United States of America v. Edward James Gleason, Jr., also known as Champ, also known as Mexico

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-1103
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Edward James Gleason, Jr., also known as Champ, also known as Mexico
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
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Submitted: January 12, 2023
Filed: June 14, 2023
[Unpublished]
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Before GRASZ, MELLOY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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MELLOY, Circuit Judge.
On the second day of a jury trial, without a negotiated plea agreement, Edward
James Gleason, Jr., pleaded guilty to: one count of conspiring to distribute 500 grams
or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), (b)(1)(A) and 846; two counts of
distributing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); and one count
of possessing with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, 21

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U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Sixteen months later, Mr. Gleason moved
unsuccessfully to withdraw his guilty plea. At sentencing, the district court1 found
a base offense level of 36 and applied a two-level role enhancement. The adjusted
offense level of 38 and a Category VI criminal history resulted in an advisory
Guidelines sentencing range of 360 months to life. The district court varied
downward and imposed a sentence of 240 months. Mr. Gleason appeals the denial
of his motion to withdraw and application of the role enhancement. We affirm.
Mr. Gleason argues the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to withdraw. See United States v. Maxwell, 498 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 2007)
(standard of review). In his motion, he argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to inform him of a government plea offer. “[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has
the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms
and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S.
134, 145 (2012). We have emphasized that counsel’s duty pursuant to Frye does not
apply to informal plea negotiations and potential but non-formal offers made by the
government. Ramirez v. United States, 751 F.3d 604, 608 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding
that a defendant could not show prejudice as required by Frye and Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), where the defendant “received at most an
informal plea offer—one that expressly contained no promises or assurances”). As
such, although open communication between defense counsel and a defendant is
important, we generally will not find ineffective assistance and the requisite prejudice
meriting relief merely because counsel fails to communicate fully the details of
negotiations that fall short of actual and formal plea offers. Id.
Here, Mr. Gleason’s challenge to the denial of his motion to withdraw fails for
two reasons. First, there was no formal plea offer from the government. Although
1The Honorable Beth Phillips, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri.
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defense counsel and the prosecutor discussed a possible plea agreement prior to trial,
evidence of that potential agreement shows, at most, tentative approval and a further
need for the prosecutor to discuss the case with supervisors. Rather than a formal
offer, the communications between defense counsel and the prosecutor amounted to
an “express[ion of] an interest in negotiating” and simply did not rise to the level of
“promises or assurances.” Id.
Second, defense counsel actually communicated to Mr. Gleason the
information Mr. Gleason now challenges as having been withheld. In an email,
defense counsel informed Mr. Gleason of the government’s possible willingness to
allow a plea agreement that would have permitted a reduced minimum sentence,
allowed the defense to argue for a base offense level as low as 30, but also allowed
the government to argue for a base offense level as high as 36 based in large part on
Mr. Gleason’s own statements as to drug quantity. Although Mr. Gleason recites
portions of the information he received from counsel, a full reading of the
communications shows neither a formal plea offer nor a failure to share the material
details of a potential agreement.
Regarding the role enhancement, preponderant evidence supports the district
court’s conclusion. See United States v. Alcalde, 818 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2016)
(factual determinations supporting a role enhancement are reviewed for clear error).
The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) set forth facts concerning Mr. Gleason’s
role in the offense and recommended a four-level enhancement as a leader or
organizer. He did not object to those factual statements. Rather, he argued that if a
role enhancement applied, it should be a two-level rather than a four-level
enhancement. At sentencing, despite the absence of a factual objection, the
government did not rely on all the unobjected-to statements of fact found in the PSR.
Rather, the government constrained its arguments to certain evidence as presented at
the partial trial. Even this evidence showed the requisite control over another person
to support the two-level enhancement. Mr. Gleason instructed and controlled a
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girlfriend in the use of her home as a “stash house” and relied on her as a translator.
See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1; United States v. Denson, 967 F.3d 699, 708 (8th Cir. 2020)
(directing the use of another’s residence as a stash house demonstrates requisite
control).
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
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