United States of America v. Bryce Alexander Vittetoe

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-2930
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Bryce Alexander Vittetoe
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri
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Submitted: September 22, 2023
Filed: November 20, 2023
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Before COLLOTON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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GRASZ, Circuit Judge.
Bryce Vittetoe pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to
distribute and to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon. The district court1
1 The Honorable Brian C. Wimes, United States District Judge for the Western
District of Missouri, adopting the factual findings from the Report and
Recommendation of the Honorable Willie J. Epps, Jr., United States Magistrate
Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

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denied Vittetoe’s motion to suppress evidence found during a police search of a
vehicle after concluding Vittetoe had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
reportedly stolen vehicle. Vittetoe appeals, arguing the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress. We affirm under the alternative rationale that the
search was reasonable under the automobile exception.
I. Background
In 2020, Sergeant Aaron Hazelton of the Cole County Sheriff’s Office
conducted surveillance of Vittetoe at a storage unit in Jefferson City, Missouri.
While operating in plain clothes, Sgt. Hazelton observed Vittetoe in possession of a
White Toyota Scion at the storage unit. The car had been reported stolen according
to the Jefferson City Police Department Dispatch Center (“Dispatch”). Sgt.
Hazelton was familiar with Vittetoe from previous narcotics and other criminal
investigations. Sgt. Hazelton called for backup. Corporal Kyle Petty, who was also
aware of Vittetoe’s past criminal history, soon arrived and observed Vittetoe exit the
storage unit. Observing a large knife holstered on Vittetoe’s hip, Cpl. Petty
approached Vittetoe with his gun drawn, ordered Vittetoe to get on the ground,
handcuffed Vittetoe, and read his Miranda2 rights to him.
With Vittetoe handcuffed, Cpl. Petty then called Dispatch and confirmed what
Sgt. Hazelton had told him: the Toyota Scion was reported stolen. At some point,
Vittetoe asked Cpl. Petty what he had done wrong, and Cpl. Petty told Vittetoe the
vehicle was reported stolen. In response, Vittetoe denied stealing the vehicle,
claiming he had a bill of sale, which his mother could bring to Cpl. Petty. Vittetoe
did not have any documents with him that could show he owned or had permission
to use the vehicle. Cpl. Petty tried to confirm the Scion was stolen, but he could not
contact the previous owner of the vehicle because she was incarcerated.
2Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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Cpl. Petty then uncuffed Vittetoe, telling Vittetoe he was free to leave, but the
car needed to stay. Cpl. Petty searched the vehicle while Vittetoe voluntarily
remained in the vicinity. Cpl. Petty quickly discovered the barrel of a rifle
protruding from underneath a blanket in the backseat of the vehicle and ordered
officers to again arrest Vittetoe. A further search of the vehicle revealed numerous
firearms, including a shotgun, two rifles, a muzzle loader, a pistol, numerous rounds
of ammunition, a large amount of methamphetamine, marijuana edibles, and
prescription medications. Officers later executed a search warrant on Vittetoe’s
storage unit where they found additional contraband.
A federal grand jury indicted Vittetoe for unlawfully possessing a firearm as
a felon and possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1); 924(a)(2) and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), respectively. Vittetoe
moved to suppress the evidence police found in the Toyota Scion and the storage
unit, challenging the constitutionality of the vehicle search. The magistrate judge
recommended Vittetoe’s motion to suppress be denied, determining the search was
justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement because
probable cause existed to believe the Toyota Scion was stolen when Cpl. Petty
searched the vehicle. Vittetoe objected to the Report and Recommendation.
After independent review, the district court denied the motion to suppress.
The district court judge adopted the magistrate judge’s findings of fact but used a
different legal analysis. The district court sua sponte held Vittetoe did not have
standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the search of the Toyota Scion
because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a stolen vehicle. Vittetoe
then pled guilty to the charged offenses, but he reserved the right to challenge the
district court’s denial of his suppression motion. The district court sentenced
Vittetoe to 151 months and 60 months of imprisonment on the drugs and weapons
charges, respectively, to run concurrently. Vittetoe timely appealed.

