In re: Vera T. Welte Testamentary Trust Debtor ------------------------------ The… v. Vera T. Welte Testamentary Trust

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 22-3201
___________________________
In re: Vera T. Welte Testamentary Trust
Debtor
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The Security National Bank of Sioux City, IA, as Personal Representative of the
estate of Roger Rand
Appellee
v.
Vera T. Welte Testamentary Trust
Appellant
Carol Dunbar
Trustee
___________________________
No. 22-3332
___________________________
In re: Vera T. Welte Testamentary Trust
Debtor
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The Security National Bank of Sioux City, IA, as Personal Representative of the
estate of Roger Rand
Appellant
v.
Vera T. Welte Testamentary Trust
Appellee
Carol Dunbar
Trustee
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Western
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Submitted: November 16, 2023
Filed: March 1, 2024
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Before COLLOTON, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
In this bankruptcy matter, the Vera T. Welte Testamentary Trust contests the
enforceability of dragnet clauses within mortgages used to secure loans funding
Frank Welte’s farming operations. The Estate of Roger Rand—a creditor—believes
the clauses are enforceable. After the parties twice litigated that dispute, the Iowa
Court of Appeals and the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District
of Iowa reached conflicting conclusions. Following an appeal of the bankruptcy
court’s order, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa gave
preclusive effect to the judgment of the Iowa Court of Appeals concerning the

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enforceability of the clauses and the amounts owed thereunder. Now, the Trust and
the Estate both appeal the district court’s order, each asserting various points of error.
Because we lack jurisdiction over the appeal, it must be dismissed.
I.
Frank Welte is the sole beneficiary of the Vera T. Welte Testamentary Trust.
His brother, Claire Welte, is the trustee. The Trust’s primary asset is 160 acres of
farmland that were leased to Frank during the period of time at issue in this case. To
finance his farming operations, Frank borrowed money from Roger Rand, another
Iowa farmer. To secure the loans made to Frank, Claire, as trustee, signed mortgages
pledging the Trust’s property as security. Despite executing promissory notes which
stated a principal amount, Frank borrowed more money than was reflected in them.
Moreover, the mortgage documents—which Claire did not read before
signing—contained dragnet clauses,1 which secured not only the amount owed on
the corresponding note, but all other then-existing obligations, as well as future
obligations. And according to Claire, he assumed that he could only validly
mortgage the Trust’s income, not its property.
After Rand’s death in 2016, and after “problems arose with Frank’s
repayments,” Rand’s Estate2 initiated an Iowa state court foreclosure action against
the Trust’s farmland pledged as security for the loans. R. Doc. 1, at 7. The Estate
named Frank as a defendant in his personal capacity and Claire in his capacity as
trustee, among others. Eight days before trial, the Trust filed for chapter 12
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court stayed the foreclosure action as to Claire, the
1 Dragnet clauses—also known as Mother Hubbard clauses—are clauses
“stating that a mortgage secures all the debts that the mortgagor may at any time owe
to the mortgagee.” Mother Hubbard clause, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
2 The Estate is now personally represented in this matter by Security National
Bank of Sioux City, Iowa. For ease, we refer to the Estate throughout the opinion.

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trustee, but the foreclosure action proceeded to trial against the remaining
defendants.
Meanwhile, in the bankruptcy proceedings, the Estate filed a proof of claim
and a motion to dismiss the Trust’s chapter 12 petition. The motion to dismiss
alleged that the Trust was an ineligible debtor because it was not a business trust as
required by chapter 12. The Trust objected to the Estate’s proof of claim on October
9, 2019.
Soon after, on October 16, 2019, the Iowa state court issued its ruling in the
foreclosure action. The parties had disagreed whether the dragnet clauses in the
mortgage documents secured the loans made to Frank in excess of the face amount
of the promissory notes. The Iowa state court ruled that they did, and further ruled
that the Estate was entitled to over $3 million.
One month after the Iowa state court ruling in the foreclosure action, the
bankruptcy court held a hearing on the Estate’s motion to dismiss. Its April 2021
ruling noted, but did not address, the Iowa state court foreclosure action. In tension
with the conclusion of the Iowa state court, the bankruptcy court held that, while the
mortgages were enforceable against the Trust under Iowa law, the dragnet clauses
were not, because Claire lacked knowledge of the excess amounts loaned to Frank.
Relying on the Trust’s certified public accountant’s opinions and its own conclusion
as to the dragnet clauses, the bankruptcy court concluded that the Trust no longer
owed a debt to the Estate and that the Estate therefore had no pecuniary interest in
the bankruptcy proceedings. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court held that the Estate
lacked standing to assert its motion to dismiss and granted the Trust’s objection to
the proof of claim.
Not long after the bankruptcy court’s ruling, the Iowa Court of Appeals
affirmed the state court decision, concluding that “the [Iowa state] district court
properly applied the dragnet clause and determined the proper amount owed by the

