Andrew Williams v. County of Washington

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued April 15, 2026
Decided August 3, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2509
ANDREW WILLIAMS, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 2:23-cv-01668
J. P. Stadtmueller,
Judge.
O R D E R
Plaintiffs, who are three Wisconsin towing companies and, separately, their
owners Andrew, Harold, and John Williams, sued Washington County, the Washington
County Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Martin Schulteis, and Sergeant Bruce Theusch
(collectively “the County”) for violating their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection. Plaintiffs allege that the County discriminated against them in favor of a
competitor in allocating calls for towing service. The district court dismissed Andrew,
Harold, and John Williams as plaintiffs for lack of Article III standing and granted
summary judgment to the County on the towing companies’ equal protection claim. We
affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Williamses as plaintiffs, but do so because the
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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Williamses lack prudential standing rather than Article III standing. On the merits of
the towing companies’ equal protection claim, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the County.
I
Because this appeal arises from a grant of summary judgment, we recite the facts
in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Brown v. Chi. Transit Auth., 179 F.4th 577, 588
(7th Cir. 2026). When a vehicle breaks down on a Washington County road, the
Washington County Sheriff’s Office (WCSO) is responsible for arranging a tow. If the
owner has a preferred towing company, WCSO officers will call that company. But
when the owner cannot be identified or has no preference, officers call WCSO’s
dispatchers, who call a company on WCSO’s “no preference call list.”
WCSO’s policy instructs dispatchers using that no preference call list to “contact
a towing service that can respond in a reasonable amount of time with the proper
equipment.” (A prior version of the policy merely advised dispatchers to contact the
“closest available” towing service.) WCSO policy also instructs dispatchers to distribute
towing calls evenly amongst companies on the no preference list “when practical.”
Similarly, the policy prohibits WCSO from specifically endorsing or prohibiting the use
of any individual towing service.
Plaintiffs are members of the Williams family and their towing companies.
Andrew Williams is the sole owner and operator of Advanced Diesel Technologies
LLC. Harold and John Williams co-own both Ralph Williams Services LLC and
Ackerville Towing Services, LLC. Advanced Diesel, Ralph Williams Services, and
Ackerville are all on WCSO’s “no preference call list.”
Even though the three companies are centrally located in the county, for years
they have received fewer tow calls from WCSO compared to their competitor, Homer’s
Towing and Service. Between 2020 and the first half of 2024, Homer’s received more
tow calls from WCSO than the three companies combined. (This calculation includes
preference tow calls too, but the vast majority of tow calls received by dispatchers are
no preference calls.) Plaintiffs estimate that their companies collectively lose over
$100,000 each year in revenue due to WCSO’s preference for Homer’s.
Plaintiffs allege that this disparity stems from the County’s longstanding animus
toward the Williams family and its businesses. This animus dates to at least 1992 when
Sheriff Schulteis’s father was Sheriff and removed Ralph Williams Services from the no

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preference list. Even after Ralph Williams Services was restored to the list, Plaintiffs
recall, WCSO continued to avoid allocating calls to the company. Later, a different
sheriff removed Advanced Diesel from the list twice for what Plaintiffs say were
arbitrary or biased reasons. Plaintiffs contrast these removals with two tow companies
that remained on the list even after their owners committed crimes.
Plaintiffs contend that Sheriff Schulteis has continued his father’s practice of
directing a disproportionate number of calls to Homer’s. WCSO deputies have
contacted Homer’s even after a driver requested a different tow company, which is
contrary to policy. Worse still, dispatchers, supervisors, and trainers testified that they
were not aware of the policy. As Plaintiffs tell it, this animus persists despite many
attempts to address their concerns. John and Harold Williams even purchased
Ackerville to increase their share of no preference calls. After the purchase, however,
Ackerville began receiving fewer calls, not more.
The County’s witnesses testified that the distribution of no preference calls
reflects Homer’s reputation for reliability and efficiency. Individual dispatchers are
generally aware of which tow companies are the most responsive and which have the
equipment necessary for different jobs. Dispatchers tend to call Homer’s, Sheriff
Schulteis testified, because Homer’s “never turn[s] down a tow.”
Unpersuaded that WCSO’s disproportionate allocation of tow calls to Homer’s
reflects anything other than unlawful discrimination, Plaintiffs sought relief in the
courts. All six Plaintiffs filed a one-count complaint alleging the County’s treatment of
them violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Andrew, Harold,
and John Williams sue in their personal capacities. The three towing companies—
Advanced Diesel, Ralph Williams Services, and Ackerville—bring suit in their corporate
capacities.
The district court dismissed the Williamses as plaintiffs for lack of Article III
standing. The court held the Williamses could not allege an “injury in fact” apart from
the alleged injuries to their businesses. The district court then granted summary
judgment for the County on the towing companies’ equal protection claim because they
failed to contest the County’s rational basis for the disproportionate no preference calls.
Plaintiffs appealed.

