Edgar R. Robertson v. DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 4, 2026*
Decided August 4, 2026
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2552
EDGAR R. ROBERTSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, Secretary of
Veterans Affairs,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 24-CV-1618-SCD
Stephen C. Dries,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
Edgar Robertson challenges the dismissal of this complaint alleging that medical
staff at the Department of Veterans Affairs caused him emotional and physical injuries.
A magistrate judge dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and for failure to
effect proper service. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-2552 Page 2
We accept the factual allegations in Robertson’s complaint as true, drawing all
reasonable inferences in his favor and liberally construing his pro se complaint. Wilson
v. Castaneda, 143 F.4th 814, 817 (7th Cir. 2025). Robertson alleged that employees of the
VA mismanaged and altered his medical records to downplay his disability and deny
him certain benefits. He further alleged that the agency’s medical staff improperly
diagnosed him, prescribed him an unsafe medication, and damaged his teeth. And he
alleged that he experienced harassment, retaliation, and abuse because of internal
grievances he filed.
The Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Douglas Collins, moved to dismiss the
complaint because Robertson’s conclusory allegations failed to state a claim and,
alternatively, Robertson had not properly effected service of process. Collins attached a
declaration from a VA paralegal, attesting that the agency never received service of the
complaint. In response, Robertson detailed his attempts to serve the complaint: The
state sheriff and the clerk of the court refused to serve the defendant on Robertson’s
behalf, so Robertson instead left copies of the summons and complaint with a clerk at
the U.S. Attorney’s office in Milwaukee. Robertson says he then sent a copy of the
complaint to the Secretary via certified mail.
The magistrate judge, presiding with the parties’ consent, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),
construed Robertson’s claims as arising under the Due Process Clause and the Federal
Tort Claims Act, see id. §§ 2671–2680, and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim. The judge noted that Robertson had not provided any information about when
the mishandling of records occurred, who was responsible, or how it injured him.
Alternatively, the judge determined that Robertson failed to establish that he had
properly served the Secretary. See F ED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(5). In response to Robertson’s
assertion that he was rebuffed in his attempts to serve the complaint personally on the
VA, the judge pointed out that Rule 4(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
prohibits a party from effecting service on his own behalf. The judge did, however,
grant Robertson leave until July 18, 2025, to amend the complaint to plead sufficient
facts and effect proper service. Robertson took no steps to amend his complaint and
instead filed this appeal.
On appeal Robertson “objects” to the conclusion that he did not establish proper
service of process, but he does not engage with the magistrate judge’s ruling that his
attempts at service were flawed because only a nonparty may serve a summons and
complaint. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 4(c)(2). We are mindful of Robertson’s pro se status, but he
is nevertheless required to comply with Rule 28(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate

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No. 25-2552 Page 3
Procedure by explaining why the judge’s decision was incorrect. See Atkins v. Gilbert,
52 F.4th 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, we see no error in the judge’s decision to
dismiss Robertson’s complaint for insufficient service of process under Rule 12(b)(5) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Cardenas v. City of Chicago, 646 F.3d 1001, 1005
(7th Cir. 2011).
Because insufficient service of process is an independent basis for affirmance, we
need not reach Robertson’s remaining argument that his allegations stated a claim.
AFFIRMED

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