Ali Kourani v. Dan Sproul

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 18, 2026*
Decided August 20, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1821
ALI KOURANI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DAN SPROUL, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 21-cv-1721-JPG
J. Phil Gilbert,
Judge.
O R D E R
Ali Kourani, a federal prisoner, challenges the summary judgment rejecting his
Bivens claim that a prison doctor and warden were deliberately indifferent to his ankle
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1821 Page 2
injury, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). We affirm.
We review summary judgment decisions de novo, viewing the record in the light
most favorable to Kourani and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. Brown v.
LaVoie, 90 F.4th 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 2024). In mid-March 2021, Kourani arrived at the
Federal Correctional Institution in Marion, Illinois. Around five weeks later, the
prison’s clinical director, Dr. Randall Pass, saw Kourani for a 14-Day Physician
Evaluation performed at Health Services and noted his chronic ankle pain. Three weeks
later, on May 18, 2021, Kourani injured his left ankle playing volleyball. The next day,
Kourani could not walk because of swelling, bruising, and pain in his ankle.
From that point on, Kourani’s medical records show that he repeatedly sought
medical care for his ankle but did not follow prison procedure. He sent several emails to
his prison “unit” about his ankle, asking to see a doctor. Each time, staff informed him
that to be seen, he needed to “report to in person sick call.” Kourani asserts that at
several unspecified times he went to sick call but did not receive help. He also asserts
that during rounds made by Warden Dan Sproul and an unnamed medical staff
member, he at times told them about his pain but to no effect.
After Kourani’s first recorded visit to sick call, however, he was seen in October
2021 by a physician for his ankle pain. From that point on, he was seen continuously by
doctors and medical staff. Even though none of the physicians who saw him found
evidence of acute injury or abnormalities, Kourani was provided ankle braces, x-rays
and physical-therapy guidance.
Kourani was seen by Dr. Pass only three times in the years after his injury. First,
in April 2022, Dr. Pass saw Kourani for reports of pain in both ankles and granted
Kourani’s request for a second ankle brace. Next, in March 2023, Dr. Pass examined
Kourani and referred him to an orthopedist. Third, in March 2024, Dr. Pass again saw
Kourani and granted his request for an MRI and a temporary permit to sleep in a lower
bunk. (In July 2024, Kourani received the MRI, which showed signs only of normal
wear and tear but no acute trauma.)

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No. 25-1821 Page 3
Kourani originally filed a complaint in state court, asserting as relevant here that
Sproul and Dr. Pass violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by failing to
adequately treat his ankle pain. He sought nominal, compensatory, and punitive
damages for his pain and emotional injury, as well as injunctive relief requiring that
defendants provide him with x-rays of both ankles, braces for both ankles, and physical
therapy. The defendants then removed the case to federal court under the Westfall Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2679, and the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
Further proceedings ensued, and eventually the district court granted the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that no reasonable
jury could find that Sproul or Dr. Pass was deliberately indifferent to Kourani’s serious
medical condition. Sproul, the court explained, was not medically trained, and Kourani
did not introduce sufficient evidence to show that the warden recklessly disregarded
Kourani’s need for medical attention. As for Dr. Pass, the court continued, no jury could
find that he acted with deliberate indifference, given that he complied with Kourani’s
every request, supplying him an ankle brace for his first injury, scheduling an
orthopedic visit for his second injury, and arranging for low-bunk permits and the MRI
exam. And because Kourani’s claim failed on the merits, the court concluded that
injunctive relief was unavailable.
On appeal, Kourani challenges the district court’s determination that Sproul’s
status as a non-medical officer shields him from liability. Kourani relies on our decision
in Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea, 806 F.3d 938, 941 (7th Cir. 2015), in which we vacated
summary judgment in favor of a prisoner who was not examined until 21 days after a
painful abscessed tooth had been confirmed by a medical technician. In determining
that there was a genuine fact question, we held that an inference of deliberate
indifference can be supported by a prison guard’s inexplicable delay in helping a
prisoner with an abscessed tooth obtain treatment. Id. “If a prisoner is writhing in
agony,” we said, “the guard cannot ignore him on the ground of not being a doctor; he
has to make an effort to find a doctor, or in this case a dentist, or a technician, or a
pharmacist—some medical professional.” Id. Kourani argues that Sproul bears

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No. 25-1821 Page 4
responsibility because he was aware of Kourani’s pain, had the power to address it, and
disregarded it.
This case is distinguishable from Dobbey. The record does not reflect that Sproul
disregarded a substantial risk to Kourani’s health. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837 (1994). Kourani says that he showed his bruised ankle to Sproul during the
warden’s rounds, but complaints that convey only a generalized or vague concern
about one’s condition will not support an inference that a prison official had actual
knowledge that the prisoner faced a serious medical risk. See Daugherty v. Page, 906 F.3d
606, 611 (7th Cir. 2018). What’s more, as warden, Sproul may delegate to medical
professionals the responsibility of handling medical care and treatment. Stewart v.
Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 14 F.4th 757, 768 (7th Cir. 2021); Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d
1040, 1049 (7th Cir. 2019).
Next, Kourani turns to Dr. Pass’s involvement and argues that the district court
should have held the doctor responsible for his staff’s deliberate indifference in failing
to treat Kourani’s ankle for months on end. But Kourani cannot hold Dr. Pass liable for
alleged conduct for which he is not personally responsible. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469,
478 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Kourani does not argue, for example, that Dr. Pass
directed medical staff to delay the initial treatment of his ankle injury or that Dr. Pass
knew of the delay and consented to it. Id. (citing Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724,
740 (7th Cir. 2001)).
AFFIRMED

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