Antoine Williams v. United States of America

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 22-3558
___________________________
Antoine Williams,
lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellant,
v.
United States of America,
lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellee.
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Eastern
____________
Submitted: October 18, 2023
Filed: January 31, 2024
____________
Before SMITH, Chief Judge, LOKEN and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
____________
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
Antoine Williams appeals from the dismissal of a motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The district court* determined that
*The Honorable C.J. Williams, United States District Judge for the Northern
District of Iowa.

-- 1 of 4 --

the filing was an unauthorized successive motion and dismissed it. Because Williams
voluntarily dismissed a previous motion under § 2255 only after it became apparent
that his argument was meritless, we conclude that the follow-on motion was
successive. We therefore affirm the judgment.
In 2013, Williams pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to distribute heroin. The
district court determined that he qualified as a career offender under the sentencing
guidelines, see USSG § 4B1.1(a) (2012), and sentenced him to 188 months’
imprisonment.
In June 2015, the Supreme Court declared that the “residual clause” of the
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague. Johnson v.
United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). The language of that clause was identical to a
provision defining “crime of violence” in USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2012). Therefore, in
May 2016, Williams moved to vacate his sentence on the ground that the district
court’s career-offender determination under the guidelines was invalid after Johnson.
While the motion was pending, the Supreme Court held in Beckles v. United
States, 580 U.S. 256 (2017), that the sentencing guidelines are not susceptible to
vagueness challenges. Two days later, the district court ordered Williams to show
cause why his motion should not be dismissed in light of Beckles. Williams, through
counsel, voluntarily dismissed his motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1)(A)(i). The record suggests no reason for the voluntary dismissal other than
the decision in Beckles.
In June 2022, Williams moved again to vacate his sentence. This time, he
relied on the intervening decision in Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021).
Borden held that an offense committed with a mens rea of ordinary recklessness does
not have as an element the use of force against another, and thus does not qualify as
a violent felony under the so-called “force clause” of the ACCA. Id. at 429.
-2-

-- 2 of 4 --

Williams suggested that the rationale of Borden also applies to the definition of
“crime of violence” under the sentencing guidelines. His motion maintained that he
should not have been classified as a career offender because some of his prior
offenses could have been committed recklessly.
The district court dismissed the motion as an unauthorized second or
successive motion under § 2255. We review the court’s conclusion de novo. United
States v. Brown, 915 F.3d 1200, 1201 (8th Cir. 2019).
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), federal
prisoners may not file a “second or successive” motion to vacate sentence under
§ 2255 without first obtaining authorization from the court of appeals. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(h). Williams argues that his present motion was not second or successive
because he voluntarily dismissed his first motion before the district court issued a
ruling.
We conclude that Williams’s present motion is second or successive. Although
the district court did not rule on the first § 2255 motion, Williams withdrew the
motion only after it was clear that the motion was destined for denial based on
Beckles. In that situation, the withdrawal of the motion is akin to a dismissal on the
merits, and subsequent motions should count as successive. See Thai v. United
States, 391 F.3d 491, 495 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Potts v. United States, 210
F.3d 770, 770 (7th Cir. 2000). Disallowing a second motion in these circumstances
serves the statutory purposes of AEDPA by limiting a prisoner to one full opportunity
on collateral review to receive a decision on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h);
Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698, 1706 (2020); Potts, 210 F.3d at 770-71. We thus
agree with other courts that have refused to allow unauthorized successive motions
after a first motion that was withdrawn in light of Beckles. United States v. Raymond,
815 F. App’x 144, 146-47 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. Rejda, 790 F. App’x 900,
-3-

-- 3 of 4 --

905-06 (10th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); In re Moore, 735 F. App’x 883, 884 (6th Cir.
2018).
Williams argues that his present motion cannot be successive because the
district court’s dismissal of the first motion under Civil Rule 41 renders that case a
nullity. See Williams v. Clarke, 82 F.3d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1996). The rules of
procedure, however, apply in § 2255 proceedings only “to the extent that they are not
inconsistent with any statutory provisions.” Rule 12, Rules Governing Section 2255
Proceedings for the United States District Courts. Applying Rule 41 in the manner
suggested would frustrate § 2255(h) and AEDPA’s limitations on second and
successive motions.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
______________________________
-4-

-- 4 of 4 --