United States of America v. Anthony D. Smith

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-3109
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Anthony D. Smith
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Eastern
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Submitted: March 11, 2024
Filed: April 1, 2024
[Unpublished]
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Before GRUENDER, SHEPHERD, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Anthony Smith pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting possession of
methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 2. While on
supervised release for this offense, Smith tested positive for illegal controlled
substances on four occasions over the course of a few months. Noting 18 U.S.C.

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§ 3583(g)(4), the district court1 revoked Smith’s supervised release and sentenced
him to 11 months’ imprisonment and 48 months’ supervised release. See id. (“If the
defendant[,] . . . as a part of drug testing, tests positive for illegal controlled
substances more than 3 times over the course of 1 year[,] the court shall revoke the
term of supervised release . . . .”).
Smith appeals and argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing
“to give full consideration” to the substance-abuse-treatment exception to mandatory
revocation. See id. § 3583(d) (“The court shall consider whether the availability of
appropriate substance abuse treatment programs, or an individual’s current or past
participation in such programs, warrants an exception . . . from the rule of section
3583(g) when considering any action against a defendant who fails a drug test.”);
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 cmt. n.6.
Assuming for the sake of argument that Smith preserved this contention for
appellate review,2 we reject it. At sentencing, the district court noted its power “to
exempt the defendant from that mandatory provision,” but found “no basis to do that
in this particular case.” Compare United States v. Pierce, 132 F.3d 1207, 1208 (8th
Cir. 1997) (vacating revocation because the district court did not recognize its
authority under § 3583(d) “to provide for treatment rather than imprisonment”), with
United States v. Kaniss, 150 F.3d 967, 968-69 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming revocation
because the district court “was aware” of the exception). This case is analogous to
Kaniss because, as Smith admits, the district court was aware of its authority to
exempt Smith from mandatory revocation.
1 The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern
District of Iowa.
2 At sentencing, Smith did not dispute the applicability of the mandatory-
revocation provision. Instead, he invited the district court to impose a 6 month term
of revocation imprisonment.

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The district court went on to find revocation “appropriate” due to the sheer
number of Smith’s violations; Smith’s criminal history, which includes a “very
extensive conspiracy,” in addition to convictions for drug trafficking, attempted
murder, and being a felon in possession of a firearm; and the fact that Smith
“continues to associate with persons engaged in criminal activity, including drugs.”
We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in determining that an
exception to the mandatory-revocation rule was not warranted. See United States v.
Hammonds, 370 F.3d 1032, 1038-39 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Hole, 774 F.
App’x 1007, 1008-09 (8th Cir. 2019).
Affirmed.
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