United States of America v. Joel Llamas Garcia

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 21-3717
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Joel Llamas Garcia
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
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Submitted: October 17, 2022
Filed: March 9, 2023
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Before COLLOTON, KELLY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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KELLY, Circuit Judge.
After a jury trial, Joel Llamas Garcia was convicted of conspiring to distribute
methamphetamine and heroin. The district court1 sentenced him to 180 months’
1 The Honorable Eric C. Tostrud, United States District Judge for the District
of Minnesota.

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imprisonment. Garcia appeals, arguing the court erred in applying a two-level
obstruction-of-justice enhancement and that his sentence is unreasonable.
I.
On September 21, 2020, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
received information from a cooperating source that Garcia, his cousin Saul Llamas
Valdovinos, and a third man had traveled from California to Minnesota to participate
in a large drug transaction. The source notified DEA agents that a semitruck
containing approximately 20 pounds of methamphetamine and 6–7 kilograms of
heroin had recently arrived in Minnesota. Garcia and his two companions, who were
staying at a nearby motel, were expected to retrieve this drug shipment from the
truck.
The same day, the source spoke with Valdovinos, who confirmed that he had
picked up the shipment and that the drugs were in the men’s motel room. Valdovinos
told the source he wanted someone to take the drugs for safekeeping elsewhere. Law
enforcement arranged for an undercover officer to pose as the source’s “guy,” who
would pick up and transport the shipment to another location. When the undercover
officer arrived at the motel, he first met briefly with Valdovinos, who directed him
to park in front of the room. Valdovinos opened the motel room door and gestured
for Garcia, who walked out carrying a black duffel bag. The undercover officer told
Garcia to put the duffel bag in the trunk. The bag contained 20 small containers and
6 brick-like packages, and the contents field-tested positive for the presence of
methamphetamine and heroin. The interaction between the undercover officer and
Garcia was captured on audio and video.
The following morning, Garcia was arrested, Mirandized, and interviewed by
law enforcement. Initially, Garcia told the officers that the three men traveled to
Minnesota to purchase a truck for work, and he denied meeting anyone at the motel
room the previous night. But eventually he admitted that they picked up a large box
from a semitruck; that he was the one who emptied his duffel bag of his personal

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belongings and replaced them with the drugs; and that he placed the duffel bag
containing the drugs in the trunk of the undercover officer’s car the night before.
A grand jury charged Garcia with one count of conspiracy to distribute 500
grams or more of a mixture containing methamphetamine and 1 kilogram or more
of a mixture containing heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A),
and 846. Trial began on July 12, 2021. Garcia testified, denying any knowledge of
the drugs, contrary to his earlier admissions to law enforcement. Garcia explained
that Valdovinos asked him to take a trip to Minnesota to buy cars. After they arrived
in Minnesota, Garcia claimed that Valdovinos received a phone call from a man who
was going to bring Valdovinos parts he needed for car repairs. Garcia testified that
he drove with Valdovinos to a semitruck to retrieve a large, sealed, white box, which
Valdovinos brought back to their motel room. Valdovinos asked to use Garcia’s
duffel bag to store items from the box, which Garcia believed contained car parts.
Garcia also testified that Valdovinos later directed him to grab the bag and give it to
the “guy” outside the motel room door. Garcia maintained that he had no knowledge
of the duffel bag’s contents, and that he “didn’t know what was happening.” The
jury returned a guilty verdict.
At sentencing, the district court found that Garcia had obstructed justice by
committing perjury at trial and applied a two-level enhancement pursuant to United
States Sentencing Guidelines § 3C1.1 (2018), resulting in an advisory sentencing
Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months. The court then varied downward and
imposed a sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment, followed by 5 years of supervised
release. Garcia now appeals.
II.
A.
Garcia first challenges the district court’s application of a two-level
enhancement to his base offense level for obstruction of justice. “We review the

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district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo,
and we review findings of fact for clear error.” United States v. Gomez-Diaz, 911
F.3d 931, 936 (8th Cir. 2018). A district court may apply the obstruction-of-justice
enhancement “only if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
engaged in obstructive conduct.” Id.
Guidelines section 3C1.1 calls for a two-level increase to the defendant’s base
offense level if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to
obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.” As relevant here,
“[c]ommitting perjury at trial constitutes an obstruction of justice within the meaning
of § 3C1.1.” United States v. Flores, 362 F.3d 1030, 1037 (8th Cir. 2004); see also
USSG § 3C1.1, comment. (n.4(B)). “[B]ut the district court cannot impose the
enhancement ‘simply because a defendant testifies on his own behalf and the jury
disbelieves him.’” Gomez-Diaz, 911 F.3d at 936 (quoting Flores, 362 F.3d at 1037).
Rather, the court must “conduct an independent evaluation and determine whether
the defendant committed perjury.” Id. (quotation omitted). “It is preferable for the
district court to address each element of perjury in a separate and clear finding, but
it is sufficient if the court makes a finding that ‘encompasses all of the factual
predicates for a finding of perjury.’” United States v. Nshanian, 821 F.3d 1013,
1018 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95 (1993)).
“A witness commits perjury when he testifies falsely under oath about a
material matter with a willful intent to deceive the fact finder.” United States v.
Abdul-Aziz, 486 F.3d 471, 478 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). At sentencing,
the district court found that Garcia’s testimony (1) was “obviously false” because it
was “preposterous” and lacked supporting details; (2) concerned a material matter
because Garcia’s testimony, if believed, “would almost certainly” have led to an
acquittal; and (3) “was willful and not the result of confusion, mistake or faulty
memory” because Garcia’s “story was too elaborate and interwoven.” The district
court described specific portions of testimony that either Garcia “struggled to
explain” or were simply “fanciful,” and noted that Garcia’s testimony under oath

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directly contradicted his earlier statements to law enforcement made immediately
after his arrest. The district court properly addressed each element of perjury, and
the court’s findings are sufficient to support an obstruction-of-justice enhancement
by a preponderance of the evidence.
B.
Garcia also argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. “We
review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under the deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.” United States v. Lazarski, 560 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 2009).
“A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor
that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an
improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in
weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” United States v.
Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quotation omitted). “A
sentence below or within the Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable on
appeal.” United States v. Barraza, 982 F.3d 1106, 1116 (8th Cir. 2020) (alteration
omitted) (quoting United States v. Canania, 532 F.3d 764, 773 (8th Cir. 2008)).
Garcia contends the district court erred by giving “undue weight” to his
perjury. A district court has wide latitude in deciding how to weigh the relevant
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Reid, 827 F.3d 797, 803–
04 (8th Cir. 2016). When sentencing Garcia, the district court specifically noted that
it weighed the gravity of the offense, the quantity of drugs involved, the
sophistication of the drug trafficking organization, and Garcia’s perjury at trial
against Garcia’s good character, work ethic, and “otherwise law-abiding life.” The
district court may “assign relatively greater weight to the nature and circumstances
of the offense than to the mitigating personal characteristics of the defendant,”
United States v. Wisecarver, 644 F.3d 764, 774 (8th Cir. 2011), and the record
demonstrates that the court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors. Under these
circumstances, Garcia’s sentence was not unreasonable.

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III.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
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