Mario Javier Cedeno-Gonzalez v. Markwayne Mullin

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 4, 2026*
Decided August 6, 2026
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 25-3186
MARIO JAVIER
CEDENO-GONZALEZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al.,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
No. 2:25-cv-00473-JPH-MJD
James Patrick Hanlon,
Judge.
O R D E R
Mario Cedeno-Gonzalez, a Venezuelan citizen, appeals the denial of his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The district court denied Cedeno-
Gonzalez’s petition and his emergency motion seeking to stay his removal to a third
country, and Cedeno-Gonzalez was subsequently removed to Mexico. Because his
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-3186 Page 2
claims concerning his detention are moot and his remaining claims are not properly
before us, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Cedeno-Gonzalez entered the United States in 2013. In 2016, he was convicted of
mail fraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and, after serving his sentence, the government initiated
removal proceedings against him. He asserted that he feared persecution or torture if he
were returned to Venezuela. In 2018, an immigration judge ordered him removed but
granted deferral of removal to Venezuela under the regulations implementing the
Convention Against Torture. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17. Cedeno-Gonzalez was released
from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody under supervision.
In August 2025, when Cedeno-Gonzalez went to a check-in for his ongoing
supervision, he was again detained by ICE. The government informed Cedeno-
Gonzalez that his supervision was revoked and that it sought to remove him to a third
country. It also notified him that he would be provided an informal interview at which
he could respond to the reasons for the revocation of his supervision (“revocation
interview”).
In September 2025, the government informed Cedeno-Gonzalez that it intended
to remove him to Mexico. He responded that, as a Venezuelan immigrant, he feared
being removed to Mexico. An asylum officer conducted a reasonable fear interview and
concluded that he did not establish a reasonable possibility of persecution or torture in
Mexico. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c).
Cedeno-Gonzalez filed a petition for habeas corpus and an emergency motion for
a temporary restraining order to prevent his removal to Mexico. He did not challenge
his underlying removal order. Instead, he argued that he was unlawfully detained prior
to his removal. He also argued that he was not afforded adequate process to challenge
the revocation of his supervision.
At the time Cedeno-Gonzalez filed his petition, the government had not yet
provided him with a revocation interview at which he could contest his ongoing
detention. The district judge entered an order for the government to show cause why
the petition should not be granted for this failure. On the same day as the judge’s
show-cause order, the government provided Cedeno-Gonzalez with a revocation
interview. He was notified that the government was prioritizing his removal because of
his criminal conviction for an aggravated felony and that he would likely be removed to
a third country. When asked for a response to the revocation of his supervision,

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No. 25-3186 Page 3
Cedeno-Gonzalez asserted, based on the advice of his counsel, that he would not
provide any information.
The district court denied Cedeno-Gonzalez’s petition for habeas corpus and his
motion to stay his removal. The court determined that Cedeno-Gonzalez’s detention
was authorized under the relevant statute and regulations, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6);
8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4, 241.13, and the two-month duration of his detention did not violate his
right to due process. The district court also concluded that the post-detention revocation
interview was sufficient process. Finally, the court rejected Cedeno-Gonzalez’s
argument that he was subject to unlawful removal to a third country without notice or a
meaningful opportunity to contest the removal because he received a reasonable fear
interview.
Cedeno-Gonzalez filed a motion to reconsider. He argued that the delay in his
revocation interview violated his due-process rights and the regulations governing
detention, see 8 C.F.R § 241.13, and that the district judge erred in dismissing the
petition for lack of jurisdiction. The district judge denied the motion to reconsider. The
judge explained that Cedeno-Gonzalez did not show that the order to provide a
delayed revocation interview constituted a manifest error of law, that he did not offer
any evidence to show that he could not present evidence during the interview, and that
the petition had not been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Following that order, Cedeno-Gonzalez was removed to Mexico. He appeals
from the district court’s decisions denying his habeas petition and motion to reconsider.
Cedeno-Gonzalez argues that his detention violated the relevant regulations, his
revocation interview was delayed and improperly conducted, he was entitled to review
by an immigration judge on the issue of his fear of removal to Mexico, the manner of his
removal to Mexico violated his due-process rights, and his counsel provided ineffective
assistance.
First, the government contends that this case is moot following Cedeno-
Gonzalez’s third-country removal to Mexico. A case becomes moot “when it is
impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.”
Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal quotation omitted). Even if a court
could provide redress to the prevailing party at the time the case is filed, when an
intervening event prevents the court from granting any effectual relief, the case is moot.
Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 708 F.3d 921, 928 (7th Cir. 2013).
The government asserts that Cedeno-Gonzalez’s removal constitutes an intervening
event that deprives us of the ability to grant him any relief.

