if another student raised a
privacy concern, the policy provided that the school should accommodate “by
providing that individual a more private option upon their request, if possible.”
The school offered F.F. access to the staff’s single-use bathrooms and installed
blinders on the stalls to protect privacy. F.F. says that this was not enough. A librarian
denied F.F. use of the staff bathroom, and F.F. used only bathrooms far from where the
initial incident occurred, which purportedly caused F.F. to lose classroom time,
heightened her unease, and disrupted her routine. F.F.’s father filed a complaint with
the school district’s Title IX coordinator that claimed that the incident showed F.F. was
discriminated against and harassed based on her sex. The coordinator rejected the
complaint.
In August 2025, F.F. filed a class-action lawsuit seeking declaratory relief,
injunctive relief, and nominal damages against Valley View Community Unit School
District 365U and certain school district officials. She also moved for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from
enforcing their policy that allowed students to access bathrooms in accordance with
their self-declared gender identities. She argued the policy violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating based on sex and Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, by creating a hostile educational
environment and compromising female students’ privacy and safety. The district court
denied her motions for a TRO and preliminary injunction and has not certified the class.
She appeals only the denial of the preliminary injunction.
We begin and end with mootness. Mootness doctrine considers whether a
change in factual or procedural circumstances has “deprived the plaintiff of a personal
stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 14 (2023). F.F. no longer
has a personal stake in the outcome of this appeal: while it was pending, the district
court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. This final order moots F.F.’s appeal of
the denial of the preliminary injunction because “the interim phase of the case is over
and so there is nothing to do or say about” it. Auto Driveaway Franchise Sys., LLC v. Auto

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No. 25-2735 Page 3
Driveaway Richmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2019) (explaining how
procedural developments can moot an appeal from the denial of a preliminary
injunction).
One final matter deserves our attention. During this litigation, F.F. turned 18
years old. Adults presumptively cannot proceed under pseudonym. Doe v. Village of
Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 376–77 (7th Cir. 2016); Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1). And the district
court has now denied F.F.’s motion to proceed anonymously. But that denial is
appealable as a collateral order. See Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d at 376. Therefore,
though we express doubt that F.F. may continue to proceed under pseudonym, Fed. R.
Civ. P. 10(a), in the interest of efficiency, we refer to her by her initials.
DISMISSED

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