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appellants.” Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Welte, 965 N.W.2d 202, 2021 WL
2453107, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021) (unpublished table decision).
The Estate timely appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. After the Estate asked the
district court to take judicial notice of the Iowa Court of Appeals’ decision, the
district court ordered several rounds of briefing on whether, among other things, the
Court of Appeals decision should be given preclusive effect. In its briefs, the Estate
also asserted the same claim raised in its motion to dismiss before the bankruptcy
court, namely, that the Trust was an ineligible debtor under chapter 12. In its
memorandum opinion and order, the district court held, among other things, that the
Iowa Court of Appeals’ conclusion regarding the enforceability of the dragnet
clauses and the amounts owed under the promissory notes was entitled to preclusive
effect. It did not reach the Estate’s arguments that the Trust was an ineligible debtor
and instead remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings.
The Trust now appeals the district court’s order, alleging that the district court
erred in (1) raising issue preclusion sua sponte, (2) giving a state court ruling
preclusive effect in a bankruptcy case which the Trust asserts involved materially
different issues, and (3) denying the Trust the benefits of the automatic stay. The
Estate cross-appeals, alleging that the district court erred by failing to find that the
Trust is an ineligible debtor under chapter 12. The Estate also moves to dismiss the
Trust’s appeal for a lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the district court’s order is not
a final, appealable order. Since our jurisdiction is a “threshold matter” that precedes
the merits of an appeal, we must first address the Estate’s motion to dismiss. Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998).
II.
The Estate alleges that we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal because the
district court’s order is not “final” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). The
Estate asserts that there is more for the bankruptcy court to do on remand than simply

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execute the district court’s order. Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1), our jurisdiction over
bankruptcy appeals is limited to “final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees” of
the district courts or Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP). This appellate jurisdiction
is more circumscribed than the district courts’ or the BAP’s. In re M & S Grading,
Inc., 526 F.3d 363, 368 (8th Cir. 2008). Unlike the district courts or BAP, “our
review is limited to final orders.” Id.; In re Farmland Indus., Inc., 397 F.3d 647, 649
(8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he BAP’s jurisdiction is not limited to final orders.”); see also
In re Woods Farmers Coop. Elevator Co., 983 F.2d 125, 126 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting
“the jurisdictional mess that results when parties to a complex bankruptcy
proceeding ignore the final order requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)”).
“We apply a broader, more flexible concept of finality in bankruptcy cases
than we do in nonbankruptcy cases.” Ritchie Special Credit Invs., Ltd. v. U.S. Tr.,
620 F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 2010). To determine the finality of an order under
§ 158(d)(1), we ask whether “‘it finally resolves a discrete segment of [the
bankruptcy] proceeding,’ that is, a ‘relevant judicial unit’ of the proceeding.”
Farmland, 397 F.3d at 650 (citation omitted).
To decide that pragmatic question, we examine . . . “the extent to which
(1) the order leaves the bankruptcy court nothing to do but execute the
order; (2) the extent to which delay in obtaining review would prevent
the aggrieved party from obtaining effective relief; [and] (3) the extent
to which a later reversal on that issue would require recommencement
of the entire proceeding.”
Id. (citation omitted). Further, we have explained that “a district court decision
involving remand normally will not be considered final” since “a decision requiring
remand to the bankruptcy court often anticipates further judicial activity that is likely
to affect the merits of the controversy.” In re Vekco, Inc., 792 F.2d 744, 745 (8th
Cir. 1986). If the remanding order leaves the bankruptcy court with only “purely
mechanical or ministerial task[s],” it is more likely to be final. In re Popkin & Stern,
289 F.3d 554, 556 (8th Cir. 2002). “An order is ministerial and final if it effectively
resolves the merits, and the task on remand is ‘unlikely to generate a new appeal or

