Robert Hague v. Chicago Board of Education

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued February 23, 2024
Decided August 10, 2026
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1691
ROBERT HAGUE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:20-cv-00797
Sara L. Ellis,
Judge.
O R D E R
Robert Hague sued his former employer, the Chicago Board of Education, for
violating the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act.
The district court granted summary judgment to the Board, finding that Hague failed to
identify evidence that would create a triable issue of fact on any of his claims. We
affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

-- 1 of 11 --

No. 23-1691 Page 2
I.
Robert Hague was a non-union real estate analyst for the Chicago Board of
Education from 2014 until his employment was terminated in 2018. At the Board, all
non-union employees serve on an at-will basis. Board guidelines state that those
employees “have no property right to their position” and “may be discharged from
employment with or without cause and with or without prior notice.” Additionally,
non-union employees are not entitled to progressive discipline, through which an
employee receives a written reprimand for their first infraction with an escalation to
suspension without pay and ultimately termination for future infractions.
For the first three years of his employment, Hague was permitted to work from 7
am to 3 pm even though the real estate department’s operating hours were 8 am to 4
pm. Things changed in 2017 when the Board hired Sevara Davis as senior manager and
Hague’s supervisor. Davis required all employee shifts to begin no earlier than 8 am.
And she adjusted department protocols to align employee responsibilities with job
descriptions.
In November 2017, nine days after Davis announced the adjustments, Hague told
Davis he may need surgery and medical leave. He applied for intermittent leave under
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) but was denied for failure to timely submit
required documents. One month later, Hague updated Davis that he was diagnosed
with cubital tunnel syndrome, scheduled for surgery, and would be out for up to six
weeks. He then applied for continuous FMLA leave from January 9 through April 1,
2018, which the Board approved after Hague resolved some paperwork issues. Hague
took leave, briefly extending it with the use of accrued vacation days.
Hague returned to work on April 10. The next day, he emailed Building
Operations Manager Julissa Davilla explaining that he could no longer use three fingers,
had difficulty typing, sometimes lost feeling in his left arm, and was in pain. He told
Davilla that his doctor wrote him a prescription for an “Ergonomic Workstation
Evaluation” to alleviate his “pain and discomfort.” Davilla looped in the Board’s Equal
Opportunity Compliance Office Administrator, Dalila Bentley, who emailed Hague the
same day. Bentley outlined Hague’s rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and attached three forms for requesting a workplace accommodation. She
informed Hague the Board “need[ed] all three forms back” to investigate and process
his request. Two of the forms likewise warned Hague that the Board could not begin its
investigation without all the completed forms and the Board would close his case if the
forms were not completed and returned within 30 days.

-- 2 of 11 --

No. 23-1691 Page 3
Hague responded to Bentley’s email 54 days later, on June 4. He attached only
one of the forms to his email. The next day, Bentley sent Hague a deficiency letter
informing him that his request could not be processed until he submitted the two
missing forms. Bentley enclosed blank copies of the forms for Hague’s convenience.
Hague did not respond.
On July 31, Hague emailed Bentley to follow up on his request for an ergonomic
workstation. Bentley responded with a copy of the deficiency letter and blank copies of
the two missing forms. The same day, Hague replied, “I believe this information was
sent previously. I will check my records.” He attached completed versions of the two
forms to his reply but did not mention the attachments in his email or change the
documents’ file names. Bentley did not notice that Hague had attached the missing
forms to his reply. And Hague did not follow up on his request again.
Meanwhile, from April to September 2018, Hague attended physical therapy at
least twice a week. According to Hague, his medical provider saw patients from 8 am to
5 pm. As a result, Hague left work early, sometimes two to five times per week, and he
often worked half-days. He also arrived late most mornings in August and September.
Several Board administrators told Hague that he needed to apply for FMLA
intermittent leave to attend medical appointments, request an ADA accommodation for
a modified work schedule, or do both. On July 26, Hague finally submitted a request for
intermittent FMLA leave to attend physical therapy. The Board subsequently approved
his use of the remaining eight hours of his FMLA leave for that purpose.
During this period, Hague emailed Davis and other Board personnel several
requests to work from 7 am to 3 pm instead of 8 am to 4 pm. None of these requests for
a schedule change expressed a medical need. Instead, Hague expressed needs such as
picking up his children from school and keeping the schedule he had before Davis was
hired. Davis invited him to provide a business case for his request. In later emails,
Hague noted that his work could be done at an earlier hour and earlier hours better
supported the constituencies he coordinated with. Davis did not approve the requests.
On September 27, Hague gave Davis flowers at work. As Hague described it,
Davis was “a little shocked” and “didn’t seem very appreciative.” After Hague left her
office, Davis sent an email to human resources reporting that she was “weirded out” by
the gesture. Hague, meanwhile, returned to his desk and took a personal phone call. An
employee nearby who overhead the call claimed that Hague was very upset and
referred to Davis as a “c—” and a “b—” during the call. Hague denies using these
words. The employee reported Hague’s conduct to a supervisor and human resources

