Gladis Yolanda Chavez- Pineda v. TODD W. BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General of the United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued July 7, 2026
Decided July 17, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
Nos. 24-2224 & 25-1278
GLADIS YOLANDA CHAVEZ-
PINEDA,
Petitioner,
v.
TODD W. BLANCHE,
Acting Attorney General of the United
States,
Respondent.
Petitions for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A208-276-014
O R D E R
Gladis Yolanda Chavez-Pineda, a Honduran citizen, entered the United States
without an entry document and applied for asylum. The immigration judge denied her
application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed her appeal. She now
petitions for review. She argues that the Board incorrectly ruled that she had
established neither a cognizable particular social group nor a nexus between her
membership in that group and any past harm or feared future harm. Because
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Nos. 24-2224 & 25-1278 Page 2
substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Chavez-Pineda did not
establish the requisite nexus, we deny the petition.
Chavez-Pineda and her juvenile daughter, A.G.C., entered the United States on
June 15, 2015, and were apprehended by a Customs and Border Protection officer the
same day. A month later, the Department of Homeland Security charged them as
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) for not being in possession of a visa or
other entry document. Through counsel, the petitioners admitted to the factual
allegations contained in the Notice to Appear, and the immigration judge found, based
on those admissions, that the petitioners were removable.
Chavez-Pineda then applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture, with A.G.C. as a
derivative beneficiary with respect to asylum. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A),
1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–1208.18. Chavez-Pineda asserted that she had been
the victim of robbery and extortion at the hands of a Honduran gang, including threats
to mutilate her daughter, and she feared similar harm would befall her or her daughter
upon their return. She attributed the harm she had experienced to her membership in
an asserted particular social group defined as: “Honduran single mothers who do not
comply with [gang] demands.”
The IJ made the following findings of fact, which Chavez-Pineda does not
challenge in her petition. Chavez-Pineda was born in Honduras. In 2014, her husband,
who had operated a mechanic shop, died in an accident. Chavez-Pineda then took over
operation of that shop. In January 2015, Chavez-Pineda was robbed by a man whom she
recognized. That February, she began receiving extortion threats from a gang, Mara 18.
The next month, she received daily threats, including threats to harm A.G.C., and she
decided to pay the extortion demand. After a brief pause, the gang once again began
threatening Chavez-Pineda, and when she refused to pay, the gang stole tools from the
shop. The threats then intensified, and in May 2015, Chavez-Pineda closed her shop and
fled Honduras for the United States with A.G.C.
During her individual hearing, Chavez-Pineda speculated that the gang may
have targeted her because the mechanic shop was known in her town, and because the
gang was aware that her husband had died and believed that she received his life
insurance benefits. She did not know if the gang had threatened her husband before his
death.
The IJ denied the applications, concluding that Chavez-Pineda’s proposed
particular social group was not cognizable because it was circularly defined by the
persecution she feared. The IJ also concluded that even assuming her claimed particular

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Nos. 24-2224 & 25-1278 Page 3
social group was cognizable, she had not demonstrated that the harm she suffered was
on account of her membership in that group. The IJ therefore denied her asylum
application and, for the same reasons, concluded that she had not established eligibility
for withholding of removal. The IJ separately denied her application for CAT
protection. In the absence of eligibility for any relief, the IJ ordered Chavez-Pineda and
A.G.C. removed to Honduras.
Chavez-Pineda appealed to the Board, arguing that the IJ incorrectly determined
that she had not proffered a cognizable social group or established the necessary nexus.
The Board agreed with the IJ that her proposed social group was not cognizable and
that she had not demonstrated that she was targeted based on her membership in her
proposed social group. The Board further reasoned that the gang members were
motivated by money—particularly because she believed that the gang targeted her for
her life insurance benefits—as opposed to animus toward members of her proposed
particular social group. The Board therefore dismissed the appeal.1
In June 2023, while Chavez-Pineda’s appeal before the Board was pending,
A.G.C. received special immigrant juvenile status, deferring her removal for four years,
at which point she would become eligible for adjustment of status. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11.
After the Board dismissed the appeal, Chavez-Pineda and A.G.C. moved to reopen their
cases, arguing that the evidence of A.G.C.’s status was not available when
Chavez-Pineda had her hearing, and that A.G.C. would experience greater hardship by
having to choose between remaining in the United States without her mother or
returning to Honduras and losing her special immigrant juvenile status. They argued,
in the alternative, that A.G.C.’s case should be severed from her mother’s and that
A.G.C.’s removal proceedings should be terminated. The Board denied the motion to
reopen Chavez-Pineda’s case because there was no evidence that her immigration
status had changed or that there was any other basis to terminate her proceedings. The
Board did, however, sever A.G.C.’s case from her mother’s and the same day entered a
separate order terminating her proceedings. Chavez-Pineda has since been removed to
Honduras.2
1 Chavez-Pineda did not challenge the IJ’s denial of relief under the Convention
Against Torture. The Board deemed the challenge waived, (Chavez-Pineda Br. Short
App. at A3 n.3), and she does not challenge that conclusion in this petition.
2 Chavez-Pineda’s removal does not render her petition moot. If she were to
succeed, she would no longer be barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) from readmission,

