United States of America v. Juan D. Osorio, also known as Spexx

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 23-2490
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Juan D. Osorio, also known as Spexx
Defendant - Appellant
___________________________
No. 23-2728
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jonathan M. Bravo-Lopez, also known as Shadow, also known as Jonathan Vravo
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
____________
Submitted: April 10, 2024
Filed: August 5, 2024
____________

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Before SMITH, WOLLMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from Juan D. Osorio and Jonathan M. Bravo-Lopez’s
convictions for the kidnapping which resulted in the death of Christian Escutia. The
district court1 sentenced Osorio and Bravo-Lopez to life imprisonment for their
crimes. They now appeal, asserting several points of error. Having jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I.
On April 3, 2017, Marco Sosa-Perea picked up defendant Bravo-Lopez in a
blue Chrysler Pacifica minivan. The pair drank Modelo beer and smoked marijuana
as they drove around. Later that day, after picking up defendant Osorio and Valeria
Zapata-Delgado, the group proceeded to a downtown area of Kansas City, Missouri
where they smoked more marijuana. While there, Zapata-Delgado received a
message from Escutia, who she knew sold marijuana. After seeing the message,
Osorio directed Zapata-Delgado to message Escutia back and set up a deal to
purchase yet more marijuana. He mentioned that Escutia owed him $300. Escutia
told Zapata-Delgado to come to his house and let him know when she was outside.
After setting up the deal, Appellants and Sosa-Perea dropped Zapata-Delgado off at
her home. Osorio told Zapata-Delgado that he had to talk to Escutia about something
personal, that he would pick her up afterwards, and that she was to message Escutia
to go to the blue Chrysler once Osorio arrived. Later, after Osorio called her,
Zapata-Delgado messaged Escutia to say that she was outside.
1 The Honorable Roseann A. Ketchmark, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

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After driving to Escutia’s home and waiting for him to approach, Appellants
forced Escutia inside the minivan at gunpoint. Sosa-Perea, still in the driver’s seat,
drove the group across the Kansas border at Bravo-Lopez’s direction. Osorio hit
Escutia with his gun while Bravo-Lopez pointed his own at Escutia. The group
eventually arrived at an industrial location, where Osorio and Escutia exited. After
Osorio got back into the van, Bravo-Lopez retrieved a gun from the minivan’s center
console and exited. Sosa-Perea then heard what he believed to be two gunshots
before Bravo-Lopez got back in the minivan. Bravo-Lopez instructed Sosa-Perea to
drive off. As the group returned to Missouri, Osorio threw bullet casings and
Escutia’s phone out of the window while he cleaned blood from the back of the
minivan with a rag.
Zapata-Delgado went to the police to talk about what happened after
becoming concerned that Escutia was missing. One of Escutia’s neighbors also
witnessed the kidnapping and had contacted the police. Officers recovered security
camera footage of the kidnapping from a nearby residence.
Bravo-Lopez was arrested and later interviewed by Detectives Erica Oldham
and Brad Thomas of the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department. Bravo-Lopez
was read his Miranda2 rights, stated that he wanted to talk, and signed a waiver form.
After initially denying involvement in Escutia’s disappearance, he admitted to being
present in the minivan with Osorio, Sosa-Perea, and Escutia, although he denied
shooting Escutia. During a break in the interrogation, Bravo-Lopez assisted officers
in locating Escutia’s body, which, at that time, had not been found. An autopsy
revealed three bullet wounds to Escutia’s head and one to his arm. A Modelo beer
can recovered near the body tested positive for Osorio’s DNA. Security camera
footage from a business near where Escutia’s body was found also showed a blue
Chrysler Pacifica coming and going the night of April 3. Osorio and Sosa-Perea
were subsequently arrested.
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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A grand jury charged Bravo-Lopez, Osorio, and Sosa-Perea with conspiracy
to commit kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) and (c), and kidnapping
resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1201(a)(1).3 Additionally, the
grand jury charged Osorio with being an alien in possession of a firearm, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5)(A) and 924(a)(2), and charged Bravo-Lopez with
unlawful re-entry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
Before trial, Bravo-Lopez moved to suppress the incriminating statements he
had made to the detectives after his arrest, asserting that he did not voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. A magistrate judge4 held an
evidentiary hearing on the motion at which detectives Oldham and Thomas testified,
as well as Dr. Antolin Llorente—a neuropsychologist who testified to
Bravo-Lopez’s borderline intellectual functioning. The magistrate judge found that
Bravo-Lopez voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights
and recommended denying the motion. The district court adopted the report and
recommendation in full and denied the motion.
Sosa-Perea entered into a plea agreement with the Government, under which
he agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit kidnapping in exchange for the
dismissal of the kidnapping resulting in death charge. Because kidnapping resulting
in death carries a death or mandatory life sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), and
because conspiracy to commit kidnapping carries only a possible life sentence, see
id. § 1201(c), Sosa-Perea avoided a more serious potential punishment.
3 The grand jury also charged the three men with using a firearm to commit
murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c) and (j)(1). On the Government’s
motion, the district court dismissed these charges before trial.
4 The Honorable Lajuana M. Counts, United States Magistrate Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

