United States of America v. Christopher Evans

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 22-1287
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Christopher Evans
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Eastern
____________
Submitted: January 13, 2023
Filed: March 27, 2023
____________
Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
____________
BENTON, Circuit Judge.
Christopher Deontye Evans pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court1
1 The Honorable C.J. Williams, United States District Judge for the Northern
District of Iowa.

-- 1 of 5 --

-2-
sentenced him to 110 months in prison. He appeals his sentence. Having jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
I.
Evans argues the district court erred in determining he had a “controlled
substance offense” under U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) and 4B1.2(b). This court
reviews de novo “whether a prior conviction is a sentencing enhancement predicate.”
United States v. Henderson, 11 F.4th 713, 716 (8th Cir. 2021). A “controlled
substance offense” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) is:
[A]n offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import,
export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a
counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a
counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export,
distribute, or dispense.
In 2014, Evans was convicted of the manufacture or delivery of one gram or
more but less than 15 grams of cocaine. See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 570/401
(2013). This crime made it “unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture or
deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance . . .
a counterfeit substance, or a controlled substance analog.” Id. It was punishable by
a term of imprisonment for more than one year. Id. Evans concedes that under this
court’s precedent, his conviction meets the definition of a controlled substance
offense. See generally Henderson, 11 F.4th 713. But he contends it should not
count because the Illinois statue is categorically broader than the federal definition.
See United States v. Oliver, 987 F.3d 794, 807 (8th Cir. 2021) (“We know that
Illinois’s definition of cocaine is categorically broader than the federal definition.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

-- 2 of 5 --

-3-
Evans believes application of Henderson violates his due process rights. See
Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). This
court has said, “It is an open question whether the Due Process Clause also forbids
retroactive judicial expansion of criminal punishments, as opposed to criminal
liability.” United States v. Dunlap, 936 F.3d 821, 823 (8th Cir. 2019). “But
assuming without deciding that the Fifth Amendment precludes certain retroactive
increases in punishment occasioned by judicial decision,” it does so only where such
decisions are “unexpected and indefensible.” Id.
Here, application of Henderson was neither unexpected nor indefensible.
First, Henderson aligns with decisions from other circuit courts. See, e.g., United
States v. Jones, 15 F.4th 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 2021) (Ҥ 4B1.2(b), by its plain
language, refers to state as well as federal law.”); United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d
364, 372 (4th Cir. 2020) (rejecting argument that “controlled substance offense”
qualifies for only those controlled substances identified in the Controlled Substances
Act). Second, contrary to Evans’ assertions, Henderson was not unexpected based
on United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 642 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 2011). In fact, the
Henderson court noted that the Sanchez-Garcia decision did not address the question
at issue in that case. See Henderson, 11 F.4th at 717-18 (noting that Sanchez-Garcia
“did not hold that a state law crime must involve one of [the Controlled Substance
Act] substances to be a ‘controlled substance offense’ under the career offender
Guidelines,” but rather that the opinion “simply affirmed the Guidelines
enhancement at issue without addressing that question”). Third, Henderson was not
unexpected because it was supported by the text of the guidelines. See id. at 718-19
(“Therefore, there is no textual basis to graft a federal law limitation onto a career-
offender guideline that specifically includes in its definition of controlled substance
offense, ‘an offense under . . . state law.’”); United States v. Luersen, 278 F.3d 772,
774 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a case was not an “unforeseeable judicial
interpretation of the sentencing guidelines” because it was “derived from the
guidelines themselves”).

-- 3 of 5 --

-4-
Evans also argues that Henderson violates his equal protection rights because
a “hypothetical defendant” sentenced before Henderson or in another circuit “would
not be subject to the enhanced base offense level.” Evans raises this issue for the
first time on appeal, and review is for plain error. United States v. Ford, 987 F.3d
1210, 1215 (8th Cir. 2021) (“When a defendant fails to timely object to a procedural
sentencing error, the error is forfeited and may only be reviewed for plain error.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Under plain error review, this court reverses if
there is an error, that is plain, that affects the defendant’s substantial rights, and
seriously affects the “fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
United States v. Lara-Ruiz, 681 F.3d 914, 920 (8th Cir. 2012).
There is no equal protection violation “if there is any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis” for the application of Henderson.
See United States v. Binkholder, 909 F.3d 215, 218 (8th Cir. 2018). Because
Henderson was neither unexpected nor indefensible, its interpretation of the
guidelines had a rational basis. The district court did not plainly err in not sua sponte
finding that applying Henderson violated Evans’ equal protection rights.
II.
Evans challenges the substantive reasonableness of his within-guidelines
sentence. This court reviews “the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Garcia, 946 F.3d 413,
419 (8th Cir. 2019). Sentences within the guidelines-range are presumed
substantively reasonable. Id. “It will be the unusual case when we reverse a district
court sentence-whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range-as
substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir.
2009) (en banc).
Evans contends his sentence “significantly overstates the seriousness of what
is attributable to him,” because his prior conviction meant his base offense level was
“almost double of the previously-calculated sentence range.” This argument is the

-- 4 of 5 --

-5-
same he makes about the application of Henderson to his case. The district court
considered the § 3553(a) factors and thoroughly explained its decision. It did not
abuse its discretion. See United States v. Halverson-Weese, 30 F.4th 760, 766 (8th
Cir. 2022) (holding a sentence at the bottom of the guidelines-range presumptively
reasonable).
* * * * * * *
The judgment is affirmed.
______________________________

-- 5 of 5 --