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23-2286•Nicole Ann Skaro v. Martin O’Malley, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration1
23-2286Court of Appeals for the Eighth CircuitJun 28, 2024
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 23-3442
___________________________
Nicole Ann Skaro
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant
v.
Martin O’Malley, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration1
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
____________
Submitted: June 17, 2024
Filed: June 24, 2024
[Unpublished]
____________
Before KELLY, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
____________
1Martin O’Malley has been appointed to serve as Commissioner of Social
Security, and is substituted as appellee pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 43(c).
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PER CURIAM.
Nicole Skaro appeals the district court’s2 order affirming the denial of disability
insurance benefits (DIB). We agree with the court that substantial evidence in the
record as a whole supports the adverse decision. See Ross v. O’Malley, 92 F.4th 775,
778 (8th Cir. 2024) (standard of review).
Specifically, we find that the administrative law judge (ALJ) properly excluded
traumatic brain injury and personality disorder from Skaro’s severe impairments, as
the medical evidence did not establish these impairments until years after the date last
insured (DLI). See Milton v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 554, 555 n.1 (8th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam) (condition developed long after expiration of DLI could not form basis for
DIB entitlement); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521 (impairment must be established by objective
medical evidence from acceptable medical source; claimant’s reports of symptoms or
diagnosis are insufficient). We also find that the ALJ properly considered Skaro’s
subjective complaints, and that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s residual
functional capacity (RFC) determination. See Buford v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 793, 797
(8th Cir. 2016) (substantial evidence supported ALJ’s RFC determination, including
objective medical evidence, conservative treatment, and claimant’s not fully credible
subjective complaints); Milam v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 985 (8th Cir. 2015) (ALJ
properly considered plaintiff’s conservative treatment history and treatment gaps in
discrediting subjective complaints). Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in
declining to remand the case for consideration of the new evidence Skaro submitted
to the district court, as that evidence was not material. See Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d
1210, 1215 (8th Cir. 1993) (to be material, new evidence must be relevant and
probative of claimant’s condition for time period for which benefits were denied, and
2The Honorable Tony N. Leung, United States Magistrate Judge for the District
of Minnesota, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of the
parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
-2-
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there must be reasonable likelihood that it would have changed agency’s
determination).
The judgment is affirmed.
______________________________
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