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During the ten-day jury trial—in which Sosa-Perea testified extensively—the
Government requested that the district court prohibit Appellants from referring to
the mandatory life sentence Sosa-Perea avoided with his plea deal, reasoning that it
was prejudicial, confusing for the jury, and that sentencing is a question for the
judge. The district court agreed that reference to the mandatory nature of the
sentence could distract the jury. Over Appellants’ objection, the district court
ordered the parties not to “utilize the word mandatory” on cross-examination or
during arguments and to use the phrase “facing a life sentence” instead. Sosa-Perea
testified about his plea deal and confirmed that he “would have been facing a life
sentence if convicted of” the dismissed count.
The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. The district court denied
Appellants’ subsequent motions for judgment of acquittal. The district court
sentenced Bravo-Lopez to life imprisonment for conspiracy to commit kidnapping
and kidnapping resulting in death, and 24 months’ imprisonment for illegal re-entry,
to be served concurrently. It sentenced Osorio to life imprisonment for kidnapping
resulting in death, 600 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to commit kidnapping,
and 120 months’ imprisonment for being an alien in possession of a firearm, also to
be served concurrently. Both Osorio and Bravo-Lopez appeal, asserting several
points of error.
II.
Osorio and Bravo-Lopez both challenge their convictions based on an alleged
violation of their Confrontation Clause rights. They assert that the district court
erred in instructing their attorneys not to “utilize the word mandatory” on
cross-examination of Sosa-Perea or during jury argument when referring to the
potential mandatory life sentence Sosa-Perea avoided with his plea deal. “When
reviewing a district court’s limitations on cross-examination, we apply an abuse of
discretion standard; we will reverse only if a clear abuse of discretion occurred and
if that error prejudiced the defendant.” United States v. Campbell, 986 F.3d 782,
794 (8th Cir. 2021).

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“The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause affords criminal defendants
the right to be ‘confronted with the witnesses against him.’” Id. (citation omitted).
The “defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine” is “[a]t the heart of the Clause,” but
it is not an unlimited right. Id. District courts have “wide latitude . . . to impose
reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other
things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Id. (quoting Delaware
v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). To establish that a limitation on
cross-examination violated the Sixth Amendment, the defendant must “show[] that
a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the
witness’s credibility had defense counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed line
of cross-examination.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the district court was concerned that use of the term “mandatory life”
would “distract[]” the jurors from their role. Appellants do not dispute that this
justification is permissible. Rather, they assert that the jury would have received a
significantly different impression of Sosa-Perea’s credibility had they been able to
reference “mandatory life” because there is a difference between “facing a life
sentence” and a “mandatory life” sentence. But Appellants point us to no authority
demonstrating that this difference in wording would have resulted in the jury
drawing a significantly different impression of Sosa-Perea’s credibility. Moreover,
we have found no abuse of discretion in situations with greater disparities between
the permitted and the proposed lines of cross-examination. See, e.g., United States
v. Wright, 866 F.3d 899, 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding no abuse of discretion
when the district court prohibited reference to “nearly a life sentence” but permitted
reference to “facing a mandatory minimum penalty that could cost [the witness]
decades of his life”); United States v. Walley, 567 F.3d 354, 360 (8th Cir. 2009)
(holding that “five-year sentence” would not have given the jury a significantly
different impression of witness’s credibility compared to “significant sentence”).
“Depriving the jury of the slight marginal utility of knowing about the mandatory”
nature of the sentence “simply does not equate to a constitutional violation.” United