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We agree with the government as to Cedeno-Gonzalez’s claims about his
detention. In his habeas petition, Cedeno-Gonzalez sought release from detention while
his removal was pending or, at least, an interview to contest the revocation of his
supervision. Cedeno-Gonzalez received a revocation interview and has been removed
to Mexico. Because he is no longer detained, we cannot provide Cedeno-Gonzalez any
relief from his allegedly unlawful detention. See Lindstrom v. Graber, 203 F.3d 470, 474
(7th Cir. 2000) (appeal moot where habeas petition challenged procedural irregularities
in extradition order, but petitioner had already been extradited to Norway).
Cedeno-Gonzalez argues that his appeal is not moot because he continues to
have collateral consequences from his removal, such as the 10-year statutory bar to
re-entry. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii); Peralta-Cabrera v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 837, 842–43
(7th Cir. 2007). But these collateral consequences stem from his removal order—which
Cedeno-Gonzalez explicitly does not challenge—not his detention. Because Cedeno-
Gonzalez’s claims about his detention are moot, we must dismiss them for lack of
jurisdiction. Pakovich v. Verizon LTD Plan, 653 F.3d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 2011).
Cedeno-Gonzalez’s claims concerning his third-country removal to Mexico,
however, are not moot. On appeal, he claims that he had a fear of persecution or torture
upon removal to Mexico and that he was not provided adequate procedure for the
government to make a reasonable fear determination. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.31. If he were to
prevail, we could grant relief: an order to facilitate his return for a proper reasonable
fear determination. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). These claims face other
obstacles, however.
Cedeno-Gonzalez’s claim about inadequate process concerning his third-country
removal to Mexico is not properly before us. He asserts on appeal that after his
reasonable fear interview, he made multiple requests for an immigration judge to
review the asylum officer’s negative fear determination. The government disputes this
as a matter of fact, but the decisive problem on appeal is that Cedeno-Gonzalez never
raised this issue in the district court. (Perhaps he could have asserted that he sought
review by an immigration judge of the negative fear determination in his amended
habeas petition or in his motion for reconsideration, but he did neither.) We have
jurisdiction to review final orders from the district court, and here, the district court did
not adjudicate this issue because it was never presented to that court. Cedeno-Gonzalez
is not permitted to raise this new claim for relief for the first time on appeal. See Krasno
v. Mnookin, 148 F.4th 465, 479 (7th Cir. 2025).

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Cedeno-Gonzalez also raises several new arguments on appeal complaining that
the government violated his rights in the manner in which it removed him to Mexico.
He asserts that he was removed while wearing a medical boot for a physical injury; that
the government classified his removal as a “self-deportation” against his wishes; that
the government left him in unsafe circumstances in Mexico that forced him into hiding
for his own protection; and that the government removed him to Mexico without
acceptance from Mexico’s government, leaving him in legal limbo. These too are new
claims that Cedeno-Gonzalez cannot raise for the first time on appeal, and we do not
consider them. See Krasno, 148 F.4th at 479.
Finally, Cedeno-Gonzalez asserts that his counsel in the district court was
constitutionally ineffective for failing to provide evidence to support his claims. We are
not well-positioned to evaluate an ineffective-assistance claim on a trial record not
developed for that purpose, especially where Cedeno-Gonzalez asserts that his counsel
failed to introduce crucial evidence into the record. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S.
500, 504–05 (2003). And regardless, Cedeno-Gonzalez has no right to effective counsel in
habeas proceedings. Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 2003).
DISMISSED

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