Russell Frank Craig v. James Sayler, Warden

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-3022
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Russell Frank Craig
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant
v.
James Sayler, Warden; Steve Hall, Parole and Probation; David Krabbenhoft,
Director of Prison; Drew Howard Wrigley, Attorney General
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of North Dakota - Western
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Submitted: March 21, 2024
Filed: April 5, 2024
[Unpublished]
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Before SMITH, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Russell Craig, who is serving a North Dakota sentence of life with the
possibility of parole, appeals the district court’s1 dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of
1The Honorable Clare R. Hochhalter, United States Magistrate Judge for the
District of North Dakota, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by
consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging the calculation of his parole eligibility.
Upon careful review, we conclude that Craig’s challenge to the calculation--based on
the use of a mortality table which differentiates based on sex and race--is not yet ripe.
See Parrish v. Dayton, 761 F.3d 873, 875 (8th Cir. 2014) (claim is not ripe for
adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all); Laclede Gas Co. v. St. Charles Cty., Mo.,
713 F.3d 413, 417 (8th Cir. 2013) (de novo review of dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction); see also N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-09.1 (persons convicted of
violent offenses are not eligible for parole until they have completed 85% of their
sentences; parole for life sentence is calculated with reference to a mortality table
chosen by the state supreme court). His eligibility is not currently--and may never
be--based on his life expectancy, as another statute prohibits his release until he has
served 30 years in prison, less good-time credit. See N.D. Cent. Code
§ 12.1-32-01(1). It is unknown at this time whether Craig will have sufficient good-
time credit under this section to be eligible for release earlier than the date on which
he would be eligible based on the mortality table.
Craig may bring his claim again as he approaches parole eligibility under
section 12.1-32-01(1), at which time it will be more certain whether, because of good
time credit earned, the mortality table will determine his parole eligibility and
whether the relief he seeks will redress his injury by actually affecting his eligibility
date. See Parrish, 761 F.3d at 875 (plaintiff need not await the consummation of the
threatened injury, it is enough that the injury is certainly impending); cf. Hughes v.
City of Cedar Rapids, 840 F.3d 987, 991-92 (8th Cir. 2016) (to have standing,
plaintiff must show injury in fact, causal connection between complained-of conduct
and injury; and likelihood that injury will be redressed by favorable decision).
Accordingly, we affirm.
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