United States of America v. Ja'Cara P. Baker, also known as Jacara P. Baker

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-3343
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Ja'Cara P. Baker, also known as Jacara P. Baker
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Western
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Submitted: March 26, 2024
Filed: March 29, 2024
[Unpublished]
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Before SMITH, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Ja’Cara Baker appeals the sentence imposed by the district court1 after she
pleaded guilty to a drug distribution charge. Her counsel has moved to withdraw, and
1The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa.

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has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), challenging the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Baker has filed a pro se motion to vacate
the sentence, challenging the calculation of her sentencing range under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines; we construe the filing as a pro se supplemental brief.
Baker has also moved for appointed counsel.
We decline to review Baker’s pro se challenges to the upward adjustments to
her Guidelines range for maintaining a drug premises, having an aggravated role, and
obstructing justice, as Baker stipulated to the adjustments prior to sentencing. See
United States v. Nguyen, 46 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a defendant
who explicitly and voluntarily exposes himself to a specific sentence may not
challenge it on appeal). While she also challenges her designation as a career
offender, the designation did not affect her sentence calculation. See United States
v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 928, 939 (8th Cir. 2013) (concluding that an error in the
Guidelines calculation was harmless, as the offense level would have remained the
same and the error did not affect the ultimate sentence calculation). To the extent
Baker seeks habeas relief in her motion to vacate, we lack jurisdiction to consider the
motion. See United States v. Auman, 8 F.3d 1268, 1272 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that
appellate courts lack jurisdiction to consider an original 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion).
As to counsel’s challenge, we conclude that Baker’s sentence was not
substantively unreasonable, as there is no indication that the district court overlooked
a relevant factor listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), gave significant weight to an improper
or irrelevant factor, or committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant
factors. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(reviewing substantive reasonableness under deferential abuse-of-discretion standard;
setting out factors that lead to abuse of discretion). Further, the court imposed a
sentence below the Guidelines range. See United States v. McCauley, 715 F.3d 1119,
1127 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting that it is “nearly inconceivable” that the district court
abused its discretion in not varying further when it varied below the Guidelines
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range). Finally, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio,
488 U.S. 75 (1988), and have found no non-frivolous issues for appeal.
Accordingly, we dismiss the pending motion to vacate the sentence to the
extent it seeks habeas relief, deny the motion for appointed counsel as moot, grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirm the judgment.
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