-- 3 of 11 --

No. 23-1691 Page 4
officer the next day, adding that Hague had previously used offensive language
directed at Davis.
Less than a week later, on October 3, the Board terminated Hague’s employment.
The Non-Union Employee Misconduct Form given to Hague that day specifies that his
dismissal was recommended because of “Conduct Unbecoming” during the flowers-
and-phone call incident. A separate document in Hague’s personnel file shows that his
employment was terminated for one violation, “Discourteous Treatment.” That
document lists the following additional charges as alleged and substantiated against
Hague: “Attendance Abuse-Absenteeism,” “Fraud-Employment Records/Inquiries,”
“Policy Non-Compliance - Benefits,” and “Fraud – Benefits.”
At the time of Hague’s termination, the Board’s policy authorized termination
“for egregious or repeated misconduct” including “discrimination, sexual harassment,
retaliation, workplace violence, creating unsafe working conditions, and similar serious
or egregious misconduct.” The Board also had a policy encouraging progressive
discipline for infractions, which Hague did not receive.
Hague sued the Board for discrimination and failure to accommodate his
disability under the ADA and for interference and retaliation under the FMLA. The
Board successfully moved for summary judgment. Hague appeals.
We review the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo and examine
the facts in the light most favorable to Hague as the non-moving party. Lohmeier v.
Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 147 F.4th 817, 821, 825 (7th Cir. 2025). Summary judgment is
appropriate only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine issue of
material fact exists if a reasonable juror could look at the evidence and return a verdict
for [Hague].” Kinney v. St. Mary’s Health, Inc., 76 F.4th 635, 642 (7th Cir. 2023).
II.
We begin with Hague’s ADA claims, the first of which is that the Board
discriminated against him on the basis of disability when it terminated his employment.
To establish that his termination violated the ADA, Hague must show that he: (1) “was
disabled within the meaning of the ADA”; (2) “was qualified to perform the essential
functions of the relevant job either with or without reasonable accommodation”; and (3)
“suffered an adverse employment decision because of his disability.” Sandefur v. Dart,
979 F.3d 1145, 1151 (7th Cir. 2020). If Hague shows all three, the Board must offer a

-- 4 of 11 --

No. 23-1691 Page 5
lawful, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating him. Majors v. GE, 714 F.3d 527, 536
(7th Cir. 2013). If the Board satisfies that burden, for his claim to succeed, Hague must
show that the Board’s proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Id.
We skip to this final step. The Board asserts that it terminated Hague for
discourteous treatment in calling Davis a “c—” and a “b—.” Thus, to survive summary
judgment, Hague must demonstrate a dispute of material fact about whether the
Board’s stated reason is pretextual. See Majors, 714 F.3d at 535–36. In analyzing this
issue, we do not consider whether Hague’s termination was proper or whether the
reason the Board gave was correct. We consider only whether the Board “honestly
believed” its reason for terminating Hague. Stelter v. Wis. Physicians Serv. Ins. Corp., 950
F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2020). Hague “need[s] to show through inconsistencies or
contradictions by [the Board] that the reason for termination was not the reason
proffered, but instead discriminatory.” Id. at 491.
Hague contends that the record shows both direct and circumstantial evidence of
pretext. For direct evidence of pretext, Hague points to his personnel file. The document
stating that he was terminated for “Discourteous Treatment” also lists other charges
substantiated against him—charges that appear to relate to his FMLA and ADA
requests. As Hague sees it, this shows that he was fired for something other than the
listed charge of discourteous treatment. But the document is not direct evidence that the
Board disbelieved the one reason it listed for firing Hague, or that it was concealing a
different reason based on disability. See generally Nawrot v. CPC Int'l, 277 F.3d 896, 906
(7th Cir. 2002) (noting that “an admission” is an example of direct evidence of pretext).
At most, the Board’s reference to other infractions as “substantiated charges”
could suggest that it considered other issues when it terminated Hague. But Hague
does not identify any evidence that would permit a reasonable inference that he indeed
was fired for something other than what the document says, discourteous treatment.
Hague could have, for example, directed us to deposition testimony by human
resources personnel with knowledge of the document, or otherwise identified evidence
in the record about the form, its author, and how it was created. See Spierer v. Rossman,
798 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2015) (“If the moving party [at summary judgment] has
properly supported his motion, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to come
forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”). Without
such additional information, however, the form—which ultimately states “Discourteous
Treatment” as the reason for Hague’s termination—does not show pretext.