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States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094, 1110 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Graber, J.,
concurring in part, specially concurring in part).
Nor are we persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the district court should
have permitted the “mandatory” line of cross-examination because Sosa-Perea had
“already received a benefit at the time of his testimony.” In support of this argument,
Appellants cite United States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1989), and
United States v. Caldwell, 88 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 1996). Those cases “both held that
it was error for a district court to limit cross-examination about the sentence of a
cooperating witness.” Walley, 567 F.3d at 359. Specifically, “[i]n Roan Eagle, the
witness already had received the benefit of a reduction in charges” by the time she
cooperated. Id. Appellants suggest that this factor is “critical” and that the district
court must therefore have erred because Sosa-Perea had also received the benefit of
a reduction in charges by the time he testified. We disagree. Appellants direct us to
no case identifying this factor as “critical.” Nor have we ever suggested that this
factor automatically entitles a defendant to their preferred line of cross-examination.
Furthermore, Roan Eagle and Caldwell are distinguishable on their facts. In Roan
Eagle, “the district court . . . did not offer the defendant the opportunity to phrase the
[proposed] question differently so as to convey the severity of the potential
sentence,” and in Caldwell the district court “allowed only a vague suggestion that
the dropped charge,” which carried a mandatory minimum penalty of ten years’
imprisonment, “may have called for ‘time in the penitentiary.’” Wright, 866 F.3d at
907 (citation omitted). Those limitations are both more restrictive than the relatively
slight limitation imposed here, which neither failed to convey the severity of the
sentence Sosa-Perea faced, nor allowed the parties to refer to it with only vague
suggestions. “[N]one of our cases mandate that district courts always allow
unfettered questioning about potential life sentences faced by cooperating
witnesses.” Id.
Appellants have not shown that a reasonable jury might have received a
significantly different impression of Sosa-Perea’s credibility had they learned of the
mandatory nature of the sentence he avoided. We therefore conclude that the district

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court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination and argument on this
point.
III.
Osorio argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment
of acquittal, asserting that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he intended
that the kidnapping result in death. “But under § 1201(a), the government must
prove [Osorio]’s knowledge and intent only with respect to the kidnapping. The
government also must prove that the kidnapping caused the victim’s death, but not
that [Osorio] intended or knew that death would result.” United States v. Simpson,
44 F.4th 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 813 (2023). The district
court did not err in denying the motion—as set forth below, infra Section V, there is
ample evidence of Osorio’s knowing and intentional participation in the kidnapping
and that the kidnapping resulted in Escutia’s death.
IV.
Bravo-Lopez argues that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury
on his diminished-capacity defense. At trial, Bravo-Lopez argued that his
“borderline intellectual functioning”—including, among other things, his low IQ,
brain damage, and poor memory—prevented him from forming the specific intent
to commit the kidnapping or enter into the conspiracy. Bravo-Lopez timely
proposed an instruction outlining this defense.5
5 The proposed instruction read as follows:
An issue in this case is whether, at the time the acts charged in Counts
One and Two, were committed, Jonathan Bravo-Lopez had a mental
disease or defect that would have prevented him from having the
necessary state of mind to knowingly and purposefully commit the
crimes. Specifically, whether his borderline intellectual functioning,
impaired memory, mental illness, executive dysfunction, and
encephalopathy, individually or as a whole, made it impossible for Mr.

