Richard Highbaugh v. Exelead, Inc .

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-2638
R ICHARD HIGHBAUGH ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
EXELEAD, I NC .,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:23-cv-01454-RLY-MJD — Richard L. Young, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED M AY 12, 2026 — DECIDED A UGUST 24, 2026
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, M ALDONADO, and T AIBLESON , Cir-
cuit Judges.
M ALDONADO, Circuit Judge. After Richard Highbaugh’s
employer, Exelead, Inc., declined to interview him for a pro-
motion and gave the role to an external candidate, Highbaugh
sued. Highbaugh, who is black and was 60 years old at the
time, believes he was not selected because of his race and age
(the selected hire was white and in his thirties). The district
court granted summary judgment to Exelead, concluding that

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2 No. 25-2638
Highbaugh failed to show that the company’s justification for
its decision—concern about Highbaugh’s qualifications—was
pretextual. We agree and affirm.
I. Background
A
Highbaugh has worked for Exelead, a clinical drug manu-
facturer and distributor, for upwards of 28 years in various
warehouse positions. At some point during his first 10 years
with the company, Highbaugh, then working as a Material
Technician, began performing “sampling” duties. Sampling
involved taking samples of raw materials that arrived at the
warehouse and delivering them to a lab for testing to ensure
suitability for drug manufacturing. Highbaugh was pro-
moted around 2008 to a team lead position, to a supervisory
role around 2013, and to the role of Senior Supervisor around
2017.
In August 2019, Highbaugh received a verbal warning for
“substandard work and carelessness.” Highbaugh believed
that this warning was in retaliation for a complaint he lodged
the month prior about his workload. In the aftermath of the
warning, Highbaugh explained to his manager that he could
not maintain both the sampling duties and his supervisory
duties. So Exelead soon reorganized the department and cre-
ated a Sampling Specialist role for Highbaugh, continuing to
give him the same pay he was receiving as a Senior Supervi-
sor. Meanwhile, Highbaugh also submitted a charge to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), al-
leging that he was experiencing race and age discrimination
and retaliation because of the complaint he had made about
his workload.

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No. 25-2638 3
Highbaugh’s performance reviews varied. In 2020 and
2021, they were “lower than he expected”—he believed the
negative feedback was in retaliation for his EEOC complaint.
But his performance review in 2022 was generally positive.
He was rated as above average in job knowledge and work
quality; excellent in dependability; and satisfactory in atti-
tude, communication, and work output. For those categories
rated as satisfactory, written feedback indicated that High-
baugh’s emails were sometimes difficult to follow, he could
be more “effective[] and efficient[]” with his communication,
there was room to increase his productivity and time manage-
ment, and he could take initiative to learn new skills.
Highbaugh’s supervisor, Aaron Mendez, testified that
though Highbaugh performed his job as a Sampling Specialist
well, Mendez had concerns about Highbaugh’s skills and pro-
fessionalism. For example, Mendez explained that High-
baugh’s capabilities with Microsoft Excel and Word were
“amateur or introductory at best,” which was concerning be-
cause Highbaugh had to prepare spreadsheets tracking his
sampling; that Mendez had witnessed multiple occasions of
Highbaugh “practically yelling” in front of his peers at team
meetings while “air[ing] his frustrations”; that he received
several poorly written emails from Highbaugh; that High-
baugh needed support with scheduling and time manage-
ment; and that Highbaugh “would constantly miss [] dead-
lines.” Based on these observations, Mendez believed High-
baugh “did not have excellent organizational, leadership,
presentation, interpersonal, and written communication
skills.”
Highbaugh disagrees with Mendez’s assessment of his
skills and his behavior. He swore that Mendez “barely

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4 No. 25-2638
observed” his work and had “never helped” him with things
like scheduling or operating Microsoft Excel. Highbaugh
opined that he has “great interpersonal and communication
skills” and is “proficient” with Microsoft programs. High-
baugh also submitted affidavits from co-workers, who of-
fered positive views about his skills.
B
In 2022, a vacancy became available for a Materials Man-
ager position, the role to which Highbaugh reported as a Sam-
pling Specialist. Mendez was responsible for conducting in-
terviews and filling that vacancy.
The job posting was opened internally at Exelead from
July 14 to July 21, 2022, though Highbaugh did not apply dur-
ing that window. The posting instructed interested employ-
ees to submit the application form and a resume to Human
Resources. Requirements listed in the job posting included 10
or more years of warehouse experience in the pharmaceutical
industry; 5 or more years of department management experi-
ence; 4 or more years of experience with particular software;
proficiency with Microsoft programs; excellent organiza-
tional, leadership, and communication skills; and strong ana-
lytical and critical thinking skills. After the internal posting
had been open for a week, it was posted externally.
About two months after the internal posting closed, High-
baugh approached Mendez on the warehouse floor and
handed him his resume and an internal transfer form. Accord-
ing to Highbaugh, the interaction was brief, and Mendez
thanked him. Mendez, for his part, says he thanked High-
baugh for his interest, “advised him that he was not the can-
didate that [he] was looking for for the role,” and explained