-- 5 of 11 --

No. 23-1691 Page 6
As additional direct evidence of pretext, Hague highlights the following items he
says the district court failed to address: (1) the suspicious timing of his termination, (2)
the Board’s failure to follow its disciplinary policy, (3) harassment he allegedly suffered,
and (4) the alleged retaliatory acts following his report to the Illinois Department of
Human Rights/Attorney General (a point Hague does not develop). To begin, these
would be examples of circumstantial, not direct, evidence of discrimination. See Nawrot,
277 F.3d at 906 (explaining that circumstantial evidence of pretext is “evidence tending
to prove that the employer’s proffered reasons are factually baseless, were not the
actual motivation for the discharge in question, or were insufficient to motivate the
discharge” (citation modified)). And, for the reasons we discuss below and later in
connection with Hague’s other claims, none of these examples are sufficient
circumstantial evidence of pretext.
We turn to the three examples developed in the record. Hague first asserts there
is suspicious timing between his protected activities and the adverse employment
actions he experienced. Indeed, a short window between protected activity and an
adverse employment action can be an indicator of discriminatory intent. Lang v. Ill.
Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 361 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2004). But Hague does not
lay out a timeline that would allow a factfinder to evaluate the question of suspicious
timing. Instead, on appeal, Hague cites only his summary judgment opposition brief,
where he merely argues that suspicious timing led to his termination. This argument is
therefore waived. See Rock Hemp Corp. v. Dunn, 51 F.4th 693, 704 (7th Cir. 2022)
(“[P]erfunctory and undeveloped arguments, as well as arguments that are
unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived.”).
Next, Hague highlights aspects of his termination process that he says departed
from Board policy. For example, the Board did not engage in a process of progressive
discipline, which would have provided Hague an opportunity to correct his behavior. It
is true that “[a]n employer’s unusual deviation from standard procedures can serve as
circumstantial evidence of discrimination.” Baines v. Walgreen Co., 863 F.3d 656, 664 (7th
Cir. 2017). To establish circumstantial evidence of pretext on this basis, Hague needed
to offer “evidence of a specific policy that is regularly enforced and followed in similar
situations.” Bagwe v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., 811 F.3d 866, 882 (7th Cir. 2016). But
the Board’s policy makes clear that progressive discipline does not apply to all
misconduct, or to all employees. In fact, non-union employees like Hague are expressly
excluded. And Hague has not supplied evidence that the policy is applied with
regularity in similar situations but was not applied in his.