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“We review the rejection of a defendant’s proposed instruction for abuse of
discretion . . . .” United States v. Burning Breast, 8 F.4th 808, 815 (8th Cir. 2021).
“This court has said in many cases that ‘[a] criminal defendant is entitled to a
theory-of-defense instruction that is timely requested, correctly states the law, and is
supported by the evidence.’” United States v. Christy, 647 F.3d 768, 770 (8th Cir.
2011) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). But a defendant’s entitlement to a
theory-of-defense instruction is not limitless:
Even where the court declines to give an instruction on a theory of
defense that is supported by the evidence, there is no error if the
instructions as a whole, by adequately setting forth the law, afford
counsel an opportunity to argue the defense theory and reasonably
ensure that the jury appropriately considers it.
Id.
Here, the district court afforded Bravo-Lopez the opportunity to argue his
diminished-capacity defense, and he extensively pursued that opportunity during
closing arguments. Further, Bravo-Lopez does not argue that the instructions given
failed to adequately set forth the law. See United States v. Garrett, 898 F.3d 811,
815 (8th Cir. 2018) (finding no error when the district court instructed the jury on
knowledge and intent elements without objection, and where defense counsel argued
the theory of defense “at length”). Therefore, assuming without deciding that
Bravo to have a purposeful and knowing state of mind necessary to
commit the crimes charged in Counts One and Two. Evidence that the
defendant acted under a mental disease or defect may be considered by
you, together with all the other evidence, in determining whether or not
Mr. Bravo-Lopez could have the mental state[] required by law under
the elements of Counts One, and Two. If you find that Mr.
Bravo-Lopez was operating under a mental disease or defect at the time
the crimes charged in Counts One and Two were committed, and you
further find that because of his mental disease or defect he was not able
to form the knowing intent required by the elements of those crimes,
you must find Mr. Bravo-Lopez not guilty of those Counts.

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Bravo-Lopez’s proposed instruction correctly stated the law and was supported by
evidence, we conclude that the district court did not err in declining to give it.
Christy, 647 F.3d at 770.
V.
Next, Bravo-Lopez argues that the district court erred in denying his motion
for judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence that he conspired
to kidnap Escutia. He asserts that the evidence at trial proved a spontaneous
kidnapping resulting from panicked behavior after the drug-buy, but not a
conspiracy. As Bravo-Lopez sees it, there was “no discussion of kidnapping, no
meeting of the minds, and no understanding of the[] purpose to kidnap.” “We review
‘the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the
evidence de novo’” and will “affirm unless, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government and accepting all reasonable inferences that may be
drawn in favor of the verdict, no reasonable jury could have found the defendant
guilty.” United States v. Soto, 58 F.4th 977, 981 (8th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted).
To prove that Bravo-Lopez conspired to kidnap Escutia, “the government had
to present evidence that [Bravo-Lopez] entered an agreement with one or more other
persons to commit the kidnapping.” United States v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723, 732
(8th Cir. 1996). Contrary to Bravo-Lopez’s suggestion, “[t]he government meets its
burden if it proves that the defendants acted in concert to achieve a common goal,
or acted with a tacit understanding,” United States v. Agofsky, 20 F.3d 866, 870 (8th
Cir. 1994) (citation omitted), and it may do so “wholly by circumstantial evidence
and inference,” Williams, 95 F.3d at 732. A discussion is not required. See United
States v. Hudspeth, 525 F.3d 667, 678 (8th Cir. 2008) (“A conspiracy
conviction . . . does not require evidence of an explicit agreement.”).
Here, Zapata-Delgado testified that, after she arranged the purchase of
marijuana from Escutia at the direction of Osorio, the group dropped her off at home
and that she was not happy about it. During that journey, Zapata-Delgado

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remembered Osorio asking Bravo-Lopez if he knew Escutia and Bravo-Lopez
nodding his head to indicate “yeah.” The fact that Zapata-Delgado was dropped off
at home despite the group having only discussed buying marijuana surprised
Sosa-Perea. Sosa-Perea testified that, when the group arrived at Escutia’s home,
Bravo-Lopez and Osorio forced Escutia into the minivan with their guns pointed at
his ribs, screaming at him to “get in the car” as he repeatedly implored them, “Don’t
do this.” Security camera footage from a nearby residence was admitted into
evidence and showed two individuals—later identified as Appellants—forcing
Escutia into a blue Chrysler minivan at gunpoint. Sosa-Perea also testified that, once
in the minivan, Bravo-Lopez read messages on Escutia’s phone, pointed his gun
towards Escutia while Osorio hit him, and directed Sosa-Perea where to drive.
Bravo-Lopez and Osorio both exited the vehicle with Escutia at the industrial
location where his body was later recovered.
Presented with these facts, a reasonable jury could have found that
Bravo-Lopez and Osorio conspired to kidnap Escutia because they acted in concert
towards that aim. See Agofsky, 20 F.3d at 870. On the day of the kidnapping,
Osorio confirmed with Bravo-Lopez that he knew Escutia. Both men exited the
minivan once at Escutia’s home and forced him back inside the minivan at gunpoint,
both screaming at Escutia to “get in the car.” Both men directed others to help
achieve the kidnapping; Osorio directed Zapata-Delgado to arrange the drug
purchase and Bravo-Lopez directed Sosa-Perea where to drive. Both men kept their
firearms trained on Escutia while in the minivan, and both exited the minivan at the
industrial location in the moments before Escutia was killed. A reasonable jury
could have inferred that arranging to purchase marijuana from Escutia was pretense
given that Zapata-Delgado was surprisingly dropped off at her home after facilitating
the deal and having smoked with the group earlier that day. The district court did
not err in denying Bravo-Lopez’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

