United States of America v. Stanford C. Griswold

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-2580
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Stanford C. Griswold
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
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Submitted: January 24, 2024
Filed: February 7, 2024
[Unpublished]
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Before GRUENDER, SHEPHERD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Stanford Griswold appeals the within-Guidelines-range sentence the district
court1 imposed after he pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm
1The Honorable David Gregory Kays, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

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pursuant to a written plea agreement containing an appeal waiver. His counsel has
moved to withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), challenging, inter alia, the voluntariness of Griswold’s plea and his sentence.
Griswold has filed a pro se brief challenging his plea, his sentence, and his counsels’
effectiveness; as well as a motion to proceed pro se.
We conclude that Griswold’s involuntary-plea claim is not cognizable on direct
appeal because he did not move below to withdraw his guilty plea. See United States
v. Washington, 515 F.3d 861, 864 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that a claim that a plea was
involuntary or unknowingly entered is not cognizable on direct appeal where the
defendant failed to move in the district court to withdraw the guilty plea). In
addition, we decline to consider Griswold’s ineffective-assistance claim on direct
appeal. See United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826-27 (8th Cir.
2006) (establishing that ineffective-assistance claims are usually best raised in
collateral proceedings where the record can be properly developed).
We further conclude that the appeal waiver is valid, enforceable, and applicable
to Griswold’s challenges to his sentence. See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702,
704 (8th Cir. 2010) (reviewing de novo the validity and applicability of an appeal
waiver); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(enforcing appeal waiver if the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement and the waiver,
and enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice).
We have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the scope of the
appeal waiver. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, deny
Griswold’s motion to proceed pro se as moot, and dismiss this appeal.
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