-- 6 of 11 --

No. 23-1691 Page 7
Lastly, Hague points to, in his words, “harassment” by the Board as evidence of
pretext. Examples of harassment Hague supplies are when the Board changed his work
schedule, failed to provide him with an ergonomic workstation, and required him to
submit doctor’s notes for physical therapy appointments. Hague argues in his brief that
incidents like these demonstrate the Board fired him because it was “angry with [his]
disability and his discrimination complaints.” Largely for the reasons we discuss below
in connection with Hague’s other claims, see infra at 7–10, these incidents, even if ill-
advised or unfair, do not help Hague to show pretext. “Pretext is defined as a dishonest
explanation, a lie rather than an oddity or an error.” Abayomi v. Collins, --- F.4th ----,
2026 WL 2056478, at *4 (7th Cir. July 16, 2026) (quoting Vassileva v. City of Chicago, 118
F.4th 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2024)). These examples of purported harassment do not create a
factual dispute about whether the Board “honestly believed the reason it has offered to
explain the discharge,” as opposed to a mere dispute about “whether [its] stated reason
was inaccurate or unfair.” Id.
The district court provided sound reasons for rejecting Hague’s remaining
arguments about circumstantial evidence; those additional arguments do not merit
discussion here. In all, the record Hague developed does not present a genuine question
of material fact about whether the Board disbelieved its stated reason for firing him and
instead fired him because of a disability.
III.
Hague’s next ADA claim flows from the statute’s requirement that employers
provide reasonable accommodations for disabled employees. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A). When an employee requests an accommodation, the ADA requires the
employer and employee to “engage in an informal interactive process to identify an
appropriate accommodation.” See Youngman v. Peoria Cty., 947 F.3d 1037, 1042 (7th Cir.
2020). This interactive process “requires a great deal of communication” between the
parties to ensure that each side has information necessary to complete the request.
Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir 2006). As such, in
assessing a failure-to-accommodate claim, we “look for signs of failure to participate in
good faith or failure by one of the parties to make reasonable efforts to help the other
party determine what specific accommodations are necessary.” Beck v. Univ. of Wisc. Bd.
of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996).
Hague claims the Board failed to accommodate his requests for a modified work
schedule and an ergonomic workstation. The record belies both assertions, making
summary judgment in the Board’s favor appropriate.

-- 7 of 11 --

No. 23-1691 Page 8
As for the modified work schedule, Hague argues that the Board knew of his
need to attend physical therapy through his FMLA requests. Hague also argues the
Board was aware that he could not schedule doctor’s appointments without missing
work. But Hague did not mention that his request for a modified schedule was related
to physical therapy, much less submit supporting documentation. His schedule-change
requests all related to non-disability-related personal needs and, later, business
justifications. These reasons did not obligate the Board to provide Hague a modified
schedule under the ADA. See Ekstrand v. Sch. Dist. of Somerset, 583 F.3d 972, 976 (7th Cir.
2009) (explaining that “our cases have consistently held that disabled employees must
make their employers aware of any nonobvious, medically necessary accommodations
with corroborating evidence … before an employer may be required under the ADA’s
reasonableness standard to provide a specific modest accommodation the employee
requests”).
Hague’s assertions about the ergonomic workstation are similarly deficient. The
record shows that Bentley sent Hague the required forms the same day he submitted his
request. Those documents directed Hague to provide certain information within 30
days lest his case be closed. Hague failed to provide the necessary information for
nearly two months. That alone is enough to defeat his claim. Beck, 75 F.3d at 1136
(“Where the missing information is of the type that can only be provided by one of the
parties, failure to provide the information may be the cause of the breakdown and the
party withholding the information may be found to have obstructed the process.”).
To be fair, Hague eventually emailed Bentley the missing documents, which she
overlooked. Bentley’s failure to acknowledge that email or process Hague’s request for
an accommodation could, under other circumstances, expose the Board to liability. Id. at
1135 (“A party that obstructs or delays the interactive process is not acting in good faith.
A party that fails to communicate, by way of initiation or response, may also be acting
in bad faith.”). However, on these facts, it is difficult to conclude that a reasonable juror
could find Bentley or the Board acted in bad faith or failed to make reasonable efforts to
accommodate Hague’s request. These facts include Hague’s initial failure to respond by
the deadline; his ultimate belated response to Bentley, which did not indicate that he
had finally completed the missing documents she had sent him twice; and his decision
not to follow up on his request once he had submitted the missing documents. There
was undoubtedly a breakdown in communication, but no reasonable juror could find
that the Board acted in bad faith. Id. (“[C]ourts should look for signs of failure to
participate in good faith or failure by one of the parties to make reasonable efforts to
help the other party determine what specific accommodations are necessary. … The

