The AI workspace for legal professionals
- Legal research with access to more than 1 million sources
- Document automation
- Matter management
- Hosted in the EU and Switzerland
Try it free for 14 days (10 questions/day during trial)
The AI workspace for legal professionals
Try it free for 14 days (10 questions/day during trial)
21-4016•United States of America v. Kenneth Leandrew Williams
21-4016Court of Appeals for the Eighth CircuitJan 31, 2023
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 22-2991
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff Appellee
v.
Kenneth Leandrew Williams
Defendant Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Central
____________
Submitted: December 29, 2022
Filed: January 19, 2023
[Unpublished]
____________
Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
____________
PER CURIAM.
Kenneth Williams appeals after the district court1 revoked his supervised
release and sentenced him to 5 months in prison and 10 years of supervised release,
1The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa.
-- 1 of 3 --
with a special condition that he reside in a residential reentry center for up to 120
days. His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw, and has filed a brief challenging
the revocation sentence and the reentry center requirement. Williams has filed a pro
se brief challenging the legality of his sentence.
After careful review of the record, we conclude that the revocation sentence
was not illegal, as the sentence and additional term of supervised release are within
the statutory maximum. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (maximum revocation prison
term is 2 years if underlying offense is Class C felony), (k) (maximum supervised
release term is life); United States v. Childs, 17 F.4th 790, 792 (8th Cir. 2021) (noting
that supervised release is distinct from the prison term and may be imposed in
addition to the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction; rejecting argument
that revocation sentence was illegal because defendant had already served more than
the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction); United States v. Zoran, 682
F.3d 1060, 1062-64 (8th Cir. 2012) (reviewing the legality of a revocation sentence
de novo). Further, the sentence was not unreasonable, as the district court properly
considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; there was no indication that it overlooked
a relevant factor, or committed a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors;
and the revocation sentence is within the advisory Guidelines range. See United
States v. Perkins, 526 F.3d 1107, 1110 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that a revocation
sentence within the Guidelines range is accorded a presumption of substantive
reasonableness on appeal); United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 915-18 (8th Cir.
2009) (reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a revocation sentence under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard).
We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by requiring
Williams to return to a reentry center. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(11) (court may
require probationer to reside at a community corrections facility for all or part of the
term of probation); U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3(e)(1) (residence in a community treatment
center, halfway house or similar facility may be imposed as a condition of probation);
-2-
-- 2 of 3 --
United States v. Melton, 666 F.3d 513, 517-18 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that the
district court has broad discretion to impose special conditions that are reasonably
related to § 3553 factors, involve no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably
necessary, and are consistent with any pertinent Sentencing Commission policy
statements).
As to Williams’s pro se argument, we conclude that the district court was
authorized to impose both a prison sentence and a term of supervised release. See 18
U.S.C. § 3583(h) (when a term of supervised release is revoked and the defendant is
required to serve a term of imprisonment, the court may include a requirement that
the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment). And the
terms of imprisonment imposed for Williams’s prior revocations do not “closely
resemble the punishment of new criminal offenses . . . without granting a defendant
the rights, including the jury right, that attend a new criminal prosecution.” United
States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2386 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment).
Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirm.
______________________________
-3-
-- 3 of 3 --
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.