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to affect the issue that the disappointed party wants to raise on appeal.’” In re
Roussel, 769 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
The first factor—whether the order leaves the bankruptcy court nothing to do
but execute the order—strongly suggests that the district court’s order is not final.
Here, remand to the bankruptcy court anticipates further judicial activity. At the
very least, the bankruptcy court will have to apply the district court’s conclusion that
the Iowa Court of Appeals’ decision has preclusive effect with respect to the dragnet
clauses and the amounts owed under the promissory notes. That will almost
certainly require the bankruptcy court to then address the Estate’s motion to dismiss,
which alleges that the Trust is not an eligible debtor under chapter 12 because it is
not a business trust. These tasks are hardly “mechanical or ministerial” and may
well “generate a new appeal.” Popkin, 289 F.3d at 556 (citation omitted); see also
Roussel, 769 F.3d at 577 (holding that outstanding tasks were more than ministerial
because “remand leaves the dischargeability of attorney fees to the bankruptcy court,
requiring factual and legal analysis”).
Resisting this conclusion, the Trust argues that “[t]here is no other action the
Bankruptcy Court can take that would affect the merits of the controversy because
there were no other instructions to the Bankruptcy Court to use its discretion or make
additional factual findings.” But that ignores the consequences of the district court’s
order. The Trust itself recognizes that the bankruptcy court will now have to address
the Estate’s motion to dismiss—a motion that will “affect the merits of” the
underlying bankruptcy case because it might end it. Vekco, 792 F.2d at 745.
Relying on our decision in In re Nicolaus, 963 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2020), the
Trust also argues that the district court’s order is final because it definitively
disposed of the Trust’s objection to the Estate’s proof of claim. But Nicolaus is
distinguishable. There, we held that the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of the
objection to the proof of claim for lack of personal jurisdiction rendered its order
final: “once the bankruptcy court decided that it could not consider Nicolaus’s
objection because he never properly served it [on the Internal Revenue Service], the

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discrete dispute ended and there was nothing left for the court to do.” Nicolaus, 963
F.3d at 842. That is a far cry from this case, where the district court’s order left
much for the bankruptcy court to do on remand: again, the bankruptcy court will
have to apply the district court’s conclusion that the Iowa Court of Appeals’ decision
has preclusive effect with respect to the dragnet clauses and the amounts owed under
the promissory notes, and then address the Estate’s motion to dismiss. Woods
Farmers Coop., 983 F.2d at 127 (“[A]s we have repeatedly noted, a district court’s
remand order is not final for purposes of § 158(d) if it ‘anticipates further judicial
activity that is likely to affect the merits of the controversy.’” (citation omitted)).
As for the second and third factors—“the extent to which delay in obtaining
review would prevent the aggrieved party from obtaining effective relief” and “the
extent to which a later reversal on [the] issue would require recommencement of the
entire [bankruptcy] proceeding”—neither the Trust nor the Estate meaningfully
develop arguments. Farmland, 397 F.3d at 650 (citation omitted). In passing, the
Trust argues that its “rights” are substantially affected by the district court’s order,
and that the district court’s order may never receive appellate review if we do not
immediately exercise jurisdiction. Although we are not obliged to consider this
perfunctorily raised, undeveloped argument, United States v. Kirk, 528 F.3d 1102,
1104 n.2 (8th Cir. 2008), it does not change our conclusion regarding the “pragmatic
question” of the district court’s order’s finality, Farmland, 397 F.3d at 650. The
Trust does not explain its prognosis, and it offers no discernible reason why the
issues addressed in the district court’s order will inevitably evade appellate review.
Finally, the Trust argues judicial economy will be aided by taking the appeal now,
rather than later. But that cuts squarely against its concession that the Estate’s
motion will have to be addressed on remand and that it “may end the entire
bankruptcy proceeding.” Judicial economy would be aided if the bankruptcy court
took up such a motion at an earlier stage of the proceedings.

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Because the district court’s order leaves much for the bankruptcy court to do
on remand, the district court’s order is not “final” under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). We
therefore lack jurisdiction over the appeal and cross-appeal.3
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the Estate’s motion to dismiss the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. We likewise dismiss the cross-appeal.
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3 We end with a suggestion that was admittedly not briefed or argued by either
party: we know of no reason why the decision of the Iowa Court of Appeals would
not be a binding statement of Iowa law. See In re Sears, 863 F.3d 973, 978 (8th Cir.
2017) (explaining that we apply state law to resolve contractual defenses to proofs
of claim); Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. of America v. Nat’l Union Ins. Co. of
Pittsburg, 621 F.3d 697, 707 (8th Cir. 2010) (“In applying state law, . . . [w]hen the
state’s highest court has not spoken, . . . [w]e may look to decisions of the state’s
intermediate courts.”); Wong v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 789 F.3d 889, 897 (8th Cir.
2015) (“It is a well-recognized rule that federal courts may not reject a state court of
appeals decision solely because a state’s highest court has not decided the matter.”).

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