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No. 25-2638 5
that he was looking for someone with exposure to larger scale
manufacturing and demonstrated leadership with a team.
But, Mendez says, he also expressed to Highbaugh that he
was interested in putting Highbaugh “in more of a supervisor
type role with potential for more responsibilities in leader-
ship.” As Mendez tells it, Highbaugh seemed interested in
that alternative role and told Mendez that he was applying
for the Materials Manager role just in case Mendez could not
find anyone else to fill it.
The next day, Highbaugh emailed Mendez asking (among
a few other unrelated topics) “what is available to me between
the senior supervisor and the manager’s position.” Though
the email indicates he was inquiring about Mendez’s pro-
posed alternative role, Highbaugh insists that he was really
inquiring about the status of his application for the Manager
role. Mendez did not reply. A few days later, Highbaugh
emailed a Human Resources employee to ask if he had re-
ceived Highbaugh’s application and resume for the Manager
role; the employee had not.
In late October 2022, Mendez hired an external candidate
named Brandon Miller—a white man in his thirties—for the
Materials Manager position. Although Miller was lacking
some of the qualifications listed on the job posting (most no-
tably, he did not have 10 years of warehouse experience in
pharmaceuticals and fell short of 5 years of management ex-
perience), Mendez interviewed Miller because he had re-
cently worked in another highly regulated industry and had
managed teams of up to 20 people across multiple shifts and
buildings. Mendez reports that in interviews, Miller appeared
passionate about the role, showed problem solving skills, and
provided detailed responses to questions and hypotheticals

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6 No. 25-2638
posed to him. Mendez decided Miller was the best candidate
for the job and extended an offer, which Miller accepted.
In early November 2022, shortly before learning about the
selection of Miller for the role, Highbaugh called Mendez to
ask about the status of his application. The next day, High-
baugh and Mendez met, and Mendez offered Highbaugh a
supervisor role, as the two had previously discussed. Mendez
thought this role would give Highbaugh more experience so
he’d be better positioned for a manager role the next time one
opened. Highbaugh declined the offer, and asked Mendez
why he hadn’t been interviewed for the Materials Manager
position. Mendez responded that he “needed someone who
was able to manage multiple buildings.” Highbaugh has
never held a “manager” position at Exelead, though he did
hold a “supervisor” title from roughly 2013 to 2019 (the de-
tails of which are not fleshed out in the record).
Mendez admits that Highbaugh satisfied many of the re-
quirements for the Materials Manager position (and some of
Highbaugh’s peers thought he was a natural fit for the role),
but as elaborated above, Mendez says he had concerns about
Highbaugh’s skills in a variety of areas. Mendez also did not
believe Highbaugh was seriously interested in the role based
on how late he applied (two months after the posting) and the
informal way in which he applied (in passing in the ware-
house).
C
Highbaugh filed a charge with the EEOC in February
2023, alleging that the choice to hire Miller instead of promot-
ing him was discriminatory. Exelead filed a position state-
ment, explaining that Highbaugh lacked qualifications that

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No. 25-2638 7
Mendez wanted the manager to possess, had not appeared
genuinely interested in the role, and struggled with commu-
nication skills.
After receiving the EEOC’s dismissal and right-to-sue no-
tice, Highbaugh brought this suit pro se. He later obtained
counsel, who filed an amended complaint asserting race dis-
crimination claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, an age
discrimination claim under 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)), and a retalia-
tion claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.1
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of
Exelead on all claims. With respect to the discrimination
claims, the court reasoned that Highbaugh failed to show that
Mendez’s stated reasons for declining to promote him were
pretextual.
II. Discussion
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable
to Highbaugh, the non-moving party, and giving him “the
benefit of all reasonable inferences in [his] favor.” Paterakos v.
City of Chicago, 147 F.4th 787, 795 (7th Cir. 2025). “Summary
judgment is proper if ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law.’” Id. (quoting F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(a)). The ultimate
question is whether Highbaugh has shown “that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict in [his] favor.” Id. (quoting Benuzzi
v. Bd. of Educ., 647 F.3d 652, 662 (7th Cir. 2011)). For purposes
1 Highbaugh does not press the retaliation claim on appeal, so we ad-
dress it no further.