-- 8 of 11 --

No. 23-1691 Page 9
determination must be made in light of the circumstances surrounding a given case.”).
IV.
We turn to Hague’s FMLA retaliation claim. The FMLA provides eligible
employees up to twelve weeks of leave for serious health conditions that render the
employee unable to do his job. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). To prevail on a retaliation
claim, Hague must show that (1) “he engaged in FMLA-protected activity”; (2) “his
employer took an adverse employment action against him”; and (3) “there is a causal
connection between the two.” Juday v. FCA US LLC, 57 F.4th 591, 596 (7th Cir. 2023).
Hague contends that the Board retaliated against him for taking FMLA leave by
changing his schedule once he returned to the office in April 2018. The Board maintains
that Davis clarified the department’s business hours alongside her other realignment
initiatives in November 2017, before Hague even applied for FMLA. The district court
found that the record read in the light most favorable to Hague showed that his hours
were changed before he began FMLA leave in January 2018.
We need not resolve the parties’ dispute. Even if Hague could show that his
schedule changed after he took FMLA leave, he has not presented evidence of a causal
connection between his FMLA leave and Davis’s insistence that he and his co-workers
begin work no earlier than 8 am. Davis testified that she began enforcing the 8 am rule
to address inconsistency among employees’ work hours and to meet business needs.
Her supervisor and the human resources director testified that Davis was permitted to
exercise this business judgment and Hague’s responsibilities did not require him to
begin work before 8 am.
To merit a trial on this claim, Hague needed to identify evidence from which a
jury could infer that his schedule changed because he took FMLA leave. He did not.
Even in his appellate brief, one of the only record cites on this point contains (1) an
April 26 email he wrote requesting a 6 am start time to better coordinate with the
engineers and contractors at the school sites he visits and (2) a May 6 email from Davis
saying, “With the realignment of the Real Estate department, the necessary working
hours are between 8 am and 6 pm.” Neither email supports a causal connection
between his FMLA leave and his schedule change, no matter how close in time the two
events were. On this record, the proximity between the two events is insufficient to
create a triable issue of fact. See Langenbach v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 761 F.3d 792, 800 (7th
Cir. 2014) (stating that suspicious timing is circumstantial evidence that “must point
‘directly to the conclusion that an employer was illegally motivated, without reliance on

-- 9 of 11 --

No. 23-1691 Page 10
speculation.’” (quoting Good v. Univ. of Chi. Med. Ctr., 673 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2012))).
V.
Hague finally contends that the Board interfered with his right to take
intermittent FMLA leave by modifying his schedule, stripping him of his benefits and
accumulated time off, docking his pay for the days he used FMLA leave, and requiring
documentation for his physical therapy sessions.
To prevail on this claim, Hague must show that (1) he was eligible for FMLA
protections; (2) the Board was covered by the FMLA; (3) he was entitled to leave under
the FMLA; (4) he provided sufficient notice of his intent to take leave; and (5) the Board
interfered with, restrained, or denied FMLA benefits to which he was entitled. Ziccarelli
v. Dart, 35 F.4th 1079, 1089 (7th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 309 (2022). Success on
this claim only requires evidence that the Board denied him an FMLA benefit; Hague
does need not to show that the interference was motivated by discriminatory intent on
the part of the Board. Shaffer v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 662 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 2011).
Hague cannot meet this low threshold. For one, he acknowledges that he
received his full pay and benefits for his FMLA leave. To be sure, the record shows his
pay was not properly processed in the early days of his leave. But the record shows the
Board corrected the issues and the issues did not recur. Further, Hague cannot rest his
claim on the fact that Davis required doctor’s notes. The Board’s policy and the FMLA
permitted her to do so. See 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a) (“An employer may require that a request
for leave … be supported by a certification issued by the health care provider of the
eligible employee.”). Lastly, for the reasons discussed above, Hague cannot rely on the
modifications to his schedule to establish interference. In sum, Hague lacks evidence
that would necessitate a trial on whether the Board denied, restrained, or interfered
with his FMLA benefits.
VI.
Before closing, we note that Hague’s brief mostly fails to comply with Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8)(A), which requires appellants to cite relevant
authorities and portions of the record in their briefs. Rather than cite the record,
Hague’s brief frequently cites his district court filings. Additionally, at times, the brief
makes contentions without legal support and misrepresents the evidence.
Were it not for the few arguments in the brief that are properly supported,

-- 10 of 11 --

No. 23-1691 Page 11
Hague’s counsel could face dismissal of his client’s appeal. See U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, Practitioner’s Handbook for Appeals 161 (2020) (citing Anderson v.
Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001)); Sullers v. Int'l Union Elevator Constructors,
Loc. 2, 141 F.4th 890, 896 (7th Cir. 2025) (“[B]riefs containing only minimal legal support
do not pass muster.”). We therefore remind counsel that deviations from the appellate
rules of procedure risk not only dismissal but also sanctions for counsel. McCurry v.
Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Noncompliance with
appellate rules wastes time and resources and frustrates the review process. Sanctions
are appropriate when the rules are violated.”).
* * *
For the reasons explained above, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.

-- 11 of 11 --