United States of America v. John Radermacher

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-1243
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
John Radermacher
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota - Southern
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Submitted: October 20, 2023
Filed: February 8, 2024
[Published]
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Before BENTON, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
A jury found John Radermacher guilty of conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and 851(a).
Radermacher appeals his conviction, arguing the district court1 erred by admitting
1 The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the
District of South Dakota.

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Rule 404(b) evidence and by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. We
affirm.
I.
First, Radermacher appeals the district court’s pretrial ruling that permitted
the government to offer evidence of his prior drug conviction under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b). Radermacher was convicted in 2008 for conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute cocaine. On appeal, he challenges the admission of the prior
conviction, arguing that it was too remote and that it was not similar in kind to the
charged conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine offense. He also contends that
any probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
“Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, with reasonable
pretrial notice of the permitted purpose for offering the evidence, the government
may introduce evidence of other crimes “for another purpose, such as proving
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2), (3). To be admissible, “[t]he
evidence must be ‘(1) relevant to a material issue; (2) similar in kind and not overly
remote in time to the crime charged; (3) supported by sufficient evidence; and (4)
higher in probative value than prejudicial effect.’” United States v. Walker, 470 F.3d
1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Strong, 415 F.3d 902, 905 (8th
Cir. 2005)). “We review a district court’s decision to admit such evidence for an
abuse of discretion, and will reverse only when the evidence ‘clearly had no bearing
on the case and was introduced solely to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit
criminal acts.’” Id. (quoting Strong, 415 F.3d at 904).
At trial, one of Radermacher’s co-defendants testified for the government.
The co-defendant said he considered Radermacher a friend. They had recently
reconnected when Radermacher was in financial trouble, and he sent Radermacher

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some money to help him out. The two then began talking about selling controlled
substances. Over the course of two months, the co-defendant fronted Radermacher
distribution-sized quantities of methamphetamine on multiple occasions.
Radermacher did not deny a relationship with the co-defendant, but argued it
did not include an agreement to distribute methamphetamine. Radermacher
characterized the co-defendant as merely an old friend who gave him money when
he needed it. According to Radermacher, this financial support—not
methamphetamine distribution—was the reason he maintained contact with his
friend and co-defendant. By presenting this alternative explanation, however,
Radermacher placed his knowledge of the drug conspiracy and his intent to join it at
issue, making his prior conviction relevant to the reasons he was in contact with his
co-defendant and the nature of their relationship.
Evidence of Radermacher’s prior conviction was also “sufficiently similar” in
kind to the crime charged. See Strong, 415 F.3d at 905. Each offense involved
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. It is true that over a decade elapsed
between the two offenses, suggesting remoteness. But Radermacher was
incarcerated for most of that time and had been out on release for about two years
prior to the instant offense. See Walker, 470 F.3d at 1275 (concluding that where
there is a long period of incarceration between offenses, “the total number of years
separating the prior offense and the charged offense [does] not ‘significantly
diminish the probativeness of the evidence’” and may lessen the remoteness of the
prior conviction (quoting Strong, 415 F.3d at 905)).
While this type of evidence carries the potential for prejudice, Radermacher
was given pretrial notice of the government’s purpose for using the evidence, and at
the pretrial conference the district court offered to provide the jury with a limiting
instruction to diminish any potential prejudicial effect. But Radermacher did not
raise the issue again when the evidence was introduced, nor did he request a limiting
instruction. In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence about Radermacher’s prior conviction.

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II.
Second, Radermacher appeals the denial of his motion for judgment of
acquittal on the grounds that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his
conviction. “This court reviews de novo the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
a judgment.” United States v. Hogan, 539 F.3d 916, 924 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted). “The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict; conflicts
are resolved in favor of the government; and, all reasonable inferences from the
jury’s verdict are accepted.” Id. (quoting United States v. Castro–Gaxiola, 479 F.3d
579, 581 (8th Cir. 2007)). “[We] ‘will reverse the conviction only if we conclude
that no reasonable jury could have found the accused guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Beck, 496 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir. 2007)).
Conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance has three elements: (1) the
existence of a conspiracy—that is, an agreement to distribute the illegal drugs; (2)
the defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant intentionally joined it.
United States v. Sainz Navarrete, 955 F.3d 713, 718–19 (8th Cir. 2020) (citation
omitted). Radermacher argues there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly joined an agreement to distribute
methamphetamine. The government disagrees, pointing to the evidence presented at
trial, which included his co-defendant’s testimony and corroborating text messages
that described fronting pound-sized quantities of methamphetamine to Radermacher
on more than one occasion. The jury also heard testimony and learned of
corroborating text messages from the co-defendant about his repeated attempts to
collect a drug debt from Radermacher, and there were records showing large sums
of money being transferred between the two. Though Radermacher denies
intentionally and knowingly joining a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine,
the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a jury to find him guilty of that
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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