Jeffrey Cole Erb v. KRISTINA BOARDMAN , Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Transportation

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 18, 2026*
Decided August 20, 2026
Before
F RANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
I LANA DIAMOND R OVNER , Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. K OLAR , Circuit Judge
No. 25-3077
JEFFREY C OLE ERB,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
K RISTINA BOARDMAN , Secretary of the
Wisconsin Department of Transportation,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States
District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin.
No. 23-cv-329-wmc
William M. Conley,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jeffrey Erb, whose driving privileges were revoked after he pleaded guilty to op-
erating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, see WIS . S TAT. § 343.31(1m)(b), challenges the
dismissal of his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contesting the constitutionality of
* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. See Fed.
R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).

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No. 25-3077 Page 2
Wisconsin’s statute. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim.
We view the complaint in the light most favorable to Erb and accept all well-
pleaded facts in his favor. Wince v. CBRE, Inc., 66 F.4th 1033, 1039 (7th Cir. 2023). In
March 2021 Erb was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, his sixth
such offense in Wisconsin. See WIS . S TAT. § 346.63(1)(a). He pleaded guilty and was sen-
tenced to two years’ imprisonment and two years’ supervision. See Wisconsin v. Erb, No.
21-CF-309 (St. Croix Cnty. Sept. 3, 2021). He completed a substance-abuse program and
was released to supervision in January 2023.
As a result of his conviction, the Wisconsin Department of Transportation re-
voked his license to drive under WIS . S TAT. § 343.31(1m)(b), which provides that the De-
partment “shall revoke” drivers’ “operating privilege[s] permanently” when it receives
records showing that they have four or more alcohol or drug impairment-related of-
fenses, and the most recent offense occurred within 15 years of the last offense. Id. Driv-
ers may apply to reinstate their licenses after ten years of revocation have passed. Id.
Erb, a lawyer representing himself,1 sued the Secretary of the Department, con-
tending that Wisconsin’s statute violates his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to
equal protection, procedural due process, and substantive due process.
The district court granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss. The court noted that
Erb had “fallen well short” of pleading that Wisconsin’s mandatory-revocation statute
is facially unconstitutional; the court thus asked whether the statute is unconstitutional
as applied to Erb. 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220581 *4 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 7, 2025). And the com-
plaint failed to state a claim for any constitutional violation, the court concluded.
Erb’s equal protection theory—which is subject to rational-basis review—fails be-
cause the statute promotes public safety and reduces recidivism among repeat offend-
ers. It also incapacitates persons who seemingly cannot be deterred from drunk driving.
Erb’s procedural due process theory fails because a statutory consequence of a
conviction may be imposed without extra hearings. Connecticut Department of Public
Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2003). Erb had plenty of process when responding to the
criminal charges; he is not entitled to a separate hearing about the revocation because
1 Erb reports that his Minnesota law license has expired for nonpayment of fees.

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No. 25-3077 Page 3
that consequence is mandatory and therefore does not depend on facts to be established
at a hearing. (Erb does not deny that he has at least four qualifying convictions.)
As for substantive due process: that doctrine applies only to fundamental rights
that either are identified in the Constitution itself or have deep historical provenance.
See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215, 237–40 (2022); Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). But no one has a “fundamental” right to keep
driving after multiple convictions demonstrate that the person poses a danger to the
public when behind the wheel.
We have considered Erb’s other arguments, which are too undeveloped to justify
discussion.
A FFIRMED

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