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II. Analysis
Vittetoe argues the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress,
insisting he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle and no exceptions
to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applied. Thus, Vittetoe maintains
that the search of the vehicle was unconstitutional, so any evidence found in the car
and later search of the storage unit should have been suppressed.
We apply a mixed standard of review to the district court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress, reviewing factual findings for clear error and the denial itself de novo.
United States v. Stevenson, 66 F.4th 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 2023). We may affirm the
denial of a motion to dismiss on any basis supported by the record. See id.
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution secures persons against
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Warrantless searches
are per se unreasonable unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies.
United States v. Kennedy, 427 F.3d 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 2005). The automobile
exception is one such exception. Id. at 1140. This exception exists “because a
vehicle’s ‘ready mobility’ creates an exigency and because individuals have a
‘reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile, owing to its pervasive
regulation.’” United States v. Dunn, 928 F.3d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996)). The “‘automobile exception’
permits police to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile if, at the time of the
search, they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or
other evidence of a crime.” Kennedy, 427 F.3d at 1140–41.
Under this standard, probable cause exists, when, given the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person could believe there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in a particular place. United
States v. Green, 39 F.4th 510, 513 (8th Cir. 2022). The probable cause inquiry is an
objective test. Just v. City of St. Louis, 7 F.4th 761, 767 (8th Cir. 2021).

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The government bears the burden of demonstrating that the officers had
probable cause at the time they searched the Toyota Scion. See Kennedy, 427 F.3d
at 1141. We agree with the magistrate judge’s original conclusion and the
government’s argument that the search was justified under the automobile exception:
the officers had probable cause because the car was reported stolen to Dispatch and
Vittetoe—who had a known criminal history—was unable to produce any
documentation indicating he was the rightful owner. A reasonable officer in these
circumstances would believe there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime,
such as proof of rightful ownership, was in the car.
Vittetoe argues the officers lacked probable cause, as evidenced by Cpl. Petty
releasing Vittetoe before searching the vehicle. According to Vittetoe, the release
shows Cpl. Petty thought he lacked probable cause. Vittetoe’s argument is
unavailing for at least two reasons. First, Vittetoe wrongly equates the probable
cause determinations for searching the vehicle and making an arrest because officers
may have probable cause to search a vehicle, even if they do not make an arrest. See
Kennedy, 427 F.3d at 1140–41 (explaining probable cause to search a car under the
automobile exception only requires “a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place”). Second, Cpl. Petty’s subjective
beliefs as to whether he had probable cause to arrest Vittetoe are not dispositive
because the test is objective. See Just, 7 F.4th at 767. Probable cause to search the
vehicle did not evaporate when Cpl. Petty released Vittetoe the first time. Instead,
we only look to whether Cpl. Petty had probable cause at the time he searched the
vehicle. Kennedy, 427 F.3d at 1140. Considering the facts of this case, a reasonable
officer would believe there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be
found in the vehicle at the time of the search.3
Because the vehicle was reported stolen, officers could search it for evidence
of it being stolen. See United States v. Vore, 743 F.3d 1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 2014).
3 Having concluded the automobile exception justifies the warrantless search,
we need not decide whether Vittetoe had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
reportedly stolen vehicle.

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Likewise, officers may consider the known criminal history of a suspect in
conducting the probable cause analysis. See United States v. Mathes, 58 F.4th 990,
994 (8th Cir. 2023). Therefore, the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle
and the district court was ultimately justified in denying Vittetoe’s motion to
suppress. It follows that we will not exclude the evidence obtained from the storage
unit because the warrant to search the unit was based on probable cause from the
evidence obtained during the valid search of the car. See United States v. Miller, 11
F.4th 944, 954 (8th Cir. 2021) (applying the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine
requires an initial, unlawful search).
III. Conclusion
We affirm the district court’s denial of Vittetoe’s motion to suppress.
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