D.s. v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-2287
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D.S.
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant
v.
Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
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Submitted: November 27, 2023
Filed: November 30, 2023
[Unpublished]
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Before COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.

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D.S. appeals the district court’s1 order affirming the denial of disabled child’s
insurance benefits. We agree with the court that substantial evidence in the record
as a whole supports the adverse decision. See Swarthout v. Kijakazi, 35 F.4th 608,
610 (8th Cir. 2022) (standard of review).
Specifically, we find that the administrative law judge (ALJ) properly
evaluated the opinion evidence and D.S.’s subjective complaints. See Cox v.
Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006) (ALJ was entitled to discount physician’s
opinion where it was inconsistent with other evidence and was written after insured
period expired); Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2005) (ALJ did not err
in discrediting complaints based on lack of objective medical evidence, conservative
treatment history, inconsistencies between complaints and daily activities, and work
activity). We also find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination of
D.S.’s residual functional capacity (RFC). See Despain v. Berryhill, 926 F.3d 1024,
1028-29 (8th Cir. 2019) (ALJ’s consideration of treatment notes, course of treatment,
daily activities, and consultants’ opinions constituted substantial evidence supporting
RFC determination); Julin v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 1082, 1089 (8th Cir. 2016) (ALJ
permissibly excluded greater limitations from RFC after finding record was not
consistent with degree of symptoms alleged).
We find no merit to D.S.’s contentions that the ALJ failed to fully develop the
record, or failed to consider all of the medical evidence. See Kamann v. Colvin, 721
F.3d 945, 950 (8th Cir. 2013) (ALJ may make decision without obtaining additional
medical evidence so long as other evidence in record provides sufficient basis for
decision); Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 2000) (ALJ is not required to
discuss every piece of evidence, and failure to cite specific evidence did not indicate
1The Honorable Katherine M. Menendez, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable
Leo I. Brisbois, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.
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it was not considered). As substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s RFC
determination, substantial evidence also supported the ALJ’s conclusion, based on
the vocational expert’s testimony, that D.S. was not disabled. See Johnson v. Astrue,
627 F.3d 316, 320-21 (8th Cir. 2010) (where medical evidence supported limitations
in RFC determination, hypothetical question to vocational expert using those
limitations was acceptable, and substantial evidence supported finding that claimant
was not disabled).
Finally, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
remand the case for consideration of the new evidence D.S. submitted, as that
evidence was not new and material. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (court may order new
evidence taken before Commissioner only upon showing that there is new and
material evidence, and that there is good cause for failure to incorporate such
evidence into record in prior proceeding); Whitman v. Colvin, 762 F.3d 701, 708 (8th
Cir. 2014) (standard of review). We also deny the motion to supplement the record
on appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.
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