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II
We first address the district court’s dismissal of the Williamses as plaintiffs for
lack of Article III standing. We review this dismissal de novo. Cellco P'ship v. City of
Milwaukee, 140 F.4th 854, 859 (7th Cir. 2025).
Article III of the Constitution limits the federal courts to adjudicating cases and
controversies. U.S. Const. art. III § 2, cl. 1. The absence of a case or controversy deprives
the courts of subject-matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992);
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). To establish that there is a case or controversy creating
standing to sue, a plaintiff must show an “injury in fact,” meaning a harm that is
“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citation
omitted). The district court found that the Williamses failed to allege an “injury in fact”
separate and apart from the injuries suffered by their LLCs. Specifically, the court
noted, the only cognizable injury from the alleged discrimination was the towing
companies’ lost revenue. Yet Wisconsin’s shareholder-standing rule barred the
Williamses from asserting that lost revenue from their businesses was an injury to
themselves rather than their LLCs. Accordingly, the court concluded, the Williamses
could not show injury in fact and thus lacked standing to sue. This, in turn, compelled
their dismissal from the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1).
We agree, in part. The shareholder-standing rule indeed bars the Williamses
from filing suit in their personal capacities for harm to their businesses. Under
Wisconsin law, LLCs and their members are legally distinct. An individual member is
not liable, “directly or indirectly,” for any “debt, obligation, or other liability” of an
LLC. See Wis. Stat. § 183.0304(1). Wisconsin courts accordingly follow a rule under
which “a shareholder generally cannot sue for indirect harm he suffers as a result of an
injury to the corporation.” Rawoof v. Texor Petroleum Co., 521 F.3d 750, 757 (7th Cir.
2008); Rose v. Schantz, 201 N.W.2d 593, 597 (Wis. 1972).
But this shareholder-standing rule “is one of prudential rather than
constitutional standing.” Doermer v. Callen, 847 F.3d 522, 526 n.1 (7th Cir. 2017). That is,
injuries to a plaintiff’s solely-owned LLC can serve as an injury in fact for purposes of
Article III standing. But even with Article III standing, such injuries still may not
authorize the plaintiff to bring suit in their own name under Wisconsin law. Rawoof, 521
F.3d at 754, 757–58 (holding that the plaintiff satisfied the “minimum requirements of
constitutional standing by virtue of an asserted indirect injury” as a shareholder but
failed to overcome the “prudential limitation” created by the shareholder-standing