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VI.
Finally, Bravo-Lopez argues that the district court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress the incriminating statements he made to detectives after his
arrest. He asserts that the detectives “glossed over” his Miranda rights and that the
statements were coerced, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In denying the motion, the district court concluded that Bravo-Lopez
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Bravo-Lopez
did not raise a Due Process Clause argument in his motion to suppress, and the
district court did not address the issue.6
We review the district court’s conclusion as to the Miranda waiver de novo
and its underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Figueroa-Serrano,
971 F.3d 806, 814 (8th Cir. 2020).
There are “two distinct dimensions” to whether a suspect’s
waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
First, the waiver “must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the
product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion, or deception.” Second, the suspect must have waived his
rights “with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” The
government bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, the validity of a Miranda waiver.
Id. (citations omitted).
Bravo-Lopez does not convince us that the Government failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waived his Miranda rights. First, Bravo-Lopez asserts that a detective minimized
6 In one paragraph of Bravo-Lopez’s motion to suppress, he mentioned the
“[d]ue process require[ment] that confessions are voluntary.” But he did so when
outlining the requirements for Miranda waiver and without developing a separate
Due Process Clause argument.

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the importance of his Miranda rights by stating, “we’ve got this little thing called the
[C]onstitution,” and that only 34 seconds were spent advising him of them. But
whether Bravo-Lopez understood the Miranda warnings is a question of fact that we
review for clear error. See Bell v. Norris, 586 F.3d 624, 630-31 (8th Cir. 2009).
Bravo-Lopez points to nothing in the record demonstrating that the district court
clearly erred when concluding that he understood the warnings. He does not argue,
for example, that 34 seconds is an inadequate length of time for him to have
understood the rights he was waiving. He asserts that he was not asked “if he would
better understand the rights in Spanish” but does not argue that he was unable to
understand English. He also asserts that he was not given the “chance to read [the
Miranda] rights himself,” but he does not explain why the district court clearly erred
in finding that he “had the opportunity to read the [Miranda Warning and Waiver]
form when it was handed to him.”
Next, Bravo-Lopez points to the unremarkable fact that, prior to his
interrogation, he was alone and his feet were shackled. “[U]nder the circumstances,
this routine procedure did not qualify as a deceptive or coercive police tactic.”
Figueroa-Serrano, 971 F.3d at 814. Bravo-Lopez also asserts that he had not eaten
since the morning, but he does not challenge the district court’s finding that
“[t]hroughout the interview, [he] was offered and accepted water, snacks, and
restroom breaks.”
Bravo-Lopez also points to Dr. Llorente’s testimony at the suppression
hearing, emphasizing that, in Dr. Llorente’s opinion, his “intellectual disabilities and
other maladies” prevented him from understanding what rights he was waiving. The
district court did not clearly err when concluding otherwise. Bravo-Lopez does not
rebut the district court’s finding that, based on its review of the video of the
interrogation, he “appeared able to comprehend what was transpiring and to
communicate effectively with the detectives.” Moreover, the district court found the
detectives credible when they testified that nothing about Bravo-Lopez suggested
that he was unable to understand them. While Bravo-Lopez complains that the
detectives are not medical professionals, the district court was permitted to credit