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Nos. 24-2224 & 25-1278 Page 4
Chavez-Pineda maintains that the Board and the IJ erred in denying her
applications for asylum and withholding of removal. She argues first that “Honduran
single mothers who do not comply with [gang] demands” is a cognizable particular
social group. She disputes the Board’s determination that this group is circularly
defined by persecution, contending that it is also defined by reference to immutable
characteristics shared with others, i.e., gender, parenthood, and past actions. Because, as
discussed below, Chavez-Pineda cannot establish the required nexus, we can assume,
without deciding, that this is a cognizable particular social group. See Orellana-Arias v.
Sessions, 865 F.3d 476, 484 (7th Cir. 2017).
Chavez-Pineda next argues that the Board erred in concluding that she failed to
establish a nexus between the harm she experienced and her asserted particular social
group. We review the Board’s nexus determination for substantial evidence,
de Paz-Peraza v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 390, 394 (7th Cir. 2025), and the agency’s finding of fact
is conclusive “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary,” Meraz-Saucedo v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 676, 684 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Nasrallah v.
Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020)). The parties dispute whether the Board applied the proper
standard for assessing a persecutor’s mixed motives, but we need not decide. It is
sufficient to say that Chavez-Pineda needed to prove that her membership in her social
group was “one central reason” for the harm. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); Ferreyra v. Barr,
962 F.3d 331, 337–38 (7th Cir. 2020).
Chavez-Pineda’s argument hinges on two lines of evidence: her testimony that
the gang targeted her because she was vulnerable as a single mother; and the timing of
the threats, particularly because they escalated after she refused to pay. But her
testimony that the gang was motivated by her marital status was conclusory, and
however suspicious the timing may have been, her evidence would, at best, support an
inference that her membership in that group played some role in the harm she suffered.
The evidence would not compel a reasonable fact finder to conclude that a central
reason she was persecuted was because of her membership in the group. See de Paz-
Peraza, 140 F.4th at 395 (internal quotation removed) (quoting Bueso-Avila v. Holder, 663
F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2011). The Board’s contrary conclusion—that she was targeted
because of her ability to pay—was supported by substantial evidence, particularly her
testimony that the gang believed she had recently received life-insurance benefits.
so there remains a live case or controversy. See Singh v. Holder, 720 F.3d 635, 638 (7th
Cir. 2013).

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Nos. 24-2224 & 25-1278 Page 5
Chavez-Pineda also contends that the Board did not adequately explain its
reasoning for denying her motion to reopen and ignored her argument that removing
her would cause undue hardship to A.G.C. This court reviews “the Board’s denial of
reopening for abuse of discretion,” and the Board may deny a motion to reopen if it fails
to demonstrate the applicant’s eligibility for relief. Perez-Perez v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 371,
374 (7th Cir. 2021). The Board may not, however, ignore the evidence presented in the
motion. Arej v. Sessions, 852 F.3d 665, 667 (7th Cir. 2017). Here, the Board did not ignore
the fact that A.G.C. had received special immigrant juvenile status: it severed and
terminated A.G.C.’s proceedings for that very reason. The only argument that
Chavez-Pineda presented to the Board for why she herself would be eligible for any
additional relief was an undeveloped contention that her removal “would raise due
process concerns.” But she did not identify any authorities establishing that she had a
due process right to remain in the United States, nor are we aware of any. At oral
argument, Chavez-Pineda suggested that the Board could have closed or terminated her
proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(c), (d). But she did not explain in her motion to
reopen why she would be eligible for either form of relief. Because Chavez-Pineda did
not provide the Board any basis to grant her relief, the Board was within its discretion
to deny the motion.
We close by observing that, although Chavez-Pineda did not prevail in her
petition, she received excellent representation before this court.
For the reasons stated, we DENY the petition.

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