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8 No. 25-2638
of this appeal, Highbaugh’s discrimination claims can be eval-
uated together because the inquiries are similar. See Gamble v.
Cnty. of Cook, 106 F.4th 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2024) (addressing Ti-
tle VII and § 1981 claims together); Vassileva v. City of Chicago,
118 F.4th 869, 873 (7th Cir. 2024) (same with Title VII and
ADEA claims).
The parties have approached this case through the McDon-
nell Douglas burden-shifting framework.2 Under that frame-
work, Highbaugh must first establish a prima facie case for
discrimination by presenting evidence that he was a member
of a protected class, qualified for the position but rejected, and
the position was given to a person outside the protected class
who was similarly or less qualified than him. Cunningham v.
Austin, 125 F.4th 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2025) (citing Logan v. City of
Chicago, 4 F.4th 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2021)). If those elements are
established, “the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employ-
ment action.” Id. (quoting Lewis v. Ind. Wesleyan Univ., 36 F.4th
755, 760 (7th Cir. 2022)). Then “the burden ‘shifts back to the
employee to show why the employer’s explanation is pre-
textual.’” Id. (quoting Lewis, 36 F.4th at 760).
Here, even assuming Highbaugh made out a prima facie
case for discrimination, his claims fail because Exelead
2 To the extent Highbaugh cites Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834
F.3d 760, 764–66 (7th Cir. 2016) (under which we place evidence in “a sin-
gle pile” and evaluate it “as a whole” to determine whether the employer’s
action would have been the same if the plaintiff had a different race or age
but “everything else had remained the same”), in his appellate briefing,
he did not invoke that framework in the district court, nor does he clearly
invoke it now. In any event, Highbaugh’s claims would fare no better un-
der the Ortiz approach.

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No. 25-2638 9
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for declin-
ing to promote him, and he has not met his burden to show
that the explanation is pretextual. See Vassileva, 118 F.4th at
874 (citation omitted) (courts may “skip the analysis” of the
prima facie case). According to Exelead, Miller was inter-
viewed and hired for the position Highbaugh sought because
Mendez believed Miller possessed the more relevant manage-
rial experience and skill set. This is a legitimate proffered non-
discriminatory reason for passing over Highbaugh. See
Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co., 587 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2009) (hir-
ing someone whom employer believed to be better qualified
is non-discriminatory reason for action); Riley v. Elkhart Cmty.
Schs., 829 F.3d 886, 893 (7th Cir. 2016) (same).
But Highbaugh says this stated rationale is a lie—it’s
merely a pretext covering the real, discriminatory basis for the
decision. “An otherwise legitimate, non-discriminatory hir-
ing rationale is pretextual if the hiring manager did not ‘sin-
cerely believe[]’ the rationale when making his final deci-
sion.” Cunningham, 125 F.4th at 789 (quoting Little v. Ill. Dep’t
of Revenue, 369 F.3d 1007, 1015 (7th Cir. 2004)). If an employer
“honestly believed” it selected the best candidate, “its reason-
ing is not pretext, ‘even if its decision was inaccurate, un-
fair, … foolish, trivial, or baseless.’” Id. at 790 (quoting Barnes-
Staples v. Carnahan, 88 F.4th 712, 716 (7th Cir. 2023)). So, this
appeal turns on whether Highbaugh’s evidence—be it cir-
cumstantial or the rare smoking gun—could lead a reasonable
jury to conclude that Mendez did not genuinely believe Miller
was the better candidate. See Paterakos, 147 F.4th at 795.
Highbaugh advances two theories of pretext: (1) Mendez
and Exelead have offered shifting and inconsistent explana-
tions for the hiring decision, and (2) Highbaugh was so clearly

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10 No. 25-2638
better qualified for the position than Miller, that Mendez
could not honestly have believed Miller to be the better can-
didate. But the evidence that Highbaugh offers for each the-
ory does not surmount the reasonable jury standard we em-
ploy here.
First, Highbaugh argues that a jury could find pretext be-
cause Mendez and Exelead have had inconsistent explana-
tions for the decision not to promote him. It is true that
“[s]hifting and inconsistent explanations can provide a basis
for a finding of pretext.” Schuster v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 327 F.3d
569, 577 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). But “the explana-
tions must actually be shifting and inconsistent to permit an
inference of mendacity.” Id. (citation omitted). Where the
“overall account is substantially consistent,” this standard is
not met. Id. at 577–78. Nor is it enough that there is some elab-
oration on a decision over time. See Saud v. DePaul Univ., 154
F.4th 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2025) (“Merely providing multiple, or
additional, reasons for an adverse employment decision does
not establish pretext.”); Johnson v. Nordstrom, Inc., 260 F.3d
727, 733–34 (7th Cir. 2001) (an employer supplementing rea-
sons for adverse action is not evidence of pretext when the
reasons do not conflict, and the employer does not retract a
reason). Similarly, an employer’s “failure to address all of the
reasons in each communication about the employee is not
enough … .” Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 577 (7th
Cir. 2015) (no pretext where employer’s “decision to empha-
size [one] rationale in her email to [plaintiff] did not create an
inconsistency. She did not disavow or contradict the [other]
justification; she simply failed to mention it.”).
Here, regardless of the lingering dispute about what Men-
dez told Highbaugh when Highbaugh applied for the