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their testimony because “[w]e consider the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether a suspect’s waiver is valid.” Id. (citation omitted).
Finally, “[e]ven if a suspect has a somewhat diminished capacity to resist
coercion due to a mental defect . . . a Miranda waiver will not be invalidated on that
basis if there is no evidence of police coercion.” United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d
476, 483 (8th Cir. 2011). In arguing that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waive his Miranda rights, Bravo-Lopez points to nothing in the record
indicating police coercion.7
Bravo-Lopez separately argues that his statements were coerced, in violation
of the Due Process Clause. His failure to raise this argument below could either be
construed as waiver or forfeiture, but only the latter would leave the issue reviewable
on appeal. See United States v. Murdock, 491 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2007)
(explaining that defendant’s failure to raise a Due Process argument before the
district court when challenging the validity of his Miranda waiver could be construed
as unreviewable waiver or reviewable forfeiture, the latter of which results in
plain-error review). Assuming without deciding that the issue was forfeited and is
therefore subject to plain-error review, no additional facts raised in Bravo-Lopez’s
Due Process argument demonstrate that his Miranda waiver was involuntary or that
the detectives coerced his statements in violation of the Due Process Clause. The
additional facts asserted by Bravo-Lopez are that the detectives used “physical
punishment,” detained him for four hours before questioning began, and questioned
7 “Obviously, interrogation of a suspect will involve some pressure because its
purpose is to elicit a confession.” United States v. Astello, 241 F.3d 965, 967 (8th
Cir. 2001). But “questioning tactics such as a raised voice, deception, or a
sympathetic attitude on the part of the interrogator will not render a confession
involuntary unless the overall impact of the interrogation caused the defendant’s will
to be overborne.” Id. (citation omitted). Bravo-Lopez does not argue that the
detectives’ interrogation tactics—such as “telling defendant Bravo-Lopez that they
knew he was not the bad guy”—overbore his will. Rather, he asserts, without further
argument or elaboration, that the tactics “were more likely to overcome his
will . . . given his mental health.”

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him for eight hours, and that he lacks formal education, having dropped out of school
in the ninth grade. We address each in turn.
Bravo-Lopez’s allegation of physical punishment is unsubstantiated
hyperbole. What Bravo-Lopez identifies as “physical punishment” is “sleep and
food deprivation.” As discussed, Bravo-Lopez fails to address the district court’s
finding that he “was offered and accepted water, snacks, and restroom breaks.” He
also fails to address the district court’s finding that he told detectives that he napped
in the four hours preceding the interrogation. We are also unpersuaded by
Bravo-Lopez’s assertion that the detectives subjected him to physical punishment
by holding him in an interrogation room that was “small . . . with a metal desk and
a few plastic chairs”: a State does not deprive a “person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law” by interrogating them in a room with limited
accoutrements. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973) (explaining that “the use of [a] confession offends due
process” when the suspect’s “will has been overborne and his capacity for
self-determination critically impaired”).
Nor does the approximately eight-hour length of Bravo-Lopez’s interrogation
demonstrate police coercion. Even if we were to include—for the sake of
argument—the four hours in which Bravo-Lopez was napping, twelve hours of
interrogation falls short of the thirteen hours that we have found “not
unconstitutional per se” where, as here, “a crime victim has disappeared and may
still be alive.” Williams v. Norris, 576 F.3d 850, 868-69 (8th Cir. 2009). At the
time of Bravo-Lopez’s interrogation, Escutia’s body had not been found, and the
interrogation was paused for approximately two hours while detectives drove around
with Bravo-Lopez searching for him. See id. at 869 (concluding that the defendant’s
will was not overborne and noting that he “received a two-hour respite during [a] car
trip”).
Bravo-Lopez’s lack of education does not demonstrate police coercion either.
Although he may have dropped out of school in the ninth grade, Bravo-Lopez

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demonstrated mental acuity by modifying the story he told the detectives as they
revealed more evidence against him. Bravo-Lopez initially told the detectives he
did not know Escutia, then that he had seen him eight days ago, and then that he was
present in the minivan with Osorio, Sosa-Perea, and Escutia. As the district court
found, “[r]ather than presenting as a low-functioning individual, the defendant
presented himself as an individual who was being cagey.” See United States v.
Turner, 157 F.3d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1998) (concluding that defendant’s Miranda
waiver was knowing and intelligent despite his low IQ and noting that he “acted in
a manner more consistent with a person attempting to avoid being caught than a
person who did not know what he was doing”). Bravo-Lopez is not the rare case
where self-incriminating statements were “‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law
enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda.” Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (citation omitted). The district court did not err in
concluding that Bravo-Lopez voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his
Miranda rights, and we find no error in the district court’s denial of the motion to
suppress.
VII.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
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