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rule).
The district court should not have dismissed the Williamses as plaintiffs for lack
of standing because their injuries satisfied Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement. This
error aside, the district court correctly held that the Williamses’ claims could not
proceed because of the shareholder-standing rule. The Williamses undoubtedly feel the
effects of their LLCs’ financial losses. But Wisconsin law—with several exceptions not
relevant here—bars them from suing in their personal capacities to recover those losses.
Id. at 757; Rose, 201 N.W.2d at 597.
The Williamses attempt to save their claims by relying on Marx v. Morris, 2019
WI 34, but that case is inapposite. In Marx, the plaintiffs were members of an LLC who
sued another member for violating his fiduciary duties to the LLC. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. The
defendant argued that the plaintiffs could not bring claims for breach of fiduciary duty
in their individual capacities because Wisconsin’s LLC statute requires such claims to be
brought derivatively on behalf of the LLC itself. Id. ¶¶ 38–40. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court disagreed, holding that “injuries to [an LLC] and to its members are not mutually
exclusive” because financial injury to an LLC “flows through to its members.” ¶¶ 43–44.
Marx does not control here, however. Marx arose in a context far afield from this case:
an intra-corporate dispute between members of an LLC alleging violations of fiduciary
duties imposed by the LLC statute itself. By contrast, the Williamses attempt to bring
individual constitutional claims against third parties based solely on injuries to their
LLCs.
In sum, we agree with the district court that the shareholder-standing rule
applies here. But that rule is properly interpreted as one of prudential standing, not
Article III standing. We therefore affirm the dismissal of the Williamses as plaintiffs
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, rather than for
lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1).
III
That leaves the towing companies’ equal protection claim. We review the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to the County de novo. Chitwood v. Ascension Health
All., 168 F.4th 493, 497 (7th Cir. 2026). We affirm only if “there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgement as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits state actors from “deny[ing] to any person

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within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
Because the towing companies do not allege membership in a protected class or claim
that the County’s actions burden a fundamental right, rational-basis review applies.
Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 680 (2012). Under rational-basis review, the
County’s actions need only “bear[] a rational relation to some legitimate end.” Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). This review is “highly deferential to the government.”
Hope v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.4th 647, 650 (7th Cir. 2023). In rational-basis
cases, summary judgment is warranted “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns,
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
Here, the towing companies’ equal protection claim fails because they offer no
evidence contesting the County’s rational explanation for their disproportionate
allocation of no preference calls to Homer’s—namely, Homer’s reputation as a reliable
and responsive tow company. During the summary judgment proceedings, the County
established that dispatchers at the WCSO Communications Center are busy addressing
tens of thousands of calls each year. Record evidence showed that, to clear roadways as
expeditiously as possible, dispatchers tend to call on the most reliable option. As Sheriff
Schulteis testified, Homer’s fits the bill: it is a “known fact” among dispatchers that
Homer’s “never turn[s] down a tow” whereas “some towing companies just don’t
answer the phone.”
The towing companies do not dispute, or even meaningfully engage with, the
County’s evidence that Homer’s is a superior tow company or that the County believes
it to be. Instead, the companies contend animus is the real explanation for the County’s
unfavorable treatment. As evidence, they point to a variety of past disputes with
WCSO, some of which led to removal from the no preference call list as referenced
above.
Even were we to assume the County’s unfavorable treatment is motivated in part
by personal bias, that is not enough. To survive rational basis review, the towing
companies must show that animus is “the sole cause” of the County’s preference for
Homer’s. Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). They
have not done so. Even viewed in the light most favorable to the companies, no record
evidence calls into question the County’s perception of Homer’s superior quality.
As an alternative road to victory, the towing companies attempt to fit their equal
protection claim into a “class of one” framework. In a “class of one” claim, “the plaintiff
alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated

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and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). But this framing runs into the same problem
discussed above. Animus only “come[s] into play” in class of one cases “when courts
can hypothesize no rational basis for the action.” 145 Fisk, LLC v. Nicklas, 986 F.3d 759,
771 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
The “class-of-one” case on which the towing companies chiefly rely, Geinosky v.
City of Chicago, illustrates this point. 675 F.3d 743, 745 (7th Cir. 2012). In Geinosky, the
plaintiff alleged he received two dozen “bogus parking tickets” from the same police
unit. Id. We held that the repeated targeting indicated that animus, rather than a
legitimate police purpose, was to blame for the plaintiff’s circumstances. Id. But these
allegations of animus sufficed partly because “[n]o one [] suggested, let alone
demonstrated … a rational and proper purpose for the ticketing.” Id. at 749. Here, by
contrast, the County has proffered a rational basis that the towing companies have
failed to negate: the County’s belief that Homer’s is a better choice. Given this
“plausible reason[]” for the unequal treatment by a state actor, the towing companies’
equal protection claim fails. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313–14.
In closing, we note that the County also argues that it is entitled to qualified
immunity. Having decided the merit of the constitutional claim, we need not address
qualified immunity. Russell v. Comstock, 167 F.4th 984, 989 (7th Cir. 2026).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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