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No. 25-2638 11
Materials Manager position on the warehouse floor, it is un-
disputed that Mendez told Highbaugh in November that he
wanted someone with a different type of experience (i.e.,
someone who could “manage multiple buildings”). That rea-
son, the need for larger-scale management experience, has
been articulated consistently: first in Exelead’s position state-
ment to the EEOC, then in the company’s interrogatory re-
sponses in this case, and then in Mendez’s deposition. What
was added to the explanation after November was Mendez’s
concern about Highbaugh’s communication skills and his be-
lief that Highbaugh wasn’t sincerely interested in the position
because of his late application. These added justifications are
neither shifting nor inconsistent. They align with Mendez’s
contemporaneous explanation and appear merely to supple-
ment or add color to that reasoning. See Johnson, 260 F.3d at
733 (“[C]onflicting, and at times retracted, justifications for
adverse treatment” are evidence of pretext, but mere supple-
mentation of explanation, when consistent, is not.).
Second, Highbaugh argues that a jury could find pretext
because he was so much more qualified than Miller that Men-
dez could not have honestly believed Miller was the better
candidate. “But we have set a high evidentiary bar for pre-
text,” and evidence of Highbaugh’s qualifications could sur-
pass that bar only “if the differences between [him and Miller]
were so favorable to [Highbaugh] that there can be no dispute
among reasonable persons of impartial judgment that [High-
baugh] was clearly better qualified for the position.” Riley, 829
F.3d at 894 (citation omitted).
No one is contesting that Highbaugh, who has devoted
decades of his professional life to Exelead, possessed some of
the qualifications necessary for the Materials Manager role.

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12 No. 25-2638
But so did Miller. A comparison of the two does not objec-
tively reveal that Highbaugh was clearly better qualified for
the position. Highbaugh may have had more years under his
belt, some of which was spent in a supervisory role, but Miller
had the specific type of large-scale management experience
Mendez said he was looking for. And Highbaugh was not in-
volved in interviewing Miller, so he cannot speak to what else
was revealed about Miller’s background or skillset beyond his
resume that might have affected Mendez’s decision. All High-
baugh can say is that, in his own opinion,3 he was more qual-
ified than Miller. But “[a]n employee’s ‘own opinions about
[his] qualifications do not give rise to a material factual dis-
pute.’” Robertson v. Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs., 949 F.3d 371, 381
(7th Cir. 2020) (citation modified).
Highbaugh also has not put forward any circumstantial
evidence suggesting that Mendez did not sincerely believe
Miller was more qualified. Highbaugh did not need to pro-
duce smoking-gun evidence catching Mendez in a lie. Rather,
“[c]ircumstantial evidence of falsity—including the fact that a
stated reason is just improbable or unreasonable—can sup-
port a reasonable inference of pretext.” Wilson v. AIM Specialty
Health, 176 F.4th 977, 984 (7th Cir. 2026) (collecting cases). The
3 Highbaugh also points to affidavits from several co-workers opining
on his qualifications, but the foundation for their opinions on High-
baugh’s qualifications for the promotion are flimsy, at best. One affiant
joined the company only a month after the position was posted and
worked in a different department; another overlapped for only two
months before the events at issue; and two left the company at least a year
before the events at issue (and before Mendez even started working there).
Further, the affiants provide no insight into Mendez’s hiring process (or
Exelead’s hiring process more generally), and the affiants themselves were
not involved in that process.

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No. 25-2638 13
question is whether “a jury could find [an employer’s stated
reasons] unworthy of belief.” Id. Here, there is nothing inher-
ently suspect or nonsensical about Mendez’s justification.
Evaluated in the context of prior similar criticism of High-
baugh and Mendez offering Highbaugh an alternative super-
visory role to gain relevant experience, the explanation is not
“fishy enough to support an inference that the real reason
must be discriminatory.” See Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., LLC,
636 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 2011). And we have no evidence,
for example, of prior comments from Mendez about race or
age or comments that contradicted his stated views on High-
baugh’s qualifications that might render the explanation “un-
worthy of belief.” See Wilson, 176 F.4th at 984.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

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